Semantic Externalism, and Justified Belief about the External World
Abstract
Philosophical skepticism about the external world seeks to call into question our knowledge of the external world. Some kinds of philosophical skepticism employ skeptical hypotheses to prove that we cannot know anything about the external world. Putnam tried to refute this kind of skepticism by adopting semantic externalism; but, as is now generally accepted, Putnam’s argument is epistemically circular. Brueckner proposes some new, “simple” arguments that in his view are not circular. In this paper we evaluate Brueckner’s simple arguments for refuting skepticism about the external world, and seek to demonstrate that they fail to prove that we can have knowledge about the external world. However, by appeal to the principle of privileged access, one of the Brueckner’s arguments does indeed succeed in showing that we can have justified beliefs about the external world.
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