First Person Authority and the Problem of Other Minds

Abstract

Abstract: In recent times Donald Davidson has extensively discussed the concept of ‘special authority’ regarding one's mental states. He takes up different topics of the philosophy of mind and interprets them from a new standpoint. This paper is the outcome how the understanding of first person authority enables us to understand the problem related to other minds.  In this regard I have explained how first person authority is guaranteed by explaining how a belief statement expressed by two individual will have the same truth value. If this is proven to be true then the first individual expressing his belief statement will be said to have authority. Though proving the belief statement of the first individual by taking up of the same statement by another individual and proving it to be true is not as simple as that. However, the paper gives a detail account as to how it is possible and then explains the problem related to other minds. The paper sums up by taking up the Principle of Charity where the speaker’s belief is considered to be true and the interpreter believes that the speaker is a rational being who knows what he speaks and if he knows what he speaks, he knows what belief he holds to be true.

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