

PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS

ONLINE JOURNAL  OF PHILOSOPHY

Editor: Marco Sgarbi

Volume XIII – Issue 3 – 2021

ISSN 2036-4989

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Twilight of *The Genealogy*? Or a Genealogy of *Twilight*? Saving Nietzsche's Internalization Hypothesis from Naïve Determinism

Brian Lightbody

Abstract: The Internalization Hypothesis (I.H.), as expressed in GM II 16 of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, is the essential albeit under-theorized principle of Nietzsche's psychology. In the following essay, I investigate the purpose I.H. serves concerning Nietzsche's theory of drives as well as the Hypothesis's epistemic warrant. I demonstrate that I.H. needs a Neo-Darwinian underpinning for two reasons: 1) to answer the Time-Crunch Problem of Transformation, and 2) in order to render it coherent with Nietzsche's physiological determinism as articulated in *Twilight of the Idols*. My re-examination of I.H., then, serves to underwrite the Hypothesis on solid empirical footing. In addition, my analysis provides further evidence to think that Brian Leiter's initial (but naïve) type-fact reading of Nietzsche's philosophy of psychology is accurate, deterministic warts and all.

Keywords: Internalization Hypothesis, Genealogy, Drive Theory, Type-Fact Theory, Time-Crunch Problem of Transformation.

Introduction

In essay two, section 16 of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche argues that violent and aggressive drives that do not find outward expression turn inward, creating new targets for the drives' successful manifestations. The primal drives to which Nietzsche is referring are the animal-like instincts of pre-humans. When proto-humans were prevented from acting on these natural predispositions, it caused the origin of the "entire inner world," the birth of subjectivity. As Nietzsche explains, the 'self' "... expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth and height in the same measure outward discharge was inhibited." (GM: II 16).¹ It was this blockage of primal instincts that transformed our ancestors from what Nietzsche calls "semi-animals" to the rational agents we (erroneously) believe ourselves to be today. (GM: II 16). The expression of these drives carves out our character; indeed, our very identity and, as such, may lead to life-denying and self-lacerating feelings like *resentiment*—along with its corresponding ethics, the ascetic ideal—or if harnessed correctly could "become the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena." (GM: II 18).

The above explanation for the emergence of subjectivity I shall call the Internalization Hypothesis (hereafter,

I.H.). It is a central feature of Nietzsche's philosophy of action. However, for all its importance, it is appallingly undertheorized in the secondary literature a point well-established in William Beals's relatively recent and significant article, "Internalization and Its Consequences."² Indeed, there appear to be several iterations of the Hypothesis in the *Genealogy of Morals* alone.³ The lack of scholarship regarding this Hypothesis (or hypotheses) is unsettling. With this point in mind there are three main concerns with Nietzsche's thesis : 1) it's undertheorization in general and, of related importance, its epistemic warrant; 2) the importance of the Hypothesis vis a vis understanding Nietzsche's theory of psychology and in particular his theory of drives; 3) the possibility that there may be several different interpretations of the hypothesis. My primary goal in the following paper is to examine the passage of GM: II 16 where the Internalization Hypothesis is given its most unambiguous expression through the explanatory framework provided by GM II 1-3, where Nietzsche elucidates the prehistorical, and most importantly, problematic well-spring of bodily forces which had to be redirected in order for the internalization of humanity to take place.

Regarding the third concern, a problem Beals himself identifies in his paper, I cannot entertain it here but would argue that there are not different theories of internalization at all, but instead that the internalization of humanity is one and the same process. In fact, the progression and deepening development of internalization, in general, is one of the central conclusions of the *Genealogy*, or so I would argue. Internalization, therefore, is a continuum, but there are definite points in history which Nietzsche flags so as to signal to his readers the emergence of new relationships to, and therefore new interpretations of, one's animalistic drives. Most significantly, these new readings of, what are fundamentally animal instincts, provide the alchemical formula for the further transformations of humanity. In tracing these varied and contingent readings of said drives, Nietzsche's genealogical method is liberating in that it shows that no interpretation is any more metaphysically necessary than any other, (despite what the priest might think) though some might be more life-enhancing.⁴

Thus, the primary foci of the following paper will be on issues one and two with the bulk of the essay concentrating on the first of these problems. I will begin by examining concern two, namely, the role I.H. plays in Nie-

tzsche's philosophy of psychology as it pertains specifically to the *Genealogy* before examining issue one, the veracity of the theory itself. The question: What epistemic warrant does the theory have? Has not been asked, let alone answered in the secondary literature. I intend to correct this oversight. I demonstrate that the underpinnings of I.H. are false, at least on the standard reading. For the standard reading of GM: II 3 holds that the entire justification of I.H. rests on Lamarck's plainly incorrect Inheritance Thesis. I intend to correct this error by demonstrating that the preparatory stages leading to Nietzsche's announcement of the I.H. in section 16 of GM:II may be reinterpreted using Neo-Darwinian insights. The solution to this part of the puzzle regarding I.H. relies heavily on my thesis (developed in a prior article) that artificial and unconscious selection perform the same work as Lamarckianism.⁵ The upshot of this interpretation is that Nietzsche's explanation for the initial ground-work of bad conscience in section GM: II 3 is on solid epistemic footing after all.

This Neo-Darwinian account plays another role. It also has a significant philological part to play, for it serves as a bridge between Nietzsche's *Genealogy* and his more deterministic and physiologically inspired works like *Twilight of the Idols and Anti-Christ*. Thus, a Neo-Darwinian reading of I.H. smooths out the wrinkles produced by the standard, Lamarckian reading of GM: II 3 and thus resolves the apparent incongruity between the *Genealogy* and Nietzsche's later work.

My solution, however, does not come without its own problems. Despite the distinct epistemic advantages of the Neo-Darwinian reading, there is an issue with the proposed solution: the I.H. would now seem superfluous. If all behavior is grounded on genetic inheritance and said genetic inheritance is determined by past mechanical and biological procedures that cannot be changed then we seem to be asserting a biologically reductionist solution to all human behavior, a temptation that some philosophers have eagerly embraced. This outcome may favor and indeed justify Nietzsche's position in *Twilight* and the *Anti-Christ* but would leave the I.H. without any work to perform in Nietzsche's philosophy of psychology. In the last section, I save the Internalization Hypothesis by demonstrating how it may be modified if one restricts its scope. In essence, the Hypothesis does not explain the peculiar psychology of the mediocre, as Nietzsche would put it, but is limited to the priestly type and its progeny.

1. Problem Two: The Role of I.H in Nietzsche's theory of mind

Nietzsche provides a rich and profound account for the origins of memory, conscience, and agency in sections 1-18 of GM II. But Nietzsche's conclusions have loftier ambitions; they extend further becoming incredibly significant regarding his overall philosophy of psychology. Nietzsche's genealogical investigations serve as both a springboard for and cornerstone of significant moral and psychic truths that are representative of Nietzsche's psychology. Indeed, the result of these explorations regarding the primeval unconscious of future humans may be dis-

tilled to a fundamental psychological principle that, seemingly, applies to the entire scope of past, present, and future human behavior. That principle is the Internalization Hypothesis. This eventual lodestone for Nietzsche's philosophy of action is best expressed in GMII, 16:

All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly (*Aussen*) turn inward—this is what I call the internalization (*Verinnerlichung*) of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his "soul." (*Seele*) The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, (*Tiefe*) breadth, (*Breite*) and height (*Höhe*), in the same measure as outward discharge, was inhibited."⁶

The Internalization Hypothesis becomes a powerful explanatory tool in reference to Nietzsche's drive theory, a veritable cottage industry in the secondary literature. The basic tenets of this theory hold that primordial drives like sex and violence always take targets for their expression. As Peter Poellner puts it, "Nietzsche ultimately treats drives not as attributes of agents (like desires) but as agents themselves."⁷ Drives moreover that are not always expressed in terms of their original objectives (e.g. sex) will find some other avenue for their successful manifestation, and thus drives that do not find outward expression turn inward leading to new dispositions, and according to some scholars, new emotions.⁸ John Richardson states the nature of drives well when he writes, "A drive is a plastic disposition...inasmuch it tends to produce different behaviors in different circumstances, in such a way that the same outcome is reached, by different routes, in all of them...Such plasticity depends on a capacity to 'respond' to circumstances ...in some minimal way."⁹

The drive theory, as expressed in many of Nietzsche's works (See *Human and all Too Human*, I. 32, *Daybreak* 119, *GM* III: 24) is well-complemented with a rich, mature, and profound articulation of the theory in the secondary literature. While it would be beyond the scope of this paper to define all of the positions on Nietzsche's theory of drives in the scholarship, still one can say, minimally, that drives motivate behaviors and thus are the bedrock for Nietzsche's system of values and psychology.¹⁰ Nietzsche intends his drive theory not only to explain our initial evaluations as to why some objects should be pursued or avoided but indeed to explain the reflective value judgments we come to have on said evaluations.¹¹ The drive, as Paul Katsafanas summarizes its role is, "Nietzsche's principle explanatory token within psychology."¹²

Yet given the apparent importance of Nietzsche's drive theory to his ethics and psychology it is perplexing to note that scholars have not focused on challenging the very historical foundation for the idea itself, which is, of course, I.H. In order to fully capture Nietzsche's theory of drives it is critical to examine the role the I.H. plays in this regard. An examination to which I now turn.

The I.H. performs two functions in Nietzsche's theory of mind. First, it explains how human beings acquired a bad conscience and later a more fully developed sense of agency and moral being. The explanation for the creation of self was an enfolding as it were of instinctual, animal drives. The I.H., therefore, plays a grounding role in

terms of naturalizing the process of transformation from that of our animal ancestors to the contemporary, rational, and free agents we assume ourselves to be today. Nietzsche's explanation is biological or, indeed, zoological in that it purports to show how we were transformed into a different species than we once were.

However, the theory also plays a further psychological role in that it attempts to explain the behavior of human beings as well as the reasons humans use to explain / rationalize their behavior. For example, it underpins Nietzsche's development of slave vs. noble values as explained in the first essay of the *Genealogy* and plays a significant explanatory role concerning Nietzsche's account of what he diagnosed as the significant sickness of the current age, nihilism.¹³ In this latter role, the Internalization Hypothesis attempts to reduce matters of what Kant would call *quid Juris* (or justification with respect to one's reasons) to a mere *quid facti* or etiological approach.¹⁴ The Internalization Hypothesis, I submit, is the lynch-pin connecting Nietzsche's reductionist biological naturalism with his philosophy of psychology.

The second essay of Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* presents the historical warrant behind the Internalization Hypothesis and, therefore the epistemic underpinnings of Nietzsche's psychology. It is vital to examine, more closely, how secure the foundation for this hypothesis is. In what follows, I propose to provide a more in-depth reading of GM: II 3 than that which is typically offered in the secondary literature in order to demonstrate the epistemic obstacles that underpin I.H in GM II: 16.

2. The Lamarckian Context of Nietzsche's Internalization Hypothesis

The purpose of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* is to provide a naturalistic account for the development of morality *per se* and subsequent proliferation of moralities. In keeping with the central tenets of philosophical genealogy, Nietzsche's account is one that does not and must not invoke the supernatural (whether construed as the Christian God or any other deity). The task before Nietzsche then, distilled to its essence¹⁵ is one of explaining how an "animal" grows a conscience —a moral "organ," as it were— that acts against the animal's natural, selfish instincts, at least most of the time. According to most scholars the key explanation for this process of moral transformation can be found in essay two of the *Genealogy* entitled "Guilt, Bad Conscience and the Like." The essay attempts to reconstruct the formatting of the human being from an unrecognizable "semi-animal" with neither capacious memory nor robust agency to the rational, moral subjects we believe ourselves to be today.¹⁶

In thinking about the question that perplexed Nietzsche, namely, "How did the promise-making animal, man, come to be?" he adopts a course of investigation perfectly consonant with the biologically infused intellectual climate of late 19th-century thinking.¹⁷ In keeping with those naturalistic sentiments of the time, Nietzsche poses that the answer to this question can be found in the conditioning of the body of these semi-animals. For example, emotions that contemporary subjects experience

today, like guilt, were produced, ultimately, from simpler physical well-springs and mechanical procedures that re-directed primal drives. Guilt, to use Nietzsche's terminology was "bred up" (*heranzuzüchten*) from several origins that were once distinct but then subsequently cultivated, redirected and amalgamated over a relatively short period of time, all things considered.¹⁸ It is through violence claims Nietzsche, that "the oldest state thus appeared as a fearful tyranny, as an oppressive and remorseless machine, and went on working until this raw material of people and semi-animals was at last only thoroughly kneaded and pliant but also formed." (GM: II, 17)

The genealogy of this naturalistic account of how the modern human being evolved begins in GM II: 3. The standard reading of this section (and in conjunction with sections 16 and 17) proposes that there were two principal drivers for the creation of the new promise-making animal. The first was communal enclosures (e.g. walls). The received view holds that walls served as flight deterrents in early human communities because they forced proto-men and women to submit to the laws and rules of their overlords whom Nietzsche charitably describes as artistic warriors and in other cases, more animalistically as blonde beasts of prey.¹⁹

The second driver was torture. Breathtakingly cruel tortures were used to deter our early ancestors from climbing over the walls of their new-found pens. Nevertheless, said tortures served another purpose, Nietzsche avers. As noted, Nietzsche depicts our ancestors as semi-animals without much in the way of memory or agency. The question Nietzsche asks: How was memory burned into the human animal? Is answered, so the standard reading suggests as follows: over several millennia, a combination of mechanical techniques (i.e. torture directly applied to the animal misbehaving along with public spectacles of torture meant to serve as warnings to others) were used to traumatize and deter early humans from escaping civilization. Over time, a generation of these proto-humans, inherited, rather miraculously, five or six of the prohibitions created by the first Ur Community of warrior-artists, which then became central to the development of civilization itself.²⁰

The above summary as to the creation of memory is well-supported in the secondary literature. Daniel Conway, in his masterful *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Reader's Guide*, sums up the received view well when he writes, "The community, in turn, acquired a collective identity of its own, which it maintained on the strength of its credible threat to renew the founding trauma. The practice of what we now know to be punishment thus began as an attempt to tame those primitive human beings who were forcibly immured in the earliest communities."²¹

Brian Leiter also agrees with Conway's assessment. He notes in his *Nietzsche on Morality A Reader's Guide to On the Genealogy of Morals* that "Two factors are singled out by Nietzsche as formative for the human animal in its development of regular behavior and a memory: the morality of custom and the role of pain in mnemonics."²²

Finally, we have Lawrence Hatab. Hatab, in his *Nietzsche on the Genealogy of Morals An Introduction*, echoes the above interpretations by writing the following:

In section 3 Nietzsche elaborates on the “long history” of cruel practices that made something like conscience possible...such a phenomenon could only come about when prepared by the struggle to establish memory in the face of active forgetfulness. This is the role played by cruel punishments and torments—Nietzsche mentions practices such as mutilation, stoning, impaling, flaying, drawing and quartering, boiling alive—which served to “burn” a memory into the victims and onlookers because “pain was the most powerful aid to mnemonics.”²³

Taking all these interpretations together, in reconstructing Nietzsche’s speculative analysis contained within sections GM: II 3 (and to a lesser degree, GM II: 16, 17) it is indisputable, then, that some definite group with a clear identity seized control of a motley collection of creatures who were far less technically, psychologically and culturally advanced. The first original community then reformatted this assemblage setting it on the path to memory, agency, and morality.

What is unclear is the mechanism employed to alter the instinctual animal-like nature of our ancestors. How, exactly, did the lessons of torture come to be imparted or “burnt in” to creatures who are described by Nietzsche as lacking capacious memory, that is, the sort of memory necessary for a culture to revamp aggressive, natural instincts to conform to the strait-jacket of civilization? Notice that only a robust sense of memory, a “culture-serving” notion of memory as I put it in a prior article, would be able to constrain such instincts and additionally provide the *sine qua non* for civilization that the I.H., all by itself, clearly lacks in Nietzsche’s account.²⁴

However, what is most striking about this problem is that Nietzsche clearly understands it because he articulates it well near the beginning of GM: II 3. He writes, “How can one create a memory for the human animal? How can one impress something upon this partly obtuse, partly flighty mind, attuned only to the passing moment, in such a way that it will stay there?” (GM II: 3). Why is Nietzsche’s question such a problem? Moreover, how is that many scholars in the secondary literature have failed to recognize or at the very least, fail to mention the problematic nature of Nietzsche’s answer?

To bring this problem into sharper focus, consider the training of a guard dog as an analog for our semi-animal ancestors. The proto-guard dog will be expected to learn a few basic commands. Such commands may be instilled by employing heinous forms of Pavlovian negative reinforcement techniques, an analog for torture that was applied to early humans, so Nietzsche contends. But then again, these same techniques would need to be redeployed to every generation of the dog after that. The puppy of the guard-dog would not know the commands instilled in its mother. It would need to learn these commands in the same way its mother learned them—through violence—that is if the analogy between early humans is to hold. Nonetheless, this is not and cannot be what Nietzsche is suggesting. He is suggesting that the capacity to remember is itself something that can be bred up from previous generations. One generation first remembers the first five or six “thou shall nots” of civil society; the next or several generations after that builds on these rules by learning the rudiments of culture, namely its laws, songs, and stories. As this culture progresses so too subsequent generations

of these individuals’ capacity to remember evolves. Each succeeding generation of proto-humans begins with the learning, the memories inscribed in its parents. If this were not true then the very fundamentals of civilization, namely the regulation of behavior and as Brian Leiter puts it, “regular civilized intercourse” would always need to start over from scratch—just like the puppy who must learn the commands of its mother.²⁵ What Nietzsche requires, undoubtedly, is a mechanism other than behavioral psychology to account for this radical zoological transformation.

The solution to the above problem of transforming an animal into an agent means that there are only a few theoretical contenders that fit the bill. According to some theorists, natural selection would be one such theory.²⁶ However, Nietzsche faces another constraint that would eliminate this possibility as well. He is under a time-crunch problem in that he must explain how mechanical procedures of torture could inscribe fear and aversion in essentially an animal population lacking memory, and yet acknowledge that these same mechanical procedures created a being that resembles contemporary agents of today. Moreover, this Herculean task must have taken place, if Nietzsche’s account is to remain even remotely warranted, within the space of say 12,000 years—a very, very generous timeframe indeed for the origin of civilization defined for our purposes as communities with walls and tax collection.²⁷ Combining both of these points, the problem of essentially zoological transformation and the relatively short time period in which said transformation took place, I shall call the Time-Crunch Problem of Transformation (hereafter TCPT)²⁸. This problem is significantly under-theorized in the secondary literature and, as a result, has led to some surprising and in some cases not well-thought-out answers. One of the leading contenders offered by scholars in the secondary literature to solve this problem is Lamarck’s Inheritability thesis.

Lamarck’s Inheritability Thesis (sometimes also referred to as the “Second Law”) claims that the learned traits and experiences of the parent animal may be passed on to that animal’s progeny. Lamarck explains the thesis well in his late-nineteenth-century article:

All that nature acquires or loses in individuals by the influence of circumstances to which the race has been exposed for a long time, and in consequence by the influence of the predominate employment of such organ, or by the influence of disuse of such part, she preserves by generation, among new individuals which spring from it, providing the acquired changes be common to both sexes, or to those which have produced new individuals.²⁹

Contained within this short quotation are the two main principles of what is popularly called “Lamarckism.” The first is that the continued use of the same organ causes that organ to enlarge while its disuse causes the organ to shrink and eventually disappear. One of Lamarck’s favorite examples to prove his theory are cave-dwelling animals. Fish who live in cave-ponds once had the same capacity for vision as their ancestors, so Lamarck thought. However, because having eyes in the total darkness of a cave would not supply a survival advantage, some of these fish lost their ability to see while other species developed eyelids covering their eyes completely. These

fish so Lamarck's theory would have it, lost their eyesight over many generations because their eyes were no longer being utilized.³⁰

The second notion of Lamarck's principle holds that the developments that occur within the life-span of an organism (whether positive or negative) are transferred, biologically, to their offspring. Another favorite example of Lamarck's and one that has often been lampooned in the literature is the giraffe. Lamarck thought that giraffes were once the size of deer. However, these proto-giraffes were not blessed with access to abundant, rich woodlands as their European and North American counterparts clearly were. Accordingly, giraffes had to stretch their necks to eat leaves from trees, and this stretching caused the individual giraffe to elongate its neck ever so slightly during its lifespan. These early giraffes would have produced progeny whose necks were a little longer when compared to other members of their species who either did not choose to stretch their necks and, over several generations, died off entirely. The pseudo-giraffes who survived would engage in the same practice as their ancestors, until, over many generations, the proto-giraffe, deer-like in size, evolved to become the giraffe we know today.³¹

Lamarck's thesis solves the TCPT all too well, but strikingly neither Conway, Leiter, nor Hatab mentions the name of Lamarck in their respective commentaries on section GM: II, 3. Indeed Lamarck's name does not appear *anywhere* in any of the above works, and yet it seems evident that Nietzsche had Lamarck in mind when writing this section. I will call this group of scholars the "covert Lamarckians" as their respective interpretations all seem to rely on the Inheritability Thesis in order to remain coherent. In the next section, I examine two overt Lamarckians, Richard Schacht and John Richardson, who lament Nietzsche's adoption of the French biologist's theory but agree that Nietzsche's theory is propped up by the Second Law.

3. Overt Lamarckianism in the Secondary Literature

John Richardson and Richard Schacht believe that Nietzsche was a Lamarckian. Both agree that Nietzsche's adoption of the Inheritability Thesis to fortify his account in the second essay of the *Genealogy* is regrettable. Regarding GM:II 3, Richardson argues: "Consider his famous account in GM II of how a 'memory' was 'burned into' pre-civilized humans: this memory is fixed not by selection of those who can remember, but by the acquisition of pain associations that are inheritable."³² Richardson goes on to cite other passages from Nietzsche's work, (most notably GS 143 and BGE 213), that support a Lamarckian reading.³³ In examining the totality of the evidence, Richardson concludes "He (Nietzsche) carries much further a Lamarckism that Darwin also accepts, but uses much less."³⁴

Schacht, too, holds that Nietzsche underpins the account of GM: II 3 on Lamarckism. He notes that "A part of it (the explanation of our newfound moral 'essence') would appear to be the idea that the application of 'fearful means' of 'torture' over a very long period of time even-

tually altered the character of the dispositions we start out with."³⁵

Furthermore, Schacht goes on to note that Nietzsche "...seems to have become convinced, in the course of his attempts to inform himself with respect to the life sciences in the 1880s, that changes can and do happen among living creatures—human beings included—in Lamarckian ways (even if perhaps in other ways as well). We take it for granted that this idea is largely mistaken; but Nietzsche evidently considered it to be common knowledge among the sophisticated..."³⁶

However, neither Richardson nor Schacht are very forthcoming when it comes to providing the details of this supposed Lamarckian underpinning of Nietzsche's story. Schacht acknowledges that Lamarck's is a false theory and, therefore, perhaps finds getting into the details of how the Inheritability Thesis matches up with Nietzsche's investigation pointless. He implies that we must overcome our prejudice in thinking that a great philosopher like Nietzsche would have seen the error of his ways by invoking Lamarckism to defend his account and therefore would seem to acknowledge that Nietzsche's story, at least as it pertains to the formation of bad conscience, is just that, a work of fiction.³⁷ Richardson, in contrast, goes beyond the philological upshot of Schacht's article. He desires to supplant Nietzsche's Lamarckism by offering a sophisticated, Neo-Darwinian defense of Nietzsche's account that rests on utilizing drives and not genes as the target of selective processes. His silence, then, when it comes to integrating Lamarckism³⁸ with Nietzsche's genealogical explanation is consistent with his overall position—if we wish to save the feasibility of Nietzsche's interpretations regarding the transformation of drives over time, then a new foundation for that interpretation must be invoked.³⁹

Despite this silence, it is essential to clarify how one might interpret sections 3, 16 and 17 of GM: II through a Lamarckian filter with a dual-emphasis on the two principal aspects of Lamarckism outlined above: the biological inheritance of learned behavior and the enlargement or atrophy of an organ in accordance with the organ's use or lack thereof. With that aim in mind, the origin of the preparatory stage of bad conscience, namely capacious memory, may be explained as follows. Early human herds were captured by more sophisticated yet highly organized beasts of prey, warrior-artists. The members of this original Ur-community were, initially, like "forces of nature"—imposing their will and design on the hapless creatures they captured. Eventually, they came to learn how to create a new being from this formless mass of flesh before them. They constructed walls to imprison these newfound guinea pigs of morality and imposed tortures so that the first five or six prohibitions required for the formation of civilization would be "burnt" into the flesh of these semi-animals. In other words, these creatures inherited trauma suffered by their forebears, thereby forming the very foundation for what Nietzsche would later call the "straitjacket" of civil society in the centuries to come. It was this trauma, so holds the Lamarckian reading, that was transferred to subsequent offspring of these tortured creatures. The biological remnants of the suffering the original group of captured proto-humans experienced,

sedimented and was transferred to their progeny. The process of torture and inheritance continued producing a new organ, that of memory or, more precisely, the capacity to remember cause, effect, and consequences of one's behavior. Over several centuries this inherited trauma turned into something else, the Internalization Hypothesis, which then becomes the touchstone for understanding Nietzsche's much-vaunted and much valued psychological explanations.

As simple as this Lamarckian narrative sounds, there are two problems with it. The first is epistemic, and the other is philological. Firstly, and rather obviously, Lamarck's Inheritability Thesis is false. Nevertheless, if Nietzsche's interpretation regarding the development of humanity is subtended by a false scientific theory, then surely the I.H. is also unwarranted. Secondly, the Lamarckian reinterpretation of GM II: 3 stands at odds with Nietzsche's later, physiological and deterministic reductionism found in writings like *Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ*. These works would seem to be more congruent with contemporary biological and physiological reductionist approaches to action theory, and indeed scholars such as Brian Leiter and Joshua Knobe have shown how the essential principles of these works are well-supported in the contemporary, empirical psychological literature.⁴⁰ If, however, a Lamarckian reading of I.H. subtends the insights of Nietzsche's psychological principles, then these principles, too, are suspect—an important point that seldom if any commentators have picked up on.

However, there is another significant but this time philological problem that concerns the I.H. irrespective of its Lamarckian lineage. In order to draw out this problem, I need to delve more deeply into Nietzsche's physiologically reductionist psychology as articulated in his late philosophy.

4. Nietzsche's Physiological Philosophy: The Late Period

Ruth Abbey in her *Nietzsche's Middle Period* provides an informative if critical lens through which to view Nietzsche's psychology *cum* physiology stance. Abbey writes that Nietzsche's philosophy of psychology

...is a circular approach to action and identity. Bad or degenerate action is a sign of declining life; it indicates that either one's inheritance was inferior to begin with or has become impoverished, while beautiful action is a function of a good, thriving inheritance. How uninformative an approach to identity and action this is becomes apparent when Nietzsche applies it reflexively, describing the illness that forced him to resign his professorship at Basel as "that *bad* inheritance from my father's side." If higher types falter or fail, it must be due to something faulty in their inheritance.⁴¹

One of the passages to which Abbey refers in defense of her assessment is the diet of Cornaro as described by Nietzsche in section 1 of "The Four Great Errors" of *Twilight of the Idols*. One of these errors is confusing cause and consequence. Cornaro's secret to long-life, then, as Nietzsche explains, is backwards—Cornaro's paltry diet did not extend his life, but rather it was the only diet he could

stomach as a consequence of his incredibly slow metabolism. It was the slow metabolism Cornaro inherited, which resulted in his peculiar physiological characteristics and, therefore, distinctive eating habits.

Nietzsche's strong physiological reductionism is not peculiar to this section. Both *Twilight* and the *Anti-Christ* contain many other physiological interpretations to either explain or explain away philosophical and religious puzzles. In section I of 'Improvers of Mankind' in *Twilight*, Nietzsche makes clear that "there are no moral facts" but instead argues that "morality is merely a sign-language, symptomatology."⁴² What do moral codes signify one might ask? Nietzsche again is clear: degenerating signs of life. In physiological terms, Nietzsche explains in the very next section, "...in the struggle with the beast (the blond beast of prey) making it sick *can* be the only means of making it weak. This the Church understood: it corrupted the human being, it weakened him—but it claimed to have 'improved' him."⁴³ Other well-known sections that reduce morality to a physiological sign-language may be found in section 6 of "Morality as Anti-Nature." In writing on so-called 'freewill' that is believed by the masses to be latent within each individual, Nietzsche instead declares, "The individual is, in his future and in his past a piece of fate, one law more, one necessity more for everything that is and everything that will be."⁴⁴

What is more, even philosophical thinking writ large, at times, is also reduced to superstition—a crude inefficacious way of looking at the world. In a striking passage from section 3 of 'Reason in Philosophy' in *Twilight* Nietzsche writes: "We possess scientific knowledge today to precisely the extent that we have decided to accept the evidence of the senses—to the extent that we have learned to sharpen and arm them and to see them through to their conclusions."⁴⁵ "The rest, (Nietzsche declares) is abortion and not-yet-science: which is to say metaphysics, theology, psychology, epistemology."⁴⁶

The conviction that physiology is the true touchstone for determining values whether epistemic or otherwise appears once more in section 57 of the *Anti-Christ* where Nietzsche declares the following:

In every healthy society, there can be distinguished three types of man of divergent physiological tendency which mutually condition one another and each of which possesses its own hygiene, its own realm of work, its own sort of mastery and feeling of perfection. Nature, not Manu, separates from one another the predominately spiritual type, the muscular and temperamental type and the third type distinguished neither in one or the other, the mediocre type—the last as the great majority...⁴⁷

It is clear, then, that Nietzsche is advancing a position where epistemic importance vis a vis morality lies with the natural sciences and more perspicuously put, biology and physiology. Ethical intuitions are nothing more than confessions of an individual's physiological symptomatology; they are indicative of what a person will do, but neither they nor the person who holds them is causally efficacious.⁴⁸

These two works read much like contemporary Neo-Darwinian approaches that attempt to explain the development of moral psychology *via* natural selection, even though Nietzsche would have no understanding of the

second arm of this synthesis, namely, Mendelian genetics. Despite this difficulty, some scholars have interpreted this period of Nietzsche's writing as one marked by the slogan "anatomy is destiny" as Freud later put it, and, accordingly, have tried to make sense of this idea in light of contemporary scientific research. Brian Leiter, for example, argues that Nietzsche clarifies and refines a type-fact theory during this phase of his writing.

The type-fact theory argues that human beings belong to fixed and immutable psycho-physiological, which determine and, if understood correctly, explain the cognitive faculties, desires, and behavior of individuals.⁴⁹ "Each person, Leiter declares, has a fixed psycho-physical constitution, which defines him as a particular type of person."⁵⁰ There are two types according to Leiter's interpretation. There are weak types who are impotent, reactive, prone to nursing grudges and intriguingly, desire to create values that serve their *interests*, and then there are strong types who are active, exuberant, healthy and express their values outwardly. Also, and in converse fashion to the weak type, the strong construct values which come to serve their *instincts*.⁵¹

The above type-acts, it is important to emphasize, are immutable, at least according to the early Leiter. Type-facts are physiological and psychological traits that constitute a person, and which place him in one of the two categories (weak/strong) noted above. These type-facts may then be used to predict, with some degree of accuracy, the moral and theoretical beliefs of so-called persons. "A 'person' (Leiter proclaims and his inverted commas) is the arena in which the struggle of drives (type-facts) is played out; how they play out determines what he believes, what he values, what he becomes."⁵²

According to Leiter's later position, type-facts are mutable but cannot be changed by the person who 'has' them because a person remains (as with the earlier position) simply the unconscious expression of type-facts. If one's type-facts do change, then this alteration is caused by culture, perhaps by turning genes on or off. What remains true in both Leiterian accounts is the causal inefficacy of the individual. As Leiter puts it in his recent book, *Moral Psychology with Nietzsche*, "Nietzsche holds that heritable type-facts are central determinants of personality and morally significant behaviors, a claim well-supported by extensive empirical findings in behavioral genetics."⁵³ What is more notable in Leiter's later work, is his attempt to demonstrate that Nietzsche's nineteenth-century musings on the relationship between physiology and conscious action are compatible with the results of experiments on the nature of "free will" (it appears to be fiction) conducted in the field of contemporary neuroscience.⁵⁴

My account buttresses and fills in an important gap regarding Leiter's position: he is at pains to show that Nietzsche's genealogies are truthful accounts that chronicle how strong types have been duped by what he calls Morality in a Pejorative Sense or MPS. The real purpose of *On the Genealogy of Morals* is to speak to the strong types who happen to read Nietzsche's book. "The genealogy of morality, Leiter reminds us, is but one instrument for arriving at a particular end, namely a critique of morality" (My Italics)⁵⁵ My reading lends further support to Leiter's overall position and provides one mechanism that

gave rise to these two distinct physiological types as articulated by Leiter.

Still, there is a more critical point to bear in mind. If the type-fact interpretation of Nietzsche's later philosophy is accurate it stands at odds with the Lamarckian infused narrative as noted above. Consider that if one is determined by immutable type facts, then the Internalization Hypothesis has no causal role to play when it comes to explaining the epistemic, affective or conative landscape of human beings. Moreover, since Lamarck's is a false theory it is incommensurable with the contemporary research Leiter uses to warrant Nietzsche's physiological reductionism. I argue that a Neo-Darwinian account of GM: II 3 predicated as it is on artificial and unconscious selection to justify Nietzsche's origin of memory, also explains the origins of the Internalization Hypothesis. My thesis provides further support for Nietzsche's well-known biologically reductionistic tendencies of his later years and vice versa; the Neo-Darwinian underpinnings regarding I.H outlined above, explains and deepens Nietzsche's physiological-psychological predestinarian leanings in his late works. The upshot of my solution is that the law of internalization is a problem of scope: it does not apply to humanity writ large but to a small subclass: the priestly/philosophical type. Outside of this class it is an unnecessary theoretical appendage that performs little philosophical work in Nietzsche's late philosophy, and thus the problem disappears.

My argument consists of two parts. First, I outline how the twin selective pressures of artificial and unconscious selection do the same work as Lamarck's Inheritably thesis, and yet since they are components of the Neo-Darwinian synthesis, such an account is more likely to be true. Second, I then show that this position acts a bridge of sorts that explains Nietzsche's deterministic leanings in *Twilight of the Idols* and *the Anti-Christ* while also ensuring that this bridge is consistent with empirical research that Leiter marshals forth to support the deterministic positions taken up by Nietzsche in these late works.

5. Artificial and Unconscious selection and Nietzsche's Type-Fact Theory

In a previous article titled, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection in Nietzsche's Genealogy: Expectorating the Poisoned Pill of the Lamarckian Reading", I demonstrate that the most warranted mechanisms to explain the docility of early inhabitants of civilization—given Nietzsche's narrative—are twofold. First, the warrior-artists selected those individuals who displayed capacities to retain whatever lessons were needed to be imparted to their subjects in the first civilizations. It was these creatures who could learn the first five or six commandments of early civilization, and it was these same creatures that were then bred with others of a similar disposition preserving the genes of the two lines in the process. Those who were incapable of reformatting themselves "to behave" were tortured, as Nietzsche correctly suggests. However, the real benefit to civilization of said torture did not stem from the effects of torture itself, i.e. punishments. Incurable creatures did not learn to behave themselves. Instead, it was the result

of torture, namely the creature's death, that was the causally active ingredient in terms of getting civilization off the ground.⁵⁶

Evidence for this interpretation can be found in Nietzsche's discussion of the old Germanic punishments listed above by Hatab. Of the nine German punishments Nietzsche offers as analogs for pre-civilized forms of torture, it is critical to note that *all* of the practices end in the death of the tormented beast. The importance of torture, then, is this: because the creature dies, it is unable to pass on its unruly, aggressive drives subtended as these are by specific genes. Punishment is over-determined; a point Nietzsche makes clear in section GM II 13: "To return to our subject, namely punishment, one must distinguish two aspects: on the one hand, that in it which is relatively *enduring*, the custom, the act, the "drama", a certain strict sequence of procedures; on the other, that in it which is *fluid*, the meaning, the purpose, the expectation associated with the performance of such procedures." (Nietzsche's Italics).

We believe, mistakenly, that ancient torture was meant to deter. It was not. Its real purpose was to cull. Memory was a desirable trait that was artificially selected for by those "blonde beasts of prey" as Nietzsche puts it.

The second driver of civilization was unconscious selection. The first animals in the early human *Domus* were bred for a variety of reasons. Animals were bred for their fertility, size, productivity (e.g. goats were bred for their milk), and overall health. Animals were bred, however, for yet another but unconscious reason: docility. Animals who could conform to the strictures of domestication are invariably more docile than their counterparts. Indeed, it is for this reason they are unconsciously selected for breeding in the first place. As agrarian anthropologist James Scott, himself a sheep farmer put it in *Against the Grain*:

I have always been personally offended when sheep are used as a synonym for cowardly behavior and lack of individuality. We have, for the past 8000 years, been selecting among sheep for tractability, slaughtering first the aggressive ones who broke out of the corral. How dare we, then, turn around and slander a species for some combination of normal herd behavior and precisely those characteristics we selected for?⁵⁷

Sheep are sheepish in part because the ones displaying aggression are slaughtered before their wranglers *allowed* them to breed.

The argument that I advance, then, is that aggressive or non-conductive drives for civilization itself, such as adventure, war, hunting, and the like manifested themselves in some individuals and not others. Those pre-modern humans who had these drives were considered anathema to civilization and were tortured and killed for entertainment by the rulers of the first "Ur community". However, the entertainment of the warrior-artists also produced another unconscious benefit, at least from their point of view: the genetic code of these individuals was not selected because they were not bred. Such belligerent instincts, noted above, were held in the opinion of the first rulers of civilization, to be impediments to successful breeding and were therefore blocked from expression not because they were internalized but because they were bled out as a re-

sult of the painful practices of unconscious culling (torture) adopted by said rulers. Cruelty to oneself was and is a genetic predisposition that grew to feverish pitches as more and more "adventurous" types were eliminated from the genetic pool and more individuals with the desired genetic traits took their place. Tameness, then, the capacity to accept the new fetters of civilization was not initially something produced through internalization but genetically selected for.⁵⁸

6. Application of The Neo-Darwinian Synthesis to the Late Work

If my reconstruction of Nietzsche's speculative account of human development is accurate, then the reductionistic tendencies of Nietzsche's later work are congruent with that of the *Genealogy*. The emergence of Nietzsche's weak types may be explained, at least in part, in terms of the twin drivers of artificial and unconscious selection. Nietzsche's much-heralded strong types did not, over a relatively short period of time, have their instincts internalized and reinterpreted via the Internalization Hypothesis but rather saw most if not almost all its members culled to make way for a more docile creature, the Last Man. In contradistinction, the I.H. performs no explanatory work in terms of elucidating the behavior of the weak; the actual driver behind obsequious, genuflection before power is to be explained via the genes said individuals inherited. Nietzsche too, it would seem is guilty of attributing a false cause in the *Genealogy*, and thus much like his explanation for Cornaro's diet, the effects of the I.H. are the *consequence* and not the *cause* of the weak's propensity for at least in part, docility.

With the groundwork for a Neo-Darwinian approach in place, there remain several minor steps to establishing the final part of the argument, namely, saving I.H. as a theory that does, in fact, perform some work in Nietzsche's philosophy of mind. Firstly, it must be noted that Nietzsche's fecund psychological acumen came, mainly, from his introspection and, as such, the psychological law of internalization is as much a reflection on Nietzsche's mental make-up as it is an account of the bad conscience writ large. What we have is a problem of scope. The explanation Nietzsche affords regarding the redirection of primal drives fits better with illuminating the psychology of Nietzsche's priestly types. Under my interpretation, these individuals are deeply furrowed: they have a tremendous and a genuine capacity to serve both their God and their flock, but they possess equally aggressive natures which are now turned inward as the result of some form of initial physical illness leading to *resentiment* and the creation and embracement of slave values.⁵⁹ They are self-lacerating individuals capable of incredible depths of cognitive dissonance; the priestly type is self-tormented but also quite capable of harnessing its violent instincts to wage war against his former aristocratic brothers, the warrior caste. Nietzsche supports this fragmented psychology of the priestly type in in the *Genealogy* and elsewhere: In GM I, 7 Nietzsche explains how the priestly style of appraisal slowly begins to separate itself from the aristocratic model. He writes, "By now it will be clear how easily

the priestly mode of evaluation may diverge from the knightly-aristocratic mode and then develop [*fortentwickeln*] into its opposite."⁶⁰

In GM III: 13, Nietzsche expands on this new gulf existing between the warriors and priestly caste by explaining the primary mode of interpreting life for the priestly type, which is, of course, the ascetic ideal. He claims that "The ascetic ideal is derived from the protective and healing instincts of a degenerating life, which seeks to preserve itself and fights for existence with any available means."⁶¹ These above quotations may be read as evidence for the priestly type's mixed heritage, under a Neo-Darwinian reading. A final piece of evidence for this reading can be gleaned from Nietzsche's comments regarding the further evolution of the priestly type to that of the philosophical model. As Nietzsche gently suggests, "Contemplation first appeared on earth in disguised form, with an ambiguous appearance, with an evil heart and often with a frightening head."⁶² If my argument is correct, then the priestly type is the paragon of a mixed breeding heritage: they are products from the interbreeding of docile and aggressive types.⁶³

The bad conscience as a form of self-laceration produced by the internalization of aggressive instincts is psychologically correct as it pertains to the priestly and, to a lesser extent, philosophical type but not as an explanation that fits humanity as a whole. After all "It is precisely among criminals and convicts," Nietzsche reminds us "...that the sting of conscience is extremely rare; prisons and penitentiaries are not the kinds of hotbed in which this species of gnawing worm is likely to flourish."⁶⁴ Nor are the docile, ambitionless Last Men (*Letzter Menschen*) whom Zarathustra contrasts with the *Urbemensch* subject to this psychological law either. The Last Man, Voegelin observed some 60 years ago, "...is the man without creative love, without creative imagination, without a desire for anything that is more than himself...he is satisfied with his little pleasures and the comforts of his existence."⁶⁵ Such a contemptible creature projected by Nietzsche to be one possible destiny of the human race in the not so distant future is not aggrieved because all desire for freedom has been bred out, or so "modified" type-fact theory would suggest. Nietzsche's penetrating psychological law remains truthful if we limit its scope to the contemplative type, broadly construed to include both priests and philosophers.

In conclusion, my solution to the time-crunch, transformation problem (TCTP) in GM II:3 removes the problem of incommensurability between Lamarckian and Neo-Darwinian paradigms in accounting for the evolutionary underpinnings of Nietzsche's explanation for the development of bad conscience. In demonstrating that one can explain indispensable results of the *Genealogy* without relying on Lamarckism, we now have a prominent bridge between the conclusions of the *Genealogy* and later works such as *Twilight* and *Anti-Christ*. The one wrinkle in the argument pertains to the priestly type. My solution to this problem, however, demonstrates that artificial and unconscious selection explain the development of the priestly sort as one who has inherited both aggressive and docile drives. This inheritance explains the fragmented psychology of this type that Nietzsche carefully notes in

GM:I. The Internalization Hypothesis, long a bulwark of Nietzsche's philosophy of psychology remains relevant but only as it applies to this category of types (along with its subsequent iterations like the philosopher) and not to humanity, in general. My interpretation also adds further sophistication and justification to Leiter's type-fact theory in that it marshals forth additional philological evidence from Nietzsche's corpus to reinforce Leiter's initial and rather naïve interpretation. Furthermore, the added evolutionary grounds provided above, in conjunction with the neuroscientific evidence already presented in Leiter's most recent work leads one to think that Nietzsche's type-fact theory, deterministic warts and all, may very well be true.

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- 6 Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, GMII: 16, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, Trans. Walter Kaufmann, Ed. Peter Gay, New York: Random House, 2000, 520.
- 7 Peter Poellner, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 1995, 174.
- 8 See Lanier R. Anderson, "What is a Nietzschean Self" in Christopher Janaway and Simon Roberston (eds), *Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 202-235, 216-218.
- 9 John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 2004, 75.
- 10 I write "minimally" because there are more controversial, robust views of drives in the literature. One such view is the "homunculi" drive position which stipulates that drives are like proto-agents. See Maude-marie Clark and David Dudrick's *The Soul of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 2012. See especially chapters 6 and 7 where they claim that aspects like commanding, obeying and the recognition of one drive being more authoritative than some other, belong to the nature of drives themselves.
- 11 Paul Katsafanas, *The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency and the Unconscious*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 11.
- 12 Paul Katsafanas, *The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency and the Unconscious*, 74.
- 13 Nietzsche, GM: III: 28.
- 14 Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (London: Palgrave-Macmillan), 2007, A 84, B116.
- 15 For more on the central tenets of genealogy, see Brian Lightbody "Twice Removed: Foucault's Critique of Nietzsche's Genealogical Method." Chapter seven of *Foucault and Nietzsche: A Critical Encounter* and Brian Lightbody *Philosophical Genealogy: An Epistemological Reconstruction Of Nietzsche and Foucault's Genealogical Method*.
- 16 Nietzsche, GM: II 16, 520. See Brian Lightbody, "Hermeneutics vs. Genealogy: Brandom's Cloak or Nietzsche's Quilt", 635-652
- 17 See Gregory Moore's damning assessment of Nietzsche's indebtedness to nineteenth century Biologism. Moore writes: "Nietzsche's Biologism is more wide-ranging more total than that of his immediate successors. Their work (Scheler, Spengler, Simmel, Lessing, Klages) also lacks the fundamental contradictoriness of Nietzsche's position—a nineteenth century faith in the institutional authority of the biological sciences which co-exists uneasily with a belief that these same disciplines are infected with false values." Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, Metaphor*, (New York Oxford University Press), 2002, 211.
- 18 Nietzsche, GM: II, 2 : "The task of breeding an animal with the right to make promises evidently embraces and presupposes as a preparatory task that one first makes men to a certain degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and consequently calculable."
- 19 "I employed the word 'state': it is obvious what is meant—some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race which, organized for war and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomad." GM II 17, 522
- 20 Nietzsche, GM: II, 17. It is important to note that "blonde breast" is not a racial concept according to Nietzsche. Kaufmann's nearly half-century old commentary on this passage is instructive: "The blond beast is not a racial concept and does not refer to the 'Nordic race' of which the Nazis later made so much. Nietzsche specifically refers to Arabs and Japanese, Romans and Greeks no less than ancient Teutonic tribes when he first introduces this term (GM I 11)-and the 'blondness' obviously refers to the beast, the lion, rather than the kind of man." (Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ*, 225. A word also needs to be said regarding "master race." Nietzsche is not claiming that a singular identifiable race marks the pinnacle of human development. That horrific idea is not what Nietzsche is espousing. Indeed the original German text makes this clear: *eine Eroberer-und Herren-Rasse. Eine Eroberer* (a conquerer is hyphenated to *Herrerr-Rasse* thus becoming one word). The translation should really be "a conqueror and a master race." With regard to GM II: 17, then, Nietzsche's use of "master race" should be understood functionally: all Nietzsche's hypothesis entails is that when one studies the formation of any state (defined as communities with tax collection and walls) one finds that it began when one ethnic group imposed its values onto one or more others. The group who can impose its values on some other is at the top of that state's political and social hierarchy. This is all Nietzsche means by "master." Nietzsche's musings in GM II 17 should not be confused with what he says in GM I 10-11. When Nietzsche discusses noble vs slave values in those sections, he is referring to *mental attitudes*, which, as Leiter's type theory supposes, have a genetic platform but this platform is not racially circumscribed. Reginster explains the difference between these attitudes well. See endnote 59.

Notes

¹ All references to Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* will be from the Kaufmann translation specifically *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, Trans. Walter Kaufmann and Edited by Peter Gay (New York, Basic Books: 2000). Passages from *Anti-Christ* and *Twilight* are translated by R.J. Holingdale, *Twilight of the Idols/Anti-Christ*, (London: Penguin Books, 1990).

² William Beals, "Internationalization and Its Consequences" *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol 44. No. 3 Autumn, 2013, 435-445, 435.

³ William Beals, "Internationalization and Its Consequences" *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol 44. No. 3 Autumn, 2013, 435-445, 443.

⁴ This diagnostic reading of philosophical genealogy is given expression in many works the most notable of which is Michel Foucault's, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, Ed. D. Bouchard, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977

⁵ Brian Lightbody, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection In Nietzsche's *Genealogy*: Expectorating the Poisoned-Pill of Lamarckism." *Genealogy*, 3, 31, 1-23

- ²¹ Daniel Conway, *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Reader's Guide* (Lanham: MD: Rowman and Littlefield Press, 2008), 60.
- ²² Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* (London: Routledge, 2002), 227.
- ²³ Also see Lawrence Hatab, *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals an Introduction* (Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), 8.
- ²⁴ Lightbody, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection in Nietzsche's *Genealogy*", 17
- ²⁵ It is once again very strange to note, that, while Brian Leiter is so perceptive and articulate in recognizing the problems with Nietzsche's account, he is silent on providing a solution. He writes, "What bears emphasizing here is that we are discussing a phenomenon of pre-history: we are discussing what the animal man had to be like before regular civilized intercourse with his fellows (the advantages of society) would even be possible. That means, of course, that the phenomenon we are discussing—the development of conscience and, in particular, bad conscience—predates the events discussed in the First Essay of the *Genealogy*." Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, 229). The problem, once more, is that there is no attempt to answer the question: What mechanism allowed us to move from animals to individuals who could engage in such social interactions as bartering, trading and punishing our fellow communal actors?
- ²⁶ See Michael Ruse "The Biological Sciences Can Act as a Ground for Ethics," In *Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Biology*. New York: Wiley-Blackwell 2010.
- ²⁷ According to James C Scott in *Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States*, (Yale University Press, 2017) on page 3: "Permanent settlement, agriculture and pastoralism appeared about 12000 years ago... "The first states in the Mesopotamian alluvium pop up no earlier than about 6000 years ago."
- ²⁸ One might reject the entire problem of TCPT of course. There is research to suggest that the foundations for altruistic behavior and advanced cognitive thinking existed in non-human animals for millions of years. This research, on the surface, would entail that Nietzsche's speculations are "just-so" stories and very poor ones at that! However, recent scholarship suggests that only humans possess "one-shot learning"—a necessary condition, it would seem, for any kind of enculturation worthy of the term. According to Peter Tse, one-shot learning is the unique human, all too human ability . "...to make associations among arbitrary categories of things and events." As Tse concretizes the idea: "In contrast, (to animals), a three-year old child can pretend that a block is a truck and then, a moment later, pretend that it is a monster. This capacity to instantly remap the referent of an object file is unique to humans and is at the heart of why our cognition can be truly symbolic." (Peter Tse, "Symbolic Thought and the Evolution of Human Morality", 269-271. If symbolic thinking represents a clear break with our animal past, then Nietzsche's investigation as to when this break took place becomes most pressing.
- ²⁹ Lamarck, Jean Baptiste Pierre Antoine. "On the Influence of Circumstances on the Actions and Habits of Animals, and that of the Actions and Habits of Living Bodies, as Causes Which Modify Their Organization." *The American Naturalist* 22, 1888: 960–972, 968.
- ³⁰ Abdul Ahad "Evolution without Lamarck's Theory and its Use in the Darwinian Theories of Evolution" 2011 *International Journal of Bio-resource and Stress Management* 2011, 2(3):363-368, 364.
- ³¹ Ibid, 364.
- ³² John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2004, 18.
- ³³ Ibid, 17.
- ³⁴ Ibid, 17.
- ³⁵ Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche and Lamarckism," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Summer Vol. 44 No. 2 2013 264-281, 275.
- ³⁶ Ibid, 266.
- ³⁷ Ibid, 278.
- ³⁸ Richardson has concerns with the warrantability of Nietzsche's hypothesis too. He writes: "I claim that we can't understand his (Nietzsche's) views on our values without seeing first and precisely how he thinks we are animals with drives. And we should only take those views about values seriously, if we have reason to think these foundations might let them be true." Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, 11-12.
- ³⁹ Richardson summarizes his project best between pages 52-65 of *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*. For an informative and incisive critique of Richardson, see Brian Lightbody *Nietzsche's Will to Power Naturalized, Translating the Human into Nature and Nature into the Human*, (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2017), pp. 96-103.
- ⁴⁰ See chapter 7 162-180 of Brian Leiter's *Moral Psychology with Nietzsche*, (Oxford University Press), 2019. The co-written chapter with Joshua Knobe is devoted, mainly, to buttressing Brian Leiter' type-fact theory of Nietzsche's psychology by utilizing recent work in the field of empirical psychology.
- ⁴¹ Ruth Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Work*, (New York Oxford University Press, 2000), 104-105.
- ⁴² Friedrich Nietzsche, 'The Improvers of Mankind' in *Twilight of the Idols/Anti-Christ*, Trans. R.J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin Books, 1990. Richardson, (*Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, 11-12).
- ⁴³ Ibid, 67
- ⁴⁴ Ibid, *Morality as Anti-Nature*, section 6, 56.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid, 'Reason' in *Philosophy*, section 3, 46.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid, 'Reason' in *Philosophy* section, 3, 46
- ⁴⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Anti-Christ* Section 57, 190-191
- ⁴⁸ There are many important works in the secondary literature that emphasize the biological and physiological aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy. See Gregory Moore's *Nietzsche, Biology, Metaphor*, (Cambridge University Press, 2002). Daniel Ahern's *Nietzsche as Cultural Physicist*, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). Richard S.G. Brown's two articles, "Nihilism: "Thus Speaks Physiology" in *Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, Language and Politics* edited by Tom Darby, Bela Egyed and Ben Jones (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), 133–144. "Nietzsche: That Profound Physiologist", in *Nietzsche and Science* Eds (Gregory Moore and Thomas Brobjer, (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2004) 51-71. Wayne Klein's *Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997). In what follows, I will choose to examine Brian Leiter's "type-fact" position for its lucidity and comprehensiveness.
- ⁴⁹ Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, 91.
- ⁵⁰ Brian Leiter, "The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche," in *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator*, ed. Christopher Janaway (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 219.
- ⁵¹ Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 8
- ⁵² Ibid, 100
- ⁵³ Brian Leiter, *Moral Psychology With Nietzsche*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 9.
- ⁵⁴ See Leiter's discussion of Daniel Wegner's *The Illusion of Conscious Will* (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 2002) on 141-142 of *Moral Psychology With Nietzsche* along with Leiter's discussion of "Libet experiments" which test RP (Readiness Potential) in Leiter's earlier paper, "Nietzsche's Theory of the Will", *Philosopher's Imprint*, Vol. 7 No. 7, 2007 1-15, 13.
- ⁵⁵ Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, 177
- ⁵⁶ Lightbody, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection", 21
- ⁵⁷ James C Scott, *Against the Grain, A Deep History of the Earliest States* (Yale University Press, 2017), 80.
- ⁵⁸ Lightbody, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection," *Genealogy*, 20-23
- ⁵⁹ There has been renewed interest in Nietzsche's priestly type especially in regard to the question of value creation. Two thinkers in particular have done trailblazing work in demonstrating flaws with the traditional account regarding the creation of slave values. See Bernard Reginster, "Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57.2 (1997): 281–305. and R. Anderson in "On the Nobility of Nietzsche's Priests," in *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide*, ed. Simon May [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011], 24–55. According to Reginster, the quintessential attitude of slave morality is resignation. The slave is resigned to accepting that he cannot aspire to a kind of life where he can generate his own values—the quintessential attitude of nobility. As Reginster explains: "Thus the slave accepts his masters' high estimation of the noble life and their low estimation of himself, and therefore never even forms the expectation to live the life his master's value. The attitude characteristic of the slave is his resignation to a worthless way of life." 287. In my view, Iain Morriison's "Ascetic Slaves: Rereading Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals" (*Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2014), pp. 230-257 advances and clarifies the work of Reginster and Anderson in new ways. He offers the best explanation of how slave values eventually overtook noble ideals. My thesis provides a naturalistic underpinning to Morrison's work.
- ⁶⁰ Nietzsche, *Genealogy* I: 7
- ⁶¹ Nietzsche, GM III: 13
- ⁶² Nietzsche, KSA 5 359.
- ⁶³ For a more fulsome discussion of this point, see Brian Lightbody, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals pp.18-22. My argument relies, in part, on Belyaev's 1959 (and still ongoing) silver-fox experiment. In the experiment, wild foxes (*Vulpes vulpes*) were exclusively selected for docile behavior and then interbred. Later, in the sixties, a second experiment was initiated to breed foxes that exhibited greater aggressive behavior than their cohabitants. The

results of this experiment created a separate strain of hyper-aggressive, growling foxes. A control group that was neither docile nor aggressive were also interbred. The most interesting part of this study is what scientists learned from the sequencing of the silver fox genome. "They identified 103 genetic regions that varied significantly among the three groups." What was most striking about the experiment was how the SorSC1 gene, which is responsible, for among other things, shuttling proteins crucial to developing system signaling and synapse formation, varied between each group. SorSC1 is a gene we share with foxes and other mammals and thus the import this experiment has in humans may be significant as the author of the piece notes: "In addition to SorCS1, the team found variations in genes related to immune response and genes that, in humans, are linked to autism, bipolar disorder, and Williams-Beuren syndrome. The latter causes "elfinlike" facial features and a friendly demeanor in humans. No one yet knows how any of these genes function in foxes. But Constantina Theofanopoulou, a neuroscientist at the University of Barcelona in Spain who was not involved in the work, says cross-species comparisons hold promise. "The same changes that we see that provoke changes in human behavior or give rise to social deficits ... are the same ones that pop up in differences in behavior and social behavior in other species." She says future studies could use genetically engineered domesticated mice to narrow down which domesticated behaviors are linked to which genes or networks of genes." Catherine Maticic, "These docile foxes may hold some of the keys to domestication" *Science*, Aug. 6th 2018, <https://www.science.org/news/2018/08/these-docile-foxes-may-hold-some-genetic-keys-domestication>.

⁶⁴ Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*, 2: 14, 517.

⁶⁵ Eric Voegelin, "Nietzsche, The Crisis and the War," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 6 No. 2 May, 1944, 177-212, 179.

Mind-Language and Epistemology: A Role of Language Acquisition

Ravi Kumar

Abstract: Language and mind reflect each other in an established manner. Language as a source of interaction among others is leading the process of communication but it is not an easy task to define that language reflects the society with the only source of perception. The main component in this paper is to be paying attention that language is not only understood through the medium of perception but sometimes it is to be based on cognitive abilities of human beings. One has always an inherent power of First Language Acquisition that will promote the acquirement of Second Language Acquisition or learning. The research will more comparatively dominate the relation between First Language Acquisition to Second Language Acquisition that how this will reflect the former to latter. Mind and language develop a relationship in an epistemological process in a social occurrence. The main assumption in this paper is; can second language be treated as the first language, if the first language will not learn at the learning stage? The study in this approach formulates the role of transforming First Language Acquisition to Second Language Acquisition with the medium of cognitive processes.

Keywords: language, learning, meaning, acquisition, FLA, SLA, cognition.

1. Introduction

Language and cognition occupy a prominent position in the philosophy of language. Various contemporary philosophers like (Frege, 1973, 55-66); (Husserl, 1982, 89-97); (Wittgenstein, 1995, 43-47); (Searle, 1971, 36-39), and various others also defined language as a basic agreement for existence. The notion of language acquisition varies from First Language Acquisition (FLA) with Second Language Acquisition (SLA) with the medium of diverse abilities. SLA requires more dependency on learning the language in comparison to FLA. The reason for this dependency would be categorized based on conscious and unconscious nature. The debate between conscious and unconscious referred to the utilization of former and latter. The former i.e. FLA¹ is defined as the unconscious study of mind whereas latter i.e. SLA is understood as the conscious study of the mind. In this matter, the idea of language captured that the knowledge is constructed in the latter part through the conscious study of the mind. The instruction is playing its role in the latter part (SLA); it enables the acquisition of learning a new language

structure with the conscious state of mind. Another criterion that would be highlighted in this work is that the SLA can be acquired between the 12-13 years of age. But if it will not able to acquire a second language then he would be competent to perform their first language ability. The second language may also attach with the notion of lateralization² that structured the function of the brain into two hemispheres- left and right. So, the acquisitioned ability after puberty is known for its various effects as playing music, games, etc.

Another fact about the FLA and SLA is the dependence on motivation and personality. SLA in this regard would be very conscious as it depends on the notion of motivation and personality. But it is not in the case of FLA; it is an inborn effort that prompts by birth. It has its biological sense of the word. One thing that occurs in this relationship is no one denies acquiring the first language and no one disliked to gather it. FLA is an instinct that would have no choice but SLA can utilize as per their maxims. In this part, there is also little sort of confusion that acquisition does not require conscious state of mind but it is not applicable on all the circumstances like to learn chess; one would be very consciously to learn how to move pieces. A child would do all their tasks unconsciously during their childhood as like to ride a bicycle. So, it is necessary to mention that conscious and unconscious states arriving from our beliefs as it was based on different activities. The unconscious activity has no happening for previous experiences through which they can learn from a conscious state of mind.

There are various theories and approaches that have been come into sight over the last some years but the important approach that reflects more dominantly is the origin of language acquisition. The sources that are considered significant for the sources of language acquisition are cognitivist theory, innatist theory or some notions of maternal appearances. These three parts describe the relationship of language with innate abilities. The basic feature of language acquisition asserts that language is the innate capacity that accumulates in the brain of a child. The children hold a special mind power for gathering the social experiences after some time of their birth. Chomsky as considered the main proponent for cognition theory. He defines that every action of a human being is connected with one or another form of cognitive³ feature. A child nourishes in a social reality with the impact of cognition.

(Piaget, 1926, 1-18) in their viewpoint also shares that, "language is just one aspect of a child's overall intel-

lectual development". Language is a symbolic representation that permits the child to flourish in a social environment with their cognitive abilities. The first language is considered to be innate because a child learns this easily as he learns to walk. In FLA, every task of learning would be gathered easily in comparison to SLA. (E. Smith and Mackie, 2000, 19-27) they too define that language is all social about in its nature. In the words of Aristotle, Plato, Wittgenstein, Bühler, Searle defined how language is related to cognition. So, the main focus of this paper is that the relation of language with cognition. The two main questions here focused in this paper is that how language reflects cognition? And others, if the language and cognition are the two same related notions of the same adaptive functions, then how it can develop their relationships among themselves.

The main objective of cognitive science is to develop the human mental abilities among them to judging the physical or social entities and language abilities. There exists a two-way cognition process as a general-purpose process. In general purposes, it is defined as the inductive process. In it, all individuals are leading the same cognition for the same object by particular assumptions. The other approach is the mental state in which the distinct cognitions exist for the same object. There always exist the different mental states in which different responses occur in this social world. Human being has a large number of ideas for the physical notions to fulfill the condition of satisfaction. The children are born with the acquisition of learning language. This knowledge is acquainted with them with the proper nouns, verbs, and grammar. (Chomsky, 2006, 88-99) defined that children cannot learn words correctly in learning stage. They utter incorrect terms in spite of the right words. It is their language acquisition through which they develop the words with the hearing of the relation. In keeping a view of this, Chomsky's linguistic approach is defined as 'generative linguistic'.

So, the modern theories of language acquisition would be treated as the base for human language. In this description, it is considered that every social being in their childhood has an innate power⁴ through which they construct their imagination power about the physical objects as FLA. After this stage, the children lead to SLA in which they learn a language that is familiar to the social environment.

2. Notion of Language acquisition

The present part discusses the language as a part of speech act i.e. based on actions. (Austin, 1962, 39-51) in his book, "*How to do things with words*" remarked that language is based on actions. He defined that human beings can produce their utterance with the actions. After this, John Searle brought some changes in the field of speech act. He argued that there is some sort of defected arguments in the Austin's speech act. This assumption of Austin formulates that the language has a source of rationality by which every person referred to the social context. In this description, Austin formulates that the dialect of an individual is primarily based on their act. All kinds

of speech act has involved in one or the other form of speech act. Language without words and words without references are difficult to predict. Correspondence of words with symbols or sentences is considered to be the token for language based acts. The essay describes that the knowledge has an important share for their judgment i.e. actions. It is rightly defined by (Christopher, 2009, 106-109); that, "A theory of language is a theory of action". There is also a notion of accentuation that the expressions have an alternate or particular importance to its client and audience other than its significance as indicated by the dialect.

This description formulates that the language has two different expressions – constative and performative utterances. In the book, "*How to do things with words*" explores the constative and performative utterances as the necessary approaches. A constative articulation is something which portrays or means the circumstance, in connection with the reality of true or false. Like the person asked Mexi whether she had stolen the confection. Mexi answers "Mmmmm". Here the expressions of Mexi depicts the occasion in settlement of noting her instructor whether the circumstance was valid or false. This represents the form of FLA.

The performative articulations are something that doesn't depict anything by any stretch of the imagination. The expressions in the sentences or the piece of sentences are regularly considered as having its own importance. The sentiments, dispositions, feelings, and contemplations of the individual performing phonetic act are quite a bit of an essential unit here. Another Case: Bane and Sarah have been dating for as long as four years. One fine night Bane took Sarah to the most costly eatery around the local area. Also, he requested the most costly wine accessible in the eatery. At that point, he drew nearer to her and asked her that "will you wed me?". Sarah burst with satisfaction and answered, "I will". Here the "I will" of Sarah express her sentiments, states of mind and enthusiastic towards the specific circumstance. These articulations have its particular significance just in connection to its particular setting. This represents the notion of SLA with the knowledge of language power.

Language games⁵ are yet another important description of Wittgenstein's later work in Philosophical Investigations. He defined this concept as very significant to the language-based approach. In language games, it does not mean that there is a reference to the sports or any type of championship. The language – games referred that the same word has various meanings for its uses. The same word refers to the different approaches for their availability. Various terms like water, the term water has different relations in social reality as like in science- (H₂O) but the word water has its only one meaning. The concept will not about the description of word-meaning but it describes the role of language concerning the different contexts. The idea of language game theory has a very broad concept for Wittgenstein in their study for the classification of different categories in social aspects.

Wittgenstein did not construct any limit about the role of language games to the word-meaning. Every word has its origin with their reference to the physical appearances. It indicates the relation of word with the object. A word

that has no meaning/reference; is not a medium of any game process through which one represents it. He did not confine the language games only with the word-meaning but it also holds their place in sentence-meaning. Sentences did not frame without any referent terms. Like "John did not exist" refers to the different assumptions as he is not present in this meeting, he might be in abroad, he might quit from this organization or he may be died. By all these circumstances, one may focus on only the non-existence of John that why they are not present here. So, the term 'existence' or non-existence has various meanings in reflection to the 'non-existence'.

He talked about in Philosophical Investigations that the language is defined as a primitive form of learning in which a child is trying to learn communication but that notion of learning is not found in the form of explanation, but it is through the proper training. The reason behind this debate is the learning of native language is confined to the action, behavior, signs, etc but not in communication. So, the debate on language acquisition would be raised in those years when a child trying for communication. In his description, words have a secondary role in which a child learns only training⁶ but no explanation. Language has reflection only when a child communicates with others and then the acquisition of learning a new language would be satisfied.

In Wittgenstein's linguistic form, the role of language acquisition would be very approachable due to the development of new behavior for a child. A language would be considered as a part of training for the acquisition of a new language. He defined various other concepts also in a relationship with the linguistic form of a language game. The basic idea of a language game that will be highlighted in this part is to be following the rule(s). Every action of human beings is followed through the notion of rules. A rule followed by a child did not know is it right or wrong but he/she can follow without worry. The mental capacity of a child would not be very higher to gather external resources. They learn new experiences in social reality with the medium of various linguistic practices. So, the important description of the language problem of acquisition would be partitioned into two categories as FLA and SLA. Wittgenstein argued that the child learns his first language acquisition through training because he did not know the language or rules of language. In this stage, he is learning their experience through physical signs, gestures, intentions, etc. through their elders/parents but in contrast with the second language acquisition, the author describes the role of learning the language through which they follow all actions with the instance of language game /rules.

3. First language vs. the Second language

The first language is not required too much of the surroundings for acquisition. In this process, children make use of their objects and learned their way. They (children) stored that sort of knowledge in mind and confined to be first language acquisition. Generally, people talk with their babies in a babyish way but the outcome; they (babies) did not end up in the same linguistic manner. First

did not depend on any kind of special ability for understanding, it acquires through a native form with full and proper manner. The main notion is about the first language is that sometimes the parents or elders in a family had very highly educated but the children did not gather it in their childhood. That notion was confined to sufficient after the child went to school for second language learning or acquisition. This sort of native language would be very difficult to gather by a child; they acquire it after the knowledge of reading and writing in a school. So, the first language is more based on the usage view and holds it for the acquisition of more syntax and morphology.

Another debate between first and second language leads to the notion of forgetting. The first language cannot forget; it will continue till the life while the second language will have forgotten at some stage or in some circumstances depending on the conditions and situations. The latter will be considered as a lower level of competing i.e. in it a person has do mistakes and they also know their mistakes for language acquisition. So, one consideration would be known that in first language acquisition, there arises a one-word, two-word and multi-word categories. Although in the early childhood stage, children generalize their language are all very weak verbs. But they also correct themselves when they hear from the adults in the correct form. In FLA, the children have made various errors or unstructured forms based on the level of their acquisition. After the puberty period, the SLA although also made mistakes but that is to be recognized. The SLA will lead the FLA i.e. L1 carries over to L2. In FLA, parents become an important source for the acquisition of knowledge. Surroundings, siblings, and playmates also lead to an important phenomenon for acquiring knowledge. In the other form, some cases have the acquisition of bilingual in the early childhood period. In this case, one language will dominate in comparison to others; the degree of understanding the language will be acquired in only. That notion will have much more effective after the puberty period.

The research for the acquisition of the second language has been most conversational among the two sides i.e. "cognitivist" and "sociocultural". These categories hold their own opinions regarding the second language; the former beliefs in the notion of cognition power and the latter believe in the social practices. But the outcomes from these two groups will negation; it becomes unhelpful and useful for the findings. In second language acquisition (SLA), there is the need for development in the field of cognitive sciences including the acquisition for the first language. It is an important platform to know that cognition⁷ is the basis for social interaction and also it is shaped through socio-cultural and political occurrence. So, the work emphasis on the criterion that epistemic function of second language acquisition (SLA) is central to the mode of cognition. Language acquisition in latter mode is considered as a paradigm in cognitive aspects for findings in research.

At the beginning of a new paradigm, it is argued that the human sphere has revolutionized in the field of language, epistemology, learning, and mind. The research dominates that the power of transforming the FLA to SLA is a fundamental resource of human beings. The Second

form of language is more understood as learning than acquisition. One thing that has to be important for the understanding of FLA and SLA is its distinctive features. F1 and S2 are two distinct terms that develop a different kind of relationship in the social process. Many times, the social processes are also criticized because every entity is understood in the form of either first language or second language. The social processes are constructed in either natural or artificial settings. Different forms have arisen in the formal as well as informal settings. Both the categories either F1 or S2 have their approaches for their origination.

First Language Acquisition (FLA)	Second Language Acquisition/Learning (SLA)
- It happens in natural settings.	- It is constructed through artificial mode.
- It has an informal form.	- It has a formal occurrence.
- Not more conscious in this stage.	- Full form of consciousness appears.
- More grammatical errors occurred.	- Have the knowledge of grammatical rules and also vocabulary.

The debate between FLA and SLA is very conversational due to which that would be difficult to mention that the former have no conscious form of sense and latter have the full form of thought and sense. The work also explores the distinctive features of the notion of subconscious and consciousness as well as grammatical and vocabulary form. The relation between the language and cognition is influenced in the form of communication but the notion for their justification depends on the medium of communication. In the modern world, language has too many justifications for developing the word to world relation. The role of language has to be assumed in the form of external appearances. It (language) is known for its mode of representation concerning the context of physical appearances. The main point in this description is about the relation between human natural language with cognition and thought. Natural language is treated as the basic function of human beings. The basic feature of Homo sapiens⁸ is fixed as natural language. In this process, no human being is deficient in this feature and also no other species in this social world possesses this notion. Language in this regard defined as the system of rules and signs observed during their communication. The universal idea about language with society is based on the methods of thought as well as communication. Language occupies two important functions to depict very dominantly: to represent the world or social appearances in the mind of human beings and the notion of communication among themselves. The other notion in this work is that we (human beings) could not identify human thought with the medium of language. The reason behind this that there


exist several thoughts like non-linguistic as image construction thoughts in children as well as adults. Their non-verbal communication became the main hurdle for not understanding the way of communication.

4. The Cognitive approach towards the acquisition

The method of cognitive resources in the living of human beings will have a great impact because it generates the idea regarding social occurrences. The human beings could find out the cognitive approaches but animals did not have this kind of attitude. The other notion that will be highlighted is the power of cognitive approaches that also included sometimes to non-human species. When we talked about the meaning of a language; we approach the two descriptions about their meaning – artificial and natural or representational or communication. In this work, there is more approach to the natural language that will show the relation with the social reality. We human beings produce a several words to construct our sentences but these sentences are created naturally when we don't know actual form language or word construction. That is why language constructs the reality with the medium of some observations or perceptions occurring.

The natural language implies the biologically based abilities that have evolved naturally in human beings with the mode of use and repetition processes. It has no conscious level for the planning of utterances. The natural language is referred to as first language acquisition (FLA) that has a sub-conscious stage of learning the language. The argument that will be approached in this article leads to the phenomenon that how a first language will lead to the acquisition of the second language? How did second language learning deliberately to the representation process?

There are more debating approaches among the representation and communicative features. The article focuses on the description that how the language interrelated among FLA and SLA. Chomsky in this manner introduced the idea of universal grammar that applies to the human mind/brain. The main principle behind universal grammar is based on the human mind that how the epistemic and ontological function occurs. Every natural way of communication has to be represented in the form of reference. Authors like Buhler (1982), define the different forms to represent the function of language – symbolic, descriptive, and ideational, etc. The model of language known among the individuals is framed as like:



In this fig. there appear the different components between the sender and receiver. The main component behind this is the 'message'. But this message has reached the receiver with some code or channel. The important function of a

message refers to the reality that has to be perceived through emotions or by the expressive way. The receiver has also the notion of reaction to follow their message. The level of representation leads to the relation between the sender and the receiver. A message became the central point between the code⁹ and channel¹⁰. The most debating issue in the work is about the native language that how one can understand through native utterances. The people mostly believe that an uneducated person cannot learn the second language due to the negligence of the knowledge. The main notion about this problem is that human being always tries to learn those abilities through which they acquire in the first language. The F1 becomes the most favorable for capturing the learning of physical entities in the social world. On the other hand, S2 becomes selective for limited purposes due to the more adoption of F1 for learning.

First language and second language became more debated when it categorized on the grounds of learning within the various stages. Sometimes, we (human beings) follow the sources throughout which our elders learn but in the present world; it may not in the case. The present era denies the past notion of learning the language. In the modern world, people learn a second language and that language is not confined to be native or personal; it is of universal understanding. So, the main criteria behind this understanding are that individuals did not learn that language through which they did not benefit. The argument in the work lies that how one leads the S2 without the knowledge of F1. The reply to this argument would be too difficult for verifiability. In the epistemological point of view, language is the only medium throughout which one refers to reality. Knowledge becomes the core of all our experiences. When a child learns a knowledge/language, they may nourish their mind for acquisition. The acquisition is more developed in the age level of 10-13 years and through this method, they acquire mostly the S2. So, one thing that will be acquired in this debate that S2 would be more beneficial if one would be communicated to the social world. S2 acquisition can acquire in all groups irrespective of culture, creed, religion, and sex and it also may acquire at any time.

Another most influential argument occurs among the F1 and S2 is that can the F1 and S2 both learn in the F1 period? To reply to this notion, it is very difficult to verify due to the minimum chances of the acquisition of learning in both the conditions. If the child in the early period learns the S2, then he will know the knowledge/learning of F1. So, reality occurs in both situations. There are many through which the child can acquire the only F1 in the childhood stage. In early childhood, the child would not be in a position to acquire S2 with F1. Many times, the knowledge learned through external appearances would be lead to the confusion that how this occurred but in a practical positions, one may have the correspondence phenomenon with reality for knowledge acquisition. The fact behind this argument is that if both the F1 and S2 learned in the F1 stage, then what would be learned in the S2 stage? In S2 learning, they acquire either the new language or one of their native languages. So, it is clear from this description that language learning would have no level. It is to be acquired on both levels. If one learns already

in the different stage then they might learn something new knowledge in present stage with the level of consciousness.

It is rationally observed that human beings are very deliberately referred to the language that is manifested based on one to one correspondence. The language debate becomes very interesting in the modern world due to its level of consciousness and sub-consciousness. The level of thinking is a much influenced part of this work. Human beings and other species in this world have different categories for rationalization. All these categories will have different approaches to the realization of the existence of objects. The level of consciousness is debated in the field of epistemology. In the epistemological point of view, the first language and second language has depended on its level of consciousness. Consciousness is that part of the human beings through which all senses work. The cognition part also plays a significant role in leading the level of knowing F1 and S2. F1 is before the subject by which the category of understanding the external appearance is very deliberate in the notion of reality. The philosophy of science in this era has a very complex relationship among human beings. Every individual has its reference in this world for referring to reality. Human beings like those approaches that are favorable to the existence. The argument lies in this position that men have very aggressive in developing the approach for its relation among language acquisition. Through this approach, men have developed the internal as well as external relations the reality. Sometimes the idea constructed in the mind but difficult to share in the linguistic form that will be leading the notion unawareness about the language. So, if one knows external appearance than it might have also the knowledge of F1 as well as S2. In the past, people from backward areas did not confine to get an education because of unawareness among them. In that world, they did not learn the S2 because of no use. They know only F1 and that will be continued with its growth and development. The pictures have several occurrences in the philosophy of science that how human beings evolutes. They did not even know the way of living. Thus, the level of consciousness becomes important in this description that how many levels we (human beings) should develop for learning the second language because the second language can be learned based on the first language. One might have known our first native language by which we move to the acquisition of the second language.

5. Are Language and Cognition inter-related?

It is understood that language and cognition¹¹ are related because it is based on biological aspects. (Chomsky, 2006, 57-66); and various others also mention that language is based on cognitive constraints that has rooted in ages ago from a philosophical point of view. In it, the language was considered to be subordinate to the primary ideas in the views of Plato. It means that the man has first developed ideas than represent names. On the other hand, Descartes' view that – I think, therefore I exist i.e. cogito ergo sum. Here, Descartes' point of view is that first ideas came in the mind then there is a physical appearance.

He also defines the concept of linguistic relativity. Language includes mental, logical and biological constraints because all these aspects are closely related to language for their utterance of thoughts and experiences. Linguistic relativity as thought and experience is considered as necessary. It is not easy to understand everything through the a priori understanding of language because many areas like color perception depend on the vision. Although the color variation is also to be experienced through language with different names and the impact of non-linguistic factors that include a sensory process that will have their source of language expression. Words through emotions, gestures, etc. are all the basis of language. The most important instance is that deaf people who cannot understand the linguistic expressions. For this, the cognition works as a rule of their functioning. So, the reflection occurs in a very important place in this instance. (Furth, 1969, 78-99); "Thinking without language: Psychological implications of deafness" defines that the 'cognitive functions' are very much vastly independent on uttering expressions.

6. Language and its Role in Social Interaction

There are various approaches to the role of language¹² in social interaction but here, the author talked about the only two main approaches i.e. Neo- Whorfian and Gricean approach. Neo- Whorfian approach refers to the process of the human mind because it includes the neo- functions that include the stimulation process. It includes inferences, decisions, judgments, etc. On the other hand, Gricean¹³ approach that emphasizes the process of conversation between two individuals or more. It is followed through the notion of behavior by all kinds of language games.

Both of the approaches/categories are considered to be the premises of meaning and understanding. So, here the quotation of Otto Jespersen in the (Clark and Clark , 1977, 33-79); that "The essence of language is human activity - activity on the part of one individual to make himself understood, and activity on the part of that other to understand what was in the mind of the first."

Although (Buhler, 1982, 45-8); views about language are of encoding and decoding i.e. the communicator follows the encoding process of language through verbal symbols and the recipient's task is to decode it in a symbol string. Thus, the language is not a single way process but it is the relation of encoder and decoder in all of the aspects.

7. Conclusion

The paper describes the relation between first language and second language that constructs with the power of conscious and subconscious levels. Human beings in their rational world approached more believe on the learning of second language. The paper have also describes the view points of different authors regarding the relation between F1 and S2. It has been also elaborated that the relationship with the word to world is more comprehensive when hu-

man beings construct the language in the form of acquiring S2. This form of learning a second language can generate ideas among individuals for their exploration of experience in the social world. This experience has been considered learning of a new knowledge in different forms of language. So, one most important element mentioned in this paper is every part of our life has an acquisition for knowledge either it is through F1 and S2.

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Notes

- ¹ First Language Acquisition as considered to be inherent ability.
- ² It is a brain function that tends to perform some neural tasks with cognitive efforts on both sides of the brain.
- ³ Chris Knight, Tim Ingold and Bruno Latour.(1995), pp. 396-399.
- ⁴ Descartes views that children have their innate ideas at the time of birth. Through this medium, children have worldly experiences concerning social objects.
- ⁵ G. E. M. Anscombe.(1958),pp.30-31.
- ⁶ Ibid.,pp.4-5.
- ⁷ Klaus Fiedler. (2008), pp.38-47
- ⁸ Kurez Ida. (2001), pp. 6-16.

⁹ Code here implies as a letter, word, sound, image, or gesture that has a reference with the social reality. A word has its meaning only when they apply to the right form of existence in social construction.

¹⁰ Channel is understood as the source or medium of command.

¹¹ Chris Knight, Tim Ingold and Bruno Latour.(1995), pp. 396-399.

¹² Alexander Marshack. (1996), pp. 539-541.

¹³ Manuel Garcia-Carpintero. (2001), pp. 93-131.

Parajes inhóspitos: Inquietud, familiaridad, mundaneidad

Fernando Gilabert

Abstract: With our reflections, we intend to show the rupture of the familiar-daily and the authentic existence following the premises that Martin Heidegger exposes in his works written around 1935. In these texts, poetics takes on special importance, since the way in which it uses language presupposes a reality originating in the human being in which there is no family home to which he should return, but rather reveals the inhospitable situation to which the human being is thrown, not because he has embarked on a march from the warmth of the home towards the unknown, but because this inhospitable condition is intrinsic to him.

Keywords: Heidegger; restlessness; familiarity; worldliness; poetics.

1. Las siguientes reflexiones versarán sobre la inquietante posibilidad de encontrar una fractura entre lo que consideramos familiar y lo que sería una existencia auténtica (*eigentlich*), en el modo expuesto por el filósofo alemán Martin Heidegger en *Sein und Zeit*¹. Que exista riesgo de fractura hace saltar las alarmas, a pesar de que en la vida cotidiana parece que hay una especie de cuerda que nos ata al hogar familiar o, mejor dicho, un rastro de migas de pan, como en el cuento de Hansel y Gretel, que nos permitirá volver a casa siempre que lo deseemos². Esta metáfora empleada por los Hermanos Grimm pone el acento en un momento de ruptura: cuando los pájaros devoran el pan. Habría que localizar el origen tempóreo de ese momento de ruptura y dar marcha atrás para subsanar el error, bien con la vana esperanza de enmendarlo, bien con intenciones de, al menos, comprenderlo. De esta forma, nuestro destino trágico en el desamparo del mundo moderno podría hacérsenos más llevadero. Los sinsabores cotidianos son más tolerables si tenemos un hogar perdido que es posible recuperar; podemos volver al Edén, sólo hay que volver a encontrar el camino. Nuestra opinión es tajante: no creemos que haya existido jamás ese hogar inicial al que debamos, queramos o podamos volver, sino que, más bien, responde a las habladurías (*Gerede*) del mundo cotidiano³. Nuestra condición de arrojado empieza cada vez ahora y ya nos encontramos desde siempre en la tierra de hierro⁴, en el paraje inhóspito y desacogedor, diríamos más, en el abismo (*Abgrund*)⁵. No hay vuelta al hogar ni retorno al calor de lo familiar. El morar en el paraje inhóspito es el "estado natural" de la humanidad: el ser humano está desamparado porque es un ser sin hogar, no porque lo perdió, sino porque nunca lo tuvo.

Un pequeño faro que ilumine nuestras diatribas podemos encontrarlo en un poema de Charles Bukowsky:

*The burning of the dream*⁶. En él se cuenta la noticia leída en un periódico del incendio de la biblioteca pública de Los Angeles. En esa biblioteca, entre mendigos que usaban los servicios, el poeta conoció las obras literarias que le permitieron algo así como afrontar eso que nosotros hemos denominado morar en el paraje inhóspito, evitando que se convirtiera en un suicida, un carnicero, un motorista de la policía o en alguien que pega a su mujer. Este poema podría pasarse por alto para nuestra cuestión si no fuera por su último verso: *You can't go home again*. El fuego, el incendio, marca el hiato del autor con lo familiar, pero parece que eso que era familiar ya estaba demasiado lejos y ya no había retorno, puesto que, según entendemos en esa composición, por entonces aún no había decidido su "qué", sino que estaba todavía en camino de configurar su identidad.

No podemos volver al hogar, no hay un retorno al calor de lo que era familiar. Las propuestas filosóficas que de Heidegger tomaremos para tratar de esclarecer la imposibilidad de este regreso, las hallaremos principalmente en los textos alrededor del año 1935, como las lecciones impartidas en el semestre de verano en Friburgo, el curso *Introducción a la Metafísica*⁷. En un determinado momento de este curso, el pensador de Meßkirch hace referencia a la obra de Sófocles *Antígona*⁸. La alusión a esta tragedia nos va a servir como indicativo de uno de los aspectos que consideramos clave de la existencia: el desamparo, el estar en un paraje inhóspito y lo inquietante de percatarnos de que allí moramos. La elucidación de este desamparo marcará la pauta de nuestro trabajo.

2. A nuestro parecer, 1935 supone, en el camino del pensar de Heidegger, un año de tránsito. Por esta fecha, el giro de su pensamiento, la llamada *Kehre*⁹, está tomando la forma necesaria que permite el salto al exterior de la metafísica. Sólo un año después comenzará con la escritura de los *Aportes a la filosofía*¹⁰, clave para ese salto. Pero la situación personal del filósofo de la *Schwarzwald* en ese año de 1935 es bastante compleja. Un año antes, concretamente el 23 de Abril de 1934, había presentado su dimisión como rector de la Universidad de Friburgo sólo un año después de haber tomado posesión del cargo¹¹. Los motivos de la renuncia siguen sin estar, para nosotros, del todo claros, a pesar de las palabras de exculpación de Heidegger cuando acaba la guerra¹² y toda la especulación habida en torno a ese tema a partir de su intercambio epistolar (en ocasiones censurado o perdido sospechosamente, como las cartas a su hermano Fritz¹³), los registros burocráticos de los que tenemos constancia¹⁴ y los recuerdos de quienes mantuvieron contacto con él en aquellos años¹⁵. Esto es, lo que tenemos es una documentación ex-

tensa pero limitada, por no ser, en el fondo, explícita y por provenir de personas poco imparciales, por ser partidistas leales de Heidegger o estar decididamente en contra de él. A partir de todo ello se han elaborado ya muchos trabajos para demostrar o desmentir la conexión con el nazismo, tanto de la filosofía como de la persona. Aquí no vamos añadir nada nuevo a este tema escabroso. Señalamos sólo que 1935 es un año intenso en el camino heideggeriano, a pesar de que el curso haya sido mirado con lupa por si en él hubiera un ensalzamiento del nazismo o una muestra de decepción porque este movimiento no comprendiera su grandeza intrínseca y se tornase el culmen de la metafísica¹⁶.

La única observación que añadimos a este debate es la referencia a un apunte editorial insertado en la reelaboración del curso para su publicación en 1953, casi veinte años después. En la nota preliminar se señala: "Lo hablado ya no habla en lo impreso"¹⁷. Esto puede despertar la duda acerca de si mencionó en el transcurso de las clases algo que omitió deliberadamente en el texto editado para no verse comprometido. Pero el sentido de esta observación que hacemos va por otros derroteros: Lo hablado que ya no habla, porque ya no es posible hablar una vez que ha sido escrito, es la oralidad misma acorde a la circunstancialidad del aula. La palabra viva de la lección se pierde cuando se estatiza por escrito. Esta imagen de oralidad es importante en nuestros propósitos.

3. A nuestro juicio, el objetivo primordial de estas lecciones de 1935 es el ataque a la metafísica imperante en la tradición filosófica de Occidente desde los antiguos griegos y desde la que pretende saltar Heidegger en este periodo de *Kehre*. Las líneas de pensamiento desarrolladas durante el curso comienzan retomando el problema de la preponderancia del carácter de ser de lo ente por encima de la nada¹⁸, un problema que ya había sido examinado con anterioridad en *Was ist Metaphysik?*¹⁹ Este problema no se resuelve con una simple respuesta al porqué, como cualquier otra pregunta que se nos presenta en la cotidianidad, que pueden contestarse con una respuesta de tipo consecuente (por ejemplo: ¿Por qué hemos llegado tarde? Porque perdimos el autobús). En ese tipo de preguntas, toda asignación de un porqué es siempre interna de un mundo, como conjunto de todos los entes que se justifican entre sí, que se interrelacionan, pero no tiene sentido respecto de lo ente en su totalidad, esto es, de lo que es el mundo. Las preguntas de tipo "por qué" atañen a lo que hay en el mundo, pero no al mundo. Sin embargo, preguntarse por qué lo ente y no más bien la nada, problematiza la totalidad de lo ente como tal, problematiza al mundo²⁰. Que este problema no haya sido elaborado en la tradición metafísica indica que, en ésta, el problema mismo de la nada fue pasado por alto, puede que incluso por la comodidad de un programa filosófico sin ella: si la nada no existe, no se habla de ella y es mejor atenerse a lo que tiene ser, a lo ente. Pero al desligar de la nada al ser se produce una identificación de éste con lo ente en términos de mera presencialidad (*Anwesenheit*)²¹. La metafísica acude al ser buscando un ente sobre el que fundar todos los otros entes, sin percatarse de que, primero, el ser no es un ente y, segundo, de serlo, en ese ente primero o último se re-

plantea de nuevo toda la problemática del fundamento, del ser en cuanto tal.

Al no elaborar el problema de la nada, la metafísica no elabora de manera auténtica aquella problemática del ser, que es precisamente de donde partió. El origen de la metafísica es la pregunta por el ser y a lo largo de toda su historia esta pregunta inicial ha ido olvidándose paulatinamente²². De este olvido no somos culpables ni nosotros, los modernos, ni las generaciones anteriores, porque se remonta a algo que está más allá de nosotros, ya que incumbe al ser mismo. Pero a la vez la historia de la metafísica, la historia del olvido del ser, es nuestra propia historia, porque nos atañe ya que somos la apertura donde los entes (y nosotros mismo como entes) aparecen, esto es, una apertura que implica una relación con el ser de lo ente caracterizada por su propio olvido²³.

Que uno de los objetivos primordiales de todo el planteamiento filosófico de Heidegger sea la rehabilitación del pensar acerca del ser, pone a este curso de 1935 como un hito significativo en todo su camino del pensar. En esta *Introducción* se describen las amenazas para que dicha rehabilitación sea fecunda y cómo las tendencias que a lo largo de las sucesivas épocas ha tenido la metafísica, auparon la primacía de lo ente en detrimento del ser. La pregunta por lo ente y no por la nada es, entonces, la pregunta fundamental a la que ha de remitirse el pensar, ya que acude a los fundamentos. Estos fundamentos, que remiten a la diferencia ontológica (el ser y lo ente no son la misma cosa aunque se den en conjunto y nunca el uno sin el otro), radican en la delimitación de la palabra "ser". Pero también hay que destacar en este texto la crítica a la razón instrumental, a la tecnociencia que rige el pensar de las sociedades modernas y que se ha erigido en la tradición metafísica como la doctrina ideológica dominante a cuyo compás se mueve el mundo.

4. Podríamos preguntarnos qué tiene que ver el problema de por qué el ente y no la nada con la cuestión de la inquietud respecto de lo inhóspito y lo familiar. La ausencia de una pregunta por el fundamento, por haber sido eliminada de los interrogantes metafísicos, tiene que ver con que la reflexión derive hacia lo poético más que a lo metafísico, al arte más que a la ciencia. Porque el fundamento es el hogar último al que regresar. Si a éste no hay retorno, todo lo que era familiar (lo ente) se quiebra ante nosotros propiciando el abismo del desamparo. De ahí, la urgencia de la pregunta, porque a nuestro ser como entes le atañe la apertura misma del ser en tanto que hogar en el que se despliega la aperturidad del resto de entes que, junto con nosotros, constituyen el mundo. En esta situación, la poética (*Dichtung*) se torna el elemento que expone la violencia con que se comprende el paraje inhóspito en que moramos, porque muestra el desamparo humano como algo irremediable, al ser, en cierto modo, nuestro "estado natural": el hombre como ser desamparado, como un ser sin hogar que nunca lo tuvo. Ejemplo de esa poética que muestra la violencia de la comprensión de lo inhóspito es el texto de *Antígona* que emplea Heidegger²⁴.

Lo poética sirve a Heidegger para mostrar el desamparo provocado por la falta de un fundamento al que asirse. Que en su planteamiento haya una teorización del arte y la estética en relación, sobre todo, de sus investigaciones

en torno a la poesía, no es una novedad que presentemos, sino que ya muchos otros se han ocupado de ello²⁵. El propio Heidegger además es explícito sobre arte y poética, como muestra en los ensayos y lecciones sobre Hölderlin²⁶, Rilke²⁷ y Trakl²⁸ y la fascinación tardía por Celan²⁹. La poética no es el único arte que suscita su interés, ya que mostró también inclinaciones hacia los movimientos artísticos coetáneos, como el expresionismo alemán o la obra de Chillida³⁰. Nosotros, sin embargo, en el presente trabajo vamos a centrarnos en la poética para reflejar la violencia de la comprensión de lo inhóspito.

Hay que remontarse al vínculo que en la antigua Grecia se establecía entre el arte y la poesía. Para los griegos, la *ποίησις* es un "hacer" pero desde un sentido técnico y artesanal, es decir, tiene que ver con la creación, con el dar lugar a algo. Ese algo originado es la obra. Aquí, el "hacer", la acción técnica que se lleva a cabo en el acto de crear, es igual en el artesano y en el artista, esto es, vale tanto para construir útiles para el día a día como para las bellas artes³¹. Pero además, el origen etimológico de la poética lo vincula con más fuerza al arte que cualquiera de las otras "artes", que las otras disciplinas artísticas. La *ποίησις* aludía, en la antigua Grecia, a la actividad creadora porque daba existencia a algo que no la tenía. Eso valía tanto para el verso como para la pintura o la escultura: creaba algo de la nada y lo hacía aparecer en el mundo. Podemos objetar que los materiales a partir de los que se crea ya estaban en el mundo, pero el arte no es una mera transformación: el origen del Partenón no es la cantera de mármol. El arte, la *ποίησις* es un hacer-aparecer en el mundo.

Ahora bien, cuando hoy día, en nuestro hablar cotidiano medio, hacemos referencia a la poética (*Dichtung*), lo que con ello consideramos es un género literario, una obra de arte concreta que realizan los poetas y en la que se muestran los sentimientos del autor, del poeta, para con el mundo. La poesía ha pasado a ser lírica en el mundo moderno, dejando atrás el propio carácter del hacer. Es una construcción, una creación pero ya no es más el carácter propio de la creación, el carácter que ha de poseer toda obra de arte como fruto del artista creador. Más bien es, como señalamos, un género literario. Lo que sucede es que la etimología latina de literatura tiene que ver con las letras y al aludir a éstas, lo que nos sale al paso es leer³². De este modo, cuando hablamos de poesía, lo que nos viene a la mente, por lo general, es el libro de poemas, tenga éste un contenido meramente lírico o narre una epopeya. Matizamos lo del libro de poemas porque, si bien hay poesía en las canciones y hay poesía declamada, en el mundo cotidiano en que estamos inmersos, la imagen que se tiene de la poesía es un género literario, letras, lectura. Hasta la misma declamación de la poesía es llamada "lectura poética". Pero en su sentido originario griego, la poética no estaba destinada a la lectura, sino a ser interpretada, a ser re-presentada.

5. La poética, tal y como la entendían los antiguos griegos, estaba hecha para ser representada en el *θέατρον*. Ya Platón nos habla de tres tipos de poética: la poesía imitativa, que es la tragedia clásica; la no imitativa, identificada con la lírica en la que se cantaba a Dionisos; y la épica, donde se relataban hechos heroicos y se ensalzaba

a los héroes³³. Todas estas formas de poesía tenían en común que eran narradas a un público, que eran re-presentadas.

Volviendo a Heidegger, cabría preguntarnos qué es eso de la presencia (*Anwesenheit*) que antes citábamos, y si tiene que ver con la re-presentación de lo poético. Para buscar una respuesta, aunque sea con gran provisionalidad, acudiremos a los seminarios que impartió en la pequeña población suiza de Zollikon, a donde fue invitado por el psiquiatra Medard Boss³⁴. Re-presentar, como se hace en la poesía griega, tiene el sentido de volver a hacer presente y la presencia, que es el modo en que la metafísica ha tratado al ser, tiene que ver con el tiempo en tanto que siempre indica un presente actual, un ahora³⁵, no el antes que ya no es, ni el después, que aún no ha sido. Podríamos decir que la presencia tiene un ser, en sentido metafísico, a diferencia del pasado y del futuro, que no son, el pasado porque ya-no y el futuro porque aún-no. Y sin embargo, este pasado y este futuro no son una nada, sino que tienen un ser que es fruto de la limitación de la presencia como presente actual. Por ello, el ser del tiempo no es meramente un concepto del ser como presencia, tal y como lo entiende la tradición metafísica, porque a partir del tiempo la presencia se determina como ahora. Pero el ahora no puede separarse del pasado y del futuro. Re-presentar es volver a hacer presente, pero de un modo que no tiene nada que ver con el ahora estático de la presencia como el ser de la metafísica. Es más bien un traer a la presencia.

Ahora bien, cuando algo se trae a la presencia, solo ese hacer-presente mismo indica aquello que hace presente, sin una ulterior suposición y conclusión³⁶, que es lo que hace cualquier disciplina científica. Además, la re-presentación tiene el carácter de un estar-en-medio-de sólo en el pensamiento. Aquí tenemos que distinguir la imaginación de ese pensamiento mediante el que estamos en-medio-de, que son fenómenos distintos. Pensamiento sólo en hay en el pensar³⁷. La particularidad del hacer-presente es que nos permite estar en medio de lo re-presentado, es decir, en medio de lo ente que no es el ente que somos nosotros mismos, sin estar allí "personalmente". El estar-en-medio-de nuestro estar-aquí en medio de las cosas, tiene el rasgo fundamental del estar abierto para lo presente en que se está. El estar-cerrado, como la privación que es, sólo se da allí donde impera el carácter de abierto. Este carácter de abierto para lo presente es el rasgo fundamental de la existencia, por lo que la interpretación correcta del re-presentar trata de aceptar simplemente aquello que se muestra en el fenómeno del representar y nada más³⁸.

Siguiendo esto, el pensamiento no es ningún calcular, tal y como dicta la ciencia, sino un agradecer en tanto que está expuesto al aceptar que lo ente "es" algo y no nada. Ese "es" interpela al lenguaje no hablado del ser al ser humano, ese lenguaje del silencio, cuya distinción y peligrosidad se basa en estar abierto de muchas forma para lo ente como ente. Ese estar-abierto, esa apertura es precisamente la existencia. De ahí la importancia del vínculo entre la poética, entendida como re-presentación, y el existir auténtico.

La obra artística, una creación con visos de re-presentación, se identifica con lo poético y, desde su re-

presentar, abre mundo. La obra de arte, lo poético, es la apertura de la verdad, no sólo como un modo nuevo de ordenar la totalidad de lo ente, sino que presenta además el otro aspecto de la verdad que la tradición metafísica ha olvidado a lo largo de la historia del olvido del ser: el ocultamiento del que procede toda revelación³⁹. En la obra poética la verdad se muestra como revelación y apertura, pero también como oscuridad y ocultamiento. Ese abrir-mundo de la poética no significa una mera pertenencia a ese mundo, si no que abre e instituye la aperturidad misma, produce un cambio de ser. No es sólo una definición de la poética a partir del rasgo característico de su puesta en marcha por la verdad y como apertura de mundo, sino que implica que en ella radica la esencia de todo lo artístico⁴⁰. La obra no proviene de lo ente, sino de la nada del ente, es una novedad radical, es creación y, como tal, se instituye mediante la palabra, el lenguaje, de lo novedoso. La poética (*Dichtung*) designa la poesía como arte específico de la palabra. La novedad radical del arte sólo o principalmente puede darse en y desde la palabra, por lo que es el lenguaje el modo mismo de apertura al ser, al ser la precomprensión del proyecto existencial (dada en el pensamiento)⁴¹. Puesto que la apertura se da ante todo y fundamentalmente en el lenguaje, es aquí, en el lenguaje, donde se verifica toda verdadera innovación ontológica, todo cambio del ser.

Esto podría enlazar con lo señalado en la *Briefe über den Humanismus*, donde se señala que el lenguaje es la casa del ser⁴². Lo aquí expuesto se aclara en el sentido de que el lenguaje es la custodia de la presencia, esto es, del ser de las cosas como dar-se en la presencia. Esa aclaración del lenguaje como custodia de la presencia es lo que está a la base de un giro poético hacia el hogar.

6. Todo ese giro que en torno a 1935 da hacia el pensar poetizante del lenguaje, su interés en los textos de Hölderlin o por los trágicos griegos en las lecciones del *Sommersemester*, pueden verse como un alejamiento del activismo público y social de Heidegger tras el fracaso del Rectorado. Sin embargo, nuestra opinión es que la lectura de Hölderlin retoma más bien la cuestión de lo político, si bien no desde un sentido de lo nacional, como defiende, por ejemplo, Miguel de Beistegui⁴³. Contrariamente a Beistegui, no creemos que una reflexión filosófica en torno a lo político desde los planteamientos heideggerianos remita obligatoriamente a un nacionalismo a ultranza, independientemente de los vínculos de toda patriotía con una política como la nacionalsocialista. Una lectura nacionalista de Heidegger contraria al nazismo como la barajada es plausible si tenemos en cuenta que las políticas del NSDAP remiten a fortalecer las decisiones de un gobierno central, mientras que Heidegger alude al terruño, a la ciudad de provincias frente a la gran capital que es Berlín⁴⁴. Pero, la interpretación que hacemos de una política heideggeriana no implica hablar de Estados y nacionalismos, sino que es un acudir a lo político⁴⁵, lo cual tendría una estrecha relación con un morar originario, con un habitar en un hogar familiar primigenio.

El hogar familiar puede ser una traducción a *Heimat*, un término que Heidegger emplea frecuentemente por estos años. *Heimat*, es una palabra empleada por Heidegger pero que, al igual que sucede con *Volk* (pueblo) o *Er-*

de (tierra), suelen ser propios de un discurso con un marcado carácter nacionalista. Pero a diferencia de estos alejados territorialistas, donde "patria", "pueblo", "origen", "tierra", "raza" u "hogar", a pesar de sus matices diferenciadores, son equivalentes en tanto que remiten al mismo fundamento, en el discurso heideggeriano no se da esta equiparación, no son palabras intercambiables, entre otras cosas porque se emplean cronológicamente: En los años del Rectorado (1933 y 1934), la palabra clave es "pueblo" (*Volk*), con el que se alude a un tipo de comunidad, p. e. la universitaria, en tanto que unidad⁴⁶. Ya en 1935, con la lectura de Hölderlin y los textos y lecciones que aquí nos ocupan, el término a tener cuenta es *Heimat*, que presenta connotaciones muy distintas a las de "patria" y "pueblo". Finalmente, el concepto "tierra" (*Erde*), que comienza a emplearse a finales de 1935, no toma una forma definitiva hasta tornarse uno de los elementos de la cuaternidad (*Geviert*), desarrollada como un último *τόπος* de su pensamiento⁴⁷.

Pondremos el foco de nuestra atención en *Heimat*. Usualmente puede ser traducido por "hogar" o "casa", pero también tiene el sentido de "patria" o "tierra natal". Podríamos exponer la exégesis de que, en el planteamiento de Heidegger, la *Heimat* marca la frontera entre el nacionalismo de pertenencia y lo que la nación "es", en tanto colectivo y mundo al que uno es arrojado. La raíz *heim* daría lugar a un rico léxico: *Heimat* (tierra natal y hogar), *Heimweh* (nostalgia), *Heimkunft* (futuro hogar, regreso a la patria), *Heimischwerden* (acogedor), *Heimlichkeit* (secreto, misterio, tal vez privacidad), *Umheimlichkeit* (lo misterioso, lo inquietante)⁴⁸. *Umheimlich* es lo inquietante, lo pavoroso, podríamos decir que revela algo así como aquello que no es familiar, como lo inhóspito, puesto que entendemos el hogar como lo familiar, como el lugar que no nos es extraño y/o ajeno.

La *Heimat*, desde su sentido de "lo familiar", frente a lo *Umheimlich*, "lo inquietante" es un término que Heidegger emplea a partir de la lectura que hace de Hölderlin. Lo familiar es la proximidad al ser, pensada a partir del discurso sobre la *Heimkunft* hölderliniana⁴⁹. Es posible que Hölderlin derive *Heimat* de lo que para los antiguos griegos era *οἶκος*. Una traducción literal de este vocablo griego lo definiría como "chimenea", el hueco en el techo por el que se iban fuera los humos del fuego del hogar. En torno a ese fuego se ordenaba la casa⁵⁰. *Οἶκος* es el lugar donde permanece el hombre, es el ámbito de la cercanía, ya que tiene connotaciones de lo familiar, privado y doméstico (*οἰκεῖος*), así como de apropiación (*οἰκεῖών*)⁵¹. En la Grecia clásica era la morada, la vivienda, la casa, pero también hacía referencia a la unidad familiar, la base de la sociedad, la comunidad que satisfacía las necesidades de la cotidianidad⁵².

En Hölderlin encontramos una preocupación porque sus paisanos encuentren su esencia, no en el egoísmo de un pueblo cerrado en sí mismo, sino en la pertenencia al destino de Occidente, como una proximidad al origen. La patria de este morar es la proximidad al ser, en la cual se consume la decisión sobre si los dioses se niegan a sí mismos y permanece la noche o si puede haber un nuevo amanecer para lo sacro⁵³. De este modo comienza la superación del destierro por parajes inhóspitos, donde el hombre y su esencia vagan sin rumbo. En Heidegger, la supe-

ración de este destierro comienza con el giro hacia el poetizar.

7. Cuando Heidegger pone la mirada en lo poético lo hace con el propósito de vincular la *ποίησις* y la *τέχνη*. Con anterioridad aludimos a que para los griegos *ποίησις* era un hacer técnico y artesanal. Por su parte, la *τέχνη* designa el comportamiento esencial y originario del hombre con respecto de la verdad de los entes. No es un el arte ni una habilidad técnica sino que es un conocimiento, una cierta manera de entender y morar entre los entes, un saber que permite la planificación, organización y dominio sobre lo que se organiza, es creación y construcción a partir de un saber⁵⁴. El saber, el conocimiento, es el poder-poner-en-obra. La obra poética no es solo obra por ser producida, sino porque efectúa el ser de un ente⁵⁵.

Para el Heidegger de 1935, el de las lecciones de *Introducción a la metafísica* y el texto sobre *El origen de la obra de arte*, el cuestionamiento se equipara con el poder de la poética. La obra del poeta es anterior incluso a la del filósofo, cuya reflexión siempre fue a posteriori, cuando el pensar se volvió una nostalgia de la reunión del ente en su ser⁵⁶, reunión ya dada en el pensamiento poético al ser éste *λόγος*⁵⁷. El habla del poeta constituye así el discurso originario de los antiguos griegos, porque para ellos, la poesía pensante era el lugar donde se daba a la existencia su configuración histórica. De este modo, el pensamiento y el poetizar son cooriginarios porque encuentran su fundamento en la esencia del lenguaje, ambos consiste en un habitar el lenguaje donde éste es *λόγος* y, por tanto, lleva a sí mismo su propia esencia. Pero si señalamos esto, que poesía y pensamiento presuponen el lenguaje, reconocemos que ese lenguaje tiene un origen más originario que el pensamiento y la poesía mismos. De ahí la urgencia también de la pregunta por el lenguaje.

A partir de entonces, a partir de ese "giro" hacia lo poético del pensamiento de Heidegger, el lenguaje se revela como el "ahí" del ser y el lugar de encuentro del hombre con el mundo. El conocimiento, esa *τέχνη* que designa el comportamiento humano para con la verdad de lo ente, presupone el lenguaje: si el hombre tiene una precomprensión del ser es porque se erige bajo su yugo, siendo esta precomprensión de índole poética al darse el ser en el lenguaje. Poesía y pensamiento presuponen la apertura inicial del lenguaje en lo originario.

La poesía no es un género literario, como antes señalamos, sino que es la esencia misma del lenguaje, el modo en que éste se despliega según su esencia. Otros modos del lenguaje, como podrían ser la prosa o el estilo empleado cuando hablamos a diario en la cotidianidad, son modos caídos, ya situados a una cierta distancia de la esencia del lenguaje. Desde el principio mismo, la esencia del lenguaje como poesía se ve amenazada por su contrario, por el hecho de que lo abierto por él en un momento de irrupción y desbaratamiento es cerrado por la familiaridad del discurso común, de esos modos lingüísticos caídos, que posteriormente se convierten en la regla y medida del lenguaje, regla que hasta entonces era dada por lo poético⁵⁸.

En la medida en que los poetas son fundadores, establecen nuevas leyes para el futuro. Pero, sin embargo, dicha fundamentación siempre es una transgresión de un

tiempo dado, de la ley del hoy y del ahora. Porque los poetas siempre están adelantados a su tiempo, lo superan y transgreden. Son creadores, pero sus creaciones son fruto de una soledad esencial: los poetas no pueden sentirse en casa en el tiempo de su hoy y ahora, en "su" tiempo, sobrepasan su *Zeitgeist*, siempre están más allá⁵⁹. La situación de los poetas es el exilio, aunque su obra lleve consigo la promesa de un morar nuevo y más auténtico, un nuevo hogar. El poeta es extraño por eso, por estar fuera del tiempo de lo que nos es familiar.

Sin embargo, Heidegger ve en los poetas una forma de regreso a la tierra, a un morar originario. La cuestión no es regresar a un punto de origen perdido, sino que hay que crear las condiciones para una relación libre con la tierra, de preparar el suelo sobre el que nos asentamos. El regreso al hogar apunta en la dirección de un origen que, paradójicamente, está por venir, pero el hombre moderno carece de un hogar, una patria a la que volver, no por la pérdida de una identidad nacional, sino por abandono del ser que amenaza la esencia misma como el "ahí" del despliegue del ser⁶⁰. Hölderlin, como poeta, sugiere indicios para el camino de vuelta al hogar, pero esta morada familiar no está ya al comienzo, no es originario, sino que se presenta como una conquista, un aproximarse que se afirma en el mismo momento en que se emprende el camino a casa. Es por eso que el retorno no es regresar a lo que estaba antes dado, no es volver al punto en que se comienza a andar, sino que ese origen se constituye mediante el retorno mismo. El hombre no está en el hogar del mundo, sino que este hogar es más bien lo más ajeno⁶¹, más aún que el paraje inhóspito donde mora.

8. En las lecciones de 1935, el empleo que Heidegger hace de la traducción que Hölderlin realiza de la *Antígona* de Sófocles, nos sirve para mostrar como el camino de regreso al hogar verdaderamente es un camino a ninguna parte, como esos *Holzwege*, senderos perdidos en la espesura del bosque⁶². Cuando en *Introducción a la Metafísica* alude a esta tragedia griega, lo hace en relación a la determinación de lo humano concebida desde la distinción entre ser y pensar, que ha devenido en la conceptualización fundamental que de ello tiene la tradición occidental⁶³. Esa determinación de lo humano que se ha dado conjuntamente a la historia del olvido del ser, a su juicio, es un error y debe ser enmendado, por lo que se hace preciso desandar el camino y, por ello, volver al origen y repensar la cuestión del hombre desde ese origen mismo de Occidente, desde la antigua Grecia. Para comprender entonces la cuestión primera del hombre, la pregunta por aquello qué es el hombre mismo, remite a los versos del primer estásimo de la tragedia sofoclea⁶⁴. Nosotros nos centraremos en el primer verso y en la antístrofa final.

El primer verso en el original griego es *πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδ' ἐν ἀνθρώπων δεινότερον πέλει*⁶⁵. La traducción de dichos verso a nuestro idioma podría ser la que hace Alamillo en su versión de las *Tragedias* de Sófocles: "Muchas cosas asombrosas existen y, con todo, nada más asombroso que el hombre"⁶⁶. Sin embargo, una traducción al castellano aproximada de la interpretación de Hölderlin que emplea Heidegger sería algo así como "Muchas cosas son pavorosas; nada, sin embargo, sobre-

pasa al hombre en pavor⁶⁷. Por su parte, la antístrofa final dice así:

σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχων
 τοτὲ μὲν κακόν, ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἐσθλὸν ἔρπει,
 νόμους γεραίων χθονὸς θεῶν τ' ἔνορκον δίκαν,
 ὑψίπολις ἄπολις ὅτω τὸ μὴ καλὸν
 ξύνεστι τόλμας χάριν. μήτ' ἐμοὶ παρέστιος
 γένοιτο μήτ' ἴσον φρονῶν ὅς τὰδ' ἔρδει⁶⁸

La traducción de la editorial Gredos, la de Alamillo, considerada la de mayor relevancia para la interpretación grecolatina en nuestro país es:

Poseyendo una habilidad superior a lo que se puede uno imaginar, la destreza para ingeniar recursos, la encamina unas veces al mal, otras veces al bien. Será un alto cargo en la ciudad, respetando las leyes de la tierra y la justicia de los dioses que obliga por juramento.

Desterrado sea aquel que, debido a su osadía, se da a lo que no está bien. ¡Que no llegue a sentarse junto a mi hogar ni participe de mis pensamientos el que haga esto!⁶⁹,

mientras que la de Hölderlin variará bastante de ésta, siendo:

Ingenioso, por dominar la habilidad en las técnicas más allá de lo esperado, un día se deja llevar por el Mal, otro día logra también empresas nobles. Entre las normas terrenas y el orden jurado por los dioses toma su camino. Sobresale en su lugar y lo pierde aquel que siempre considera el no-ser como el ser a favor de la acción audaz.

No se acerque a mi hogar en confianza ni confunda su divagar con mi saber quien cometa tales acciones⁷⁰.

Las traducciones, como vemos, tienen entre sí acuerdos y desacuerdos. El sentido del texto es glosar qué es el hombre, el ser que domina y transforma el mundo. Pero el contenido de uno y otro es diferente. Ambas traducciones se refieren al hombre como un ser dominante, pero especifican de modo distinto el modo de dominio. La interpretación que Heidegger hace de lo humano desde el sentido de los antiguos griegos implica una especie de retorno y se aparta explícitamente de la exégesis de la tradición, que es la que late en la traducción que empleamos de Alamillo, ya que pone el acento en lo inquietante del término *δεινόν* al ser traducido por Hölderlin como *Umheimlich*, que manifiesta un carácter des-acogedor, de lo inhóspito.

Sófocles señala al hombre como τὸ δεινότατον. Alamillo lo traduce como "asombroso", el ser humano como aquel ser digno del mayor asombro. Pero si recurrimos a un diccionario manual de griego, la entrada referente a *δεινός -όν*, de donde deriva *δεινότατον*, alude a lo temido, a lo espantosos, a lo horrible, alude al peligro e incluso a lo indigno, pero no a lo asombroso⁷¹. Parece más acertado traducirlo como *Umheimlich*. Señalar al hombre como lo inhóspito implica captarlo desde los límites más extremos y desde los escarpados abismos de su ser⁷². *Δεινόν* es lo terrible en el sentido del imperar que somete violentamente al ente por su condición de inhóspito, pero el hombre no hace uso de esa violencia contra lo que somete, sino que su actividad es violenta por sí. Lo inhóspito es lo arrancado de lo familiar, de lo do-

méstico. La existencia auténtica del hombre constituye el paraje más inhóspito porque su esencia está en medio de lo *Umheimlich*, de lo inquietante, de lo pavoroso, transcendiendo además los límites que le son habituales (familiares) siguiendo la dirección de su poder sometedor⁷³.

El ser humano avanza hacia todos los dominios del ente y, al hacerlo, es arrojado paradójicamente fuera de de todo camino. Sólo por esto se abre la condición de lo inhóspito que lo expulsa de lo familiar. Las características del hombre están al mismo nivel del poder sometedor de la naturaleza, pero con la diferencia fundamental de que estos rasgos lo atraviesan y lo empujan a asumir el ente que él mismo es, y no sólo lo rodean y sostienen, como sucede en el caso de la naturaleza. El carácter inquietante e inhóspito del hombre le somete a sí mismo en un estado ajeno a su esencia, convirtiendo en lo más próximo lo que es más lejano. El hombre es un extraño a su propio ser al aceptar encontrarse bajo la fuerza sometedora y, con ello, a sí mismo⁷⁴.

De este modo, tenemos que lo inhóspito está de algún modo ligado a la actitud violenta del poder poético. La actitud violenta, que originariamente abre caminos en lo ente como sujeción y doblegamiento de las fuerzas por las que el ente se abre al insertarse en él el ser humano, sólo fracasa ante la muerte, que sobrepasa todo límite. En este sentido, la existencia es el acontecer mismo de lo inhóspito. La violencia constituye el ámbito de la *τέχνη*, como el mirar más allá de lo materialmente existente y disponible. La *τέχνη* es el poder-poner-en-obra del ser como un ente y es en cada cual de uno u otro modo y, por tanto, lo que los griegos entendían con dicho término es la poética misma, porque la obra de arte efectúa el ser de un ente⁷⁵. La *τέχνη* caracteriza al *δεινόν* porque consiste en el empleo de la violencia contra la fuerza sometedora.

La existencia auténtica significa ser puesto como brecha que irrumpe y aparece en la superioridad del poder del ser, para que esta brecha misma se quiebre bajo él. El hombre, lo más inhóspito, es lo que es porque, fundamentalmente, promueve lo familiar, pero para transgredirlo y permitir con su transgresión que irrumpa la fuerza que lo somete⁷⁶. En cuanto brecha para la manifestación del ser, la existencia histórica es un incidente donde surge la fuerza sometedora del ser y se inserta en la obra como acontecer histórico. Recordemos para finalizar las últimas palabras del estásimo de Sófocles donde lo que se señala se vincula con el poema de Bukowski: un ente tan inquietante como el hombre ha de ser excluido de hogar y consejo: el hombre no puede regresar al hogar.

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- la *Briefe über den Humanismus* (1946), por poner como hitos de este giro dos de la obras principales del que fuera rector de Friburgo. De este modo, con el término *Kehre* queremos indicar la autointerpretación que Heidegger mismo hace de su propia filosofía. Sobre esta lectura, véase la magnífica biografía de Rüdiger Safranski (*Un maestro en Alemania. Martin Heidegger y su tiempo*. Barcelona, Tusquets, 2007. pp. 422 y ss.).
- ¹⁰ Heidegger, M. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936-1938). Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 2003.
- ¹¹ Xolocotzi, A. *Heidegger y el nacionalsocialismo. Una crónica*. México D. F. Plaza y Valdés, 2013. p. 140.
- ¹² Los hechos y reflexiones (*Tatsachen und Gedanken*) en torno a su experiencia en el rectorado que Heidegger redactó con la vista puesta en la comisión depuradora, están recogidos en *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges (1910-1976)*. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 2000.
- ¹³ La citada correspondencia con su hermano fueron editadas por B. Pieger (*Briefwechsel 1930-1949*. En Homolka, W; Heidegger, A. *Heidegger und der Antisemitismus*. Friburgo de Brisgovia, Herder, 2016).
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- ²³ Ib. pp. 5-6.
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- ²⁶ Por ejemplo, *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (1936-1968)* (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1996) o *Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein" (Wintersemester 1934/35)* (Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1999).
- ²⁷ v. *Wozu Dichter?* Recogido en Heidegger, M. *Holzwege (1935-1946)*. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 2003. pp. 248-295.
- ²⁸ v. *Die Sprache y Die Sprache im Gedicht*. Recogidos en Heidegger, M. *Unterwegs zu Sprache (1950-1959)*. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1985.
- ²⁹ Pueden verse los detalles del encuentro entre ambos en Safranski, R. Op. cit. pp. 483-486.
- ³⁰ v. *Der Kunst und der Raum*. Recogido en Heidegger, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1910-1976)*. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1983.
- ³¹ Heidegger, M. *Holzwege (1935-1946)*. Op. cit. p. 47
- ³² En el *Diccionario de la Real Academia Española* (Madrid, Espasa, 2014) podemos encontrar las diversas acepciones de los términos "poesía", "poética"... que aducen esta significación coloquial.
- ³³ Platón. *República*. 392C y ss.
- ³⁴ v. Heidegger, M. *Zölliker Seminare. Protokolle - Zwiegespräche - Briefe*. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 2006.
- ³⁵ Ib. p. 43.
- ³⁶ Ib. p. 89.
- ³⁷ Ib. p. 91.
- ³⁸ Ib. p. 94.
- ³⁹ v. Heidegger, M. *Holzwege (1935-1946)*. Op. cit. pp. 29 y ss.
- ⁴⁰ Ib. p. 62.
- ⁴¹ cfr. Ib.
- ⁴² cfr. Heidegger, M. *Wegmarken (1919-1961)*. Op. cit. pp. 313-364.
- ⁴³ v. de Beistegui, M. *Heidegger y lo político*. Tr. M. Costa y G. Merlino. Buenos Aires, Prometeo, 2013. p. 145.
- ⁴⁴ v. Heidegger, M. *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1910-1976)*. Op. cit. pp. 9-13.
- ⁴⁵ Partiremos de la división que Chantal Mouffe hace entre "lo" político y "la" política. A *grosso modo*, la política remite a un orden en la coexistencia humana, una forma de organización social, mientras que lo político implica el mero hecho de ser sociales, las relaciones que surgen en el convivir de unos con otros. v. Mouffe, C. *The Return of the political*. Londres, Verso, 1993.

Notas

- ¹ Heidegger, M. *Sein und Zeit*. Tübinga, Niemeyer, 2006. p. 42.
- ² v. Grimm, J., Grimm, W. *Kinder und Hausmärchen*. Bl. Gotinga, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986.
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- ⁴ *Deuteronomio*. 28, 23.
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- ⁷ Heidegger, M. *Einführung in die Metaphysik. (Sommersemester 1935)*. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1983.
- ⁸ La versión que nosotros emplearemos será la edición del griego clásica a cargo de R. Claverhouse Jebb (*Antigone*. Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1963), en que se basa la edición canónica del castellano (Incluída en Sófocles. *Tragedias*. Tr. A. Alamillo. Madrid, Gredos, 2005). Para exponer en castellano las diferencias que ofrece la versión de Heidegger y facilitar el texto castellano del fragmento al que remite, emplearemos la traducción que aparece en la versión castellana del *Sommersemester* de 1935 (*Introducción a la Metafísica*. Tr. A. Ackerman. Barcelona, Gedisa, 2003). De este modo, no dejamos de tener la mirada puesta en la que Heidegger empleó originalmente, la traducción que hizo Hölderlin (Insel. Frankfurt am Main, 1989), así como la edición en castellano de esta versión (*La Antígona de Sófocles en la versión de Hölderlin*. Tr. H. Cortés. Madrid, La oficina de Arte y Ediciones, 2014).
- ⁹ Hemos de señalar sobre la *Kehre* que no es un cortocircuito que de la noche a la mañana lleva al giro en el camino filosófico de Heidegger, sino que más bien es un proceso de casi dos décadas que comienza tras la publicación de *Sein und Zeit* (1927) y continúa, al menos, hasta la de

- ⁴⁶ v. El discurso con que inaugura su rectorado en 1933 *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität*, recogido en *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges (1910-1976)*. Op. cit.
- ⁴⁷ v. Heidegger, M. *Vorträge und Aufsätze (1936-1953)*. Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 2000. pp. 167-187.
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- ⁵¹ cfr. Pabón S. de Urbina, J. M. *Diccionario manual griego clásico-español*. Barcelona, Vox-Spes, 2003. Entrada "οἶκος". p. 419.
- ⁵² Aristóteles. *Política*, 1252b.
- ⁵³ Heidegger, M. *Wegmarken (1919-1961)*. Op. cit. pp. 338-339.
- ⁵⁴ Heidegger, M. *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Op. cit. p. 19.
- ⁵⁵ Ib. p. 169.
- ⁵⁶ Heidegger, M. *Was ist das Philosophie?* Pfullingen, Neske, 1992. p. 14.
- ⁵⁷ Ib. p. 30.
- ⁵⁸ de Beistegui, M. Op. cit. p. 152.
- ⁵⁹ Ib. p. 163.
- ⁶⁰ Ib. p. 168.
- ⁶¹ Ib. p. 171.
- ⁶² El camino de bosque, la senda perdida, es una metáfora muy del gusto de Heidegger. Ya sabemos la importancia que en su filosofía tiene la palabra "camino" (*Weg*). Los caminos de bosque (*Holzwege*), título de una de sus colecciones de textos, son esos caminos que se pierden entre la frondosidad de la arboleda, donde las sendas no están delimitadas.
- ⁶³ Heidegger, M. *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Op. cit. pp. 148 y ss.
- ⁶⁴ Ib. p. 155.
- ⁶⁵ Sófocles. *Antígona*, 332.
- ⁶⁶ Sófocles. *Tragedias*. Op. cit. p. 261.
- ⁶⁷ "Vielfältig das Unheimliche, nicht doch über den Menschen hinaus Umheimlicheres ragend sich regt". Heidegger, M. *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Op. cit. pp. 148 y ss.
- ⁶⁸ Sófocles. *Antígona*, 364-375.
- ⁶⁹ Sófocles. *Tragedias*. Op. cit. p. 262.
- ⁷⁰ "Gewitziges wohl, weil das Gemache des Könnens, über Verhoffen bemeinsternd, verfällt er einmal auf Arges gar, Wackeres zum anderen wieder gerät ihm. Zwischen die Satzung der Erde und den beschworenen Fug der Götter hindurch fährt er. Hochüberranged die Stätte, verlustig der Stätte ist er, dem immer das Unseiende seiend der Wagnis zugunsten. Nicht werde dem Herde ei trauter mir der, nicht auch teile mit mir sein Wähnen mein Wissen, der dieses führet ins Werk". Heidegger, M. *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Op. cit. pp. 148 y ss.
- ⁷¹ Pabón S. de Urbina, J. M. Op. cit. Entrada "δεινός -όν". p. 129.
- ⁷² Heidegger, M. *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Op. cit. p. 158.
- ⁷³ Ib. p. 160.
- ⁷⁴ Ib. p. 165.
- ⁷⁵ Ib. p. 168.
- ⁷⁶ Ib. p. 172.

Evaluating MacIntyre's "Nietzsche or Aristotle" Argument

Ali Abedi Renani, Muhammed Shareef

Abstract: The primary focus of this article is to explain how MacIntyre, as part of his project of the critique of modern morality, treats Nietzsche and his genealogical explorations of morality, and how adequate his interpretation is. This article includes an introductory elucidation of his larger project of what he himself rightly calls as disquieting and quieting suggestions (MacIntyre 2011: ch.II). This would enable us to situate our specific problem in a larger and meaningful context and make it more intelligible. It will also explain how MacIntyre places Nietzsche within his own critical endeavor to make a general claim on the enlightenment project of moral philosophy, so that he can make a radical disjunction between the Nietzschean and Aristotelian morality. It follows how MacIntyre interprets certain Nietzschean terms like "will to power" and "Übermensch" to fit his essential articulation of Nietzsche's moral theory as a culmination of enlightenment project of individualistic morality and 'Nietzschean emotivism'. Our aim is to show that MacIntyre's emotivistic interpretation of Nietzsche is not right; however, despite the recent attempts to place Nietzsche in the virtue ethics camp alongside with Aristotle, MacIntyre has been right to present Nietzsche and Aristotle as polar opposites.

Keywords: Aristotle, Nietzsche, MacIntyre, Virtue Ethics, Emotivism.

Introduction

The primary focus of this article is to explain how MacIntyre, as part of his project of the critique of modern morality, treats Nietzsche and his genealogical explorations of morality, and how adequate his interpretation is. This article includes an introductory elucidation of his larger project of what he himself rightly calls as disquieting and quieting suggestions (MacIntyre 2011: ch.II). This would enable us to situate our specific problem in a larger and meaningful context and make it more intelligible. It will also explain how MacIntyre places Nietzsche within his own critical endeavor to make a general claim on the enlightenment project of moral philosophy, so that he can make a radical disjunction between the Nietzschean and Aristotelian morality. It follows how MacIntyre interprets certain Nietzschean terms like "will to power" and "Übermensch" to fit his essential articulation of Nietzsche's moral theory as a culmination of enlightenment project of individualistic morality and 'Nietzschean emotivism'. Our aim is to show that MacIntyre's emotivistic interpretation of Nietzsche is not right; however, despite the re-

cent attempts to place Nietzsche in the virtue ethics camp alongside with Aristotle, MacIntyre has been right to present Nietzsche and Aristotle as polar opposites.

1. MacIntyre's Critique of Modernity

MacIntyre's critical project is centered on the state of grave disorder of moral philosophy in the modernity. The characteristic feature of modern moral arguments lies in its "interminable character". Moral debate of modern times will lead to nowhere and an agreed upon solution would be just a fantasy. Different positions in a debate each will proceed to conclusions incommensurable and irreconcilable with each other. Every argument would go back to totally different premises which are the reasons behind the irreconcilability of the solutions (MacIntyre 2011: 5).

A reason for the interminability of moral debates is the "conceptual incommensurability of rival arguments in each of these debates" (MacIntyre 2011: 5). This is because the rival arguments stem from totally different normative standards which are at odds with each other. In the just war debate, for instance, the concepts of "justice and innocence" face "success and survival" and thus each of the arguments is conceptually incommensurable with its counter arguments. This holds true in most of the contemporary moral debates. Whenever we affiliate ourselves with a single position in those debates, it is certain that we cannot convince our rival party who holds a distinct but logically justified position in the debate, because we do not have a common criterion to weigh one position against other. The lack of "an unassailable criteria" prompts one to proceed with his own judgement of what is feasible and what is not in a particular situation, giving rise to the interminability of arguments from every position (ibid).

The problem whether the interminability of moral utterances of today's ethical discourses is a contingent cultural fact, or it is inherent in moral discourse itself, is of a great philosophical significance. In order to do so, as MacIntyre notes, we have to address the theory of emotivism "which is the doctrine that all evaluative judgement and more specifically all moral judgements are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude and feeling" (MacIntyre 2011: 12). C. L. Stevenson is one of the main proponents of the theory of emotivism. For him, the sentence 'This is good' means roughly the same as 'I approve of this; do as well' trying to capture by this equivalence both the function of the moral judgment as expressive of the speaker's attitudes and the function of

the moral judgment as designed to influence the hearer's attitudes' (MacIntyre 2011: 13). Taking a different view point, MacIntyre (ibid) holds that "the expressions of feeling or attitude is characteristically a function not of the meaning of the sentence, but of their use on particular occasions". Emotivism, thus, is the theory of the use of moral precepts. This theory can be seen as a result of the failure of finding a rational and objective basis for moral utterances. Once the philosophers in the Enlightenment movement could not provide a rational justification for morality, there was no way other than resorting to an emotivistic reading of morality. Moral theory of emotivism has been a widely influential one throughout the modern history. Even within the frame of emotivism, the language used for the expression was completely deceptive and misleading. Instead of saying; 'Do this, because I approve of this' the expression 'You ought to do this, because this is good' which is seemingly objective is put forward. Thus, MacIntyre contends that our modern culture presupposes an emotivistic understanding:

Emotivism has become embodied in our culture. But of course in saying this I am not merely contending that morality is not what it once was, but also and more importantly what once was morality has to some large degree disappeared- and that this marks a degeneration, a grave cultural loss (MacIntyre 2011: 25).

Likewise, emotivism has become embedded in our cultural situations in a way that our moral utterances themselves are the product of an emotivistic understanding of ethical judgements. Not only the self-conscious theorization but also the everyday practices have been largely shaped by the culture of emotivism.

MacIntyre seeks to explain how different ethical projects in modernity have a deep root in emotivism and consequently how all of those projects have failed in a significant way. This includes an analysis of a seemingly radically different ethical justifications ranging from Immanuel Kant to Locke, Nietzsche and Sartre and different projects of analytic philosophers. This also includes how emotivism is expressed in our everyday making of a modern self and its resultant unintelligibility of the ethical realm (MacIntyre 2011: 35).

2. MacIntyre's Positive Project: Creating Virtue Ethics as a New Paradigm

MacIntyre's positive project centers on the notion of the virtues, which was dominant in classical societies from the Homeric age to the medieval period. Though Aristotle is a central figure in this analysis, for him, the Aristotelian tradition is not confined to the works and deliberations of Aristotle, but it includes a whole set of social facts before him in Athens and Homeric Greek, and after him the medieval Christian formulations.

MacIntyre envisages Aristotle as part of a tradition, even though a typical Aristotle would resist the attempt to view philosophy as part of a tradition. For Aristotle, human being has an essential nature by which he is defined. Human being is essentially characterized by an end or by what he calls as "human telos" (ibid: 52). So a good hu-

man life is that which is lived in a way that is apt to realize that "telos". Human telos or "Eudaimonia" is translated as blessedness, happiness, and prosperity (ibid: 148):

What constitutes the good for man is a complete human life lived at its best, and the exercise of the virtues is a necessary and central part of such a life, not a mere preparatory exercise to secure such a life (MacIntyre 2011: 149).

Aristotle explains the position of every virtue as being in the middle of two extremities, for instance "courage lies between rashness and timidity, justice between doing injustice and suffering injustice and liberality between prodigality and meanness" (MacIntyre 2011: 153). MacIntyre defines the virtues from three perspectives as follows:

A virtue is a quality that enables an individual to discharge his or her social role (Homer); a virtue is a quality that enables an individual to move towards the achievement of specifically human telos, whether natural or super natural (Aristotle, the New Testament and Aquinas), and a virtue is a quality which has a utility in achieving earthly and heavenly success (Franklin) (MacIntyre 2011: 250).

3. MacIntyre's Nietzsche: How MacIntyre Understood Nietzsche

After explaining MacIntyre's dual project of criticizing modern morality and proposing a new ethical alternative, it is time to enter into the crux of our topic; how MacIntyre understood or appropriated Nietzsche in order to reject him as a radical counterpart of Aristotelian virtue ethics. MacIntyre, after providing an extensive review of the enlightenment project of justifying morality, ends up in a radical choice between Aristotle and Nietzsche. The very title "Nietzsche or Aristotle" suggests this climax, and this is evident in the passage itself:

Either one must follow through the aspirations and collapse of the different versions of enlightenment project until there remains only Nietzschean diagnosis or Nietzschean problematic or one must hold that the enlightenment project was not only mistaken but should never have been commenced in the first place. There is no third alternative ... (MacIntyre 2011: 111).

This is how MacIntyre characterizes Nietzsche in his "either, or" argument. Either Nietzsche's diagnosis of enlightenment project is correct, and his supposedly emotivistic understanding is the true answer for the moral dilemma, or the enlightenment's denial of the Aristotelian ethical tradition is false and thus Aristotle's or Aristotelian ethical formulation was right. Our task in this connection is to enquire how MacIntyre was led to this conclusion, and ascertain whether he was right in his understanding. MacIntyre (2011: 113) sees Nietzsche essentially as a moral philosopher of emotivism. But unlike other emotivists, MacIntyre ascribes some privilege to him over his analytic counterparts.

The power of Nietzsche's position depends upon the truth of one central thesis; that all rational vindications of morality manifestly fail and therefore belief in the tenets of morality need to be explained in terms of a set of ra-

tionalizations that conceals the fundamentally non-rational phenomena of the will:

My own argument obliges me to agree with Nietzsche that the philosophers of enlightenment never succeeded in providing grounds for doubting his central thesis; his epigrams are deadlier than his extended arguments (MacIntyre 2011: 132).

Here MacIntyre acknowledges the fact that Nietzsche is, unlike any other philosophers, exceptional in understanding the moral dilemma of modernity. But some of his characterizations of Nietzsche are problematic and philosophically inaccurate. This includes his characterization of Nietzsche as a philosopher of emotivism and his lack of understanding of Nietzsche's real problem with morality.

4. Criticizing MacIntyre's Interpretation of Nietzsche

There are many criticisms of MacIntyre's account of Nietzsche. In this section, we will explain some of these criticisms; however, we finally argue that the virtue ethics interpretation of Nietzsche does not damage MacIntyre's contrast between Nietzsche and Aristotle.

Buket Korkut in his *MacIntyre's Nietzsche or Nietzsche's MacIntyre* identifies some of the problems with MacIntyre's portrayal of Nietzsche. He identifies three claims that have been made by MacIntyre's Nietzsche in the above passage; firstly, "The enlightenment philosophers failed to give a rational justification of morality" (Korkut 2012: 214); secondly, that "this is mainly because what these philosophers purported to be appeals to objectivity were in fact the expressions of subjective will" (Korkut 2012: 214); and thirdly that "there cannot be any rational justifications of morality because moral judgements are expressions of subjective will" (Korkut 2012: 199).

Korkut argues that MacIntyre's account of Nietzsche can be challenged if we can show that his interpretation of Nietzsche's problem with enlightenment project of morality is implausible (Korkut 2012: 200). Korkut argues that Nietzsche's moral project was very different from MacIntyre's characterization. We can look into whether this allegation is right in the light of Nietzsche's own texts. Nietzsche says in *Beyond Good and Evil*:

Morality in Europe today is herd animal morality—in other words, as we understand it merely one type of human morality beside which, before which and after which, many other types above all, higher moralities are, or ought to be, possible. But this morality resists such a possibility, such an 'ought', with all its power; it says stubbornly and inexorably, I am morality itself and nothing besides is morality (Nietzsche 2000: 305).

Based on the above-mentioned quotation, Korkut argues that Nietzsche's problem with contemporary morality was not its subjectivist nature but rather its absoluteness and appearance as an absolute frame of reference for practical life. Thus, he suggests that "Nietzsche's complaint about the Enlightenment philosophers is primarily based on a different reasoning and his problem with morality is actually different from MacIntyre's characterization of it"

(Korkut 2012: 203). He explains that philosophers before Nietzsche found themselves concentrating on predominantly epistemological problems. Even Kant, as is evident in his critique of pure and practical reason, and Hume were primarily stumbled upon what can be called 'moral knowledge'. But according to Korkut,

For Nietzsche, the problem of morality is not an epistemological problem, as (mis)understood by the Enlightenment philosophers such as Kant; the question is not how moral judgements are justified but the value of the very values that underlies such moral judgements. As opposed to the problem of knowledge, Nietzsche introduces the problem of values as the crucial task of philosophers (Korkut 2012: 203).

Thus, the primary Nietzschean criticism of the enlightenment project is that it does not question the values in the first place, and just attempts to find a rational foundation for them. Indeed, Nietzsche does not investigate the issue of truth from an epistemological perspective; rather, he questions the value of truth and asks "why not untruth" in the opening page of *Beyond Good and Evil*: "Granted that we want the truth: WHY NOT RATHER untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? (Nietzsche 2000: 6).

Korkut also sets out a criticism against MacIntyre's misinterpretation of Nietzschean perspectivism. For him, Nietzsche's notion of perspectivism cannot be identified with a version of moral emotivism, because it does not arise from individual subjectivism. He explains further that Nietzsche does not claim that moral judgements are individual preferences, which is the basic tenet of emotivism. Rather, it has its origin in Nietzsche's recognition of the socio-historical situated-ness of morality, in the sense that different moral systems might exist for different communities at different times in history. Accordingly, in contemporary terms, Nietzsche is neither a subjectivist nor an objectivist, but an inter-subjectivist regarding morality' (ibid: 205).

Daniel W. Conway is another scholar who, in his book *After MacIntyre; Excerpts from a Philosophical Bestiary*, levelled a strong criticism against MacIntyre's understanding of Nietzsche:

the crucial disjunction that MacIntyre proposes between Nietzsche and Aristotle is neither so exclusive, nor historically compelling as he suggests. Many of the Aristotelian currents that MacIntyre chastises Nietzsche for ignoring actually inform Nietzsche's moral philosophy (Conway 1986: 206).

Conway places Nietzsche within the Aristotelian moral tradition, which MacIntyre explicitly denies. Conway (ibid) argues that Nietzsche can be seen as a "neo-Aristotelian teacher of virtues" whose main purpose is to promote an ideal of human flourishing. Conway's focus in this connection is on Nietzsche's concept of 'Übermensch', which was for MacIntyre "at once absurd and dangerous fantasy" (MacIntyre 2011: 113). Moral individualism and radical voluntarism are the two elements that make up what may be called "MacIntyrean Nietzsche", and consequently lead him to make conclusions about the Nietzschean moral ideal "Übermensch" (Conway, ibid: 210). Übermensch, MacIntyre (2011: 257) states, "finds his good nowhere in the social world to

date, but only in that in himself which dictates his own new law and his own new table of virtues.” According to MacIntyre, the concept of “Übermensch” is an incoherent moral ideal, which stands aloof from all existing socio-cultural systems (ibid).

The primary objection raised by Conway is that MacIntyre’s account is clearly in conflict with many explicit writings of Nietzsche, and “this discordance is largely attributable to MacIntyre’s curious disregard for the context and rhetoric of Nietzsche’s writings” (Conway 1986: 212). Nietzsche’s repudiation of the concept of causal efficacy of the will, the view that the will is not a causal faculty, explained in many of his works including *Twilight of Idols*, is one important issue that MacIntyre has neglected. Because once it is repudiated, the radical voluntarism that he attaches to Nietzsche would be simply undermined. The same is the case with moral individualism.

Nietzsche explicitly protests against individualism by claiming that “the single one, ‘the individual’ as hitherto understood, by the people and philosophers alike, is an error after all” (Nietzsche 1990: 33). Nietzsche’s notion of the historicity of human being is also a defiant rejection of moral individualism and the characterization of superman as someone who transcends socio-historical specificities. These facts testify that MacIntyre’s rendition of Nietzsche’s Übermensch is loaded with serious misunderstanding of Nietzsche’s holistic ideas and is not a sufficient reason to render a radical disjunction between Nietzsche and Aristotle possible. There are many reasons, for Conway, to suggest that Nietzsche and Aristotle are not competent enough to be in such a disjunctive relation. There is little textual evidence that Nietzsche directly confronts Aristotle except in some aesthetic issues. Another reason for this is the fact that MacIntyre’s own admission that Nietzsche and Aristotle were against liberalism, suggests that both cannot be in a polar opposition (Conway, ibid: 215).

Conway (ibid) argues that, besides, there are enough evidence that Nietzsche was also promoting some kind of virtue ethics like Aristotle’s. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is one among the texts in which Zarathustra appears as a promoter of virtues. The main philosophical concern of Nietzsche was the promotion of virtue (Conway: ibid).

Alongside with Conway, Nietzsche specialists like Christian Daigle, Thomas Brobjer and Christine Swanton offer a virtue ethics interpretation of Nietzsche’s morality. We will explain their views, and try to defend a viable and more justifiable reading of Nietzsche’s virtue ethics, which is also called a “virtue ethics of becoming”; but we do not agree with these authors that his virtue ethics is identical with Aristotle’s.

5. Virtue Ethics and Character Development

Because of the explicit connection between virtue ethics and Aristotle, any reading of Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist would seem to presuppose that there is an underlying connection between Nietzsche and Aristotle. In fact, in a pioneering work, *Nietzsche; Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, Walter Kaufmann (1974: 382) considers Aris-

totle’s ethical ideas to have exerted an immense influence on Nietzsche’s ethical deliberations. This assumption is led by the relation between the concept of “the greatness of the soul” in Aristotle and the concept of “Overman” in Nietzsche. But, even the scholars who wanted to read Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist now reject Kaufmann’s assumption based on the superficiality of the argument and Nietzsche’s explicit statement regarding Aristotelian ethics as an example of “morality as timidity” in *Beyond Good and Evil*.

In his paper *Nietzsche: Virtue Ethics... Virtue Politics*, Christine Daigle (2006) sets out to understand Nietzsche as part of the larger tradition of virtue ethics, trying to resolve the assumed tension between the ethics of Nietzsche and Aristotle. Daigle (2006) is interested in reading Nietzsche’s ethics in connection with the twentieth century revival of virtue ethics. For him virtue ethics focuses on the character of a person rather than the conformity to an objective rule or the end or the consequences of an action. In virtue ethics, the agent’s inner state becomes the point of attention rather than the outward appearance of the agent.

For Daigle (2006: 2), virtue ethics “refocus attention on the moral agent and on a determination of virtues”. He is more interested in the project that focuses on moral agent because “its focus on agent and his or her character allows for the development of an ethics that has the flourishing of the individual as its strict preoccupation” (Daigle 2006: 2). Drawing on Michael Slote (1998) who identifies Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist “who thinks we should promote the good, but who has a distinctive and controversial view of what that good is”, Daigle (2006: 3) forcefully argues that Nietzsche promotes a character based virtue ethics. This is despite the fact that various scholars including Brian Leiter would reject any attempt to view Nietzsche as constructing any brand of morality.

Daigle based on various texts of Nietzsche seeks to explain the central importance of character formation and flourishing. This is in favor of the idea that apart from destructing the existing moral systems, Nietzsche is looking for self-affirming and life-enhancing virtues:

In the main all those moral systems are distasteful to me which say: ‘Do not do this! Renounce! Overcome thyself!’ On the other hand I am favorable to those moral systems which stimulate me to do something and to do it again from morning till evening, to dream of it at night and think of nothing else but to do it well, as well as is possible for me alone. I do not like any of the negative virtues whose very essence is negation and self-renunciation (Nietzsche 2010: 304).

This passage illustrates well Nietzsche’s typical stand in relation to morality. Nietzsche evidently promotes moralities that induce him to do something rather than make him abstinent from the act. When he says that he does not like negative virtues it means that he favors life enhancing and self-affirming virtues. The passages that explain both his destructive and constructive perception of morality can be found in many parts of his works:

The most general formula at the basis of every religion and morality is: ‘Do this and this-and you will be happy! Otherwise...’ Every morality, every religion is this imperative —I call it the

great original sin of reason, immortal unreason (Nietzsche 1990: 2).

In *Ecce Homo*, he specifically targets Christian model of morality:

At bottom my expression immoralist involves two denials. I deny first a type of man who has hitherto counted as the highest, the good, the benevolent, beneficent; I deny secondly a kind of morality which has come to be accepted and to dominate as morality in itself—decadence morality, in more palpable terms Christian morality (Nietzsche 2010: 4).

The same idea is repeated elsewhere:

We deny, and must deny, because something in us wants to live and affirm itself, something which we perhaps do not as yet know, do not as yet see! (Nietzsche 2010: 307).

The Nietzschean rejection of traditional morality is based on the fact that traditional morality tends to neglect individual potentialities and tries to forcefully conform to the historically created models of existence in which the free flourishing of life is brutally thwarted and hindered. So, the apparent nihilism is only a first step toward constructing a life affirming mode of authentic existence. For Daigle, Nietzsche's *Übermensch* is the one who has perfectly realized his affirmative ethical life.

The 'Übermensch' in Thus Spake Zarathustra, is the figure who is successful in becoming his own master. He is an overman, more than a man, a human being that is human and more. Why more? The *Übermensch* is the individual who has overcome the fragmentation inherent in tradition. It is the person who has reunited himself, who has decided to live fully as he is (Daigle 2006: 10).

Nietzsche's Overman embodies the spirit of his ethical teachings. The greatest achievement of Overman is his overcoming of traditional understanding of not only the ethical behavior but also the human existence itself. He has the capacity to affirm the concept of eternal recurrence by which each moments of his flourishing life would be lived authentically without negating an iota of experience.

6. Nietzsche: Egoist? or Virtue Ethicist?

How the popular characterization of Nietzsche as an egoist could possibly be reconciled with our reading of him as a virtue ethicist? How various statements maintaining an existential outlook can be seen from a view of virtue ethical orientation? These are some of the problems that have to be dealt with in studying Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist.

Swanton agrees that Nietzsche was an egoist; but in his view, there are different accounts of moral egoism. In his view, we can describe Nietzsche as a virtuous egoist, a form of egoism that is virtuous and therefore not egoism at all on some conceptions of egoism. Virtuous egoism is opposed to both non-virtuous altruism and non-virtuous egoism but not to all forms of altruism (Swanton 2015: 111). Nietzsche's kind of egoism is different from various

types of egoism that completely reject any sense of altruism. Ethics for Nietzsche is both egoistic and virtuous, both being internally connected together.

Nietzsche's virtuous egoism, which is inextricably related to the affirmation of life, can be articulated as the view that

"the fundamental shape of an individual's life ought to be one where her own life is affirmed by him or her" (Swanton 2015: 114).

This proposition needs to be understood in contrast to various other propositions about egoism. It should be differentiated from the statement "everyone should affirm all lives" (ibid: 115), because Nietzsche is not arguing for a super affirmation in which every life, whether it is authentically creative or not, is celebrated and affirmed. He has a definite sense of how one's life should be. He also holds that "one should be disgusted at other's mediocre non-affirming lives" (ibid: 115). He severely condemns the tendency to express disgust over other forms of life. A feeling of disgust itself is a sign of decadence. This view is also in contrast to the doctrine with an elitist connotation: "Everyone should affirm only the best or superior lives" (ibid: 116). Nietzsche cannot agree with this doctrine, because he is primarily concerned with the ethics of one's own self, but without precluding an attitude of admiration towards appreciable ways of life. But the above mentioned doctrine, rejected by Nietzsche neglects the cultivation of self and focuses on others. It should also be distinguished from something like "Each person should put her own life first in her practical reasoning and actions" (Swanton 2015: 116), because this is an instance of pure non-virtuous egoism, which Nietzsche does not hold on.

The Nietzschean virtuous egoism is also different from other strands of egoism such as evaluative and motivational egoism. Evaluative egoism holds that "Each person should evaluate her life as having superior value or worth than anyone else's" (ibid: 116). According to motivational egoism, "only the higher types [of human beings] should affirm their own lives" (ibid: 117), "Lesser human beings should promote the life affirmation of the higher types rather than affirm their own lives" (ibid), and "Everyone should affirm his own life by directly involving himself in the highest end like the redemption of his society and culture" (ibid). These differentiations make the original proposition of virtuous egoism strictly meaningful.

According to Swanton (ibid: 118), Nietzsche's virtuous egoism has a strong connection with his idea of will to power. There are questions as to how virtues and egoism go hand in hand and how Nietzschean egoistic actions are valuable. In his mature works, Nietzsche dismissed Hedonism, the idea that pleasure is intrinsically good. In his view, power and the will to power are not intrinsically good either; "rather what is good or valuable is will to power exercised well or excellently" (ibid: 120). Some forms of will to power are distorted. The criterion for this is that the distorted forms of will to power are self-denying instead of self-affirming. As will be argued below, pity is a vice in which a distorted will to power manifests itself. Swanton (ibid: 133) rejects Hunt's (1991)

view that for Nietzsche the attainment of power is the only standard by which we can evaluate the worth of people. Swanton argues that power is not the goal of the will to power, and attaining power may express a distorted, weak or unhealthy form. A passage from *Daybreak* explains this further:

Unegoistic!- this one is hollow and wants to be full, that one is overfull and wants to be emptied – both go in search of an individual who will serve their purpose. And this process, understood in its highest sense, is in both cases called by the same word: love – what? Is love supposed to be something unegoistic? (Nietzsche 1997: 91-92).

For Nietzsche love is egoistic since it expresses the need to be filled, and there are strong and weak expressions of this need. These notions provide an important remark about the character behind these actions, which has a central importance in virtue ethics. This is why some of egoistic actions are perfectly compatible and even better than some of the altruistic acts. Taking another example of acting for the sake of someone else, if the intention is “expressive of being overfull and need to bestow then it is egoistic in a valuable sense” (Swanton 2015: 124). Nevertheless, if the intention is “externalizing self-contempt by loving for and through others”, it is “altruistic in a non-virtuous way” and, thus, weak (*ibid*). A loving behavior express valuable or invaluable states in the individual depending on the character, deeper drives or motives behind it. If the drive is the expression of being “overfull” and a need to bestow, the loving is egoistic in a valuable sense. But if the motive is self-denial, self-sacrificing and externalizing self-contempt through others, it would be a non-virtuous altruism, as the person does not affirm or enhance his own life (*ibid*).

Pity is an instance of an altruistic act resulted from a distorted will to power, and is also an “externalized form of self-hate—an escape from a sense of vulnerability”; it is a disguised, subtle form of revenge—a repressed anger at one’s own susceptibility to the fate that has befallen the one pitied” (*ibid*). This is how the supposed altruistic action becomes for Nietzsche an expression of suppressed hostility. In essence, Nietzsche’s egoism is in some respects better than the apparent ethical boast of altruistic morality. We should note that the simplistic categorization of egoistic and altruistic acts is not applicable to Nietzsche’s own conception of what we call virtuous egoism. The discussion on the problem of egoism and altruism in Nietzsche’s ethical project can be summed up thus: Nietzsche’s rejection of altruism and acceptance of egoism is based solely on some specific notions of both expressions, that is, a popular non-virtuous notion of altruism is rejected and a virtuous notion of egoism is accepted.

7. The Nietzschean and Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

Even if we accept the virtue ethics interpretation of Nietzsche presented above, in our view, it is not possible to consider it as identical with the Aristotelian virtue ethics. In fairness to MacIntyre, there seems to be remarkable distinctions between the Aristotelian and Nietzschean virtue ethics. In our view, the Nietzschean and Aristotelian

virtue differ in at least two respects. The first is the communal nature of the Aristotelian virtue ethics *versus* the individualistic nature of the Nietzschean one; and the second is the teleological and good-based nature of the Aristotelian virtue ethics.

Regarding the first point, for Aristotle, the virtues are acquired through taming of desires. The process of taming desires occurs in an apprentice/master relationship. Intellectual virtues like wisdom, intelligence and prudence are acquired through teaching; moral virtues or the virtues of character like courage and justice are acquired by practice and habituation (MacIntyre 2011: 154). Aristotle (1966, Sec. II.1) explains the relation between the virtues and habits as follows.

Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (*ethike*) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word *ethos* (habit). ... Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.

In Aristotle’s view, MacIntyre (2006, pp.3-4) maintains, “practical habituation in the exercise of the virtues has to precede education in moral theory.” Only those who have acquired good habits are able “to theorize well about issues of practice.” Only the practically intelligent human being, in Aristotle’s view, can judge the mean in any particular situation. Such a person does not have any external criterion to guide him, but he himself is “the standard of right judgment, passion, and action.” Even true theoretical moral judgments are only accessible to the good human being.

These judgments, unlike theories in the physical sciences, require more than intellectual virtues, and require participation in particular kinds of moral and political practices (MacIntyre 2006: 4).

Nietzsche, by contrast, does not accept this role for moral exemplars. As Kristjansson (2007: 102) puts the point:

Nietzsche emphatically explains how the true role of a moral exemplar is to waken yourself to your ‘higher self’—the higher ideals to which you can aspire, the possibilities that lie dormant within yourself—and that you cannot take someone as your exemplar simply by undertaking to imitate him. Such an undertaking would, in Nietzsche’s view, amount to an ethically impotent form of admiration: a strategy for evading a morally motivated, inwardly felt demand for self-transformation.

For Nietzsche, the role of role-modeling and moral exemplars is far more restricted than its role in Aristotle’s view. The former has individualistic aspects. The role model cannot set goals for us to achieve. As Nietzsche holds, “No one can construct for you the bridge upon which precisely you must cross the stream of life, no one but you yourself alone” (*ibid*: 102). This is different from the communal view of the Aristotelian virtue ethics.

Regarding the second point, for Nietzsche, the virtue ethics of becoming, a term coined by Swanton (2015) to describe the Nietzschean virtue ethics, reject a definite telos for human beings. ‘Becoming one self’ is a continu-

ous process in which one constantly overcome his own present state of affairs without presupposing a definite end stage. It is also not about reaching a goal that is already set, which is evident in a statement by Nietzsche, "no such [as free will] substratum exists; there is no 'being' behind doing, acting, becoming... the doing itself is everything" (Nietzsche 2010: 23). In his view, "Becoming what you are presupposes that you have not the slightest inkling what you are".

The human being who doesn't wish to belong to the mass needs only to cease being comfortable with himself; let him follow his conscience, which call to him: "Be yourself! All you are now doing, thinking, desiring is not you yourself (Nietzsche 1997: 197).

The virtue ethics of becoming does not set a definite goal for us to achieve, and in fact rejects such a teleological attitude. It focuses on creating our values, not following the mess and human creativity without specifying any measure for distinction between the good and the bad. It clearly has individualistic values in line with the Enlightenment morality. This clearly contrasts with the Aristotelian virtues ethics, which is based on a substantive notion of the good.

Therefore, MacIntyre has been right to polarize Aristotle with Nietzsche, because the former was living and thinking in a context in which it was meaningful to speak about the good life and there was shared views about it; whereas, the latter did not have access to such an agreement on the good life; and thus, was just able to offer us some vague and empty notions such as life-enhancing, self-affirming and becoming, without articulating their meanings and offering us any criteria.

As shown above, intentions play a significant role in the Nietzschean virtue ethics. The self-enhancing and life-affirming intentions underlie the virtues. However, a question might arise for Nietzsche along the line that why life-affirmation counts a virtue, what its true meaning is, and what substantial impacts it will have on human relationships. Without having a shared account of the good life, Nietzsche cannot appeal to this criterion to distinguish between the distorted and correct forms of will to power. In other words, self-affirming is an empty notion. It by itself does not tell us what it really means. Nietzsche does not offer us criteria for affirmation. We do not know what kinds of life deserve to be affirmed and what kinds should be denied any worth.

By contrast, the Aristotelian virtue ethics introduces intellectual and moral virtues and ways to obtain these virtues such as the community and moral exemplars (Aristotle *ibid*: Sec. II.1). The Aristotelian virtue ethics is in principle communal. The individual by himself cannot know what the right thing is to do and affirm; rather, he learns from the community and moral exemplars what the virtues are. Therefore, any attempt to identify the Aristotelian and Nietzschean virtue ethics with each other because both place emphasis on the human character fails, as it does not take into account their differences outlined above.

Conclusion

We showed that MacIntyre has understood Nietzsche rightly in characterizing him as a rival of Aristotelian account of virtue ethics and conceptualizing him as a desperate culmination of modern projects of justifying morality. However, we argued that Nietzsche is far more than a moral emotivist, as is evident throughout his mature writings on ethics. As argued by the latest virtue ethical theorists, Nietzsche fits well into the virtue ethics fold. His focus on the importance of character and intentions is a great inspiration in this project. Virtue ethicists like Buket Korkut and Thomas Brobjer helped us understand how Nietzsche's writings express an inherent affirmative attitude towards a virtue ethical reading.

It was in Swanton's work that we saw a mature depiction of Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist. In her view, virtue ethics is seen as a family or genus of the ethics of which Nietzsche's or Aristotle's ethical projects are species. Swanton has argued that Nietzsche has moved away from Hedonism, and has in mind proper ways for exercising the will to power based on self-affirming and life-enhancing motives. Power is not the ultimate aim of human conduct. In the end, we argued that it is not possible to take the two figures' virtue ethics identical with each other, as the Aristotelian virtue ethics has communal and teleological aspects, while the Nietzschean virtue ethics is individualistic. Therefore, MacIntyre has been right to place us in a dilemma between Aristotle and Nietzsche, and the existence of some elements of virtue ethics in Nietzsche's moral theory does not save him from this rivalry.

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