Considerazioni sulla negazione logica e l'opposizione reale di F. A. Trendelenburg

Abstract

In the third chapter of the Logische Untersuchungen, trough the distinction between logische Verneinung and reale Opposition, Trendelenburg articulates his own criticism of the Hegelian dialectic: the logic negation of the pure Thought would no longer find the way to proceed in his movement, if not by being continuously mistaken for a real opposition; that is, by illicitly drawing from the realm of empirical intuitions. Although this has been – and still is – one of the most resumed reprovals against Hegel's method, it has to be noticed that the aforementioned distinction, especially in the way Trendelenburg characterizes it, shows some serious weaknesses. The following inquiry concerns the problem of his interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics and Kant's pre-critical writings, from which the distinction originally depends.