
Introduction. Philosophy in and from Colombia

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What does it mean to put together a volume on “Philosophy in Colombia”? This was the question posed to us when we received the invitation from Prof. Marco Sgarbi to edit a special volume for this journal. The task could be interpreted in multiple ways. After all, the discipline of philosophy already has a longstanding tradition in Colombia, and compiling the history of this trajectory would be an important contribution to the current historiography of the discipline.¹ Moreover, there was the question of whether a volume on this topic should reflect the kind of philosophy that has traditionally been produced in Colombia. This would mean, perhaps, compiling some of the most important contributions to Colombian academic philosophy in the last 40 to 50 years in order to provide an overview of the landscape of the discipline. Doing so may have offered a first insight into the kinds of questions that doing philosophy in and from Colombia engenders even if traditionally this production has mostly overlooked and set aside – either explicitly or tacitly – the singularity of its geographical and historical circumstances.

As much as these questions, among others, could have been answered in very interesting ways in *Philosophical Reading’s* invitation, we have decided to take up the challenge differently – and perhaps from a more literal point of view. We asked ourselves what does it mean to think Colombia philosophically, and who has been producing this kind of thinking in recent years. Our interest was at least twofold: on the one hand, we were interested in showing the various forms in which the discipline of philosophy in Colombia has taken up the task of approaching its own present by questioning, making explicit, critically addressing and/or “reading” different aspects of Colombia’s reality and history. On the other hand, we wanted to explore the shape that philosophy takes when it is directed towards such a specific object of study: what kinds of voices are made audible and are produced in the process, what methodologies need to be questioned and which ones need to be thought anew, and specially, what does it mean to think philosophically in this context when most of the history of the discipline has explicitly ignored the singularity of non-European, non-Western forms of thought.

The challenge comes with its own difficulties; particularly for those of us educated in a more traditional form of academic philosophy which in Colombia has remained almost exclusively within the European and Anglo-American frameworks. It is also, however, an opportunity to explore a territory that remains mostly uncharted. This is not to say that this effort does not have important antecedents in Colombia’s academic tradition.² It, however, is

definitely not the usual way of approaching philosophy’s task. This task entails, among other things, a capacity for philosophy to listen to the specificity of one’s own location. Such specificity requires the ability, sometimes, to set aside, to undo – or even to unlearn – categories of thought that do not allow for certain realities to be made audible. Some other times, it entails putting those very same categories to use, in creative ways, to establish a horizontal dialogue – archipelagic, in Édouard Glissant’s words – between the different and often incommensurable traditions that transverse postcolonial territories where such a dialogue is not only with an-other, but rather a dialogue with the other of oneself, with one’s own past and with the structures that still lie at the ground of one’s own present. Finally, it always seems to require an understanding of the limits of such a dialogical horizontality, and of the production of frameworks or grammars that can in fact do justice to the uniqueness of the realities they intend to interrogate.

Part of our interest in this volume is to explore how these various possibilities are deployed in different ways and through different approaches by some of the Colombian philosophers who, over the past few years, have been consistently committed to taking up some of these challenges in their work. One could say that each one of the contributions to this issue shows a particular side of what it means to think in and from Colombia, or, more broadly, from the periphery, in Adolfo Chaparro and Fernando Zalamea’s words. The common thread of all these contributions is the effort either to question a more traditional form of doing philosophy, or to put this traditional form to use in a context that requires it to be creatively pushed to its limits. While some of the articles are more explicitly devoted to taking as their object of study a Colombian case-study (see most of the contributions in the first part of this issue), they are all concerned in one way or another with what it means for philosophy to think from the margins (see particularly the second part of this issue).

Thus, the first part, *Violence, History and Representation*, begins with Angela Uribe Botero’s contribution. In her article titled “Empatía y humillación: sobre *La Violencia* en Colombia” (“Empathy and Humiliation: Regarding *La Violencia* in Colombia”), Uribe Botero continues the kind of work she has been producing for the last few years and of which her book *Perfiles del mal en la historia de Colombia* (2009) is a good first sample. Namely, she uses contemporary political philosophy and ethics to interrogate concrete instances of violence in Colombia’s history in order to show, sometimes, philosophy’s limits in giving an account of extreme forms of vio-

lence, and, at other times, to bring to light the tools philosophy can offer to make sense and illuminate the former. In her contribution to this issue, Uribe Botero addresses the extreme cruelty and brutality that characterized the kind of violence inflicted on bodies during the historical period known as “La Violencia” – the armed confrontation between *Conservadores* and *Liberales* between 1948 and 1964 in Colombia. She asks, how is it possible to understand the extremely vicious and blood-thirsty character of the massacres during this period? How are we to give meaning to the painstaking detail with which the perpetrators left their particular marks on their victim’s bodies? Uribe Botero analyzes the plausibility of an explanation that has become predominant in the Colombian context as an answer to these questions, and according to which the perpetrators did not really *see* themselves, nor their victims, as human beings. This answer has been defended in particular in the extensive work of anthropologist and historian María Victoria Uribe Alarcón.³ Uribe Botero follows this explanation focusing in particular on Uribe Alarcón’s hypothesis of a supposed functional schizophrenia used by perpetrators to displace the authorship of their actions from themselves to a sort of “alias” – a fictional character, “animalized” or “objectified,” that the perpetrator creates to defer their own responsibility. The hypothesis of such schizophrenic device is rejected by Uribe Botero on two grounds. First, this pathology is not used in the works of Uribe Alarcón as a literal mental condition affecting the perpetrators, but as a sort of voluntary artifice created in order to exculpate themselves. If this is so, the argument would show that rather than not really “*seeing* themselves as fully human,” the perpetrators produce a device to avoid the consequences of what they actually *see* but cannot or do not want to face. Second, the author focuses on the possible meanings of the word “see” in this context. Attending to the more colloquial interpretation of the expression, namely, the way in which we perceive, and to phenomenological approaches to “*seeing*,” via Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein, Uribe Botero argues that perpetrators did *see* themselves and their victims as humans and not as animals or things. The article ends by suggesting a better way of approaching the phenomenon and the perplexity that arises in hearing and reading about the atrocities of *La Violencia* by alluding to Avishai Margalit’s notion of humiliation. It is not so much that the perpetrators “see” themselves and their victim as an animal, but that they act “as if” the other was an animal or a thing. The metaphorical character of the “*seeing*,” Uribe Botero argues, avoids the difficulties of a more literal conception of perception, and allows her to go back to Uribe Alarcón’s historical explanation with new eyes, and to consider under a different, more ethical, light the question about the cruelty of “La Violencia”’s criminal acts.

Following the question of violence and its representation, but this time addressing the issue of the difficulties this entails for memory building, Ana María Rabe devotes her contribution to the kinds of challenges that arise when we ask, from a philosophical perspective, about the production of memory in the aftermath of Colombia’s conflict. In her article titled “La memoria no es ‘cosa del pasado’”. Los retos de la memoria en Colombia desde una perspectiva filosófica” (“Memory is not a thing of the

past. Challenges for memory in Colombia from a philosophical perspective”), Rabe examines some of the “common places” frequently associated with the question of memory in transitional contexts such as Colombia’s. She is mostly worried about the usual conception of the past as an already closed event, frozen in time, which entails a conception of memory as mere “recovery” of the past. Such a conception risks increasing the gap between past and present which helps to ensure rather than to resist oblivion. Paying attention to a philosophical conception of time, particularly Walter Benjamin’s notion of *Eingedenken*, Rabe proposes to put in question the usually presupposed gap between past and present. Colombia’s current transitional process, Rabe argues, helps us see the very complicated entanglement between the two, and the impossibility of sustaining a radical separation between them. Following the case study of a project for a museum of memory in Medellín, and through a comparative approach with other memory museums in Bilbao and Victoria-Gasteiz, Rabe shows what it means to think of the past in continuous construction and connection to the present, and how this entails a conception of memory more focused on repairing the present than on “recovering” the past.

Miguel Gualdrón Ramírez’s essay, “Transversality as disruption and connection: on the possibilities and limits of using the framework of trauma in Glissant’s philosophy of Caribbean history,” continues the topic of a philosophical perspective on memory with a special focus on the question of trauma. Gualdrón Ramírez asks whether the idea of trauma – with its Western and European background and history – can be used to describe the social, cultural, and historical conditions of the Caribbean peoples in the present. Could Caribbean history be described as a series of traumatized communities on account of the genocide of its indigenous peoples, the slave trade, and the hundreds of years of continuous colonization? In order to approach this question, Gualdrón Ramírez uses as a starting point Martinican thinker Édouard Glissant’s image of the abyss [*le gouffre*] with which Glissant evokes the Middle Passage, that is, the geopolitical model used for four hundred years for the transportation of around twelve million people from Africa to the Americas to be used as slave labor. The particularity of Caribbean history, in the context of its abyss-beginning, leads to a paradoxical phenomenon, namely, that the absence of history feels, at the same time, as too onerous. Using Cathy Caruth’s approach to trauma, and her way of working through this paradox between the absence and the excess of memory/history, Gualdrón Ramírez shows how Glissant’s answer to the paradox is both a way of taking up the question of trauma, and simultaneously questioning its sufficiency to give an account of the atrocity entailed by the Middle Passage as well as the kind of memory and history that is demanded by it. In the case of the Caribbean, Glissant claims, the goal is not only to witness trauma, but to de-traumatize communities. In Gualdrón Ramírez’s analysis, this process of de-traumatization is equivalent, and runs parallel, to a process of decolonization of his-tory. Gualdrón Ramírez points to Glissant’s notion of “transversality” as the main feature allowing for this attempt at de-colonization and breaking of the paradox of history. In this way, his article shows the possible

connections between a way of doing history as a decolonial and decolonizing task, and the creativity involved in this process. This way of understanding the task of decolonization brings to light another way of conceiving the connections, suggested by Glissant himself, between trauma and the history of coloniality in the Americas.

Continuing with the subject of history and memory from a decolonial perspective, María del Rosario Acosta López chooses as her object of study in her article “One Hundred Years of Forgottenness: Aesth-Ethics of Memory in Latin America,” a very specific event in the history of erasures that populates—and has produced, as Acosta López argues—Colombian history: the massacre of the United Fruit Company workers in 1928 in Ciénaga, Magdalena. Against all the institutional attempts to erase the event – one of the biggest undocumented massacres in the history of Colombian violence – and its real protagonists, Acosta López explores the ways in which it has not only resisted oblivion but has survived, oscillating between myth and reality, thanks to the denouncing, challenging, and decolonizing power of literature and art. How to address the “truth” about what happened when everything pointing to an objective and incontrovertible proof has been radically erased? And how to remember this very erasure? What are the strategies to memorialize both the event and its multiple erasures all the way up to the present? Following García Márquez’s suggestions about the need to produce conceptual resources that can render unimaginable lives believable and supporting this line of thought with Hannah Arendt’s reflections on the stubbornness of facts against oblivion, Acosta López proposes to displace the question of history as a reconstruction of the truth, to the question of memory as the condition of possibility for believability. Literature in García Márquez’s *Cien años de soledad*, and art in José Alejandro Restrepo’s *Musa Paradisiaca*, seem to be able to produce grammars capable of remembering what cannot be recovered and yet resist oblivion despite the fact that violence has erased every other possibility of signification. These grammars, multiple, irreducible to one another, and perhaps sometimes incommensurable among themselves, can be read as a continuation of Gualdrón Ramírez’s proposal around the need to decolonize history by way of producing alternative visions of the past.

Restrepo’s *Musa Paradisiaca* is also the protagonist of the next contribution to this issue. If Acosta López is interested in showing the ways in which the artist has been able to tie coloniality to current forms of violence in the history of the Colombian conflict, in his contribution to this issue, Bruno Mazzoldi explores the connection between this side of the artwork and its hallucinatory powers. In “Amanita, amarguísima amanita... (a propósito de *Musa Paradisiaca* de José Alejandro Restrepo)” [“Amanita the most bitter amanita... (on José Alejandro Restrepo’s *Musa Paradisiaca*)], Mazzoldi, whose work has always echoed Derrida’s deconstructive writing while showing its power when exercised from the margins, untangles the forms of hallucination that Restrepo’s installation simultaneously produces while denouncing, and denounces by producing. Tied to the questions – posed by Restrepo in his work – of what it means to have a history colonized by its own myths, and a mythical form of history condemned to repeat its inherited forms of violence,

Mazzoldi attends to the intriguing power of the work of art to interrupt by way of alluding, and producing with this allusion the most lucid of all hallucinations. It is to the writing – and the performance of this writing – and not only to what is written that the reader should attend in the case of Mazzoldi’s contribution. His essay is a very good example of the kind of work he has committed himself to produce. A kind of work always situated in a very specific historical/geographical present/location, always open to inaugurating a form of thinking that, like Restrepo’s work, attempts to call for the need to interrupt the operation of coloniality by producing a decolonizing form of “writing”.

Finally, in the last paper of the first section of the issue, “Historia como fantología: Vida onírica, cantos mortuorios y el deber para con los espectros en Bojayá, Chocó” (“History as hauntology: oneiric life, mortuary chants, and the duty towards specters in Bojayá, Chocó”), Diego Cagüañas Roza investigates another form of device that is also interruptive perhaps because of its hallucinatory character, namely, the power of the oneiric life in the context of processing, memorializing, and mourning extreme forms of violence. In his paper, Cagüañas Roza investigates the relations between dreams, history, and memory by analyzing their particular entanglement in the practices of the *alabaos* in the Chocó region in Colombia. *Alabaos* are funerary songs, usually sung by women (*alabaoras*), that help the dead navigate their way to the land of their ancestors. When the body cannot be buried and the dead are not yet entirely dead but disappeared as it is the case with some of the dead bodies left by the kind of violence endured for decades in the Chocó region, these chants become, as Cagüañas Roza shows, strategies for political resistance and denunciation. Dreams in this context, a region “between” the land of the living and the land of the dead, are shown by Cagüañas Roza as a territory of personal and political dispute, one affected by the armed conflict in Colombia, and in particular, by the 2002 massacre in Bojayá where, during an armed attack by the FARC guerrillas, a home-made mortar was thrown against the Bella-vista church where people had been hiding, killing more than 100 of them. The victims, who were buried in unnamed tombs near the town, were never guided by *alabaoras* to the other side, and thus the soul of the community was gravely damaged. In the article, Cagüañas Roza focuses on the story of Ciria Pino, an *alabaora* who recounts having been visited in her dreams by two souls who taught her a most sacred *alabao* “Por el rostro y por la sangre” [“For the face and for the blood]. This *alabao*, communicated to her in dreams before the 2002 massacre, becomes stronger in the face of the terrible “harm to the soul” of the community that continues unresolved today. The article proposes then, following this story, a way to approach history as “hauntology” [*fantología*] that goes beyond the Freudian framework for interpreting dreams, and considers us all as specters, and history as a demand on both the living and the dead. On an ethical level, this theory requires us to live *as if* we could be dreamt as being part of a non-violent, alternate, history – thus, it demands that we imagine a non-oppressive version of a history that is yet to be produced in order to do justice to the dead living amongst us.

The second part of this issue, *Philosophy from the Margins*, begins with Lisímaco Parra París's contribution. Parra París's article is a very good example of the kind of work he has been promoting and producing for around twenty years. He has devoted a number of seminars, study groups, and many years of research, to reconstructing the history of thought in Colombia in connection to, and in dialogue with, its philosophical sources. In the case of his article for this issue, "La recepción de Bentham en la Nueva Granada" ("Bentham's reception in the Nueva Granada"), Parra París explores the multiple ways in which both conservatism and liberalism in Colombia at the time of the Nueva Granada⁴ understood and took up Bentham's ideas. He pays particular attention to Francisco de Paula Santander's mandate in 1825, and then again in 1835, that Bentham's philosophy should be taught in high-schools and universities. Following Ernst Cassirer's distinction between substantialism and functionalism, the article shows that Bentham was largely interpreted in the Nueva Granada during this time as the former rather than the latter. By analyzing the debate between those who defended and those who criticized Santander's mandate, Parra París shows that the discussion was tainted for both parties by a substantialist view. However, according to Parra París, only if one understands Bentham as a functionalist thinker can one understand the essential elements of his utilitarianism, namely, his critique of natural law, his distance from an understanding of actions as essentially virtuous or vicious, and the importance of external causes as determining factors in the value of actions, among other aspects of his thought. All these elements, according to Parra París's analysis, remained unseen among the prevailing interpretations of Bentham's ideas at the time. More importantly, these interpretations led to a tacit agreement among elites, conservative and liberal alike, that the newly established order in the aftermath of the region's independence needed to continue, rather than radically breaking with, the previous colonial order – an agreement that would have been questioned, Parra París argues, if Bentham's reception would have been led by a more functionalist approach.

In "La inteligencia periférica. Fragmentos de la imaginación del borde en la obra de Ezequiel Martínez Estrada" ("Peripheric intelligence. Reflections on border imagination in the work of Ezequiel Martínez Estrada"), Fernando Zalamea continues his already extensive work on Latin American thinkers, and his emphasis on the richness of a thought engendered outside of the main centers of production and diffusion of knowledge.⁵ This time, Zalamea focuses on Argentinian thinker and author Martínez Estrada in order to investigate the kind of intelligence that is shaped by, and happens at the kind of geographies of thought located at the border, the periphery, and the margins. According to Zalamea, a work like *Radiografía de la Pampa* (1933) exemplifies a form of thinking that not only eludes traditional dichotomies in Latin American thinking (Domingo Sarmiento's civilization vs. barbarism, the tension between modernity and postmodernity, or the contradiction between center and periphery, just to name a few), but also seeks to understand Latin America otherwise. The concept of *inteligencia* plays an important role in Zalamea's reading as a me-

diating and inexhaustible process of going back and forth between in-formation and trans-formation, between the center and the borders of knowledge. In the final section of the text, Zalamea suggests a connection between Walter Benjamin and Martínez Estrada. Although there is materially nothing in common between the Parisian *passages* that Benjamin so obsessively attended to, and the Latin American *paisajes* that wander through Martínez Estrada's thought, both allow for a similar opening of the imagination of the border and blur the distinctions between interior and exterior without having to completely undo them. Martínez Estrada's work is thus shown in Zalamea's approach as foundational for a way of thinking in Latin America that puts it in an interesting dialogue-contrast with the European tradition while also inaugurating its own "peripheric" references and trajectories.

In his contribution to this issue, "Mapas nocturnos y mediaciones diurnas" ("Nocturnal maps and diurnal mediations"), philosopher and media thinker Jesús Martín-Barbero takes up these two guiding images to offer a re-reading of the work he has been producing over the last fifty years.⁶ These concepts, he argues, correspond to two complementary methodological considerations or "modes of thinking." The image of the nocturnal map, taken from Saint-Exupéry's *Flight to Arras [Pilote de guerre]*, describes a way of approaching territories, a cartography, that avoids the rigid and neutral character of the traditional map, and appeals to all five senses as much as to memories, intuitions, and glimpses, to draw routes and borders. Such a mode of thinking focuses on, and leads to, "mediations," a concept that Martín-Barbero refuses to define, but that avoids the presuppositions of positivism and ideologism and their focus on the immediate and most perceivable effects of media. Media (conceived through the idea of mediation) results in a question about culture and not merely about ideology and manipulation. Following these modes of thinking, the author shows how his work has most recently approached the ideas of memory and history as well as technology attending particularly to the way in which these are *mediated* by the Colombian armed conflict and the current peace agreements.

If Zalamea's and Martín-Barbero's articles describe what could be characterized as a change of paradigm in the valorization and production of knowledge, turning away from the center to the periphery, and focusing on a more horizontal conception of knowledge, Adolfo Chaparro Amaya's contribution to this issue, "Mimetismo y filosofía o cómo pensar las modernidades periféricas" ("Mimetism and philosophy, or how to approach peripheric modernities"), questions the traditional reading of Latin America as "peripheric" while advancing another, non-linear, approach to Latin American spatialities and temporalities. Breaking with the chronologic distinction between pre- and post-modernity, Chaparro Amaya proposes to re think Latin American 'modernities' in their simultaneity rather than as successive in character. This allows him to understand the potency of a kind of thought that not only gives way to an altogether different conceptualization of time and history, but that has been born within a completely different conception of what it means to think and understand ourselves as 'peripheric.' Chaparro Amaya proposes thus to break with the idea of

“mestizaje” to describe the Latin American condition, and to adopt the idea of “mimetism” which, according to the author, describes in a much more accurate way the kind of complexities that traverse Latin American culture and knowledge production. His contribution to this issue is the abbreviated version of the introduction to his more recent and forthcoming book, *Modernidades periféricas. Una perspectiva problemática de la historia conceptual de América Latina*.⁷

Continuing with a conversation about how to situate Latin America within the horizon of global knowledge, Santiago Castro-Gómez polemically discusses the usual and traditional tendency in Latin American studies to insist on a form of particularism in order to legitimate the local production of knowledge. In “¿Qué hacer con los universalismos occidentales? Observaciones en torno al ‘giro decolonial’” (What to do with Western universalisms? Reflections around the ‘decolonial turn’”) Castro-Gómez addresses decolonial critique in order to question three of its main presuppositions, namely, the appeal to a different form of chronology and historical temporality outside of European modernity, the call for a form of “exteriority” in relation to the ‘center’ of Western thought, and the radical break with any attempt to articulate itself as ‘universal.’ In order to put these three presuppositions into question, and following Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Ernesto Laclau, Castro-Gómez proposes a defense of ‘universality’ as the conceptual medium to think adequately cultural identities in their specificity. Any break with ‘universal’ thinking may come together with a collapse of the very idea of identity losing therefore the political power of such a discourse. The same critique applies in turn to eurocentrism and its tendency to conceive of itself outside of, and exterior to, colonialism and the ongoing logics of coloniality. It is only taking universality to its radical core – and avoiding an understanding of it as an abstract ‘universalism’ that negates its connection to particularities – and therefore turning European modernity against itself, that one can produce both an adequate critique of eurocentrism and therefore a more powerful decolonial strategy.

Finally, “Del ir y venir entre el texto y la vida. Avatares filosóficos en un barrio popular de Bogotá,” (“To go back and forth between text and life. Philosophical incarnations in a working-class neighborhood in Bogotá”) the article that closes our special issue, results, as its authors describe it, from a very concrete encounter with an ethical and political experience in a popular neighborhood in Bogotá and connected to the tradition of liberation theology – a tradition that should not be forgotten as a powerful transformative strategy of political resistance and identity empowerment. In their article, Laura Quintana and Carlos Manrique describe the experience of *Casitas Bíblicas*, a program that has been gathering for more than twenty years small groups of teenagers and adults to read and interpret the Bible. In their encounter with this experience, and their conversations with those who have led and participated in these groups for years, the authors propose to understand these practices not only as reading groups, but as powerful experiences of transformation of life and politics. The expression “Del texto a la vida” (“from the text to life”), used by one of the participants to describe the effects of *Casitas Bíblicas*, is analyzed by the

authors as a way of opening an interpretation of what takes place in these processes of transformation, namely, a practical alteration of reality, an emancipatory experience of building communal ties and of producing and encouraging the appropriation and the putting into play of liberating forms of subjectivity. While analyzing this political aspect of what could be easily reduced otherwise to a mere religious private practice, Quintana and Manrique perform another way of theorizing by letting themselves be transformed by the encounter itself. Their essay, thus, not only produces a philosophical reflection on the reading practices of these communities by proposing a productive dialogue between this experience and contemporary philosophies of the common, it also performs in the process of its writing a critical approach to academic methodologies and ways of doing political philosophy.

The issue closes therefore with an article that brings us back to the main topic of the first part of the volume: how to allow philosophy to be challenged and questioned by the singularity of a concrete historical experience. This time, however, the focus is not on violence and its representations, but rather on the main idea that has guided the second part of this special issue; that is, the question about the shape that philosophy may take when produced in and from the ‘margins.’ By compiling texts that have approached these two main topics from different philosophical traditions, perspectives, and practices, we have tried to offer the reader a glimpse of what it means to do philosophy in Colombia today, when the location is not only the contingent accident of thought production, but also its very explicit framework and object of study.

Notes

¹ Some important efforts in this direction have been taken up in the last two decades by Colombian philosophers. For an updated overview of the production of history of philosophy in Colombia, along with their methodologies and situatedness with respect to Latin America, see Carlos Arturo López’s work, in particular his forthcoming article “Tramitar la incertidumbre de la escritura: cuestiones de método en una historia de las prácticas de escritura”, and the forthcoming volumes on philosophy in Colombia edited under his coordination for the Instituto Pensar, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. See also the work of Damián Pachón, *Estudios Sobre El Pensamiento Colombiano* Vol. 1 (Bogotá: Ediciones desde abajo, 2011) and the forthcoming second volume, currently under production.

² Among them precisely some of the authors we invited to contribute to this volume who have devoted a big part of their academic careers to interrogate what it means to think (from) the periphery (see Santiago Castro Gómez, Adolfo Chaparro, Bruno Mazzoldi, and Fernando Zalamea’s contributions in this issue besides their extensive work on the subject), to study our own philosophical history (see Lisimaco Parra’s article, and more broadly his work on “pensamiento colombiano”), and to use philosophy’s tools to interrogate Colombia’s history and reality (see Angela Uribe’s article in this issue and her various publications over the years).

³ It is important to note here that Uribe Alarcón has most recently revised her claims in a new version of her classic 2005 study *Antropología de la Inhumanidad* (see Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2018), precisely following, among others, Uribe Botero’s criticisms. About this, see María Victoria Uribe’s comments in a recently issued interview about her work for Red de Estudios Críticos (REC) Latinoamérica (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0MVcSOM_R0).

⁴ The Nueva Granada was the name given to Colombian territory between 1831 and 1858 right after the dissolution of the Gran Colombia.

⁵ See for instance one of his most recent books, *Pasajes de Proteo. Residuos, límites y paisajes en el ensayo, la narrativa y el arte latinoamericano* (México: Siglo XXI, 2012).

⁶ Martín-Barbero’s most classic work, *De los medios a las mediaciones* (Barcelona: Gustavo Gili, 1987) has been considered one of the major

contributions in the area of cultural studies, not only in Latin America, but globally. It has been translated into multiple languages and is a mandatory reference in almost any cultural studies and media studies program around the world. See the English translation of this work, *Communication, Culture and Hegemony* (London: Sage, 1992).

⁷ Cf. Barcelona: Herder, 2020.