Epistemic semblance in Metaphysics

Abstract

Simon Blackburn, in Truth A Guide for the Perplexed (Blackburn 2006), deploys the relation of thought with the facts and says, ‘We met the argument that theorizing involves an impossible activity of stepping outside our own skins and pretending to a ‘transcendental’ point of view, a standpoint from which we can survey the relationship between our thoughts and facts, without using the very forms of thought whose relation to the facts we are hoping to describe.’ (Blackburn, 2006, 109) My philosophical reflections on this claim appreciate the view and turn towards the epistemic semblance in the metaphysical purview. A few challenges of the theory take up a side-effect of the ‘knowing procedures’ and its subsequent notion of the rigid concomitance of realism without a human face. My endeavor would be to slightly bypassing the account of objective realism and debut into the sphere of the old-fashioned query ‘what do we know about the conceptualized world where concepts steadily contaminate objects?’ We may appreciative beliefs and concepts, which are human creations as these impart to the human-experienced world where concepts are the objective features of the subject’s conceptual scheme.

Keywords: Epistemic, Realism, Anti-realism, conceptual schemata, Concept, intensional, supervenience, Ontology

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