Searle's Collective Intentionality: A Defence

Abstract

This paper concerns social ontology. At the heart of the discussion of social ontology are institutional facts. These are indispensable to sustain harmoniously in a society. The focal point of this paper is collective intentionality or we-intentionality that is used to create institutional facts. It is one of the building blocks in the creation of institutional facts. There is a debate within the social ontological arena whether the collective intentionality can or cannot be reduced to individual intentionality. Primarily, I will deal with this debate. John Searle has opposed such a reduction but thinkers like Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller have painted an opposed picture. This paper is restricted to these thinkers the core discussion being collective intentionality. I have put forward arguments defending John R. Searle’s irreducibility account. Searle has put forward his account of collective intentionality as biologically primitive which is not merely a culmination of individual intentionality.

References

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