
The Location of God: A Medieval Question on Pantheism and Its Responses in Early Modernity

Paul Richard Blum

Abstract: Peter Lombard discussed in his *Sentences* (lib. 1, d. 37) the meaning of the statement: *Deus est in omnibus*. It was an aside, as he noted, for it diverted the perspective from theology proper to the relation of things to the Creator. He differentiated divine presence as potency and essence and also as grace. Thomas Aquinas commented on the problem, both in his commentary on the *Sentences* and in his *Summa theologiae*, noticing the danger of pantheism (ante litteram, of course) when focusing on created things. During the Renaissance and early modern scholasticism the question: Where is God? and its legitimacy became a litmus test of Christian philosophy. Francisco Suárez and Théophile Raynaud reconstructed the history of the notion of divine omnipresence and its biblical hermeneutics and pointed to heretics past and present. Rodrigo de Arriaga responded by relating omnipresence to action at a distance in physics. Honoré Tournely, then, responding to Spinoza's pantheism, emphasized the otherness of God against rationalizing and naturalizing the divine. The formula, 'God is in everything,' discloses the conundrum that God's omnipresence is equally real, substantial, effective, particular, and universal.

Keywords: Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Suárez, Théophile Raynaud, Rodrigo de Arriaga, Honoré Tournely, omnipresence of God, pantheism.

Introduction

Our interest is to investigate the context and conditions of pantheistic thought in Early Modernity. It is well known that modern secularism and atheism emerged after a historical period in which pantheism was a viable philosophical option. Pantheism promised to offer philosophical structure to such claims about nature that did not depend on revelation and yet asserted the existence and role of God in reality. As the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* defines it, at its most general, pantheism may be understood positively as the view that God is identical with the cosmos, that is, the view that there exists nothing which is outside of God, or else negatively as the rejection of any view that considers God as distinct from the universe.¹

Among the many possible approaches, in this case we look at the proposition that God is indwelling in creation with the specific aspect of location. Is it legitimate – provided that God is involved in His creation – to raise the

question, "Where is God?" The problem with that question is that a possible answer is: Everywhere is God. In that case, creation and creator cannot be distinct. Hence follows the objection that there must obtain a distinction between the Creator and creation to the extent that God's involvement in reality is not that of location. This problem of the location of God has been addressed by Peter Lombard in his *Sentences* (1:37-38), and commentators on this work followed suit. The evolution of the discussion marks the evolution of pantheism.

1. Peter Lombard

Let us start with Petrus Lombardus (1100-1160).² He discusses the problem of pantheism and of pantheism (of course not in those terms) as the questions, whether all things are in God and whether God is in all things. Evidently, the creation is in God's mind, but not substantially; otherwise, things were identical with God's essence (*Si enim hoc diceretur, intelligerentur esse eiusdem cum eo essentiae*; dist. 36, n. 1, col. 619). In a way, Peter thus established what we would call pan-en-theism, teaching "all things are in God;" however things are in God not as such, not as substances but mentally. Hence, the absolute metaphysical distinction between Creator and creation is maintained. Peter then discusses in which sense it can be said that "God is in things" (*Deus dicatur esse in rebus*). The answer is: the way in which God may be said to be everywhere and in all created things is *essentialiter, praesentialiter, potentialiter* (dist. 37, n. 1, col. 621 and 622). Before we consider the meaning of these adverbs, we notice that Peter states as a precaution that this way of presence exceeds the grasp of human understanding (col. 621). He adduces several authorities, of whom Gregorius is reported to phrase the presence as *praesentia, potentia, substantia*, which strictly speaking is not the same: Peter reduces the presence that sounds the 'being in' to modes of being. Referring to St. Paul (*Colos. 2:9*) and Augustine (*Epist. 187, c. 6, n. 19; MPL 33, 739*), the presence is a mode of *gratia*, insofar as God fills the variety of things that He erected as his *dilectissimum sibi templum gratia suae bonitatis* (col. 621). The presence by way of grace may be seen as a version of potential pantheism insofar as the purpose of creation was, indeed, the erection of the temple of the divine grace and goodness. From Ambrosius' *De Spiritu sancto* (ch. 7, n. 81 and 86; MPL 16, 723) Peter derives the distinction of the three Persons so that the Holy Spirit demarcates the distinction of the limited-

ness of creation, on the one hand, from the divine ubiquity and eternity, which is, then, the condition of the potential to fill everything and the Redeemer of the world (*qui replevit orbem, et, quod plus est, replevit et Jesum, totius mundi Redemptorem*; col. 622).

With these argumentative moves, Peter shows the potential of ubiquity, both in human perspective and in divine attributes. For theological questions proper, this is important because, as Peter says in dist. 17, n. 9, the Holy Spirit is in all things and fully in every creature; however, many things in which He dwells do not 'have' the Spirit; otherwise even creatures without intelligence would have the Holy Spirit.³ We observe a clear distinction between presence and possession: God is everywhere, but not everywhere is God. Things have no claim on the divine while their very existence depends on the presence of the Creator.

One viable response to the issue of the ubication of God, as already implied in the previous discussion, is the reference to grace. God's indwelling by way of essence, presence, and potency is thinkable as grace and goodness – we could translate that as God's care for His world. Therefore, the most convincing case of presence is that of grace bestowed on saints. Grace transforms presence in any vague sense into indwelling (*habitare*) in those who are of themselves good and thus *templum eius et sedes eius* (dist. 37, n. 2). The prime mode of location is metaphorical and spiritual, depending on the habitus of the recipient. Hence (*ibid.*), "The throne of wisdom is the soul of the just; for in the just ones, it is more specifically than in other things, in all of which nevertheless it is fully." This quotation from the *Book of Wisdom* (Sap. 7, 27; et c. 9, 10) presupposes that God is potentially and essentially present in the form of wisdom. Interestingly, later authors dismissed the role of grace, or reduced it to the presence of God in saints.

We should at least mention in passing that this form of speaking implies a negative theology, since it resorts to images and metaphors to discuss the unfathomable. In this case the unfathomable is God's location. Another aspect of this theology is its burdening of the recipient with the responsibility for God's presence. As Augustine said (not quoted here by Peter), "If God is, He is everywhere present." This is a moral statement, rather than an ontological one, for the statement is followed by the exhortation to the sinner: "Whereto are you stealing yourself from the eyes of God in order to speak somewhere what He would not hear?" Hence, Augustine continues, "Don't think of God in places – He is with you as such one as you were. [...] Wherever you take refuge, there He is."⁴

Later, in section 4, Peter explains with a long quotation from Augustine (*De agone christiano*) that God couldn't possibly be affected by the limitations of the creation, which He inhabits in his divine way. It is like the sun that shines on dirty matter without becoming sordid. Obviously, that is an application of the universal truth (stated in section 5) that talking of divine location does not affect the divine nature. God's being everywhere has nothing in common with physical space and time. Even created spirits do have location (n. 6) in the sense of being at one place while being absent from another place, and yet they are not acquiring local dimensions; but God is absolutely location-free (*illocalis*) and non-

circumscribable, because space and time are properties of changeable things as distinct from God (n. 9). Consequently, God's omnipresence is possible due to His infinity and physical and quantitative immobility and unchangeability (n. 14: *non tamen spatiosa magnitudine nec locali motu, sed immensitate atque immobilitate suae essentiae*).

Two lessons can be taken from this discussion: the first is that talking of God in general, but specifically discussing the relation of God to reality as in the question of divine presence, has to be constantly alert against reifying God in physical terms, although the whole exercise aims at understanding the relevance of the divine for the mundane. The other lesson is that, paradoxically, the most adequate language to address the relation between God and Creation is that of metaphor and spirituality. Metaphorically, God inhabits the world and most importantly the human soul. God is present in the saints to the extent of their saintliness; but, even more disturbing, God is present in human individuals to the extent of their sinfulness. This second lesson, it appears, does not help in understanding the world; it rather leads away from the world as it does not offer any refuge.

2. Thomas Aquinas

Among the countless commentaries on the *Sentences*, we now turn to Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). In his commentary on *Sentences*, Aquinas emphasizes that the question of any presence of God in things is one of modes, rather than of substance. That is known even from the comparison of physical with spiritual things in motion. In bodies, the mover and the moving cannot be in the same place, whereas spiritual movers are present in the moved object (like the soul in the body) without being shaped by that location.⁵

Commenting on the being in things by potency, presence, and essence, Aquinas takes the mode of presence of God by grace in the saints and in Christ as equivalent but distinct modes. In discussing presence in things, Aquinas notices that this is of different meanings, depending on how one looks at the reality of things or by way of concepts. From the perspective of things, 'God' has meanings as diverse as things are; but conceptually, the modes of presence, namely knowledge, potency, and others vary with the attributes of God. God is in all things universally, and that means modified by circumstance and perspective. This explains the constant wavering between denial and affirmation of propositions that may sound pantheistic. The presence is diversified according to the relation of things to God.⁶

The confusion about the relation between locality and God is provoked by two givens. On the one hand, every corporeal thing is tied to location, whereby, in Aristotelian physics, the location determines the limits of the body. On the other hand, since God cannot be delimited by any measure, it is God as the creator who sets those limits "by way of giving to the place the nature to locate and to contain" (*ut dans loco naturam locandi et continendi*) in the same ontological sense as God creates all features of things.⁷ The fundamental difference is that between locating and being located. From this we may infer that the

common misunderstanding of pantheism, which assumes that God is everywhere without qualification, is that between the penetration of the infinite and the penetrability of the finite. Or, more generally, between the transcendent, which is foundational, and the real, which is dependent. The same difference obtains between the substance and the accident: to be somewhere is an accident to corporeal substances, although inevitable, whereas to be potentially and essentially everywhere is the essence of the infinite God.⁸ Aquinas also states that saying God is everywhere – from the physical understanding of place – is metaphorical speech.⁹

In Thomas' comments on the *Sentences*, we implicitly gather the main objection against pantheism, namely the confusion between the state of creature and the Creator. While the entire question arises from the belief in the necessity and existence of God as the foundation and origin of everything, and especially as the logically and naturally necessary foundation of everything that is not absolute, the philosophical temptation is to consider the absolute in terms of the relative. Since nature is endowed with properties, among others location, in the pious attempt to fathom the divine, the temptation consists in projecting the finite back on the infinite rather than inferring the infinite from the finite. As Thomas says, concluding the question in his *Summa contra gentiles* (lib. 3 cap. 68 n. 9): God is "in all things in the mode of the agent" (*in omnibus per modum causae agentis*).

Ontologically speaking, God is no part of the creation and therefore has no properties of the created things, while He is in the created beings as the mode of the transcendent power. Also ontologically speaking, location is a relation. However, it is an external relation as it does not pertain to God's essence and interior denominations, such as wisdom, will, etc., which do not exist exterior to God. Location and time, on the contrary, are attributed to God only by way of human understanding (*secundum intelligentiae modum*) of the relation of something else to God (*Contra Gentiles*, lib. 2 cap. 13 n. 3).

We see that the problem of presence and omnipresence is that of the difference between claims in the ontological realm of things and the pure relation of the agent to the object. In the *Summa theologiae* we read: "God is in all things; however, not as part of the essence or as *accidens*, but as the agent is at hand in what it acts."¹⁰ To be 'at hand' without participating in the object of action, that is the mode of presence of God in creation. And similar to what we have already heard, "Deus est in rebus sicut continens res" (ad 2.). Things are somehow located in God, if we guard our language from implying God to be a container; that is to say, location and presence are inevitably metaphorical expressions. This cautious way of expressing the relation of presence is also the condition for speaking of omni-presence. As soon as we liberate our speaking about 'God being in things' from the physical implication and understand that God is the locator of the located things, then also omnipresence becomes plausible. God "fills all places by giving being to all located things that fill places" (*per hoc replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent loca*; a. 2, co.).

Now, the *Sentences* had declared that God is present *essentialiter*, *praesentialiter*, *potentialiter*; therefore, the

meaning of these modes needs to be explored. Aquinas quickly gets the presence by grace out of the way: obviously, in humans God can be essentially present if they cognize and love God, as the saints do. The philosophical issue is that of essential presence in natural things. The enemy is Manicheism, meaning in philosophical terms dualism that separates the spiritual from the material realm. Against these, the involvement of the divine in the physical needs to be defended following the described patterns: everything is subject to God's potency; everything is "naked" under God's supervision (*omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis eius*); and God is in everything as the cause of their being (a. 3, co.).

The question of ubiquity and presence of God is, philosophically speaking, an exercise in philosophical theology as the discipline that aims to establish methodical insight into realms that transcend rationality and therefore require fine-tuning of philosophical arguments. From the various problems that arise, it becomes plausible in what ways a philosophical theory about the relationship between the absolute and the relative can be derailed. The dualism of physics and theology is one flaw; pantheism, which identifies the finite and the infinite and thus abolishes transcendence, is another way to upset the balance.

3. Francisco Suárez

Aquinas' *Summa theologiae* has been the standard of theology over centuries starting with the Renaissance. As one sample, let us take a look into Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548-1617).¹¹ To the quaestio 8 of *Summa I* he dedicated his chapter 2 of book II in his *Commentarii ac distributiones* on that book. First it is remarkable that the Jesuit summarizes the question of the location of God in the group of negative attributes of God, namely: infinite, immense, immutable, eternal, incomprehensible, and more. The "existence of God in all things or places" (title of chapter 2) is a subsection of the immensity. The reader should, therefore, be aware of moving in the area of negative theology. Apophatic theology makes statements about God from the finite perspective through cancelling out all that is finite. Speaking of ubication regarding God requires transferring whatever is associated with place in the material world to the immeasurable nature of God. After quoting from the Bible, Suárez explains:

For the Scripture talks to humans in human ways and, thus, in order to describe that God fills all things, it uses this metaphor of human placement (*utitur metaphora illa humanae positionis*), as though he held the feet on the earth and the head in the heavens and would fill up everything else with his body.¹²

With this strong image it is manifest that when speaking of God's presence or assistance to things we are still using metaphors, which is known to be the proper way of speaking of God. When scrutinizing such figurative attributions of God, we should not forget that the omnipresence and any language of locality does not add or impute any perfection or real property (*modum realem*) to God's immensity. On the other hand, the suspicion arises that plain pantheism of the kind *deus sive natura* or "nature is all there is" overlooks the nuances between metaphorical

and apophatic speech and descriptive proposals with un-investigated ontological implications.

Ubication is just an implication of God and things (*concomitantia*); for it lies in the nature of created beings to have no distance from God. “Just by being, [things] have the divine substance in them present that is altogether non-distant (*indistantem*) from themselves: and that is what we mean when we say God is in them.” (n. 4, p. 38a) Instead of pondering location as some surrounding body, as was known in Aristotle’s *Physics*, ‘presence of God in things’ means the absence of distance between God and things to the effect that location proves to be a metaphor for the negativity of dimensions in God. Consequently, the essential mode of presence of God in things is, for Suárez, the most proper conception. The non-distance of God’s essence from His creation in all details (*per indistantiam essentiae suae ab omnibus rebus creatis*; n. 4, p. 38 a) is the true meaning of God’s omnipresence. One consequence, which safeguards the distinction of things from God, is that this presence still is not implied in the definition of God by necessity but dependent on His freedom, namely, the freedom to create things outside of Himself.

Whereas immensity is a necessary attribute, an intrinsic mode of being, the discussed omnipresence depends on God creating external creation. “Being in things, as well as being everywhere, connotes that something actually exists outside of God, in which we affirm God to exist.” It does not directly follow from God’s immensity but, “if any one thing comes to be, it is necessary that God is in it by reason of His immensity.”¹³ Logically speaking, presence in things is *denominatio extrinseca*, that is to say signifying by something outside the thing rather than essential, although possible by God’s essence.¹⁴ Suárez comments on this assumption – if there is any one thing – terming it a hypothesis: ‘if there were any such thing in existence outside of God ...’ Evidently, such a hypothesis is unrealistic because nothing is possible without God’s action since there is nothing in existence without God’s effective causation. What is striking here is the argument from finite things to God: is it at all possible to conceive of physical things without implying their being created? The answer lies in the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* inferences.

The conclusion that the perfect efficient cause is perfectly present at the effect can be confirmed with an *a posteriori* argument, according to Suárez, in that we conclude from the action to the immensity. Any divine action in this universe can be extended to a doubly large universe and, from there, to infinite universes. However, the real presence of God in His creation depends on an *a priori* argument. From the immensity follows the actual presence in all things because the immensity implies action towards the existence of things; that is to say, God’s action implies His presence.¹⁵ It is striking that Suárez’ contemporary expert of Thomistic philosophy, the heretic Giordano Bruno, employed the same reasoning regarding God’s infinity. The fact that this does not exclude an infinite number of universes proved for Bruno that the universe is infinite and the worlds innumerable; and all that follows from God’s perfection. In Bruno’s case that amounted to a version of pantheism.

It should be noted that the question of ubication and immensity is largely discussed in Suárez’s *Disputationes metaphysicae* (esp. disp. 22 and 30).¹⁶ Disputation 51 is dedicated to the category “ubi” where also the distinction between material location and the location of spiritual beings is discussed. The distinction is this: being everywhere apparently implies a sort of ‘somewhere’ (*alicubi*), but this somewhere cannot be described or defined. That is correct, responds Suárez, because the ‘where’ of God is not among the categories of being, rather, in God, being somewhere and everywhere is his very essence.¹⁷

4. Rodrigo de Arriaga

A different approach is to be found in the Prague Jesuit Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592-1667). In commenting on Aquinas, he treats the question of the presence of God in things in his disputation about the existence, unity, simplicity, and perfection of God. Notably, there is no reference to negative theology. God is incorporeal and unchangeable, and the unchangeability of God is rooted in his immensity. Again, immensity offers the occasion to speak about God as being present everywhere. The first question is about the existence of God outside of heaven and in imaginary spaces. Arriaga reminds his readers that God being in imaginary spaces may not be taken in the sense as though those spaces were existing, because even the world as a whole is not in imaginary spaces. That is why they are termed imaginary. However, thanks to his immensity, God has a (conceptual) ‘where’ that is indistinguishable from himself. Arriaga explains it with the analogy of a mystic who has a beatific vision and sees God outside of the corporeal real spaces, and hence in seeing nothing the mystic sees God.¹⁸

This theorem of *spatium imaginarium* had become obligatory in late Renaissance physics and in Jesuit Philosophy.¹⁹ It made it possible to treat the physics of moving bodies within the Aristotelian definition of place as the surface of the surrounding body of the located thing. This standard notion of place was not apt to describe physical movement as such, since place by definition does not move when the object occupies a new location. The concept was now supplemented with the idea of space, meaning the dimensions, within which the thing changes place, without any claim to physical reality; it was a mere conceptual necessity. Since the Aristotelian notion of place never was intended to be physically real (it was only the conceptual surface of the surrounding body), the new idea of imaginary space was ontologically not different from place but offered now the possibility of thinking of finite things to be moving in a merely conceptual three-dimensional space.

What we can see here is that with this approach Arriaga shifts the question of God’s presence from the strictly theological realm to the question of physics. This is confirmed by his subsequent discussion of the presence of God due to his operation. God creates spaces and places by way of creating material things. That requires that God exists *formaliter* in every single location (*ubicationes*); and that implies that “God *formaliter* contains the perfection that consists in being in this or that place to the effect

to produce those locations that have a similar perfection.”²⁰

We had seen such an interpretation in Suárez, who identified the agency in the presence of God in creation. Arriaga’s physical approach is confirmed by his discussion about the presence of God in things where he refers back to his own treatise on physics, in which he discusses the action at distance. This again, while known to the medievals, was a hot topic in early modern physics, involving among other things magnetism. Arriaga claims to have defended that immediate presence and physical contact without any intermediary causation is not necessary under the condition of absolute potency. This however does not sufficiently prove the immediate presence of God in things by way of his operation. He criticizes Suárez for his theory. The action does not make presence necessary. The argument is that God produces not only the things but also their locations, and from this he concludes that God has to contain in himself in an eminent way the locations of things, which is only possible if God is formally in every place where things exist and all their locations.²¹ In his *Cursus philosophicus*, Arriaga holds that action at a distance is impossible in nature (admitting mediating causation). The theological objection that immediate action would require physical presence and hence God being immediately present in humans is rejected with the now familiar distinction between physical and spiritual or intentional presence. On the other hand, the physical presence in physical causation does not at all require the penetration of the cause in the effect; contiguity is sufficient. God’s penetrating his creation is the result of his operation.²²

Arriaga uses the language of ‘formal’ versus ‘material,’ saying that God has to contain the perfection in a formal way, which consists in any one thing being in this or that place. God can therefore produce locations, and from that we can infer the immensity of God out of his operations. The second argument is that it is impossible to imagine any real place or imaginary place where God is not present, which follows from his perfection. This is a version of Suárez’ argument from *a posteriori* and *a priori* inference: From the concept of God’s immensity follows His creating spaces; and from understanding the nature of location follows the presence of God.

It is noteworthy that for Arriaga the question of God’s presence is not very important (he devotes only a few sections to it) and that he is clearly relating it to the physics of the creation. He seems to take the attributes of God for granted and therefore seems to be more concerned with the physical explanation of omnipresence. Equally, he doesn’t seem concerned about the problems of pantheism. And he does not take many precautions to make sure the dialectics of God’s indwelling in the world and the metaphysical and logical distinction of God from his creation remains challenging. Underestimating the speculative difficulty of understanding God as Creator and the creation as dependent from the Creator was most likely one pathway to early modern pantheism.

5. Théophile Raynaud

Around the same time as Arriaga, the Jesuit Théophile Raynaud (1583-1663) published his *Theologia naturalis*, a handbook of the part of metaphysics that – in the traditional Jesuit curriculum – deals with immaterial beings, i.e., angels and God. He devotes a long chapter to “the perfection of the Divine oneness derived from the unchangeability of God regarding place, that is, God’s immensity.”²³ One example of the usefulness of this treatise is the vast number of sources, ancient and recent, quoted to explicate the problem. The main thesis is this: God coexists substantially and by essence with every true or imaginary space that is infinitely extended; he is, hence, immense (immeasurable) and unmovable with regard to place (p. 691).

The notion of God being somewhere (*alicubi*) may refer to essence, presence, or power (as he endorses from Peter Lombard); however, only the first meaning of ‘somewhere’ may include place (p. 691a). The second meaning, presence, means God’s view or watch that pervades everything (*contuitum omnia pervadentem*), probably implying providence. The location as potency refers to operations “from end to end” (*a fine usque ad finem*) which, as Raynaud avers, are possible even if the agent is not there. In this article, place-location as presence by essence and substance in “realibus locis” is the issue. We need to be aware that, for the question of pantheism, this distinction is of importance: what does the presence of God mean and entail, if not local presence, and how does it affect the distinction between God and creation? Equally, if the power of God makes God not only be present but also effective “in” the creation, what sort of “being in the creation” could that be?

Raynaud cites a number of authors who mistook the local presence physically and therefore in some ridiculous way, like God even being in the latrine, which might go back to Heraclitus who said in an aphorism that “even here are the gods” (frg. A 9), which he cites a few pages later.²⁴ The Presocratic dictum and the various reflections on God’s sojourn on earth all revolve around the local and substantial interpretation that God is ‘somewhere.’ Therefore, to understand the verse of Psalm 138: “when I will ascend to the heaven, You will be there” as meaning that God is exclusively and substantially in heaven, is an error that is said to be refuted by Gabriel Vasquez and Hurtado (n. 76, p. 691b). This misunderstanding of divine location is, then, connected with the question of incarnation, as will become clear later in this disputation.

Among the misrepresentations of God’s immensity are theories that teach God to be limited to the heavens or other places, which is due to the “carnal” view with bodily eyes so that God is considered in animal terms.²⁵ The opposite misrepresentation was to deny any presence of God (p. 692b). After reporting about many versions of asserting God’s omnipresence from pagan and Christian authors, Raynaud also proposes the theory that God is “coexistent with the imaginary spaces,” provided that such spaces are truly non-local and indeterminate. The true meaning of the idea is that if, hypothetically, “anywhere any real things exist or come to be, then God – not being enclosed in any circumscription of heaven – extends infinitely beyond and coexists with real things.”²⁶

Raynaud's favorite argument, however, is the Hermetic adage "God is a circle whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere." For details, he refers to Nicholas of Cusa's interpretation in his *Docta ignorantia* I 21 and 23.²⁷ The adage is paralleled with quotations from Pimander, Pythagoreans, and other non-Christian and Christian authorities (p. 693a-b). The result is, presence is omni-presence: God is present in any physical place, but only by reason of his immensity and infinity so that the location does not reduce, delimit, or limit God's essence. Again, Raynaud applies hypothetical reasoning. We conceive of God's center to be in the middle of the world, although we can conceive of the center and middle to be anywhere else, while the imaginary space is implied in the concept of an infinite body. In other words, the statement about the center and the circumference is correct, provided we assume that in a corporeal world the center is anywhere (which is equivalent to hypothetically everywhere) and the circumference is infinite (which is equivalent to nowhere). Evidently, this way of reasoning starts with corporeal imagination and moves over to speculation. Regarding the idea of divine immensity, Raynaud emphasizes the negativity of the form of argument. However, he draws the positive conclusion that immensity does not entail a negation of the quiddity (*quidditative esse negationem*) but rather confirms there is "actual correspondence of God with any space, be that real or imaginary." Hence follows that the divine substance implies "infinite *quasi* local diffusion."²⁸ With that, scholasticism merges with Renaissance pantheism.

Raynaud elaborates further on the real presence and agency of God in creation by way of infinity and magnitude. It is crucial that God's infinity as immensity is essential, that is, infinity is not a property or any other attribution but given with the being and without any qualification.²⁹ Referring to Plotinus (*Enn.* VI 6, 31), Raynaud moves the concept of infinity close to negative theology (without using the term, of course), for infinity cannot be explained better than through negation of the end or terminus that encloses things. God is locally and temporally infinitely diffused by virtue of the denial of any local or temporal limit. Hence, God is *essentialiter* or by essence infinite because in his essence there are no limits of perfection (p.739a). At this point he refers to Gasparo Contarini's *Prima philosophiae compendium*, which discusses negative natural theology.³⁰ If the terminology of property is at all appropriate, then the relation that is manifest in propriety needs to be expounded. The infinity of God entitles him to reign over everything.³¹ The presence and diffusion consists in the hierarchy (the governing of the degrees) and dominion of the perfect over the less perfect. Alluding to Aristotle's theory of the natural dominion of the master over the servants and the soul over the body, Raynaud suggests that God's presence is natural due to excellence. Even Epicurus (as Seneca reports in *De beneficiis* IV 19), while disarming the gods in order to liberate humanity of fear, held that the gods need to be worshipped for their outstanding majesty (n. 147-148, p. 758a-759a). This superiority results in domination. However, not every superiority empowers over the lower levels. Angels, he says, are superior to humans and yet have no dominion because they are of an entirely different species than humans. They do not form a community as, for

instance, masters and servants form one community, in which one commands over the other. On the other hand, Angels, together with humans, are two communities that both are subject to God who is the vertex of all created beings. Therefore, the question regarding the location of God leads over to the understanding of presence and essence. Consequently, the superiority of God and the belonging of creation form a syndrome of natural theology, in which it is acceptable to speak of God dwelling in the world without abolishing the essential difference which would amount to plain pantheism.

6. Honoré Tournély

About a century after Raynaud, pantheism had become a public problem, due to Baruch Spinoza's philosophy. Therefore, the Paris professor Honoré Tournély (1658-1729) expressly mentioned Spinoza in his theology lectures. When discussing the existence of God, he claims that knowledge of the existence of God is "intimately impressed (*intime impressa*) in every human being." But what is it that is impressed? It is the idea of God who "factually and, indeed, alone is the most perfect being." Here the author mentions, in one breath, the Epicureans and Spinoza as those who "have the idea of a most perfect being but refer that to the world and don't believe in God." The error is, according to Tournély, that they transfer the idea of perfection, which they naturally share and admit, to the material world, "stupidly" contradicting themselves.³² This is the shortest rebuttal against pantheism I know. Spinozism is equal to atomism (and we may remember Giordano Bruno as an atomist and precursor of Spinoza). If atomism that denies the existence of gods admits of highest perfection, then it imputes that perfection on the material world and endorses the same pantheism as that of Spinoza. The question of interest for us, here, is not whether Tournély does any justice to Spinoza or whether he is joining the anti-Spinozist tradition, but the coherence of the thought that the givenness of the idea of divine perfection may still lead to pantheism. The diagnosis we find here is this: lack of awareness of the notion of perfection as pre-empirical ('transcendental' in Kantian terms) induces to neglect the transcendent origin of the idea of the absolute and, hence, to bestow it on the world. It reminds us of Anselm's response to "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God. Corrupt (*corrupti*) are they [...]." The fool is victim of a performative contradiction (Anselm, *Proslogion* 2-4, on Ps. 14:1 and 53:1). Nevertheless, we should consider that the argument is actually not a systematic but a moral one. It is a moral flaw to not listen to the mind and to act stupidly. Pantheism is possible when the idea of God is projected upon the creation, although the very idea is distinct from the world.

Tournély comes back to Spinoza when he discusses the presence of God, which confirms that this attribute is closest to the temptation of pantheism. The question that precedes that about location is that God is about *simplicitas*. Is it the case that all compositions, be they physical, metaphysical, or logical, have to be removed from the idea of God? First among the heretics discussed is Spinoza. His *Ethics* is quoted where he says that there can be no two substances, nor can one be produced by another; that

God is the only substance possible or thinkable, and so on.³³ Tournély's thesis is that "God is not the only substance in the nature of things, nor is God that one and universal (*unica et universalis*) substance of the world."³⁴ For our purpose of interest are references to the extension of substance.

Such one and only substance must be extended – but where does mind or intelligence come from? Thinking and extension cannot be modes of the same substance because they are opposed. Even more, in scholastic terminology modes cannot apply to God, because a mode adds to a thing, which cannot be true of God, and if it were, then there had to be infinitely many modes, which annihilates all metaphysics of modality. As to extension, both as an attribute and as a mode, it provides alteration and mutation, which contradicts God's perfection that cannot be divisible. It is contradictory when Spinoza considers 'substance' as metaphysical and abstract, since every substance as such is to be viewed as physical (*physice ac in concreto spectanda*) and, hence, imperfect. Evidently, if God is the only and universal substance then he is everything *formaliter* including plant, rock, and lion.³⁵ With these objections, Tournély's explanation of the presence of God in things is predictable.

Of the generally accepted forms of presence (*potentia, praesentia, essentia*), Tournély focuses on essence, by which God "pervades and penetrates" everything as the "agent that is intimately present to the thing in which it acts" (p. 82a). He illustrates God's dwelling in the heavens through the comparison with the soul in the brain:

As the soul diffuses all the spirit of life from the brain through all the limbs, so God infuses from the heaven [...] in the entire circle of this universe the *quasi* spirit of his life conservation and providence while governing, moderating, and supporting everything, notwithstanding that he is by substance everywhere present.³⁶

What this description conveys is the conundrum of omnipresence that is real, substantial, effective, particular, and universal – all at the same time. Doubts are possible whether his reference to the early modern anatomy of soul and brain makes sense. It is certain that the author favors the doctrine that God's presence in things can be inferred from his operation (p. 85a). This is the argument *a posteriori* that we have seen earlier. Predictably, Tournély also holds that "God's operation is transient, free, and external." With the possibility for God not to act, such operation is free and not included in the concept of God – hence not provable *a priori* – and the idea of God is metaphysically distinct (external) from that of creation.³⁷ The discussion closes with dismissing the question of imaginary spaces: Since there are no such fictitious imaginary spaces the debate about God being in or beyond imaginary spaces is moot (p. 87a). In Tournély's lectures we have a thorough and masterful discussion of the attributes of God that shows the influence of enlightenment philosophy that was shaping the debate about human understanding, cosmology, and natural theology. While defending the basics of scholastic philosophical theology they lay bare the implications that lead to empiricism as well as to pantheism.

7. Conclusion

This exploration of some classic and lesser-known commentaries on the theological question of the place of God has yielded some interesting results, especially with regard to the philosophical problem of pantheism. The problem turns out to be intimately linked with negative theology because any talk about God within the horizon of any determination inevitably violates the rule of ineffability. Therefore, we learn that by asking *where* God is we enter the realm of metaphorical discourse, which has its own rules in view of ontology and spirituality. What we need to avoid is what was called the "carnal view" or, rather, we need to be aware of that reifying temptation. For what we also notice is the fact that speaking about location and space in the context of God involves either the 'carnal' projection of finite and material samples onto the infinite and spiritual or the analysis of the absolute for the sake of understanding the dependent. In terms of logic, the projection requires *a posteriori* reasoning, including the provisional and uncertain nature of the result; the analysis of the concept of God follows *a priori* arguments, which may be well construed but depending only on the capacity of the human understanding. The latter concludes from the concept of God and his essence to his presence, the former from the finiteness of creation to the creator.

An interesting solution is to say that the physical perspective on omnipresence requires admitting that God produces not only things but also their locations. The emphasis, here, lies on the creative operation of the divine, which – as creation – implicitly allows for finitude, in producing both things and their attributes that all relate back to the absolute.

From this perspective it appears that underestimating the speculative difficulty of understanding God as Creator and the creation as dependent from the Creator was most likely one pathway to early modern pantheism. The subtleties of logical inference, of metaphorical versus factual language, of imagination versus inference, not to mention the ineffability of the object of negative theology – all these serve to safeguard the fundamental distinction between God and the world that rests in him and that he ultimately and constantly shapes. This distinction, methodologically, is clearly precautionary in terms of intent and outcome. So are pantheists bold and courageous, if not reckless? That is precisely how alleged pantheists like Giordano Bruno or Baruch Spinoza have been portrayed. Or as "corrupt" and "foolish" as Anselm's denier of God. Hence, localization is the touchstone of the distinction between the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the dependent, whereby the infinite can be conceived as quasi-local diffusion, with emphasis on diffusion: the infinite God can be present in things as though he were spreading out locally. As we saw, God is not in things in the category of "where" but by infinitely attending or caring. These, of course, are metaphors again.

One more aspect in the discussion about the omnipresence of God is that of dominion. God's care for the world is anything but cozy. He is setting the terms of the relationship. If time were a legitimate category (it has been discussed by the authors mentioned that it is not) the dominion of the Creator precedes the creation; epistemologically speaking, it is transcendental. Before any human

thinker can conceive of divine infinity and perfection it must have been true. Absolute perfection is pre-empirical; even the very idea of absolute perfection marks the fundamental distinction of the world from God. In one sentence, what we learn from this discussion is that God's omnipresence is equally real, substantial, effective, particular, and universal.

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- by the Czech Science Foundation as the project GA ČR 21-17059S “Pantheism and Panpsychism in the Renaissance and the Emergence of Secularism”.
- ² The *Sentences* are quoted with reference to Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiarum libri quator*, ed. Jacques Paul Migne, Opera omnia 2: Patrologia Latina 192 (Paris: Migne, 1855), cited as MPL 192. On the medieval context see Luisa Valente, “‘Deus est ubique, ergo alicubi?’ Ubiquité et présence de Dieu dans le monde au XIIIe siècle,” in *Lieu, espace, mouvement: Physique, Métaphysique et Cosmologie (xiiie-xviiè siècles): Actes du colloque international Université de Fribourg (Suisse), 12-14 mars 2015*, ed. Tiziana Suarez-Nani, Olivier Ribordy, and Antonio Petagine (Barcelona: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Etudes Médiévales, 2017), 17–38. On more medieval discussions, especially Alexander of Hales, cf. Adrian Fuerst, *An Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Omnipresence of God in Selected Writings Between 1220-1270* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1951). Evidently, the question of the location of God was part of the philosophical debate about infinite space and vacuum, from the Middle Ages through early modernity; see Edward Grant, *Much Ado about Nothing. Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). See also Jeffrey Witt, “An Introduction to God's Omnipresence through the ‘four Ways’ of Francis de Mayronnes OFM (Fl. 1320),” *Intellectual History Review*, forthcoming. Witt's paper inspired me to look into the issue in terms of pantheism.
- ³ MPL 192, dist. 17, n. 9, col. 567: “Cumque ubique sit et in omni creatura totus, sunt tamen multi qui eum non habent. Non enim omnes Spiritum sanctum habent, in quibus est; alioquin et irrationabiles creaturae haberent Spiritum sanctum, quod fidei pietas non admittit.”
- ⁴ Augustinus, *Enarratio in Psalmum 74, n. 9*, MPL 36, col. 952: “Si Deus est, ubique praesens est. Quo te auferes ab oculis Dei, ut in parte aliqua loquaris quod ille non audiat? [...] Noli ergo cogitare Deum in locis; ille tecum est talis, quails fueris. [...] Quocumque ergo fugeris, ibi est.”
- ⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 37 q. 1 pr and q.1 a. 1 co. All quotations of Aquinas are from <https://www.corpusthomicum.org>.
- ⁶ Aquinas, *Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 37 q. 1 a. 2 ad 1 and ad 2, and q. 1 a. 2 ad 2, 3, and 4.
- ⁷ Aquinas, *Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 37 q. 2 a. 1 co.
- ⁸ Aquinas, *Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 37 q. 2 a. 2 co: “Deo autem per se convenit ubique esse: quia ipse totus est in quolibet loco; et infinitis aliis locis existentibus, in omnibus esset; et hoc non est communicabile alicui creaturae nisi communicaretur sibi esse virtutis infinitae.”
- ⁹ *Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 37 q. 2 a. 1 co: “non convenit Deo esse ubique nisi metaphoricè.”
- ¹⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I^a q. 8 a. 1 co: “Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit.”
- ¹¹ Suárez appears to be aware of Duns Scotus' objections against Aquinas, but this is not the issue at hand; cf. Richard Cross, “Duns Scotus on Divine Immensity,” *Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers* 33, no. 4 (2016): 389–413; Grant, *Much Ado about Nothing*, 151–57.
- ¹² Franciscus Suarez, *Commentarii ac distributiones In Primam Partem Summae Theologiae D. Thomae* (Venetiis: Iuncta, Ciottus et Socii, 1608), 37b, lib. 2, cap. 2, n. 3: “Loquitur enim scriptura hominibus more humano, et ita, ut describat Deum replentem omnia, utitur metaphora illa humanae positionis, ac si haberet pedes in terra, et caput in coelo, et corpore suo cetera repleret.” The metaphor of feet on the earth and head in the heavens is a quotation from Augustine, *Enarratio in Psalmum 90*, Sermo 2, n. 5, MPL 37, col. 1167.
- ¹³ Suarez, 38b, lib. 2, cap. 2, n. 5: “At vero esse in rebus actualiter, et similiter esse ubique connotant aliquam rem extra Deum actualiter existentem, in qua Deus dicatur existere. [...] Hoc autem simpliciter necessarium non est [...], necessitate absoluta, sed tantum conditionata, quia si talis res fit, necesse est, ut Deus sit in illa ratione suae immensitatis.”
- ¹⁴ Suarez, 38b, lib. 2, cap. 2, n. 5. (ibid. cf. SGen 2, cap. 13) Cf. Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 2 cap. 13 n. 3: “Duplex est modus quo aliquid denominative praedicatur. Denominatur enim aliquid ab eo quod extra ipsum est, sicut a loco dicitur aliquis esse alicubi, et a tempore aliquando: aliquid vero denominatur ab eo quod inest, sicut ab albedine albus. A relatione vero non invenitur aliquid denominari quasi exterius existente, sed inhaerente: non enim denominatur aliquis pater nisi a paternitate quae ei inest. Non igitur potest esse quod relationes quibus Deus ad creaturas refertur, sint res aliquae extra ipsum.”
- ¹⁵ Suarez, 39a, lib. 2, cap. 2, n. 7: “Potest autem hoc modo ex actione Dei inferri a posteriori immensitas ipsius, quia sicut agit in hoc univer-

Notes

¹ William Mander, “Pantheism,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2020 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2020), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/pantheism/>. – This study is a result of research funded

sum, quod creavit, possit agree in aliud duplo magis, et sic in infinitum [...] sine sui mutatione. Actualis vero praesentia substantialis ad omnes res existentes colligitur a priori ex immensitate, necessarium vero est adiungere actionem, ut per eam possint creaturae habere existentiam [...]. Nam fundamentum ponitur ex vi immensitatis; terminus ponitur per actionem Dei.”

A few sections earlier (ch. 2, n. 3, col. 37b), Suárez had stated that God’s immensity can be demonstrated *a priori* from his infinity and perfection, and *a posteriori* from the effects and these not only factually but also from the infinite potential outcomes without changing himself.

¹⁶ Franciscus Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, (Opera omnia vol. 25-26) (Paris: Vivès, 1861) vol. 25, disp. 22, sect. 1: An possit sufficienter probari ratione naturali deum per se ac immediate operari in actionibus omnium creaturarum, esp. n. 16-23, pp. 805 ff.: Quomodo Deus immediate concurrat; vol. 26, disp. 30, sect. 7: An Deum esse immensum demonstrari possit, especially n. 52, pp. 112 ff.

¹⁷ Suárez vol. 26, disp. 51, sect. 6, n. 7, p. 1005: “Quarto objici potest circa eandem divisionem: nam Deus est etiam alicubi, cum sit ubique, et tamen neque est circumscriptive, nec definitive. Verum haec objectio potius declarat partitionem illam optime accommodari ad Ubi praedicamentale; nam Deus non est alicubi per aliquod Ubi pertinens ad hoc praedicamentum, quia ejus immensa praesentia non est accidens, nec modus substantiae ejus, sed omnino ipsamet essentia ejus.” On disp. 51 specifically see Olivier Ribordy, “La localisation comme enjeu métaphysique. Thèses sur le lieu, discutées par Francisco Suárez,” in *Lieu, espace, mouvement: Physique, Métaphysique et Cosmologie (xviie-xviii siècles): Actes du colloque international Université de Fribourg (Suisse), 12-14 mars 2015*, ed. Tiziana Suarez-Nani, Olivier Ribordy, and Antonio Petagine (Barcelona: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Etudes Médiévales, 2017), 249–73.

¹⁸ Rodericus de Arriaga, *Disputationes theologicae in Primam Partem D. Thomae. Tomus primus* (Antverpiae: Plantinus Moretti, 1643) disp. 2, sect. 9, n. 79, p. 48b: “[...] an Deus sit extra coelos in spatiis imaginariis. [...] ut non intelligatur Deum esse in ipsis spatiis, quasi spatii aliquid sint: nam in hoc sensu neque mundus est in spatiis ullis; sed quod Deus habeat ratione suae immensitatis per Ubi a se indistinctum, id quod vere et realiter haberet mundus extra istum productus, ut scilicet existeret extra illum. Quod iam sic declaro: ut sicut Beatus clare Deum intuens [...]: ita eodem modo (liceat sic concipere) si intueatur ultra coelum empyreum extra spatia realia corporealia, licet nullum ibi videat corpus, videat tamen Deum ibi [...].”

¹⁹ Paul Richard Blum, “Early Jesuit Philosophers on the Nature of Space,” in *Jesuit Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity*, ed. Cristiano Casalini (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 137–65. For Francisco Suárez see: Miquel Beltrán, “El Dios de Suárez y los espacios imaginarios,” in *Francisco Suárez (1548-1617): Tradição e Modernidade*, ed. Adelino Cardoso, António Manuel Martins, and Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (Lisboa: Colibri, 1999), 93–98.

²⁰ Arriaga, *Disputationes in Primam Partem D. Thomae, I*, disp. 2, sect. 9, n. 81, p. 49a: “Nam Deus non solum producit res, sed etiam illarum ubicationes, ergo debet continere eminenter perfectionem earum ubicationum. [...] ergo Deus formaliter debet continere perfectionem quae consistit in hoc, quod est esse in tali et tali loco, ut possit ubicationes, quae similem habent perfectionem, producere.”

²¹ Arriaga, disp. 2, sect. 9, n. 81, p. 49a.

²² Rodericus de Arriaga, *Cursus philosophicus* (Parisiis: Quesnel, 1639), disp. 7 physica, sect. 6, n. 48, p. 292a.

²³ Theophilus Raynaudus, *Theologia naturalis. Sive entis increati et creati, intra supremam abstractionem, ex naturae lumine investigatio* (Lugduni: Landri, 1622), dist. 7, q. 1, art. 6, pp. 690 ff.

²⁴ Raynaudus, n. 77, p. 693b, and n. 80, 695a, from Aristotle, *De partibus animalium* I 5, 645a18. It should be noted that the fragment of Heraclitus speaks of the fireplace or stove, but it is also known to have been a euphemism for latrine. Instead of *furnarium* (stove), Raynaud says *fumarium* (smoke chamber), which may be an error, but it also evokes an unpleasant place.

²⁵ Raynaudus, dist. 7, q. 1, art. 6, n. 76, p. 692a, quoting Fulgentius against Arrianus.

²⁶ Raynaudus, n. 81, p. 696a: “[...] Deum ibi esse eo quod substantia Divina non claudatur ambitu convexo extremi coeli, sed infinite ultra porrigatur, et ibi re ipsa iam nunc ita sit ut absque ulla sui mutatione coexistit esset veris rebus, si ibi aliquae quandoque fierent: Sic certissimum videtur quod contendunt [...].” Many references follow.

²⁷ Raynaudus n. 82, pp. 697a-b. Cf. Paul Richard Blum, “Zentrum,” in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 12 (Basel: Schwabe, 2004), 1298–1301. Raynaud is more detailed than, for instance, Suárez, who also quotes the Hermetic text that “Deum comparavit sphaerae perfectae, cuius centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam.” (disp. 30,

sect. 7, n. 48, p. 110); he quotes it summarily and without further commentary, when discussing among the attributes of God the immensity, which is evidently connected with the presence of divine power in things, together with more sources of the Platonic tradition such as Marsilio Ficino and Augustinus Steuchus.

²⁸ Raynaudus, *Theologia naturalis*, n. 84, p. 699a: “Non dico Divinam immensitatem quidditative esse negationem: hoc enim falsum esset [...]. Itaque per negationem indistantiae a quovis spatio, adiunctam Divinae omnipraesentiae, designo actualem correspondentiam Dei cum quovis spatio vero aut imaginario, quae Divinae substantiae immensitatem seu infinitam localem quasi diffusionem consequitur.”

²⁹ Raynaudus, dist. 7 q. 3 art. 2, n. 127, p. 738b: “infinitatem non secundum propriam aliquam rationem, sed secundum quod ens seu simplicitate.”

³⁰ Gasparo Contarini, “Primae philosophiae compendium,” in *Opera* (Parisiis: Sebastianus Niuellius, 1571), 91–176, lib. 4, pp. 141–144.

³¹ Raynaudus, *Theologia naturalis*, dist. 7 q. 3 art. 4, p. 757b: (heading) “De eadem Divinae naturae infinitate ut fundante eminentissimum titulum domini Dei in res omnes.”

³² Honoratus Tournely, *Cursus theologicus scholastico-dogmaticus et moralis, sive praelectionum theologiarum [...] tomus primus* (Coloniae Agrippinae: Metternich, 1735), 41a, 44b: “agitur quippe de idea Dei, qui re ipsa et quidem solus est ens perfectissimum. At inquires, Epicurei, Spinosa etc. habent ideam perfectissimam, nempe mundi, nec tamen in Deum confitentur? [...] sed quia ideam illam ad mundum seu rerum universitatem transferunt turpiter aberrant, sibi quae manifeste contradicunt.” The numbering of sections is confusing and therefore left aside.

³³ Tournely, 71a-b: “Simplicitatem Dei impugnare [...] Spinosa. [...] 1. (Propositione quinta) ait, in rerum natura non posse dari duas aut plures substantias eiusdem naturae sive attributi [...]” Almost literally are quoted *Ethics* I, propositions 5, 6, 15, 16, 29, and 36 (appendix).

³⁴ Tournely, 74a.

³⁵ Tournely, 75a.

³⁶ Tournely, 84b: “Sicut enim anima e cerebro omnem vitae spiritum per omnes corporis artus diffundit; ita Deus e coelo [...] in omnem universi hujus ambitum, vitae conservationis et providentiae suae quasi spiritum infundit omnia regendo, moderando, sustentando; tametsi per substantiam ubique praesens adsit.”

³⁷ Tournely, 86a: “[...] operatio vero Dei transiens, libera et externa; ergo praesentia Dei in rebus a priori non probatur ex operatione transeunte.”