
Twilight of *The Genealogy*? Or a Genealogy of *Twilight*? Saving Nietzsche's Internalization Hypothesis from Naïve Determinism

Brian Lightbody

Abstract: The Internalization Hypothesis (I.H.), as expressed in GM II 16 of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, is the essential albeit under-theorized principle of Nietzsche's psychology. In the following essay, I investigate the purpose I.H. serves concerning Nietzsche's theory of drives as well as the Hypothesis's epistemic warrant. I demonstrate that I.H. needs a Neo-Darwinian underpinning for two reasons: 1) to answer the Time-Crunch Problem of Transformation, and 2) in order to render it coherent with Nietzsche's physiological determinism as articulated in *Twilight of the Idols*. My re-examination of I.H., then, serves to underwrite the Hypothesis on solid empirical footing. In addition, my analysis provides further evidence to think that Brian Leiter's initial (but naïve) type-fact reading of Nietzsche's philosophy of psychology is accurate, deterministic warts and all.

Keywords: Internalization Hypothesis, Genealogy, Drive Theory, Type-Fact Theory, Time-Crunch Problem of Transformation.

Introduction

In essay two, section 16 of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche argues that violent and aggressive drives that do not find outward expression turn inward, creating new targets for the drives' successful manifestations. The primal drives to which Nietzsche is referring are the animal-like instincts of pre-humans. When proto-humans were prevented from acting on these natural predispositions, it caused the origin of the "entire inner world," the birth of subjectivity. As Nietzsche explains, the 'self' "... expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth and height in the same measure outward discharge was inhibited." (GM: II 16).¹ It was this blockage of primal instincts that transformed our ancestors from what Nietzsche calls "semi-animals" to the rational agents we (erroneously) believe ourselves to be today. (GM: II 16). The expression of these drives carves out our character; indeed, our very identity and, as such, may lead to life-denying and self-lacerating feelings like *resentiment*—along with its corresponding ethics, the ascetic ideal—or if harnessed correctly could "become the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena." (GM: II 18).

The above explanation for the emergence of subjectivity I shall call the Internalization Hypothesis (hereafter,

I.H.). It is a central feature of Nietzsche's philosophy of action. However, for all its importance, it is appallingly undertheorized in the secondary literature a point well-established in William Beals's relatively recent and significant article, "Internalization and Its Consequences."² Indeed, there appear to be several iterations of the Hypothesis in the *Genealogy of Morals* alone.³ The lack of scholarship regarding this Hypothesis (or hypotheses) is unsettling. With this point in mind there are three main concerns with Nietzsche's thesis : 1) it's undertheorization in general and, of related importance, its epistemic warrant; 2) the importance of the Hypothesis vis a vis understanding Nietzsche's theory of psychology and in particular his theory of drives; 3) the possibility that there may be several different interpretations of the hypothesis. My primary goal in the following paper is to examine the passage of GM: II 16 where the Internalization Hypothesis is given its most unambiguous expression through the explanatory framework provided by GM II 1-3, where Nietzsche elucidates the prehistorical, and most importantly, problematic well-spring of bodily forces which had to be redirected in order for the internalization of humanity to take place.

Regarding the third concern, a problem Beals himself identifies in his paper, I cannot entertain it here but would argue that there are not different theories of internalization at all, but instead that the internalization of humanity is one and the same process. In fact, the progression and deepening development of internalization, in general, is one of the central conclusions of the *Genealogy*, or so I would argue. Internalization, therefore, is a continuum, but there are definite points in history which Nietzsche flags so as to signal to his readers the emergence of new relationships to, and therefore new interpretations of, one's animalistic drives. Most significantly, these new readings of, what are fundamentally animal instincts, provide the alchemical formula for the further transformations of humanity. In tracing these varied and contingent readings of said drives, Nietzsche's genealogical method is liberating in that it shows that no interpretation is any more metaphysically necessary than any other, (despite what the priest might think) though some might be more life-enhancing.⁴

Thus, the primary foci of the following paper will be on issues one and two with the bulk of the essay concentrating on the first of these problems. I will begin by examining concern two, namely, the role I.H. plays in Nie-

tzsche's philosophy of psychology as it pertains specifically to the *Genealogy* before examining issue one, the veracity of the theory itself. The question: What epistemic warrant does the theory have? Has not been asked, let alone answered in the secondary literature. I intend to correct this oversight. I demonstrate that the underpinnings of I.H. are false, at least on the standard reading. For the standard reading of GM: II 3 holds that the entire justification of I.H. rests on Lamarck's plainly incorrect Inheritance Thesis. I intend to correct this error by demonstrating that the preparatory stages leading to Nietzsche's announcement of the I.H. in section 16 of GM:II may be reinterpreted using Neo-Darwinian insights. The solution to this part of the puzzle regarding I.H. relies heavily on my thesis (developed in a prior article) that artificial and unconscious selection perform the same work as Lamarckianism.⁵ The upshot of this interpretation is that Nietzsche's explanation for the initial ground-work of bad conscience in section GM: II 3 is on solid epistemic footing after all.

This Neo-Darwinian account plays another role. It also has a significant philological part to play, for it serves as a bridge between Nietzsche's *Genealogy* and his more deterministic and physiologically inspired works like *Twilight of the Idols and Anti-Christ*. Thus, a Neo-Darwinian reading of I.H. smooths out the wrinkles produced by the standard, Lamarckian reading of GM: II 3 and thus resolves the apparent incongruity between the *Genealogy* and Nietzsche's later work.

My solution, however, does not come without its own problems. Despite the distinct epistemic advantages of the Neo-Darwinian reading, there is an issue with the proposed solution: the I.H. would now seem superfluous. If all behavior is grounded on genetic inheritance and said genetic inheritance is determined by past mechanical and biological procedures that cannot be changed then we seem to be asserting a biologically reductionist solution to all human behavior, a temptation that some philosophers have eagerly embraced. This outcome may favor and indeed justify Nietzsche's position in *Twilight* and the *Anti-Christ* but would leave the I.H. without any work to perform in Nietzsche's philosophy of psychology. In the last section, I save the Internalization Hypothesis by demonstrating how it may be modified if one restricts its scope. In essence, the Hypothesis does not explain the peculiar psychology of the mediocre, as Nietzsche would put it, but is limited to the priestly type and its progeny.

1. Problem Two: The Role of I.H. in Nietzsche's theory of mind

Nietzsche provides a rich and profound account for the origins of memory, conscience, and agency in sections 1-18 of GM II. But Nietzsche's conclusions have loftier ambitions; they extend further becoming incredibly significant regarding his overall philosophy of psychology. Nietzsche's genealogical investigations serve as both a springboard for and cornerstone of significant moral and psychic truths that are representative of Nietzsche's psychology. Indeed, the result of these explorations regarding the primeval unconscious of future humans may be dis-

tilled to a fundamental psychological principle that, seemingly, applies to the entire scope of past, present, and future human behavior. That principle is the Internalization Hypothesis. This eventual lodestone for Nietzsche's philosophy of action is best expressed in GMII, 16:

All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly (*Aussen*) turn inward—this is what I call the internalization (*Verinnerlichung*) of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his "soul." (*Seele*) The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, (*Tiefe*) breadth, (*Breite*) and height (*Höhe*), in the same measure as outward discharge, was inhibited."⁶

The Internalization Hypothesis becomes a powerful explanatory tool in reference to Nietzsche's drive theory, a veritable cottage industry in the secondary literature. The basic tenets of this theory hold that primordial drives like sex and violence always take targets for their expression. As Peter Poellner puts it, "Nietzsche ultimately treats drives not as attributes of agents (like desires) but as agents themselves."⁷ Drives moreover that are not always expressed in terms of their original objectives (e.g. sex) will find some other avenue for their successful manifestation, and thus drives that do not find outward expression turn inward leading to new dispositions, and according to some scholars, new emotions.⁸ John Richardson states the nature of drives well when he writes, "A drive is a plastic disposition...inasmuch it tends to produce different behaviors in different circumstances, in such a way that the same outcome is reached, by different routes, in all of them...Such plasticity depends on a capacity to 'respond' to circumstances ...in some minimal way."⁹

The drive theory, as expressed in many of Nietzsche's works (See *Human and all Too Human*, I. 32, *Daybreak* 119, *GM* III: 24) is well-complemented with a rich, mature, and profound articulation of the theory in the secondary literature. While it would be beyond the scope of this paper to define all of the positions on Nietzsche's theory of drives in the scholarship, still one can say, minimally, that drives motivate behaviors and thus are the bedrock for Nietzsche's system of values and psychology.¹⁰ Nietzsche intends his drive theory not only to explain our initial evaluations as to why some objects should be pursued or avoided but indeed to explain the reflective value judgments we come to have on said evaluations.¹¹ The drive, as Paul Katsafanas summarizes its role is, "Nietzsche's principle explanatory token within psychology."¹²

Yet given the apparent importance of Nietzsche's drive theory to his ethics and psychology it is perplexing to note that scholars have not focused on challenging the very historical foundation for the idea itself, which is, of course, I.H. In order to fully capture Nietzsche's theory of drives it is critical to examine the role the I.H. plays in this regard. An examination to which I now turn.

The I.H. performs two functions in Nietzsche's theory of mind. First, it explains how human beings acquired a bad conscience and later a more fully developed sense of agency and moral being. The explanation for the creation of self was an enfolding as it were of instinctual, animal drives. The I.H., therefore, plays a grounding role in

terms of naturalizing the process of transformation from that of our animal ancestors to the contemporary, rational, and free agents we assume ourselves to be today. Nietzsche's explanation is biological or, indeed, zoological in that it purports to show how we were transformed into a different species than we once were.

However, the theory also plays a further psychological role in that it attempts to explain the behavior of human beings as well as the reasons humans use to explain / rationalize their behavior. For example, it underpins Nietzsche's development of slave vs. noble values as explained in the first essay of the *Genealogy* and plays a significant explanatory role concerning Nietzsche's account of what he diagnosed as the significant sickness of the current age, nihilism.¹³ In this latter role, the Internalization Hypothesis attempts to reduce matters of what Kant would call *quid Juris* (or justification with respect to one's reasons) to a mere *quid facti* or etiological approach.¹⁴ The Internalization Hypothesis, I submit, is the lynch-pin connecting Nietzsche's reductionist biological naturalism with his philosophy of psychology.

The second essay of Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* presents the historical warrant behind the Internalization Hypothesis and, therefore the epistemic underpinnings of Nietzsche's psychology. It is vital to examine, more closely, how secure the foundation for this hypothesis is. In what follows, I propose to provide a more in-depth reading of GM: II 3 than that which is typically offered in the secondary literature in order to demonstrate the epistemic obstacles that underpin I.H in GM II: 16.

2. The Lamarckian Context of Nietzsche's Internalization Hypothesis

The purpose of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* is to provide a naturalistic account for the development of morality *per se* and subsequent proliferation of moralities. In keeping with the central tenets of philosophical genealogy, Nietzsche's account is one that does not and must not invoke the supernatural (whether construed as the Christian God or any other deity). The task before Nietzsche then, distilled to its essence¹⁵ is one of explaining how an "animal" grows a conscience —a moral "organ," as it were— that acts against the animal's natural, selfish instincts, at least most of the time. According to most scholars the key explanation for this process of moral transformation can be found in essay two of the *Genealogy* entitled "Guilt, Bad Conscience and the Like." The essay attempts to reconstruct the formatting of the human being from an unrecognizable "semi-animal" with neither capacious memory nor robust agency to the rational, moral subjects we believe ourselves to be today.¹⁶

In thinking about the question that perplexed Nietzsche, namely, "How did the promise-making animal, man, come to be?" he adopts a course of investigation perfectly consonant with the biologically infused intellectual climate of late 19th-century thinking.¹⁷ In keeping with those naturalistic sentiments of the time, Nietzsche poses that the answer to this question can be found in the conditioning of the body of these semi-animals. For example, emotions that contemporary subjects experience

today, like guilt, were produced, ultimately, from simpler physical well-springs and mechanical procedures that re-directed primal drives. Guilt, to use Nietzsche's terminology was "bred up" (*heranzuzüchten*) from several origins that were once distinct but then subsequently cultivated, redirected and amalgamated over a relatively short period of time, all things considered.¹⁸ It is through violence claims Nietzsche, that "the oldest state thus appeared as a fearful tyranny, as an oppressive and remorseless machine, and went on working until this raw material of people and semi-animals was at last only thoroughly kneaded and pliant but also formed." (GM: II, 17)

The genealogy of this naturalistic account of how the modern human being evolved begins in GM II: 3. The standard reading of this section (and in conjunction with sections 16 and 17) proposes that there were two principal drivers for the creation of the new promise-making animal. The first was communal enclosures (e.g. walls). The received view holds that walls served as flight deterrents in early human communities because they forced proto-men and women to submit to the laws and rules of their overlords whom Nietzsche charitably describes as artistic warriors and in other cases, more animalistically as blonde beasts of prey.¹⁹

The second driver was torture. Breathtakingly cruel tortures were used to deter our early ancestors from climbing over the walls of their new-found pens. Nevertheless, said tortures served another purpose, Nietzsche avers. As noted, Nietzsche depicts our ancestors as semi-animals without much in the way of memory or agency. The question Nietzsche asks: How was memory burned into the human animal? Is answered, so the standard reading suggests as follows: over several millennia, a combination of mechanical techniques (i.e. torture directly applied to the animal misbehaving along with public spectacles of torture meant to serve as warnings to others) were used to traumatize and deter early humans from escaping civilization. Over time, a generation of these proto-humans, inherited, rather miraculously, five or six of the prohibitions created by the first Ur Community of warrior-artists, which then became central to the development of civilization itself.²⁰

The above summary as to the creation of memory is well-supported in the secondary literature. Daniel Conway, in his masterful *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Reader's Guide*, sums up the received view well when he writes, "The community, in turn, acquired a collective identity of its own, which it maintained on the strength of its credible threat to renew the founding trauma. The practice of what we now know to be punishment thus began as an attempt to tame those primitive human beings who were forcibly immured in the earliest communities."²¹

Brian Leiter also agrees with Conway's assessment. He notes in his *Nietzsche on Morality A Reader's Guide to On the Genealogy of Morals* that "Two factors are singled out by Nietzsche as formative for the human animal in its development of regular behavior and a memory: the morality of custom and the role of pain in mnemonics."²²

Finally, we have Lawrence Hatab. Hatab, in his *Nietzsche on the Genealogy of Morals An Introduction*, echoes the above interpretations by writing the following:

In section 3 Nietzsche elaborates on the “long history” of cruel practices that made something like conscience possible...such a phenomenon could only come about when prepared by the struggle to establish memory in the face of active forgetfulness. This is the role played by cruel punishments and torments—Nietzsche mentions practices such as mutilation, stoning, impaling, flaying, drawing and quartering, boiling alive—which served to “burn” a memory into the victims and onlookers because “pain was the most powerful aid to mnemonics.”²³

Taking all these interpretations together, in reconstructing Nietzsche’s speculative analysis contained within sections GM: II 3 (and to a lesser degree, GM II: 16, 17) it is indisputable, then, that some definite group with a clear identity seized control of a motley collection of creatures who were far less technically, psychologically and culturally advanced. The first original community then reformatted this assemblage setting it on the path to memory, agency, and morality.

What is unclear is the mechanism employed to alter the instinctual animal-like nature of our ancestors. How, exactly, did the lessons of torture come to be imparted or “burnt in” to creatures who are described by Nietzsche as lacking capacious memory, that is, the sort of memory necessary for a culture to revamp aggressive, natural instincts to conform to the strait-jacket of civilization? Notice that only a robust sense of memory, a “culture-serving” notion of memory as I put it in a prior article, would be able to constrain such instincts and additionally provide the *sine qua non* for civilization that the I.H., all by itself, clearly lacks in Nietzsche’s account.²⁴

However, what is most striking about this problem is that Nietzsche clearly understands it because he articulates it well near the beginning of GM: II 3. He writes, “How can one create a memory for the human animal? How can one impress something upon this partly obtuse, partly flighty mind, attuned only to the passing moment, in such a way that it will stay there?” (GM II: 3). Why is Nietzsche’s question such a problem? Moreover, how is that many scholars in the secondary literature have failed to recognize or at the very least, fail to mention the problematic nature of Nietzsche’s answer?

To bring this problem into sharper focus, consider the training of a guard dog as an analog for our semi-animal ancestors. The proto-guard dog will be expected to learn a few basic commands. Such commands may be instilled by employing heinous forms of Pavlovian negative reinforcement techniques, an analog for torture that was applied to early humans, so Nietzsche contends. But then again, these same techniques would need to be redeployed to every generation of the dog after that. The puppy of the guard-dog would not know the commands instilled in its mother. It would need to learn these commands in the same way its mother learned them—through violence—that is if the analogy between early humans is to hold. Nonetheless, this is not and cannot be what Nietzsche is suggesting. He is suggesting that the capacity to remember is itself something that can be bred up from previous generations. One generation first remembers the first five or six “thou shall nots” of civil society; the next or several generations after that builds on these rules by learning the rudiments of culture, namely its laws, songs, and stories. As this culture progresses so too subsequent generations

of these individuals’ capacity to remember evolves. Each succeeding generation of proto-humans begins with the learning, the memories inscribed in its parents. If this were not true then the very fundamentals of civilization, namely the regulation of behavior and as Brian Leiter puts it, “regular civilized intercourse” would always need to start over from scratch—just like the puppy who must learn the commands of its mother.²⁵ What Nietzsche requires, undoubtedly, is a mechanism other than behavioral psychology to account for this radical zoological transformation.

The solution to the above problem of transforming an animal into an agent means that there are only a few theoretical contenders that fit the bill. According to some theorists, natural selection would be one such theory.²⁶ However, Nietzsche faces another constraint that would eliminate this possibility as well. He is under a time-crunch problem in that he must explain how mechanical procedures of torture could inscribe fear and aversion in essentially an animal population lacking memory, and yet acknowledge that these same mechanical procedures created a being that resembles contemporary agents of today. Moreover, this Herculean task must have taken place, if Nietzsche’s account is to remain even remotely warranted, within the space of say 12,000 years—a very, very generous timeframe indeed for the origin of civilization defined for our purposes as communities with walls and tax collection.²⁷ Combining both of these points, the problem of essentially zoological transformation and the relatively short time period in which said transformation took place, I shall call the Time-Crunch Problem of Transformation (hereafter TCPT)²⁸. This problem is significantly under-theorized in the secondary literature and, as a result, has led to some surprising and in some cases not well-thought-out answers. One of the leading contenders offered by scholars in the secondary literature to solve this problem is Lamarck’s Inheritability thesis.

Lamarck’s Inheritability Thesis (sometimes also referred to as the “Second Law”) claims that the learned traits and experiences of the parent animal may be passed on to that animal’s progeny. Lamarck explains the thesis well in his late-nineteenth-century article:

All that nature acquires or loses in individuals by the influence of circumstances to which the race has been exposed for a long time, and in consequence by the influence of the predominate employment of such organ, or by the influence of disuse of such part, she preserves by generation, among new individuals which spring from it, providing the acquired changes be common to both sexes, or to those which have produced new individuals.²⁹

Contained within this short quotation are the two main principles of what is popularly called “Lamarckism.” The first is that the continued use of the same organ causes that organ to enlarge while its disuse causes the organ to shrink and eventually disappear. One of Lamarck’s favorite examples to prove his theory are cave-dwelling animals. Fish who live in cave-ponds once had the same capacity for vision as their ancestors, so Lamarck thought. However, because having eyes in the total darkness of a cave would not supply a survival advantage, some of these fish lost their ability to see while other species developed eyelids covering their eyes completely. These

fish so Lamarck's theory would have it, lost their eyesight over many generations because their eyes were no longer being utilized.³⁰

The second notion of Lamarck's principle holds that the developments that occur within the life-span of an organism (whether positive or negative) are transferred, biologically, to their offspring. Another favorite example of Lamarck's and one that has often been lampooned in the literature is the giraffe. Lamarck thought that giraffes were once the size of deer. However, these proto-giraffes were not blessed with access to abundant, rich woodlands as their European and North American counterparts clearly were. Accordingly, giraffes had to stretch their necks to eat leaves from trees, and this stretching caused the individual giraffe to elongate its neck ever so slightly during its lifespan. These early giraffes would have produced progeny whose necks were a little longer when compared to other members of their species who either did not choose to stretch their necks and, over several generations, died off entirely. The pseudo-giraffes who survived would engage in the same practice as their ancestors, until, over many generations, the proto-giraffe, deer-like in size, evolved to become the giraffe we know today.³¹

Lamarck's thesis solves the TCPT all too well, but strikingly neither Conway, Leiter, nor Hatab mentions the name of Lamarck in their respective commentaries on section GM: II, 3. Indeed Lamarck's name does not appear *anywhere* in any of the above works, and yet it seems evident that Nietzsche had Lamarck in mind when writing this section. I will call this group of scholars the "covert Lamarckians" as their respective interpretations all seem to rely on the Inheritability Thesis in order to remain coherent. In the next section, I examine two overt Lamarckians, Richard Schacht and John Richardson, who lament Nietzsche's adoption of the French biologist's theory but agree that Nietzsche's theory is propped up by the Second Law.

3. Overt Lamarckianism in the Secondary Literature

John Richardson and Richard Schacht believe that Nietzsche was a Lamarckian. Both agree that Nietzsche's adoption of the Inheritability Thesis to fortify his account in the second essay of the *Genealogy* is regrettable. Regarding GM:II 3, Richardson argues: "Consider his famous account in GM II of how a 'memory' was 'burned into' pre-civilized humans: this memory is fixed not by selection of those who can remember, but by the acquisition of pain associations that are inheritable."³² Richardson goes on to cite other passages from Nietzsche's work, (most notably GS 143 and BGE 213), that support a Lamarckian reading.³³ In examining the totality of the evidence, Richardson concludes "He (Nietzsche) carries much further a Lamarckism that Darwin also accepts, but uses much less."³⁴

Schacht, too, holds that Nietzsche underpins the account of GM: II 3 on Lamarckism. He notes that "A part of it (the explanation of our newfound moral 'essence') would appear to be the idea that the application of 'fearful means' of 'torture' over a very long period of time even-

tually altered the character of the dispositions we start out with."³⁵

Furthermore, Schacht goes on to note that Nietzsche "...seems to have become convinced, in the course of his attempts to inform himself with respect to the life sciences in the 1880s, that changes can and do happen among living creatures—human beings included—in Lamarckian ways (even if perhaps in other ways as well). We take it for granted that this idea is largely mistaken; but Nietzsche evidently considered it to be common knowledge among the sophisticated..."³⁶

However, neither Richardson nor Schacht are very forthcoming when it comes to providing the details of this supposed Lamarckian underpinning of Nietzsche's story. Schacht acknowledges that Lamarck's is a false theory and, therefore, perhaps finds getting into the details of how the Inheritability Thesis matches up with Nietzsche's investigation pointless. He implies that we must overcome our prejudice in thinking that a great philosopher like Nietzsche would have seen the error of his ways by invoking Lamarckism to defend his account and therefore would seem to acknowledge that Nietzsche's story, at least as it pertains to the formation of bad conscience, is just that, a work of fiction.³⁷ Richardson, in contrast, goes beyond the philological upshot of Schacht's article. He desires to supplant Nietzsche's Lamarckism by offering a sophisticated, Neo-Darwinian defense of Nietzsche's account that rests on utilizing drives and not genes as the target of selective processes. His silence, then, when it comes to integrating Lamarckism³⁸ with Nietzsche's genealogical explanation is consistent with his overall position—if we wish to save the feasibility of Nietzsche's interpretations regarding the transformation of drives over time, then a new foundation for that interpretation must be invoked.³⁹

Despite this silence, it is essential to clarify how one might interpret sections 3, 16 and 17 of GM: II through a Lamarckian filter with a dual-emphasis on the two principal aspects of Lamarckism outlined above: the biological inheritance of learned behavior and the enlargement or atrophy of an organ in accordance with the organ's use or lack thereof. With that aim in mind, the origin of the preparatory stage of bad conscience, namely capacious memory, may be explained as follows. Early human herds were captured by more sophisticated yet highly organized beasts of prey, warrior-artists. The members of this original Ur-community were, initially, like "forces of nature"—imposing their will and design on the hapless creatures they captured. Eventually, they came to learn how to create a new being from this formless mass of flesh before them. They constructed walls to imprison these newfound guinea pigs of morality and imposed tortures so that the first five or six prohibitions required for the formation of civilization would be "burnt" into the flesh of these semi-animals. In other words, these creatures inherited trauma suffered by their forebears, thereby forming the very foundation for what Nietzsche would later call the "straitjacket" of civil society in the centuries to come. It was this trauma, so holds the Lamarckian reading, that was transferred to subsequent offspring of these tortured creatures. The biological remnants of the suffering the original group of captured proto-humans experienced,

sedimented and was transferred to their progeny. The process of torture and inheritance continued producing a new organ, that of memory or, more precisely, the capacity to remember cause, effect, and consequences of one's behavior. Over several centuries this inherited trauma turned into something else, the Internalization Hypothesis, which then becomes the touchstone for understanding Nietzsche's much-vaunted and much valued psychological explanations.

As simple as this Lamarckian narrative sounds, there are two problems with it. The first is epistemic, and the other is philological. Firstly, and rather obviously, Lamarck's Inheritability Thesis is false. Nevertheless, if Nietzsche's interpretation regarding the development of humanity is subtended by a false scientific theory, then surely the I.H. is also unwarranted. Secondly, the Lamarckian reinterpretation of GM II: 3 stands at odds with Nietzsche's later, physiological and deterministic reductionism found in writings like *Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ*. These works would seem to be more congruent with contemporary biological and physiological reductionist approaches to action theory, and indeed scholars such as Brian Leiter and Joshua Knobe have shown how the essential principles of these works are well-supported in the contemporary, empirical psychological literature.⁴⁰ If, however, a Lamarckian reading of I.H. subtends the insights of Nietzsche's psychological principles, then these principles, too, are suspect—an important point that seldom if any commentators have picked up on.

However, there is another significant but this time philological problem that concerns the I.H. irrespective of its Lamarckian lineage. In order to draw out this problem, I need to delve more deeply into Nietzsche's physiologically reductionist psychology as articulated in his late philosophy.

4. Nietzsche's Physiological Philosophy: The Late Period

Ruth Abbey in her *Nietzsche's Middle Period* provides an informative if critical lens through which to view Nietzsche's psychology *cum* physiology stance. Abbey writes that Nietzsche's philosophy of psychology

...is a circular approach to action and identity. Bad or degenerate action is a sign of declining life; it indicates that either one's inheritance was inferior to begin with or has become impoverished, while beautiful action is a function of a good, thriving inheritance. How uninformative an approach to identity and action this is becomes apparent when Nietzsche applies it reflexively, describing the illness that forced him to resign his professorship at Basel as "that *bad* inheritance from my father's side." If higher types falter or fail, it must be due to something faulty in their inheritance.⁴¹

One of the passages to which Abbey refers in defense of her assessment is the diet of Cornaro as described by Nietzsche in section 1 of "The Four Great Errors" of *Twilight of the Idols*. One of these errors is confusing cause and consequence. Cornaro's secret to long-life, then, as Nietzsche explains, is backwards—Cornaro's paltry diet did not extend his life, but rather it was the only diet he could

stomach as a consequence of his incredibly slow metabolism. It was the slow metabolism Cornaro inherited, which resulted in his peculiar physiological characteristics and, therefore, distinctive eating habits.

Nietzsche's strong physiological reductionism is not peculiar to this section. Both *Twilight* and the *Anti-Christ* contain many other physiological interpretations to either explain or explain away philosophical and religious puzzles. In section I of 'Improvers of Mankind' in *Twilight*, Nietzsche makes clear that "there are no moral facts" but instead argues that "morality is merely a sign-language, symptomatology."⁴² What do moral codes signify one might ask? Nietzsche again is clear: degenerating signs of life. In physiological terms, Nietzsche explains in the very next section, "...in the struggle with the beast (the blond beast of prey) making it sick *can* be the only means of making it weak. This the Church understood: it corrupted the human being, it weakened him—but it claimed to have 'improved' him."⁴³ Other well-known sections that reduce morality to a physiological sign-language may be found in section 6 of "Morality as Anti-Nature." In writing on so-called 'freewill' that is believed by the masses to be latent within each individual, Nietzsche instead declares, "The individual is, in his future and in his past a piece of fate, one law more, one necessity more for everything that is and everything that will be."⁴⁴

What is more, even philosophical thinking writ large, at times, is also reduced to superstition—a crude inefficacious way of looking at the world. In a striking passage from section 3 of 'Reason in Philosophy' in *Twilight* Nietzsche writes: "We possess scientific knowledge today to precisely the extent that we have decided to accept the evidence of the senses—to the extent that we have learned to sharpen and arm them and to see them through to their conclusions."⁴⁵ "The rest, (Nietzsche declares) is abortion and not-yet-science: which is to say metaphysics, theology, psychology, epistemology."⁴⁶

The conviction that physiology is the true touchstone for determining values whether epistemic or otherwise appears once more in section 57 of the *Anti-Christ* where Nietzsche declares the following:

In every healthy society, there can be distinguished three types of man of divergent physiological tendency which mutually condition one another and each of which possesses its own hygiene, its own realm of work, its own sort of mastery and feeling of perfection. Nature, not Manu, separates from one another the predominately spiritual type, the muscular and temperamental type and the third type distinguished neither in one or the other, the mediocre type—the last as the great majority...⁴⁷

It is clear, then, that Nietzsche is advancing a position where epistemic importance vis a vis morality lies with the natural sciences and more perspicuously put, biology and physiology. Ethical intuitions are nothing more than confessions of an individual's physiological symptomatology; they are indicative of what a person will do, but neither they nor the person who holds them is causally efficacious.⁴⁸

These two works read much like contemporary Neo-Darwinian approaches that attempt to explain the development of moral psychology *via* natural selection, even though Nietzsche would have no understanding of the

second arm of this synthesis, namely, Mendelian genetics. Despite this difficulty, some scholars have interpreted this period of Nietzsche's writing as one marked by the slogan "anatomy is destiny" as Freud later put it, and, accordingly, have tried to make sense of this idea in light of contemporary scientific research. Brian Leiter, for example, argues that Nietzsche clarifies and refines a type-fact theory during this phase of his writing.

The type-fact theory argues that human beings belong to fixed and immutable psycho-physiological, which determine and, if understood correctly, explain the cognitive faculties, desires, and behavior of individuals.⁴⁹ "Each person, Leiter declares, has a fixed psycho-physical constitution, which defines him as a particular type of person."⁵⁰ There are two types according to Leiter's interpretation. There are weak types who are impotent, reactive, prone to nursing grudges and intriguingly, desire to create values that serve their *interests*, and then there are strong types who are active, exuberant, healthy and express their values outwardly. Also, and in converse fashion to the weak type, the strong construct values which come to serve their *instincts*.⁵¹

The above type-acts, it is important to emphasize, are immutable, at least according to the early Leiter. Type-facts are physiological and psychological traits that constitute a person, and which place him in one of the two categories (weak/strong) noted above. These type-facts may then be used to predict, with some degree of accuracy, the moral and theoretical beliefs of so-called persons. "A 'person' (Leiter proclaims and his inverted commas) is the arena in which the struggle of drives (type-facts) is played out; how they play out determines what he believes, what he values, what he becomes."⁵²

According to Leiter's later position, type-facts are mutable but cannot be changed by the person who 'has' them because a person remains (as with the earlier position) simply the unconscious expression of type-facts. If one's type-facts do change, then this alteration is caused by culture, perhaps by turning genes on or off. What remains true in both Leiterian accounts is the causal inefficacy of the individual. As Leiter puts it in his recent book, *Moral Psychology with Nietzsche*, "Nietzsche holds that heritable type-facts are central determinants of personality and morally significant behaviors, a claim well-supported by extensive empirical findings in behavioral genetics."⁵³ What is more notable in Leiter's later work, is his attempt to demonstrate that Nietzsche's nineteenth-century musings on the relationship between physiology and conscious action are compatible with the results of experiments on the nature of "free will" (it appears to be fiction) conducted in the field of contemporary neuroscience.⁵⁴

My account buttresses and fills in an important gap regarding Leiter's position: he is at pains to show that Nietzsche's genealogies are truthful accounts that chronicle how strong types have been duped by what he calls Morality in a Pejorative Sense or MPS. The real purpose of *On the Genealogy of Morals* is to speak to the strong types who happen to read Nietzsche's book. "The genealogy of morality, Leiter reminds us, is but one instrument for arriving at a particular end, namely a critique of morality" (My Italics)⁵⁵ My reading lends further support to Leiter's overall position and provides one mechanism that

gave rise to these two distinct physiological types as articulated by Leiter.

Still, there is a more critical point to bear in mind. If the type-fact interpretation of Nietzsche's later philosophy is accurate it stands at odds with the Lamarckian infused narrative as noted above. Consider that if one is determined by immutable type facts, then the Internalization Hypothesis has no causal role to play when it comes to explaining the epistemic, affective or conative landscape of human beings. Moreover, since Lamarck's is a false theory it is incommensurable with the contemporary research Leiter uses to warrant Nietzsche's physiological reductionism. I argue that a Neo-Darwinian account of GM: II 3 predicated as it is on artificial and unconscious selection to justify Nietzsche's origin of memory, also explains the origins of the Internalization Hypothesis. My thesis provides further support for Nietzsche's well-known biologically reductionistic tendencies of his later years and vice versa; the Neo-Darwinian underpinnings regarding I.H outlined above, explains and deepens Nietzsche's physiological-psychological predestinarian leanings in his late works. The upshot of my solution is that the law of internalization is a problem of scope: it does not apply to humanity writ large but to a small subclass: the priestly/philosophical type. Outside of this class it is an unnecessary theoretical appendage that performs little philosophical work in Nietzsche's late philosophy, and thus the problem disappears.

My argument consists of two parts. First, I outline how the twin selective pressures of artificial and unconscious selection do the same work as Lamarck's Inheritably thesis, and yet since they are components of the Neo-Darwinian synthesis, such an account is more likely to be true. Second, I then show that this position acts a bridge of sorts that explains Nietzsche's deterministic leanings in *Twilight of the Idols* and *the Anti-Christ* while also ensuring that this bridge is consistent with empirical research that Leiter marshals forth to support the deterministic positions taken up by Nietzsche in these late works.

5. Artificial and Unconscious selection and Nietzsche's Type-Fact Theory

In a previous article titled, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection in Nietzsche's Genealogy: Expectorating the Poisoned Pill of the Lamarckian Reading", I demonstrate that the most warranted mechanisms to explain the docility of early inhabitants of civilization—given Nietzsche's narrative—are twofold. First, the warrior-artists selected those individuals who displayed capacities to retain whatever lessons were needed to be imparted to their subjects in the first civilizations. It was these creatures who could learn the first five or six commandments of early civilization, and it was these same creatures that were then bred with others of a similar disposition preserving the genes of the two lines in the process. Those who were incapable of reformatting themselves "to behave" were tortured, as Nietzsche correctly suggests. However, the real benefit to civilization of said torture did not stem from the effects of torture itself, i.e. punishments. Incurable creatures did not learn to behave themselves. Instead, it was the result

of torture, namely the creature's death, that was the causally active ingredient in terms of getting civilization off the ground.⁵⁶

Evidence for this interpretation can be found in Nietzsche's discussion of the old Germanic punishments listed above by Hatab. Of the nine German punishments Nietzsche offers as analogs for pre-civilized forms of torture, it is critical to note that *all* of the practices end in the death of the tormented beast. The importance of torture, then, is this: because the creature dies, it is unable to pass on its unruly, aggressive drives subtended as these are by specific genes. Punishment is over-determined; a point Nietzsche makes clear in section GM II 13: "To return to our subject, namely punishment, one must distinguish two aspects: on the one hand, that in it which is relatively *enduring*, the custom, the act, the "drama", a certain strict sequence of procedures; on the other, that in it which is *fluid*, the meaning, the purpose, the expectation associated with the performance of such procedures." (Nietzsche's Italics).

We believe, mistakenly, that ancient torture was meant to deter. It was not. Its real purpose was to cull. Memory was a desirable trait that was artificially selected for by those "blonde beasts of prey" as Nietzsche puts it.

The second driver of civilization was unconscious selection. The first animals in the early human *Domus* were bred for a variety of reasons. Animals were bred for their fertility, size, productivity (e.g. goats were bred for their milk), and overall health. Animals were bred, however, for yet another but unconscious reason: docility. Animals who could conform to the strictures of domestication are invariably more docile than their counterparts. Indeed, it is for this reason they are unconsciously selected for breeding in the first place. As agrarian anthropologist James Scott, himself a sheep farmer put it in *Against the Grain*:

I have always been personally offended when sheep are used as a synonym for cowardly behavior and lack of individuality. We have, for the past 8000 years, been selecting among sheep for tractability, slaughtering first the aggressive ones who broke out of the corral. How dare we, then, turn around and slander a species for some combination of normal herd behavior and precisely those characteristics we selected for?⁵⁷

Sheep are sheepish in part because the ones displaying aggression are slaughtered before their wranglers *allowed* them to breed.

The argument that I advance, then, is that aggressive or non-conductive drives for civilization itself, such as adventure, war, hunting, and the like manifested themselves in some individuals and not others. Those pre-modern humans who had these drives were considered anathema to civilization and were tortured and killed for entertainment by the rulers of the first "Ur community". However, the entertainment of the warrior-artists also produced another unconscious benefit, at least from their point of view: the genetic code of these individuals was not selected because they were not bred. Such belligerent instincts, noted above, were held in the opinion of the first rulers of civilization, to be impediments to successful breeding and were therefore blocked from expression not because they were internalized but because they were bled out as a re-

sult of the painful practices of unconscious culling (torture) adopted by said rulers. Cruelty to oneself was and is a genetic predisposition that grew to feverish pitches as more and more "adventurous" types were eliminated from the genetic pool and more individuals with the desired genetic traits took their place. Tameness, then, the capacity to accept the new fetters of civilization was not initially something produced through internalization but genetically selected for.⁵⁸

6. Application of The Neo-Darwinian Synthesis to the Late Work

If my reconstruction of Nietzsche's speculative account of human development is accurate, then the reductionistic tendencies of Nietzsche's later work are congruent with that of the *Genealogy*. The emergence of Nietzsche's weak types may be explained, at least in part, in terms of the twin drivers of artificial and unconscious selection. Nietzsche's much-heralded strong types did not, over a relatively short period of time, have their instincts internalized and reinterpreted via the Internalization Hypothesis but rather saw most if not almost all its members culled to make way for a more docile creature, the Last Man. In contradistinction, the I.H. performs no explanatory work in terms of elucidating the behavior of the weak; the actual driver behind obsequious, genuflection before power is to be explained via the genes said individuals inherited. Nietzsche too, it would seem is guilty of attributing a false cause in the *Genealogy*, and thus much like his explanation for Cornaro's diet, the effects of the I.H. are the *consequence* and not the *cause* of the weak's propensity for at least in part, docility.

With the groundwork for a Neo-Darwinian approach in place, there remain several minor steps to establishing the final part of the argument, namely, saving I.H. as a theory that does, in fact, perform some work in Nietzsche's philosophy of mind. Firstly, it must be noted that Nietzsche's fecund psychological acumen came, mainly, from his introspection and, as such, the psychological law of internalization is as much a reflection on Nietzsche's mental make-up as it is an account of the bad conscience writ large. What we have is a problem of scope. The explanation Nietzsche affords regarding the redirection of primal drives fits better with illuminating the psychology of Nietzsche's priestly types. Under my interpretation, these individuals are deeply furrowed: they have a tremendous and a genuine capacity to serve both their God and their flock, but they possess equally aggressive natures which are now turned inward as the result of some form of initial physical illness leading to *resentiment* and the creation and embracement of slave values.⁵⁹ They are self-lacerating individuals capable of incredible depths of cognitive dissonance; the priestly type is self-tormented but also quite capable of harnessing its violent instincts to wage war against his former aristocratic brothers, the warrior caste. Nietzsche supports this fragmented psychology of the priestly type in in the *Genealogy* and elsewhere: In GM I, 7 Nietzsche explains how the priestly style of appraisal slowly begins to separate itself from the aristocratic model. He writes, "By now it will be clear how easily

the priestly mode of evaluation may diverge from the knightly-aristocratic mode and then develop [*fortentwickeln*] into its opposite."⁶⁰

In GM III: 13, Nietzsche expands on this new gulf existing between the warriors and priestly caste by explaining the primary mode of interpreting life for the priestly type, which is, of course, the ascetic ideal. He claims that "The ascetic ideal is derived from the protective and healing instincts of a degenerating life, which seeks to preserve itself and fights for existence with any available means."⁶¹ These above quotations may be read as evidence for the priestly type's mixed heritage, under a Neo-Darwinian reading. A final piece of evidence for this reading can be gleaned from Nietzsche's comments regarding the further evolution of the priestly type to that of the philosophical model. As Nietzsche gently suggests, "Contemplation first appeared on earth in disguised form, with an ambiguous appearance, with an evil heart and often with a frightening head."⁶² If my argument is correct, then the priestly type is the paragon of a mixed breeding heritage: they are products from the interbreeding of docile and aggressive types.⁶³

The bad conscience as a form of self-laceration produced by the internalization of aggressive instincts is psychologically correct as it pertains to the priestly and, to a lesser extent, philosophical type but not as an explanation that fits humanity as a whole. After all "It is precisely among criminals and convicts," Nietzsche reminds us "...that the sting of conscience is extremely rare; prisons and penitentiaries are not the kinds of hotbed in which this species of gnawing worm is likely to flourish."⁶⁴ Nor are the docile, ambitionless Last Men (*Letzter Menschen*) whom Zarathustra contrasts with the *Urbemensch* subject to this psychological law either. The Last Man, Voegelin observed some 60 years ago, "...is the man without creative love, without creative imagination, without a desire for anything that is more than himself...he is satisfied with his little pleasures and the comforts of his existence."⁶⁵ Such a contemptible creature projected by Nietzsche to be one possible destiny of the human race in the not so distant future is not aggrieved because all desire for freedom has been bred out, or so "modified" type-fact theory would suggest. Nietzsche's penetrating psychological law remains truthful if we limit its scope to the contemplative type, broadly construed to include both priests and philosophers.

In conclusion, my solution to the time-crunch, transformation problem (TCTP) in GM II:3 removes the problem of incommensurability between Lamarckian and Neo-Darwinian paradigms in accounting for the evolutionary underpinnings of Nietzsche's explanation for the development of bad conscience. In demonstrating that one can explain indispensable results of the *Genealogy* without relying on Lamarckism, we now have a prominent bridge between the conclusions of the *Genealogy* and later works such as *Twilight* and *Anti-Christ*. The one wrinkle in the argument pertains to the priestly type. My solution to this problem, however, demonstrates that artificial and unconscious selection explain the development of the priestly sort as one who has inherited both aggressive and docile drives. This inheritance explains the fragmented psychology of this type that Nietzsche carefully notes in

GM:I. The Internalization Hypothesis, long a bulwark of Nietzsche's philosophy of psychology remains relevant but only as it applies to this category of types (along with its subsequent iterations like the philosopher) and not to humanity, in general. My interpretation also adds further sophistication and justification to Leiter's type-fact theory in that it marshals forth additional philological evidence from Nietzsche's corpus to reinforce Leiter's initial and rather naïve interpretation. Furthermore, the added evolutionary grounds provided above, in conjunction with the neuroscientific evidence already presented in Leiter's most recent work leads one to think that Nietzsche's type-fact theory, deterministic warts and all, may very well be true.

Bibliography

- [1] Abbey, Ruth. *Nietzsche's Middle Work*. New York Oxford University Press, 2000.
- [2] Ahad, Abdul. "Evolution without Lamarck's Theory and its Use in the Darwinian Theories of Evolution" 2011 *International Journal of Bio-resource and Stress Management*, 2011, 2(3):363-368
- [3] Ahern, Daniel. *Nietzsche as Cultural Physician*. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.
- [4] Anderson, Lanier R. "What is a Nietzschean Self?" in Christopher Janaway and Simon Roberston (eds). *Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012, 202-235
- [5] Anderson, Lanier, R. "On the Nobility of Nietzsche's Priests." *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide*. Ed. Simon May. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 24-55.
- [6] Beals, William. "Internationalization and Its Consequences." *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol 44. No. 3 Autumn, 2013, 435-445.
- [7] Brown, Richard. "Nihilism: "Thus Speaks Physiology." *Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, Language and Politics*. Ed(s). Tom Darby, Bela Egyed and Ben Jones. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989, 133-144.
- [8] Brown, Richard. "Nietzsche: That Profound Physiologist". *Nietzsche and Science*. Eds Gregory Moore and Thomas Brobjer. Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2004, 51-71.
- [9] Clark, Maudemarie and Dudrick, David. *The Soul of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- [10] Conway, Daniel. *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Reader's Guide*. Lanham: MD: Rowman and Littlefield Press, 2008.
- [11] Foucault, Michel. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, Ed. D. Bouchard. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- [12] Hatab, Lawrence. *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals an Introduction*. Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts Series. Cambridge, U.K. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- [13] Kant, Immanuel. *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007.
- [14] Katsafanas, Paul. *The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency and the Unconscious*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- [15] Kaufmann, Walter. *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ*, Fourth Edition. Princeton, New Jersey: University Press, 1974.
- [16] Klein, Wayne. *Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997.
- [17] Lamarck, Jean Baptiste Pierre Antoine. "On the Influence of Circumstances on the Actions and Habits of Animals, and that of the Actions and Habits of Living Bodies, as Causes Which Modify Their Organization." *The American Naturalist*, 22, 1888, 960-972
- [18] Leiter, Brian. "The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche" *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator*. Ed. Christopher Janaway. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
- [19] Leiter, Brian. *Nietzsche on Morality*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- [20] Leiter, Brian. "Nietzsche's Theory of the Will." *Philosopher's Imprint*, Vol. 7 No. 7, 2007 1-15.
- [21] Leiter, Brian. *Moral Psychology with Nietzsche*. Oxford University Press, 2019.
- [22] Lightbody, Brian. *Philosophical Genealogy: An Epistemological Reconstruction of Nietzsche and Foucault's Genealogical Method*. New York: American University Studies Series, V. Vol. 8, Peter Lang USA, Publishers Inc. Vol. 1, 2010 Vol. 2, 2011.

- [23] Lightbody, Brian. *Nietzsche's Will to Power Naturalized, Translating the Human into Nature and Nature into the Human*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017.
- [24] Lightbody, Brian. "Twice Removed: Foucault's Critique of Nietzsche's Genealogical Method" Chapter 7 of *Foucault and Nietzsche: A Critical Encounter*. Ed. Joseph Westfall and Alan Rosenberg. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2018 167-183.
- [25] Lightbody, Brian. "Artificial and Unconscious Selection In Nietzsche's *Genealogy*: Expectorating the Poisoned-Pill of Lamarckism." *Genealogy*, 3, 31, 2019, 1-23.
- [26] Lightbody, Brian. "Hermeneutics vs. Genealogy: Brandom's Cloak or Nietzsche's Quilt?" *The European Legacy*, Vol. 25. Issue 6, 2020, 635-652.
- [27] Maticic, Catherine. "These docile foxes may hold some of the keys to domestication." *Science*, Aug. 6th, 2018. <https://www.science.org/news/2018/08/these-docile-foxes-may-hold-some-genetic-keys-domestication>.
- [28] Moore, Gregory. *Nietzsche, Biology, Metaphor*. New York Oxford University Press, 2002.
- [29] Morrison, Iain. "Ascetic Slaves: Rereading Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals." *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 3 Autumn 2014, 230-257.
- [30] Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good and Evil*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1966.
- [31] Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1974.
- [32] Nietzsche, Friedrich. *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann, Ed. Peter Gay. New York: Random House, 2000.
- [33] Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Anti-Christ and Twilight of the Idols*. Translated by R.J. Holingdale, London: Penguin Books, 1990.
- [34] Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*. 22 vols. ed(s). Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967-84.
- [35] Poellner, Peter. *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- [36] Reginster, Bernard. "Nietzsche on Resentment and Valuation." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57.2 (1997): 281-305.
- [37] Richardson, John. *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- [38] Ruse, Michael. "The Biological Sciences Can Act as a Ground for Ethics." *Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Biology*. New York: Wiley-Blackwell 2010.
- [39] Schacht, Richard. "Nietzsche and Lamarckism," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Summer Vol. 44. No. 2 2013 264-281
- [40] Scott, James, C. *Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).
- [41] Tse, Peter, Ulric. "Symbolic Thought and the Evolution of Human Morality." *Moral Psychology: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness Vol. 1* Ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. MIT Press, 2008, 269-297.
- [42] Voegelin Eric. "Nietzsche, The Crisis and the War." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 6 No. 2 May, 1944, 177-212.
- [43] Wegner, Daniel. *The Illusion of Conscious Will*. Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 2002.
- ⁶ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, GMII: 16, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, Trans. Walter Kaufmann, Ed. Peter Gay, New York: Random House, 2000, 520.
- ⁷ Peter Poellner, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 1995, 174.
- ⁸ See Lanier R. Anderson, "What is a Nietzschean Self" in Christopher Janaway and Simon Roberston (eds), *Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 202-235, 216-218.
- ⁹ John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 2004, 75.
- ¹⁰ I write "minimally" because there are more controversial, robust views of drives in the literature. One such view is the "homunculi" drive position which stipulates that drives are like proto-agents. See Maude-marie Clark and David Dudrick's *The Soul of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 2012. See especially chapters 6 and 7 where they claim that aspects like commanding, obeying and the recognition of one drive being more authoritative than some other, belong to the nature of drives themselves.
- ¹¹ Paul Katsafanas, *The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency and the Unconscious*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 11.
- ¹² Paul Katsafanas, *The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency and the Unconscious*, 74.
- ¹³ Nietzsche, GM: III: 28.
- ¹⁴ Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (London: Palgrave-Macmillan), 2007, A 84, B116.
- ¹⁵ For more on the central tenets of genealogy, see Brian Lightbody "Twice Removed: Foucault's Critique of Nietzsche's Genealogical Method." Chapter seven of *Foucault and Nietzsche: A Critical Encounter* and Brian Lightbody *Philosophical Genealogy: An Epistemological Reconstruction Of Nietzsche and Foucault's Genealogical Method*.
- ¹⁶ Nietzsche, GM: II 16, 520. See Brian Lightbody, "Hermeneutics vs. Genealogy: Brandom's Cloak or Nietzsche's Quilt", 635-652
- ¹⁷ See Gregory Moore's damning assessment of Nietzsche's indebtedness to nineteenth century Biologism. Moore writes: "Nietzsche's Biologism is more wide-ranging more total than that of his immediate successors. Their work (Scheler, Spengler, Simmel, Lessing, Klages) also lacks the fundamental contradictoriness of Nietzsche's position—a nineteenth century faith in the institutional authority of the biological sciences which co-exists uneasily with a belief that these same disciplines are infected with false values." Moore, *Nietzsche, Biology, Metaphor*, (New York Oxford University Press), 2002, 211.
- ¹⁸ Nietzsche, GM: II, 2 : "The task of breeding an animal with the right to make promises evidently embraces and presupposes as a preparatory task that one first makes men to a certain degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and consequently calculable."
- ¹⁹ "I employed the word 'state': it is obvious what is meant—some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race which, organized for war and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomad." GM II 17, 522
- ²⁰ Nietzsche, GM: II, 17. It is important to note that "blonde breast" is not a racial concept according to Nietzsche. Kaufmann's nearly half-century old commentary on this passage is instructive: "The blond beast is not a racial concept and does not refer to the 'Nordic race' of which the Nazis later made so much. Nietzsche specifically refers to Arabs and Japanese, Romans and Greeks no less than ancient Teutonic tribes when he first introduces this term (GM I 11)-and the 'blondness' obviously refers to the beast, the lion, rather than the kind of man." (Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ*, 225. A word also needs to be said regarding "master race." Nietzsche is not claiming that a singular identifiable race marks the pinnacle of human development. That horrific idea is not what Nietzsche is espousing. Indeed the original German text makes this clear: *eine Eroberer-und Herren-Rasse. Eine Eroberer* (a conquerer is hyphenated to *Herrerr-Rasse* thus becoming one word). The translation should really be "a conqueror and a master race." With regard to GM II: 17, then, Nietzsche's use of "master race" should be understood functionally: all Nietzsche's hypothesis entails is that when one studies the formation of any state (defined as communities with tax collection and walls) one finds that it began when one ethnic group imposed its values onto one or more others. The group who can impose its values on some other is at the top of that state's political and social hierarchy. This is all Nietzsche means by "master." Nietzsche's musings in GM II 17 should not be confused with what he says in GM I 10-11. When Nietzsche discusses noble vs slave values in those sections, he is referring to *mental attitudes*, which, as Leiter's type theory supposes, have a genetic platform but this platform is not racially circumscribed. Reginster explains the difference between these attitudes well. See endnote 59.

Notes

¹ All references to Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* will be from the Kaufmann translation specifically *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, Trans. Walter Kaufmann and Edited by Peter Gay (New York, Basic Books: 2000). Passages from *Anti-Christ* and *Twilight* are translated by R.J. Holingdale, *Twilight of the Idols/Anti-Christ*, (London: Penguin Books, 1990).

² William Beals, "Internationalization and Its Consequences" *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol 44. No. 3 Autumn, 2013, 435-445, 435.

³ William Beals, "Internationalization and Its Consequences" *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol 44. No. 3 Autumn, 2013, 435-445, 443.

⁴ This diagnostic reading of philosophical genealogy is given expression in many works the most notable of which is Michel Foucault's, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, Ed. D. Bouchard, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977

⁵ Brian Lightbody, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection In Nietzsche's *Genealogy*: Expectorating the Poisoned-Pill of Lamarckism." *Genealogy*, 3, 31, 1-23

- ²¹ Daniel Conway, *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Reader's Guide* (Lanham: MD: Rowman and Littlefield Press, 2008), 60.
- ²² Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* (London: Routledge, 2002), 227.
- ²³ Also see Lawrence Hatab, *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals an Introduction* (Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), 8.
- ²⁴ Lightbody, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection in Nietzsche's *Genealogy*", 17
- ²⁵ It is once again very strange to note, that, while Brian Leiter is so perceptive and articulate in recognizing the problems with Nietzsche's account, he is silent on providing a solution. He writes, "What bears emphasizing here is that we are discussing a phenomenon of pre-history: we are discussing what the animal man had to be like before regular civilized intercourse with his fellows (the advantages of society) would even be possible. That means, of course, that the phenomenon we are discussing—the development of conscience and, in particular, bad conscience—predates the events discussed in the First Essay of the *Genealogy*." Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, 229). The problem, once more, is that there is no attempt to answer the question: What mechanism allowed us to move from animals to individuals who could engage in such social interactions as bartering, trading and punishing our fellow communal actors?
- ²⁶ See Michael Ruse "The Biological Sciences Can Act as a Ground for Ethics," In *Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Biology*. New York: Wiley-Blackwell 2010.
- ²⁷ According to James C Scott in *Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States*, (Yale University Press, 2017) on page 3: "Permanent settlement, agriculture and pastoralism appeared about 12000 years ago... "The first states in the Mesopotamian alluvium pop up no earlier than about 6000 years ago."
- ²⁸ One might reject the entire problem of TCPT of course. There is research to suggest that the foundations for altruistic behavior and advanced cognitive thinking existed in non-human animals for millions of years. This research, on the surface, would entail that Nietzsche's speculations are "just-so" stories and very poor ones at that! However, recent scholarship suggests that only humans possess "one-shot learning"—a necessary condition, it would seem, for any kind of enculturation worthy of the term. According to Peter Tse, one-shot learning is the unique human, all too human ability . "...to make associations among arbitrary categories of things and events." As Tse concretizes the idea: "In contrast, (to animals), a three-year old child can pretend that a block is a truck and then, a moment later, pretend that it is a monster. This capacity to instantly remap the referent of an object file is unique to humans and is at the heart of why our cognition can be truly symbolic." (Peter Tse, "Symbolic Thought and the Evolution of Human Morality", 269-271. If symbolic thinking represents a clear break with our animal past, then Nietzsche's investigation as to when this break took place becomes most pressing.
- ²⁹ Lamarck, Jean Baptiste Pierre Antoine. "On the Influence of Circumstances on the Actions and Habits of Animals, and that of the Actions and Habits of Living Bodies, as Causes Which Modify Their Organization." *The American Naturalist* 22, 1888: 960–972, 968.
- ³⁰ Abdul Ahad "Evolution without Lamarck's Theory and its Use in the Darwinian Theories of Evolution" 2011 *International Journal of Bio-resource and Stress Management* 2011, 2(3):363-368, 364.
- ³¹ Ibid, 364.
- ³² John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2004, 18.
- ³³ Ibid, 17.
- ³⁴ Ibid, 17.
- ³⁵ Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche and Lamarckism," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Summer Vol. 44 No. 2 2013 264-281, 275.
- ³⁶ Ibid, 266.
- ³⁷ Ibid, 278.
- ³⁸ Richardson has concerns with the warrantability of Nietzsche's hypothesis too. He writes: "I claim that we can't understand his (Nietzsche's) views on our values without seeing first and precisely how he thinks we are animals with drives. And we should only take those views about values seriously, if we have reason to think these foundations might let them be true." Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, 11-12.
- ³⁹ Richardson summarizes his project best between pages 52-65 of *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*. For an informative and incisive critique of Richardson, see Brian Lightbody *Nietzsche's Will to Power Naturalized, Translating the Human into Nature and Nature into the Human*, (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2017), pp. 96-103.
- ⁴⁰ See chapter 7 162-180 of Brian Leiter's *Moral Psychology with Nietzsche*, (Oxford University Press), 2019. The co-written chapter with Joshua Knobe is devoted, mainly, to buttressing Brian Leiter' type-fact theory of Nietzsche's psychology by utilizing recent work in the field of empirical psychology.
- ⁴¹ Ruth Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Work*, (New York Oxford University Press, 2000), 104-105.
- ⁴² Friedrich Nietzsche, 'The Improvers of Mankind' in *Twilight of the Idols/Anti-Christ*, Trans. R.J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin Books, 1990. Richardson, (*Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, 11-12).
- ⁴³ Ibid, 67
- ⁴⁴ Ibid, *Morality as Anti-Nature*, section 6, 56.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid, 'Reason' in *Philosophy*, section 3, 46.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid, 'Reason' in *Philosophy* section, 3, 46
- ⁴⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Anti-Christ* Section 57, 190-191
- ⁴⁸ There are many important works in the secondary literature that emphasize the biological and physiological aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy. See Gregory Moore's *Nietzsche, Biology, Metaphor*, (Cambridge University Press, 2002). Daniel Ahern's *Nietzsche as Cultural Physicist*, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). Richard S.G. Brown's two articles, "Nihilism: "Thus Speaks Physiology" in *Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, Language and Politics* edited by Tom Darby, Bela Egyed and Ben Jones (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), 133–144. "Nietzsche: That Profound Physiologist", in *Nietzsche and Science* Eds (Gregory Moore and Thomas Brobjer, (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2004) 51-71. Wayne Klein's *Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997). In what follows, I will choose to examine Brian Leiter's "type-fact" position for its lucidity and comprehensiveness.
- ⁴⁹ Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, 91.
- ⁵⁰ Brian Leiter, "The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche," in *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator*, ed. Christopher Janaway (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 219.
- ⁵¹ Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 8
- ⁵² Ibid, 100
- ⁵³ Brian Leiter, *Moral Psychology With Nietzsche*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 9.
- ⁵⁴ See Leiter's discussion of Daniel Wegner's *The Illusion of Conscious Will* (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 2002) on 141-142 of *Moral Psychology With Nietzsche* along with Leiter's discussion of "Libet experiments" which test RP (Readiness Potential) in Leiter's earlier paper, "Nietzsche's Theory of the Will", *Philosopher's Imprint*, Vol. 7 No. 7, 2007 1-15, 13.
- ⁵⁵ Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, 177
- ⁵⁶ Lightbody, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection", 21
- ⁵⁷ James C Scott, *Against the Grain, A Deep History of the Earliest States* (Yale University Press, 2017), 80.
- ⁵⁸ Lightbody, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection," *Genealogy*, 20-23
- ⁵⁹ There has been renewed interest in Nietzsche's priestly type especially in regard to the question of value creation. Two thinkers in particular have done trailblazing work in demonstrating flaws with the traditional account regarding the creation of slave values. See Bernard Reginster, "Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57.2 (1997): 281–305. and R. Anderson in "On the Nobility of Nietzsche's Priests," in *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide*, ed. Simon May [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011], 24–55. According to Reginster, the quintessential attitude of slave morality is resignation. The slave is resigned to accepting that he cannot aspire to a kind of life where he can generate his own values—the quintessential attitude of nobility. As Reginster explains: "Thus the slave accepts his masters' high estimation of the noble life and their low estimation of himself, and therefore never even forms the expectation to live the life his master's value. The attitude characteristic of the slave is his resignation to a worthless way of life." 287. In my view, Iain Morriison's "Ascetic Slaves: Rereading Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals" (*Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2014), pp. 230-257 advances and clarifies the work of Reginster and Anderson in new ways. He offers the best explanation of how slave values eventually overtook noble ideals. My thesis provides a naturalistic underpinning to Morrison's work.
- ⁶⁰ Nietzsche, *Genealogy* I: 7
- ⁶¹ Nietzsche, GM III: 13
- ⁶² Nietzsche, KSA 5 359.
- ⁶³ For a more fulsome discussion of this point, see Brian Lightbody, "Artificial and Unconscious Selection in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals pp.18-22. My argument relies, in part, on Belyaev's 1959 (and still ongoing) silver-fox experiment. In the experiment, wild foxes (*Vulpes vulpes*) were exclusively selected for docile behavior and then interbred. Later, in the sixties, a second experiment was initiated to breed foxes that exhibited greater aggressive behavior than their cohabitants. The

results of this experiment created a separate strain of hyper-aggressive, growling foxes. A control group that was neither docile nor aggressive were also interbred. The most interesting part of this study is what scientists learned from the sequencing of the silver fox genome. "They identified 103 genetic regions that varied significantly among the three groups." What was most striking about the experiment was how the SorSC1 gene, which is responsible, for among other things, shuttling proteins crucial to developing system signaling and synapse formation, varied between each group. SorSC1 is a gene we share with foxes and other mammals and thus the import this experiment has in humans may be significant as the author of the piece notes: "In addition to SorCS1, the team found variations in genes related to immune response and genes that, in humans, are linked to autism, bipolar disorder, and Williams-Beuren syndrome. The latter causes "elfinlike" facial features and a friendly demeanor in humans. No one yet knows how any of these genes function in foxes. But Constantina Theofanopoulou, a neuroscientist at the University of Barcelona in Spain who was not involved in the work, says cross-species comparisons hold promise. "The same changes that we see that provoke changes in human behavior or give rise to social deficits ... are the same ones that pop up in differences in behavior and social behavior in other species." She says future studies could use genetically engineered domesticated mice to narrow down which domesticated behaviors are linked to which genes or networks of genes." Catherine Maticic, "These docile foxes may hold some of the keys to domestication" *Science*, Aug. 6th 2018, <https://www.science.org/news/2018/08/these-docile-foxes-may-hold-some-genetic-keys-domestication>.

⁶⁴ Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*, 2: 14, 517.

⁶⁵ Eric Voegelin, "Nietzsche, The Crisis and the War," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 6 No. 2 May, 1944, 177-212, 179.