
Rediscovering Wittgenstein's Ideas on the Nature of Mental Phenomena

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to investigate the nature of mental phenomena with special reference to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein's main concern is not with the construction of any philosophical theory about these mental phenomena. He is concerned with the dissolution of puzzles that arise because of the linguistic misunderstandings about the nature of mental phenomena. Mental phenomena are generally very complex. The words that try to capture mental phenomena do not have clear grammar. Hence, statements describing mental phenomena mislead us. Therefore, linguistic misconceptions or misunderstandings are the main sources of any philosophical problem on the human mind.

Keywords: Wittgenstein; Mental phenomena; Mental contents; Self-knowledge; Problem of other minds; Forms of life.

1. Introduction

We face both the difficulties: the difficulty of complexity and the difficulty of understanding what is at the surface level and what is at the depth level in the case of mental phenomena. For example, 'I have headache' is complex because it could have several reasons, say, lack of rest, fever, migraine, etc. and it has the superstructure of ordinary language, claiming the possession of pain, though one does not possess a pain which can be brought out by analyzing the word 'have' at the level of depth grammar. The contents of the mental occurrences look complex because of the confusion that the propositions describing mental occurrences have a grammar which is hidden by our ordinary language. The grammar seems to be the main culprit even though there is the contribution of the complexity of mental predicates. This is because grammar is closely related to the language, and language is closely related to our forms of life. We may fail to notice certain grammatical fiction in our language because of which we confuse with the various uses of the words of our mental phenomena. According to Wittgenstein, these confusions or linguistic misconceptions can be set right once we clarify the grammar of the language that describes the mental phenomena. The language that describes the mental phenomena can be called 'the language of mental phenomena'¹ analogous to the expression 'language of sense experience.' We could speak of the language of mental phenomena, and like any other language, this language is founded on convention and can understand this language like any other language.

While investigating the nature of mental phenomena,

Wittgenstein is mainly concerned with the grammar of those words which describes various mental activities like, seeing, hearing, feeling, imagining, thinking, willing, and so on. We could not get the grammar of these words by asking the questions like what is seeing or what is hearing, etc., rather it is possible only through the investigation of the concept of seeing or hearing. This investigation is mainly devoted to finding out the conceptual connections involved in our language among various mental activities. These mental activities are all related to each other, but each mental activity has a special kind of function(s) in our language. For example, thinking and remembering are closely related to each other, and each has a special kind of function(s) in the language. By understanding the grammar of a word used for mental activity, we can express our mental activities to others and also ascribe them to others. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to delve upon three related linguistic misconceptions concerning the nature of mental phenomena viz., the paradox of immediate experience of complex contents, the problem of self-knowledge and the problem of other minds².

2. The Paradox of Immediate Experience of Complex Contents

Let us first consider what immediate experience is. According to Hicks, the concept of 'immediate experience' is not to be used in the sense of any kind of immediate apprehension or intuition. By 'immediate experience,' one understands the kind of experience he has, for the moment, assuming we have of mental states or processes as they are occurring. Here, we can directly apprehend or cognize our own mental states or processes in the same way as it has been thought we directly apprehend or cognize our sense datum and self-evident truths. But when we apprehend, for example, the red colour we do not apprehend our act of seeing the colour. Nevertheless, in such case, undoubtedly a kind of mental process is occurring, and in some way, the mental process is not experienced even though that experience is not of the nature of apprehending or cognizing. This kind of experience is the immediate experience and it is used to denote the special kind of experience we each of us have of the occurrences that are phrases of our own mental states.³

While describing the experience, we tend to describe the objects of experience and the ways they are when we are experiencing them. In contrast, according to Wittgenstein, when we are describing the immediate experience,

we do not need to decide "about the presence or absence of an object."⁴ If we try to decide whether what we see as a physical object, we make the mistake of applying "our physical mode of expression to sense data."⁵ Wittgenstein goes on to write further "'Objects,' i.e., things, bodies in the space of a room – and 'objects' in one's visual field; the shadow of a body on the wall as an object!"⁶ Here, he distinguishes physical objects from objects in one's visual field. His account of sense perception that distinguishes physical objects from sense data follows a principle which Howard Robinson calls the phenomenal principle. Describing the phenomenal principle, Robinson writes "If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality."⁷ Thus, what sensibly appears to the subject to be something like red that means to say 'redness' is phenomenally present in the object. Hence, according to the phenomenal principle, there is something that must be red so that the subject is aware of the existence of the red object in the phenomenal world. Therefore, in order one's experience of red to be the way it is, redness has to be there, and he should be aware of the presence of the red object. If there is nothing bearing this property of redness, then our experience could not be as it is. Therefore, we should not be confused with the distinction between sense-data and physical objects. The objects or the contents of a personal experience or an immediate experience are so complex that we cannot express them in the way we express our physical objects. Thus, it is a kind of paradox we find about an immediate experience that we are so familiar with the immediate experience, but we cannot express the objects of that experience. This kind of paradox is called by Severin as 'the paradox of immediate experience of complex contents.'⁸

Defining immediate experience, Wittgenstein writes, "I mean by immediate experience –sometimes with a 'yes' and sometimes with a 'no' (here 'yes' and 'no' only express confirmation and lack of confirmation, to be sure), and that one can give expression to this affirmation and denial."⁹ Wittgenstein shows the inclination to agree with someone who insists that we know our own intention directly since there is no medium involved. He remarks by saying, "Only you can know if you had that intention" (*PI*§247)¹⁰ that there is no scope for skepticism. Wittgenstein also tends to claim in this quotation that the word 'know' is not appropriately used here; he tends to disagree in calling mental experience as knowledge.

According to Severin, the meaning of the phrase 'immediate experience' itself is paradoxical. By 'paradox' we usually mean a self-contradictory statement and the underlying meaning of that statement is revealed only by careful scrutiny.¹¹ In his words,

The paradox of immediate experience of complex contents is: "Understanding, intention, expectation, remembering, and other such mental occurrences can have remarkably rich and complex contents. It may take a very long time to spell out completely what exactly someone understood, intended, expected, or remembered on a given occasion. Yes, it appears that the understanding, intending, expecting, or remember can occur instantaneously: in a flash. How is it possible for some incredibly complex contents to be experienced in one moment?"¹²

What is paradoxical is that complex mental phenomena appear to be simple when we experience them. In the above passage, Severin claims that at a particular point one utters the expressions like 'Now I understand,' 'I understood,' 'I remembered,' 'I expected,' 'Now I know how to go on' etc., and from these expressions, we infer various complex mental phenomena. But the person having these mental phenomena may not be aware of all the details about the contents of those mental phenomena. Further, the contents of the mental occurrences are complex but appear to be simple because we take depth grammar to be the surface grammar of our ordinary language.

Wittgenstein once made the distinction between two languages like ordinary physical language and the language he employed for the description of immediate experience. According to him, philosophical problems arise when we apply our ordinary physical language in describing an immediate experience. In this context, Wittgenstein writes,

The worst philosophical errors always arise when we try to apply our ordinary – physical – language in the area of the immediately given. If for instance, you ask, 'Does the box still exist when I am not looking at it?', the only right answer would be 'Of course, unless someone has taken it away or destroyed it.' Naturally, a philosopher would be dissatisfied with this answer, but it would quite rightly reduce his way of formulating the question *ad absurdum*. All our forms of speech are taken from ordinary physical language and cannot be used in epistemology or phenomenology without casting a distorting light on their objects. (*PR*§57&88)¹³

In this passage, Wittgenstein employs a distinction between the ordinary language that we use to talk about physical objects and the language which employed for the description of immediate experience. Kiverstein calls the language that used for the description of immediate experience as 'the phenomenological language.'¹⁴ By raising the question 'Does the box still exist when I am not looking at it?', Wittgenstein points out that this type of questions is asked in our ordinary physical language. We cannot answer them from the epistemological or phenomenological points of view. If we try to answer them from the phenomenological or epistemological perspective, then we will create a philosophical problem. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, the skeptical problem regarding the existence of unperceived things is the result of one's confusion of the phenomenological language with the ordinary physical language.

Giving a response to Wittgenstein, Kiverstein writes,

We can give Wittgenstein's disarming response that of course, the box exists unless someone has removed or destroyed it. True, the box as-it-is-perceived-by-us doesn't continue to exist unperceived but, as Wittgenstein notes, it is not this box whose existence the skeptic is questioning. The box the skeptic is interested in is the box we talk about using what Wittgenstein calls physical language. The skeptical problem is only pressing because we confuse these two languages.¹⁵

Agreeing with Kiverstein, we claim that Wittgenstein at this stage in his writings employed the possibility of constructing the phenomenological language distinct from ordinary physical language. Wittgenstein has addressed the above issue on the skeptic's doubt regarding the existence

of an unperceived object and tried to disarm the skeptic by employing the distinction between two types of language. His employment of the phenomenological language for the description of immediate experience remains unclear, and also he concludes that the skeptic's problem is not a problem at all. It arises because of confusing physical language to be phenomenological.

In the opening section of *Philosophical Remarks*, Wittgenstein says that he no longer gives primacy to phenomenological language and further holds that such a language is necessary. Therefore, for him, to give up the goal of the phenomenological language means to give up the task of constructing a notation to describe an immediate experience (See *PR*§1). Thus, according to Wittgenstein, to think of the propositions describing immediate experience have a logical structure or grammar that is hidden by phenomenological language is a mistake. One can describe his or her immediate experience(s) through our ordinary language that we use to say about the physical objects. It is true that one might be confused with the grammar of the propositions describing an immediate experience with that of the propositions saying about our physical objects. This confusion can be removed by understanding the rules of the grammar of the language. The rules of the propositions describing an immediate experience are completely different from the rules of the propositions describing a physical object. Just like the rules of the game, chess is completely different from the rules of any other game like cricket game, ball games, or any other games. If we apply the rules of chess while playing any other games, then the philosophical problem will arise, but it is not the case that the rules of chess are hidden by our ordinary language.

Similarly, Wittgenstein takes an example that "A writes series of numbers down, B watches him and tries to find a law for the sequence of numbers. If he succeeds he exclaims: Now I can go on (*PI*§151)." It shows that B understood the series of numbers that A had written down. This understanding is something that appears in a moment, but it is so complex. While A was writing the series of numbers, B might try various algebraic formulas on the numbers. When one of the formulas confirmed a particular number that is the suitable number for the series, B might realize that he can go on. This is not a simple activity that happens in a moment. It seems understanding is an immediate experience that occurs in a moment; really, it does not happen in a moment. In this context, Wittgenstein writes, "If someone tells me something and I understand it, then this is as much something that happens to me as is hearing what he says. And here understanding is the phenomenon that occurs when I hear an English sentence, and that distinguishes this type of hearing from hearing a sentence in a foreign language."¹⁶ Now the general questions arise like, what is understanding? Is it a mental state or process?

Before investigating whether understanding is a mental state or process, let us make the distinction between a mental state and a mental process. Wittgenstein makes the distinction between mental states and mental processes, based on the distinction between 'something that can be described' and 'something that can be expressed.' Accordingly, he holds the view that a mental state can be described, but a mental process can only be expressed. When we describe a physical state like my room, we describe our state of mind. But the word 'describe' would not apply to

sensations when one says that we describe our pain. As Wittgenstein writes, "I say 'I describe my state of mind' and 'I describe my room.' You need to call to mind the differences between the language-games" (*PI*§290). Therefore, we need to know the differences between both the uses of the word 'describe.'

The above distinction between mental states and mental processes entails us that a mental state is describable and accordingly, expectation, being of opinion, hoping for something, knowing something, and being able to do something, are mental states (*PI*§572). On the other hand, believing, thinking, expecting, hoping, etc., are mental processes. These mental processes are expressed in one's behaviors or through linguistic expressions. If we compare these two categories of mental phenomena, we find that mental processes are nothing but the expressions of corresponding mental states. For example, believing is the expression of the mental state 'belief'. Thus, we could not reject mental processes as the part of our language; and mental states are not only describable, and they can also be expressed through our language and behaviors. A proposition can be the expression of belief, hope, expectation, etc., (*PI*§574). Therefore, there is no mental state that cannot be expressed in language.

Moreover, it is a general temptation to take 'understanding' as a mental state. Therefore, we say one has understood the series 1, 4, 9, 16, 25 because he has a certain mental state. We may also say writing down the next two numbers of the series correctly or uttering the formula for the series are only manifestations of this mental state. If understanding is a mental state, according to the above criterion of a mental state, it must be expressible. Let us compare the uses of a mental state with that of understanding in our day to day life, and from that comparison, we could investigate whether understanding is a mental state or not a mental state. We can describe the state of pain, but we could not describe that of understanding. We do not say of understanding as we would say of pain or depression that it has been continuous for a few days. But understanding is determined by a particular circumstance that in each case, it justifies us in saying we understand.

However, in *PI*, Wittgenstein tries to show that 'understanding' is not a form of mental state. For example, while uttering or hearing the word 'triangle' we may have the mental image of a triangle in our mind, but we could not say that is what understanding or meaning of the word consists in. Because one can understand the word 'triangle' without having any mental image of the triangle, and it is also the case that no mental images guaranty any understanding. In this sense, understanding is much like reading than pain or depression. In *PI*§156-178, Wittgenstein discusses how we normally try to formulate the various definitions of 'reading' and differentiate the activity of reading from that of non-reading. Hence, he considers three general definitions of the activity of reading and argues against the views regarding the specific features to define reading. It is the general definition that reading is accompanied by a set of sensations different from those of pretending to read or not to read. Secondly, the activity of reading entails that reading is a matter of deriving sounds from the rule provided by the alphabets. Thirdly, sounds come to one when one looks at words in a particular way.

Again, Wittgenstein also argues against the view that understanding is a mental process. According to him, "Try not to think of understanding as 'a mental process' at all. For *that* is the expression which confuses you."¹⁷ We could sometimes say, pain is growing more and more and also sometimes less but in the case of understanding that kind of criterion is not applicable. Understanding is not going through any mental processes. Thus for Wittgenstein, understanding is not a mental state or process; it is the ability to apply or use any rule correctly. Hence, understanding a mathematical formula means to have the ability to apply it. Similarly, understanding a word is to be able to use it correctly. When one says that 'I understand,' it does not mean that the person is reporting a mental phenomena, rather he is acknowledging an ability to do something. Therefore, the criterion for saying that someone understands means the person demonstrates the ability.

Similarly, Wittgenstein argues against the view that the word 'meaning' is understood as a mental process. He begins *PI* with an attack on the theory of meaning that words get their meaning from the names of ideas in mind, and accordingly, the meaning is dependent upon the individual thinkers. And words stand for ideas in the mind of the person who uses words. Therefore, the idea that gives meaning to a word is private to each language user and also mental. Wittgenstein argues against this theory of meaning that the meaning of a word is not only required individual users and their ideas but also it required the institution of language. For him, the meaning of a word does not mean its accompaniment with any mental image in mind. Rather, it is given by the explanation of the use of that word. And if one wants to know the meaning of a word, he must look at how the word is used. In this context, Wittgenstein writes, "When someone says the word 'cube' to me, for example, I know what it means. But can the whole *use* of the word come before my mind, when I understand it this way?"¹⁸ The answer is, 'No.' We could not have a clear view of all the uses of the word 'cube.' As Wittgenstein writes, "A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words."¹⁹ In this way, Wittgenstein held the view that a word gains its meaning from how it is used for a particular purpose and the grammar of our language governs the use of any word in our language.

It is worth noting that the main linguistic moves which are governed by the grammar of a language-game and whose success or failure is adjudicated using a standard are what Wittgenstein describes as 'empirical' or 'factual' propositions. These propositions are either true or false. He likens these propositions to the waters of a river, and for him, grammar is the river-bed or channel of the river. Thus, Wittgenstein claims that it may shift with time so that principles on one side of the line cross over to the other; but he nonetheless insists that there is such a division to be made (*OC*§97).²⁰ It is true that Wittgenstein makes a distinction between empirical propositions and the grammatical rules, but this division between the two is not a sharp one. An empirical proposition can be converted as a grammatical proposition in our language. For example, the empirical proposition 'this is a rose' can be grammatically used in our language like 'any flower like this is a rose.' Now the general question is: What sort of rules does Wittgenstein

recognize as the rules of grammar that govern for the linguistic moves of empirical propositions?

Wittgenstein believes that all principles those have the character of necessity or more than causal necessity are grammatical rules. Thus, the non-causal necessity is not only a sufficient condition but also a necessary condition of grammatical rules. Therefore, ostensive definitions like, 'this colour is red' also belong to grammar for Wittgenstein. As he writes, "The interpretation of written and spoken signs by ostensive definitions is not an *application* of language, but part of the grammar" (*PG-I*§45).²¹ Similarly, while ascribing a mental state, one has to give the grammatical explanation about that mental state. In this context, Wittgenstein states: "To explain my criterion for another person's having toothache is to give a grammatical explanation about the word 'toothache' and, in this sense, an explanation concerning the meaning of the word 'toothache'" (*BB*, p. 24).²²

However, by 'the rule' we could mean "...The hypothesis that satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe; or the rule which he looks up when he uses signs; or the one which he gives us in reply if we ask him what his rule is" (*BB*, p. 82)? Here, Wittgenstein tries to show that a rule can be used explicitly or implicitly. When 'the rule' means 'the hypothesis that satisfactorily describes his (one's) use of words' the person has used the rule implicitly that he is not so familiar with the rule to justify or explain the use of a word. For example, a child while using language by and large follows some rules, but the child would not be able to clarify the use of a rule.

In contrast, when the rule is used explicitly, it means the rule which he (the person) looks up when he uses signs or the one which he gives us in reply if we ask him what his rule is. Thus, when 'the rule' is used explicitly, the person is familiar with the rules. He is not only familiar with the use of a rule but also with the formulation of the rule or at least he would be able to explain or justify his use of the rule. Let us take the example of a teacher or a competent chess player. A teacher while writing a sequence of series, he knows the rule to proceed with the series. Similarly, the competent chess player is so familiar with the rules that he could cite a rule for the movement of any pieces of playing chess.

Even if the chess player somehow could cite rules of the moment of pieces of chess, still the player is not a competent player; he may not play the game well. That is to say, the disposition or the ability of the player gained through long experience is very relevant to the game. Thus, one cannot meaningfully speak of the uses of language without bringing in the concept of the language user. Therefore, our attention needs to be given to the knowledge of oneself. Let us now turn to the issue of self-knowledge.

3. The Problem of Self-knowledge

The term 'self-knowledge' refers to the knowledge about one's own mental states and processes. The most important issue regarding self-knowledge is, whether self-knowledge is real knowledge? According to Wittgenstein, the word 'know' applies to the things that belong to the world. Thus, the word 'know' can be used in the context of the factual world. One's own mental states and processes are not part

of the factual world and hence the word 'know' is strictly not applicable to them. As Wittgenstein writes, "I would like to reserve the expression 'I know' for the cases in which it is used in normal linguistic exchange" (*OC*§260). Here, Wittgenstein makes the distinction between the linguistic question and factual question. And he claims that the use of the word 'know' is only confined to the factual world; it cannot be used where the question is concerned with the linguistic question only. Let us take the example of the conversation between a doctor and a patient. When a patient visits the doctor, the doctor asks a question like 'what is wrong?' Or 'what is the problem with you?' These questions are not related to our factual world; these are limited to their (doctor-patient) conversation. The patient might answer to the doctor like 'I have toothache' or 'I have a headache' or 'I have stomach pain.' The doctor might ask again: how do you know that you have toothache or headache or stomach pain?

Both the expressions 'I have' and 'I know' are used differently when we speak about mental states or processes in comparison to physical objects and events. 'I have' in the context of mental state or process does not behave like possessive, but in the physical world, 'I have' can be possessive. For example, 'I have a car' here the expression 'I have' is used as possessive. Similarly, we use the expression 'I know' in both contexts: mental and physical. Wittgenstein wants to reserve this expression for the physical, and he would not like to use this expression for the mental. In the context of mental, he would say, 'I know that I have pain' could only mean that to doubt whether I have pain would make no sense. Thus, in the context of mental states or processes, doubting is not possible in one's own case, but this does not apply to the mental states or processes to other persons.

Following Wittgenstein, Hester says that "The word 'know' when used in a linguistic context (that is, in a context where the question is whether someone correctly understands the meaning of a word) has meaning only when there are criteria to settle the question. In other words, the word 'know' in a linguistic context presupposes the existence of relevant criteria by which correctness or incorrectness could be determined."²³ Thus, in the linguistic context while using the word 'know' is meaningful in the context of 'I know I am in pain' in the sense of our understanding only. Hence, Wittgenstein attacks the solipsist who reserves the word 'know' for his own case. And according to him, there are no relevant criteria in the case of saying, 'I know I am in pain.' No criteria determine one's saying that 'I am in pain.' In this context, we want to discuss Wittgenstein's views regarding the propositions like 'I know that I am in pain' or 'I know that I am thinking' or 'I know that I am afraid' and how his views help us to bring out some important features of self-knowledge. Here, we would like to bring some interpretations of Wittgenstein's views regarding 'the impossibility of self-knowledge.'

It is a philosophical claim regarding self-knowledge that "...only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it" (*PI*§246). This claim is a conjunction of two propositions, namely, (a) I can know that I am in pain and (b) other people cannot know that I am in pain. Now, the question is why people claim that a person cannot know if someone else is in pain. One possible reason could be that one is not sure whether one is

really in pain or pretending. Generalizing from this, one might make a general claim that one cannot know whether another is in pain or not. Another possible reason could be that one cannot have the experience of others, and hence, one cannot have the feeling of others. Thus, pain being an experience one cannot have the pain of others. If I know my pain from my experience, I cannot know the pain of others since I cannot have their experience.

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein insists that it is not the case that an individual has pain and he alone is aware of it, but others too can know that he is in pain. He writes "If we are using the word 'to know' as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain." (*PI*§246) Thus, it is simply false that only the person who experiences pain knows that he is in pain. Only after a person knows that someone is in pain can he sympathize with him, care for him, etc.

Moreover, the statement 'I know I am in pain' has no significance because it has no use. There is no occasion except in a philosophical class where one has to say, 'I know I am in pain.' Hence this sentence has no application or utility. Given this, Wittgenstein calls such a claim nonsensical. Thus, 'only I know that I am in pain' is on the one hand false and on the other nonsensical.

Following this, Kenny says that "On the other hand, if we take the term 'know' to mean know in such a way that doubt is logically excluded than the thesis (other people cannot know that I am in pain) is senseless, for there can be knowledge only where doubt is possible."²⁴ Therefore, others can know that I am in pain because they can doubt whether I am in pain or not. We might say that wherever there is no possibility of doubt, there is no possibility of knowledge. The terms 'doubt' and 'knowledge' are a pair of opposite words they cannot be learned as separate words; they need to be learned together. They are used as opposite terms, use of one without the conception of the other is not possible.

In this context, let us take Wittgenstein's views like "I know ..." may mean 'I do not doubt...' but does not mean that the words 'I doubt...' are senseless, that doubt is logically excluded" (*PI*, p. 221). Here, Wittgenstein shows that I cannot doubt whether I am in pain or not in pain; thus, in this case, there is no possibility of knowledge. But, it is not the case that 'I doubt...' is always senseless. In the case of whether another person is in pain or not in pain, 'I doubt...' is not senseless. Because there is the possibility of knowledge in the case of other individual is in pain or not in pain. Hence, to claim other individuals cannot know that I am in pain is false. As Wittgenstein says, "I can know what someone else thinking, not what I am thinking. It is correct to say 'I know what you are thinking,' and wrong to say 'I know what I am thinking'"²⁵ (*PI*, p. 222). Here, Wittgenstein's rejection of the notion of privacy entails his remarks in *Philosophical Investigations* "It can't be said of me at all ...that I know I am in pain" (*PI*§246). Wittgenstein's rejection of the use of the word 'know' in the case of one's own mental states and processes has led many philosophers to conclude that self-knowledge is impossible.

Two famous Wittgensteinian scholars P.M.S. Hacker and Anthony Kenny attributed to Wittgenstein the view of 'the impossibility of self-knowledge.' Hacker attributed the view of the impossibility of self-knowledge based on two arguments, namely, the expressive thesis and the

argument from epistemic operators.²⁶ According to the expressive thesis, the first person utterances (avowals) like 'I am in pain' are not statements but expressions.²⁷ 'I am in pain' is like a groan or cry, and it has no truth-value. Again, if 'I am in pain' does not have truth-value, then 'I am not in pain' should not have. But, it is so problematic to use 'I am not in pain' to be the expression of not being in pain. Because in the case of 'he is in pain,' one can attribute truth value to 'he is in pain.' Now the question is how is it possible to attribute the truth value to 'he is in pain' not to 'I am in pain'? One may answer this question by saying that 'he is in pain' is a statement and not an avowal.

Let us now through the textual evidence judge whether Wittgenstein held the expressive thesis regarding the impossibility of self-knowledge or not. In *Philosophical Investigations*, we find a passage in which Wittgenstein writes, "A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour" (PI§244). Here, Wittgenstein suggests that in one way, a child may learn the connection between the word 'pain' and the sensation of pain through natural pain behaviour. Therefore, 'I am in pain' can be replaced by natural pain behaviour like cry or groan.

Clearly, in the above remarks, Wittgenstein claims that avowals could be replaced by sentences of the type which are exclamations and not statements, and hence, they do not have truth-value. We can claim that Wittgenstein takes avowals to have only one function of expressing something. For example, in the case of 'I am in pain,' we can claim that for Wittgenstein, 'I am in pain' is the expression of the sensation of pain. About this, he writes, "When someone says 'I hope he'll come' – is this a *report* about his state of mind, or a *manifestation* of his hope? – I can, for example, say it to myself. And surely I am not giving myself a report. It may be a sight; but it need not. If I tell someone 'I can't keep my mind on my work today; I keep on thinking of his coming' – *this* will be called a description of my state of mind" (PI§585). Here, Wittgenstein explains how hopes and other mental activities cannot be taken as statements but expressions of their mental states. Since they are not statements, the question of their having truth value does not arise.

Again, Wittgenstein also writes, "I say I am afraid; someone else asks me: 'What was that? A cry of fear; or do you want to tell me how you feel; or it a reflection on your present state?' – Could I always give him a clear answer? Could I never give him one" (PI, p. 187)? Here, Wittgenstein gives a general view regarding the avowals. He affirms that one can tell his/ her state of mind or feelings. And from the above discussion, we find that Wittgenstein advances the expressive thesis about the first person utterances that Hacker attributes to him.

Let us come to the second argument that is the argument from epistemic operators based on which the thesis of the impossibility of self-knowledge has been attributed by Hacker to Wittgenstein. Let us first make ourselves clear what is an operator. According to Dretske, "An operator is something that when affixed to a statement operates on it to result in other statements. Examples of some operators include 'it is true that,' 'it is weird that,' 'knows that' and 'explains that.' To take a simple example of how an

operator operates on a statement, we consider the statement 'the garage is empty.' Using the operator, 'it is true that,' on this statement, we get 'it is true that the garage is empty.'"²⁸ From the example of some operators given by Dretske, 'knows that' is an epistemic operator. In relation to the use of the epistemic operators, Hacker says "If we reflect on how the use of this epistemic operator might be learnt, it is evident that it cannot be learnt as a partial substitute for natural expressive behavior in the manner in which the use of 'It hurts' or 'I want' are grafted on to natural pain- or conative-behaviour respectively."²⁹ Thus, according to Hacker's argument, one cannot learn the use of the word 'know' by using it in conjunction with expressive words. By implication, he claims that one can learn the use of this epistemic operator only from such sentences like 'I know that this is a tree' or 'I know that this is a book', etc. Thus, in the sentence 'I know that I am in pain' even if the word 'know' figures, it is not a statement.

According to the argument of epistemic operators of Hacker, a sentence of the form 'I know that p' makes sense only when a sentence of the form 'I doubt that p' makes sense. But in the case of avowals, the sentences of the form 'I doubt that p' do not make sense. Thus, it makes no sense to say 'I know that p' where p is an avowal³⁰. Agreeing with Hacker, Temkin says that "If we are to attribute the non-cognitive thesis of avowals to Wittgenstein at all, then the only plausible ground lies in his employment of what Hacker has called the 'argument from epistemic operators.'³¹ He also remarks that the argument from epistemic operators is in the heart of Wittgenstein's rejection of epistemic privacy.

While saying 'only I can know that I am in pain' is nonsense, Wittgenstein gives the reason that 'It makes sense to say of other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself' (PI§246). Based on this remark of Wittgenstein, Hacker and also Aune have attributed the argument from epistemic operators. From the use of the epistemic operator 'I know' upon the third-person, present tense, psychological propositions like 'He is in pain to the first-person case like 'I am in pain', we wrongly conclude that 'I know I am in pain' adds something more than emphasis to 'I am in pain'. In this context, Wittgenstein claims that in some special cases like when I want to inform another person about my personal experiences saying 'I know that I am in pain' has sense. Rather, when we say, 'I know that I am in pain,' we normally do not mean much more than 'I am certain that I am in pain' (OC§8).

However, in support of the first thesis that I can know that I am in pain, philosophers argue that if one cannot know his own sensations or if one cannot know what he is thinking then how he can know anything else. On the strength of the statement "... nothing to doubt whether I am in pain" (PI§288), the view attributed to Wittgenstein by Kenny is that "One cannot doubt that one is in pain."³² Therefore, there is no possibility of knowledge in the case of 'I am in pain,' and it does not make much sense to say 'I know I am in pain.' Again, Kenny attributes to Wittgenstein "Where it is senseless to say 'I doubt whether...' it is not always true to say 'I know that ...'."³³ Furthermore, Wittgenstein admits the possibility of doubting the competence of a person to use the word 'pain' appropriately. He

denies the possibility of doubting his pain if he is suffering from it. There he denies that particular expression of doubt has no place in the language-game of pain and the doubt is not about the meaning or use of 'pain' but about "whether *this*, that I have now, is pain" (PI§288).

Moreover, Wittgenstein writes, "I know what I want, wish, believe, feel ...' (and so on through all the psychological verbs) is either philosopher's nonsense, or at any rate not a judgment a priori" (PI§221). Here, Wittgenstein does not mean that 'I know what I want, wish, believe, feel...' means 'I do not doubt what I want, wish, believe, feel...' The above statement implies that Wittgenstein targets the utterances like 'I know what I want, wish, believe, feel...' as nonsense or having no significance. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, a philosophical claim, 'I know that I am in pain' or 'I know that I am thinking' has no place in language. But, the utterance 'I know I am in pain' as an expression of pain is not nonsense. "It does not follow that utterances like 'I know that I am in pain' or 'I know that I am thinking' must be incorrect, or to put it in another way, that I cannot achieve self-knowledge of the relevant sort."³⁴

Wittgenstein rejects the thesis that I know that I am in pain. For him, if it is the case that each person knows what pain is from his own case, then the learning of the meaning of the word 'pain' will be impossible. Therefore, it is impossible to generalize the meaning of the word 'pain' in the same sense as in the case of other people. In this context, Wittgenstein gives 'the beetle in the boxes example' (PI§293). Here, Wittgenstein is trying to point out that the beetle is very much like 'pain.' Just like no one looks into someone's box what contains in it.

Similarly, no one can exactly know what 'pain' is like to be an experienced thing from another's perspective. But, we assume that like a beetle, the word 'pain' means the same for all people. Wittgenstein argues that it does not matter what is in the box, or whether everyone has a beetle or not a beetle since there is no way of checking or comparing it. There is also no way of asserting or denying whether a beetle is really in each box or not in the box, but still, we have to assume that 'beetle in each box.' Similarly, we cannot assert or deny what an inner state contains but when we talk of having an inner state we are using the term 'inner' that we have learnt through conversation and public discourse. In a sense, the word 'beetle,' if it is to have any sense or meaning that simply means 'what is in the box. From this point of view, the 'pain' is simply 'what is in the box' – or rather 'what is in your head' or 'what is in the body.' Therefore, we could not check or compare what an inner state contains and that is indescribable. One could only ascribe any inner state to oneself and also to others. We can merely ascribe sensations, thoughts, feelings, etc., or justify something based on expressions. The expressions are not only linguistic; they might be bodily behavior as well. For example, 'crying' is one of the physical or behavioral expressions of pain, and the statement 'I am in pain' is the linguistic expression.

Moreover for Wittgenstein, self-ascriptions of mental phenomena like 'I have a toothache,' 'I believe that my friend will come,' 'I intend to go to movie tomorrow' are *prima facie* immediate or direct. Though they are not based on observation, and not needing any justification, they can nonetheless express some knowledge. On the other hand, in the first person and present tense, any mental phe-

nomenon is authoritative to the person who has the experience of that mental occurrence. This peculiarly authoritative self-knowledge is explained as a feature of intrinsic knowledge to having mental states. The person is certain about his own mental states or processes and it is private to the person. For example, we take 'emotion' as a feeling and it is private to the person who has the experience of that feeling. So, it is subjective to the person, who knows his/her emotional experiences through introspection or a kind of internal observation. This relies on the confusion about the meaning of the language that we use to talk about mental occurrences. Hence, what is taken for granted is that mental states or processes or occurrences present as a person's entities. The meaning of sentences about mental states consists in expressing them.

4. The Problem of Other Minds

The problem of other minds deals with the question: How do we know that others have minds? This question presupposes the possibility of knowing other minds. If we admit that there is a possibility of knowing other minds, the natural question is: What are the means of acquiring that knowledge? In a very special and technical sense, Wittgenstein uses 'criteria' as the means of acquiring our knowledge of other minds. For him, criteria are the rules within the framework of language-games and our forms of life. In response to the skeptic, Wittgenstein argues that there is no valid way to answer the skeptic and the skeptic's claim that knowledge of other minds is impossible is not tenable. For him, a skeptic misunderstands the meaning and usage of the word 'know' in our language-games.

As we know, that skeptic doubts the possibility of knowledge of other minds. A skeptic claims that we do not know other minds. For him, what is necessary for claiming something as knowledge is that it must be justified the true belief that is indubitable. And if this is so, we have no possibility of having beliefs about the knowledge of other minds. Consequently, if this is the case, then each person is limited to knowledge of himself, his own present sensations, and thoughts. This is the same as solipsism, which claims that only 'I' and 'my' own thoughts and sensations or mental states exist.

Can one know the pain of others on the analogy of one's own? If this could be done, then knowledge of other minds would be very easy since I have familiarity with my thoughts, feelings, and other mental states and processes. All that I need is to understand the other minds on the analogy of my own. There is an assumption that once I know from my own case that what pain, tickling, or consciousness is, then I can transfer the idea of these things to objects outside myself. Wittgenstein attacks the above assumption and for him, one learns what pain is only when one feels it. Therefore, if my conception of pain is obtained from the pain that I experience, then it will be a part of my conception of pain that I alone can experience it. Nobody else has the experience of my pain what I feel. Wittgenstein writes, "If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I *do not* feel on the model of pain which I *do* feel. That is, what I have to do is not simply to

make a transition in imagination from one place of pain to another."³⁵

According to Wittgenstein, it is doubtful that we could have any belief about other minds and their sensations that ought to be justified. Therefore, imagining the pain of others on the model of one's own is not an easy task. As Wittgenstein writes, "But if suppose that someone has pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had."³⁶ By attacking the concept of *sameness* or *identity*, Wittgenstein gives an example of the use of 'It is 5 o'clock here'. He states,

It is as if I were to say: You surely know what 'It is 5 o'clock here' means; so you also know what 'It's 5 o'clock on the sun' means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o'clock. The explanation using *identity* does not work here. For I know well enough that one can call 5 o'clock here and 5 o'clock there 'the same time,' but what I do not know is in what cases one is to speak of its being the same time here and there. In the same way, it is no explanation to say: the supposition that he has a pain is simply the supposition that he has the same as I. For *that* part of the grammar is quite clear to me: that is, that one will say that the stove has the same experience as I, if one says: it is in pain and I am in pain. (*PI*§350)

In this passage, 'the 5 o'clock on the sun' illustrated how the concept of mental states could not be extended from oneself to others. Here, 'it[stove] is in pain' on the analogy of 'I am in pain' gives the absurd conclusion that even material objects have minds and sensations. Thus, the question that arises here is: What is the criterion of attributing mental states or sensations to others?

It is important to point out that for Wittgenstein, the problem of other minds is not like how one can know about other minds? But it is like, "Given that 'mind,' for me, is this private inner realm, how can it even make sense to form the notion of 'other minds' in the first place?"³⁷ The 'pain' that I feel is one of my personal experiences, and other people know when I am in pain. Wittgenstein points out that I would never have learned the meaning of the word 'pain' without the aid of other people, none of whom has access to the supposed private sensations of pain that I feel. The meaning of the word 'pain' presupposes some sort of external verification and its application needs a set of criteria. We can say that observation of writhing and groaning are 'criteria' for our belief that someone is in pain.

In *BB*, Wittgenstein said, "the man who says only my pain is real' that he was rebelling against the common criteria and thereby 'objecting to a conventions'" (*BB*, p. 57). And to speak of practice as a convention is to imply that it is a matter of choice. This choice may be restricted by criteria that are not subject to choice. Criteria are used as conventions in a language-game. And "We fix criteria by laying down grammatical rules."³⁸ Again, having raised the question why we suppose that toothache correlated to holding one's tooth, he concluded that "here we strike rock bottom, that is, we have come down to conventions."³⁹ In *PI*, criteria also play a fundamental role in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind. As he writes, "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria" (*PI*§580). Therefore, Wittgenstein's dissolution to the problem of other minds provides both conditions under which we are justified in attributing mental concepts to others and an account of the utility of

language-game in our lives. In this context, we shall discuss Wittgenstein's three key concepts, namely, criterion, agreement, and form of life.

4.1 Criterion

The concept of the criterion is an important concept in Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mind. The word 'criterion' is always used as a criterion of something. What is this something for Wittgenstein? In his *The Blue and Brown Books* and *Philosophical Investigations* we find that in various places Wittgenstein writes criterion is a criterion for an expression, or the use of an expression, or for something be the case or for a states of affairs (See *BB*, pp. 24-25 and *PI*§149, 182, 238 & 269). However, all these ways of saying that the criterion is the same. Let us take an example, which Wittgenstein discusses that 'he has angina,' for it is the case that he has angina, saying he has angina or for simply angina that are various forms of expressions saying about the same thing 'angina.' Therefore, we might describe this criterion of something for a criterion of a linguistic expression fitting its object. To describe something means to specify what it is like and what it is not like.

In Wittgenstein's work, criteria are contrasted with symptoms. For him, symptoms are taken to be outward manifestations of something, while criteria point to the thing itself. However, criteria are observable features that are directly connected to an expression by its meaning. Rather, symptoms are features that are indirectly connected to the expression by being associated with the criteria in our experience. To make the distinction between 'criteria' and 'symptoms' and to avoid the confusions, Wittgenstein writes,

Let us introduce two antithetical terms to avoid certain elementary confusions: To the question 'How do you know that so-and-so is the case?' We sometimes answer by giving 'criteria' and sometimes by giving 'symptoms.' If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case 'why do you say this man has got angina?' Then the answer 'I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood' gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand, the answer was, 'His throat is inflamed,' this might give us a symptom of angina. I call 'symptom' a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion. Then to say 'A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him' is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of *angina*. But to say, 'A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat' is to make a hypothesis. (*BB*, pp. 24-25)

From the above passage, we find that Wittgenstein takes criteria are primarily the criteria that men accept, introduce, and use or apply in connection to their use of certain expressions. If something is the criterion of 'X', then that is a logically sufficient condition of 'X.' Therefore, the criterion of angina in Wittgenstein's example is what medical science calls angina and we may say that it is the defining criterion of angina. However, the criteria are not factual tools for avoiding the confusions in philosophy. They are grammatical tools for Wittgenstein. They do not help us to settle the matters of facts such as, 'Is he in pain?' Rather they help us in clarifying the grammatical matters. Hence,

Wittgenstein does not use the concept of criteria to distinguish someone who is in pain from someone who is pretending to be in pain. Rather, he uses it to determine that pain only, whether it is real or feigned. In my own case, there are no criteria at all. There are no questions of knowledge, doubt, investigation, and so on, which I cannot raise regarding my own pain. Thus, Wittgenstein is not opposing the idea that first-person pain ascriptions exist, but he is opposing the idea that these ascriptions can then be treated as objects of knowledge. Nevertheless, in the case of others, the criteria for determining whether someone is in pain are the same for determining whether the pain is real or feigned.

Wittgenstein rejects the use of 'know' in the case of avowals and thus, it is meaningless to say 'I know I am in pain.' For him, if it will be the case that each person knows what pain is from his own case, then the learning of the word 'pain' will be impossible. Therefore, it will be impossible to generalize the meaning of the word 'pain' in the same sense as in the case of other people. The same kind of argument we shall find in Wittgenstein's beetles in the boxes example. In this case, Wittgenstein is trying to point out that the beetle is very much like pain. Just like no one looks into someone's box what exactly it contains. Similarly, no one can exactly know what pain is like to be an experienced thing from another's perspective. But, we assume that like a beetle, the word pain means the same for all human beings.

Wittgenstein argues that it does not matter what is in the box, or whether everyone has a beetle or not a beetle since there is no way of checking or comparing it. There is also no way of asserting or denying whether a beetle is really in each box or not in the box, but still, we have to assume that beetle in each box. Similarly, we cannot assert or deny what a mental state contains but when we talk of having a mental state (or a beetle) we are using a term 'mental' that we have learnt through conversation and public discourse. In a sense, the word 'beetle,' if it is to have any sense or meaning, it simply means what is in the box. From this point of view, the pain is simply 'what is in the box' or rather 'what is in your head' or 'what is in the body.' Therefore, we could not check or compare what a mental state contains and that is indescribable. We cannot describe the use of words like emotion, thinking, and imagining, etc., because the definition of these terms is not possible. "A description of the use of a word is given when we define it.-When we show the sample (e.g. of colour)" (*WLPP*, p. 7).⁴⁰ Hence, one could ascribe any mental state to oneself and also to others based on expressions.

4.2 Agreement

The concept of agreement is another important concept in language. We human beings communicate with each other through language. Communication is possible by using social practices of following the rules of language. Any social practice needs human agreement. Based on the agreement we decide whether someone is right or wrong, which statement is appropriate or inappropriate. For example, if a person is asked to compute $2+3$, if the answer is given is 5, and not 4 or 6, then we call his response as right. If someone asks: Why not 4 or 6? We answer this question in terms

of the social agreement on the rule of addition. Therefore, if there is no general agreement on the rule of addition in the community, one may not be able to claim that someone is adding or not based on the behavior of a person. Similarly, when someone describes a plant or mentions the name of that plant, there ought to be a convention of calling that plant with that name. If such a convention does not exist in that society, the description of the plant by that name cannot be said to be true or false. Wittgenstein states, "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"⁴¹

As we know that we human beings are linguistic animal and through language, we communicate with each other. An agreement is necessary for any kind of communication. Wittgenstein states that "... in order to communicate, people must agree with one another about the meanings of words. But the criterion for this agreement is not just agreement with reference to definitions, e.g., ostensive definitions - but also an agreement in judgements. It is essential for communication that we agree in a large number of judgements" (*RFM-VI*§40).⁴² Following Wittgenstein, Hacker and Baker, also interpret the requirement of agreement in communication, and according to them, "If two people disagreed about how to explain the words they use, then what the one meant by an utterance would not be what the other understood by it."⁴³ Here, this does not mean that the speaker and hearer have to use the same words or the same language. Then, the question is, what they have to agree? It is nothing but the definition of the words uttered by the speaker. In addition to this, the agreement in judgment is necessary for communication. By agreement in judgment, Hacker and Baker interpret as, "interpersonal consensus about the truth and falsity of empirical propositions."⁴⁴ Here, they explain the agreement using the concept of rules, and rules for the use of words.

However, the understanding of a rule and consequently, agreement about which a rule applies is manifested in two ways, namely, "in formulating or paraphrasing it and in applying or following it in practice."⁴⁵ For Wittgenstein, both kinds of agreements are necessary for communication and both are criteria for agreement on meaning. Therefore, "We follow rules of grammar in making judgements, and the correct application of these rules is the criterion of understanding them."⁴⁶ Moreover, the meanings of our words are dependent upon our practices and social agreements. For example, a criterion of an order is that it is expected to be obeyed. When we offer this criterion, we are not claiming that all orders are always obeyed. It is also the case that orders are that sorts of things that it may be obeyed or may not be obeyed and the speaker expects the person ordered to obey. If all orders were always disobeyed, the word 'order' would not have made any sense. Thus the notion of an order presupposes the human freedom to obey or disobey. If we say that if an order is always obeyed or never obeyed, it will strip the very meaning of the word 'order.' This reminds us of Wittgenstein's emphasis on use, conventions, and agreement in sharing the forms of life.

4.3 Form of Life

The concept 'form of life' is closely related to the concept of agreement. Our form of life indicates a particular pattern

of life and it is closely related to our activities. We agree with many human responses and the way they interweave with our activities is our form of life. Our form of life is completely different from other animals' forms of life. Since our form of life is completely different from them, the communication between them is impossible. In our day-to-day life, we find that to some extent, some birds or animals give some responses towards our action. That does not mean that they can communicate with human beings. It is due to the lack of agreement, communication is impossible. In this context, Wittgenstein said, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" (*PI*, p. 223). Here, Wittgenstein shows that since our form of life is different from a lion, communication between a lion and a human being is impossible. Therefore, a form of life is common to human beings, the common behaviour of mankind that is "the system of reference using which we interpret an unknown language" (*PI*§206). This indicates that the use of language makes possible by the human form of life, and only human beings are linguistic animals.

The most fundamental aspect of language is that we learn how to use it in our social contexts. We understand each other not because of the relationship between language and reality, but because we are social beings sharing common platforms such as language. Wittgenstein denies the possibility of private language and according to him, one might invent a language for his/her private use to describe his/her sensations. In this type of language, there would be no criteria to decide whether a word is used correctly or incorrectly. For him, this type of language would have no meaning. In this context, we will take a statement 'I know I am in pain' that makes no sense. If we claim to know something, we can also doubt it and we must also have criteria for establishing knowledge about it. However, when we are dealing with one's own sensations, one will never doubt, and he /she also have no criteria for establishing knowledge about his/her sensation. He/she has the feeling of that sensation only. Therefore, we should not say, 'I know that I am in pain' instead of 'I am in pain.' We, humans, are interacting with each other through linguistic expressions, bodily expressions, or behavioral expressions. Without the context of interaction, we cannot react to others. As Wittgenstein writes, "My relation to the appearances is here part of my concept" (*Z*§543).⁴⁷ According to Wittgenstein's discussion of the meaning of words for mental concepts, an expression gets meaning only in virtue of its employment in a language-game. To speak a language is to participate in a particular form of life. Our forms of life are defined through our interactions with the world and other minds.

In his *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology* (*Vol. II*), Wittgenstein writes,

'Can one know what goes on in someone else in the same way he knows it?' Well, how does he know it? He can express his experience. No doubt within him whether he is having this experience – analogous to the doubt whether he has this or that disease – comes into play; and therefore it is wrong to say that he knows what he is experiencing. But, someone else can very well doubt whether that person has this experience. Thus doubt does come into play, but precisely for that reason, it is also possible that there is complete certainty. *LWPP-II*, p. 92)⁴⁸

In the above passage, Wittgenstein argues for the question concerning our knowledge of other minds and seeks to establish how the problem of other minds is the reversal of the problem of our own minds. Again, he attempts to show that talking about the other minds is possible only within a linguistic framework. Within the framework of language-games, he draws a line between 'our knowledge of our own minds' and 'our knowledge of other minds.'

So far as our knowledge of our own minds is concerned, we would like to raise a question like, how do I know what is going on in my mind while I am feeling a pain? Or how do I know that I am in pain? In a Wittgensteinian way, the sensation 'pain' is identical with 'I am in pain' or 'my pain.' Therefore, 'I am in pain' means 'the sensation pain.' Traditionally, the difference between 'I am in pain' and 'he is in pain' explained by reference to the one who possesses pain. This means, 'pain' in both cases refers to the same sensation, and this sensation attributed to different persons.

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein rejects the view that in the above sentences, 'pain' is the same as sensation. According to him, 'pain' in both the statements does not refer to different sensations; if this were the case, then one has to be in a position to perceive the pain of others. The question is: what is the meaning of 'pain' in both the statements? In the first statement, the meaning of the term 'pain' is given by acquaintance with some sensation, but the meaning of the term 'pain' in 'he is in pain' is not at all given by sensation but, here the meaning is exhausted by the observation of the behavior of the other person or his statement.

In *PI*, Wittgenstein writes, "other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my own behaviour, for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them" (*PI*§246). Other people can doubt whether I am in pain or not in pain, but I cannot doubt myself because I feel that I have pain. Therefore, Wittgenstein rejects the symmetrical construction of the use of mental concepts to oneself and others. For him, the ways we ascribe any mental phenomenon to ourselves and others are very different. For example, I perceive a rabbit in the bush. Here, what I perceive is my evidence for the fact that there is a rabbit in the bush. I know that there is a rabbit in the bush because I perceive it. One knows that another person is thinking, perceiving, feeling pain, etc. not by perceiving his thinking, perceiving, feeling pain, but by perceiving what he does or what he says. What he does or what he says is the evidence for us to know whether he is feeling pain, perceiving, thinking, etc.

However, what I perceive is not the fact that I perceive, even it is because I know that I perceive. Therefore, for one's own case, his perception does not provide him with the knowledge that he perceives. In this sense, we can say that no evidence one needs for his own perception, feeling, thinking, etc. In one's own case, one does not doubt whether I am in pain or not. But, in the case of other's mind, one can doubt whether others are in pain or not. Thus in the case of other's mind, there is the possibility of knowledge and evidence is always necessary in order to establish our knowledge about other's mind. Based on that evidence, we have to believe that others are feeling pain. In this context, Wittgenstein writes, "I am told: 'If you pity someone for having pains, surely you must at least believe that he has pains'" (*BB*, p. 46).

Wittgenstein uses the word 'doubt' against the skeptical or Cartesian form of doubt. He denies their universal doubt and uses genuine or philosophical doubt. The philosophical doubt makes the difference between our practices and beliefs. It also prompts us to inquiry about something. According to him, a doubt occurs only within a language-game and outside a language-game; it is not possible to doubt everything. Therefore, this act of doubting presupposes our ability in engaging the language-game and "what we do in our language-game always rests on a tacit presupposition" (*PI*, p. 179). 'I know I am in pain' presupposes the statement that 'I am in pain.' When I am in pain, other people can also know that I am in pain. There is an agreement in our form of life, and in that, we use language as our means of communication.

We human beings are linguistic animals. Within the linguistic framework, we can understand the concept of mind. Language reflects the deep structures of our thoughts and experiences. It does not mean that we can express other sensations in our ordinary language. The confusion will arise while we attempt to express others sensations, emotions, feelings, etc. in our language and we try to use one word or statement of one language-game in the way it uses in another language-game. This confusion will be removed if we understand the grammar of that word.

The concept of grammar is closely related to the concept of the form of life. Now the question is: what is the grammar of language? For Wittgenstein, 'how is a word used?' and 'what is the grammar of a word?' are the same question. We can explain the grammar of language by words, phrases, or linguistic expressions in the language. The grammar of 'I have toothache' is different from that of 'Rama has a toothache.' Here, the use of the word 'toothache' when I have a toothache and when someone else has it belongs to different language-games. 'I have toothache' and 'Rama has toothache' are different since their justifications are different. I might doubt whether Rama has a toothache or not but I cannot doubt that I have pain. Because the question does not arise in the case of 'I have toothache' but in the case of 'Rama has toothache' the question might arise. I have the feeling of my toothache but I cannot have the feeling of others' toothache. My toothache is not the same as his/ Rama's toothache, but we both may have a similar toothache. In Wittgenstein's words, "The question whether someone else has what I have when I have toothache may be meaningless, though in an ordinary situation it might be a question of fact and the answer, 'He has not,' a statement of fact. But, the philosopher who says of someone else, 'He has not got what I have' is not stating a fact" (*WL*, p. 18). Here, the problem lies in the grammar of 'having a toothache,' and the problem will arise if we try to express in a proposition, which belongs to the grammar of our language. Therefore, I cannot feel Rama's toothache means I cannot try to know Rama's toothache.

Another way of distinguishing the grammars of 'I have toothache' and 'Rama has toothache' is that it does not make sense to say that I seem to have a toothache, but it is sensible to say that Rama seems to have a toothache. In the case of 'I have a toothache,' there is no need for verification and there is no question like whether I have a toothache or not. The answer to the question how do you know you have a toothache? –might be like, I know that I have a

toothache because I feel it and 'How do you know?' is sensible in the case of 'Rama / he has a toothache,' but it becomes nonsense in case of 'I have a toothache.' Therefore, asking the question how do I know? –is not sensible in one's own case and the answer to the above question is I have a toothache because I feel it.

The notion of justification has to be understood in much detail. When it is one's own mental state, there is no need for justification claims Wittgenstein. But when it is the matter of perceiving external objects, the justification would be in terms of perceptual criteria. If someone asks me why I claim a car is a vehicle, I can demonstrate how one can travel from one place to another. Similarly, if someone asks me why I call a patch of colour 'red,' I can draw his attention to perceptual criteria and the social convention. If I am asked to justify my claim that why I consider a patient is in pain, I cannot be sure of his being in pain so easily. The first person reporting is not possible since someone else has the pain. It is not an observable phenomenon and hence, I cannot offer an ostensive definition or perceptual criteria. All that I can do is to bank on my knowledge of linguistic criteria. If our language permits calling a person having pain based on his expression of avowal or groaning, his restlessness or on his statement, then I can ascribe pain to him. That is to say; we have outward criteria to ascribe inward experience. This theory of ascription is upheld by Wittgenstein because verification principle cannot work when it is the case of the mental phenomena of others.

5. Ascription of Mental Phenomena

While ascribing any mental phenomenon to oneself or others, we find that the way we ascribe a mental phenomenon to ourselves is not the same as the way we ascribe to others. Therefore, there are two ways of ascribing mental phenomena, such as the first person ascriptions and the third person ascriptions. We ascribe a mental phenomenon to ourselves based on our awareness of mental states and we ascribe them to others on the strength of their outer manifestations like behaviors and linguistic expressions. These two kinds of ascriptions puzzle us about the unitary nature of various mental phenomena. Explaining the unique nature of mental phenomena, Pradhan says that "The mental phenomena such as willing, desiring, thinking, feeling, etc., are very much a part of the fabric of the human life and are decidedly attributed to human beings or creatures very much alike to the humans."⁴⁹ Thus, we cannot ascribe any mental phenomenon to those which are material in nature. We can attribute mind to human beings or the creatures which are very much alike the humans. This nature of mind is different from those which are material in nature⁵⁰.

Explaining the mind-matter distinction, Wittgenstein says, "... can one say of the stone that it has a soul and *that* is what has pain? What has a soul, or pain, to do with a stone? Can of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains. For one has to say it of a body, or, if you like of a soul which some body *has*. And how can a body *have* a soul" (*PI*§283)? Thus, we cannot ascribe a mental phenomenon to stones or those which are material in nature. It shows that human beings to whom we ascribe mental phenomena are different from stones, and

according to Wittgenstein, human beings can be said to have souls and stones do not have.

We can ascribe pain to human beings and while explaining the ascription of pain, Wittgenstein says that "Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. – One says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a *sensation* to a *thing*? One might as well ascribe it to a number! And look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything was, so to speak, too much smooth for it" (*PI*§284). Here, Wittgenstein shows the necessity of a subject which is conscious. There cannot be any ascription of mental phenomena to stone and even to a dead body. We cannot attribute consciousness to a stone or a dead body. In this context, let us read what Wittgenstein says about the distinction between living and dead. As he says, "Our attitude to the living is not the same as to the dead. All our reactions are different" (*PI*§284). Thus, livings and dead belong to two different categories. We can ascribe a mental phenomenon to a living and not to a dead body.

It is important to note here that the idea of an inner process gives us the wrong idea that a mental process is an invisible and inscrutable private entity. This idea underlies with the wrong use of mental words. According to Pradhan, this metaphysical picture is a grammatical fiction created by the wrong use of mental words.⁵¹ But Wittgenstein's concern with the nature of mind is not related to any metaphysical picture of the mind. Making this point clear, Wittgenstein says, "Are you really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?" – If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a *grammatical* fiction" (*PI*§307). This grammatical fiction does not help us in knowing and understanding the various uses of mental words. Rather what is important for our understanding about the mental words is to see how our mental words are used in our everyday life. These words are used in various language-games and in order to learn the use of these mental words, one has to know the possibility of confusion regarding the grammatical fictions found in the language-games. And the appropriate grammatical act is to learn the uses of various mental words as ascribing a metal predicates to oneself or others. The tendency to claim that I describe my mental states and processes have to be curbed and all that we can do is to ascribe mental states and processes to oneself and others. This is what one calls knowing one's mind and mental processes, and this is what is called knowing the mental processes and mental states of others.

Now the general question is: Which perspective to a mental phenomenon is better for our understanding of the mental phenomena? If we accept the first person perspective as the better in revealing the true nature of a mental phenomenon, then there will be two difficulties concerning the application of various mental phenomena to others. Firstly, there is no ground for ascribing a mental concept to others because one can never observe another's mental states; one could only observe other's outward expressions, like behaviors and linguistic expressions. Secondly, the problem is concerning how such outward expressions will get their meanings from what I experience in my own case because what I experience in my own case will not apply

to others. Therefore, Wittgenstein opposes the line of thinking that experiences like emotional experiences are private to the person who is experiencing and according to him, one can 'know' other's emotional experiences, and the emotional expressions play a vital role in knowing other's emotions or emotional experiences⁵².

However, emotional experience is not something that is hidden within the person who has that emotional experience. It might be the case that one can keep his or her emotional experiences hidden for a short period, but not permanently. For Wittgenstein, emotional words do not refer to private events that they are cut off from the others. It might be the case that one looks within herself or himself. This does not mean that he / she gets the meaning of these emotional words from looking within him or herself. The emotional expressions are used in our language as the public manifestations of the emotional experiences and we use emotional words as the public criteria to read into other's emotional experiences.

Again, if we favor the third person perspective, then we will face the problem to register the first person ascriptions. For example, we see a heavy iron ball fall on the feet of a child and the child is crying. Here, the child is feeling pain, and we could ascribe pain to the child on the basis of its expression. The child could ascribe sensation to itself but we could only say that the child is in pain. Hence, we could say that when one ascribes any mental phenomenon to oneself, he attributes an inner state but when one ascribes them to others, he attributes the concepts on the basis behaviors or linguistic expressions. However, Wittgenstein recognizes the distinction between the first person ascriptions and the third person ascriptions of mental concepts. As he writes, "The characteristic sign of the mental seems to be that one has to guess at it in someone else using external clues and is only acquainted with it from one's own case" (*LWPP-II*, pp. 61-62). Therefore, the knowledge of the mental concepts is constitutive of the nature of the mental that from one's own case, one is acquainted with one's own mental states and not in the case of others. Taking a clue from Wittgenstein, Gillett says,

To apply a predicate to oneself, as 'I am in pain' is to recognize that a certain condition is instanced by oneself, the condition that warrants the use of a given term – here 'pain.' Whether this condition is present may, on any particular occasion, be evident to the person in that condition and not to others, but the condition itself must typically, critically, or essentially be recognizable by others in order to give rise to convergent rule-governed judgements which avoid the traps of a private language.⁵³

In similar way, Colin McGinn writes, "The special difficulty presented by these two modes of ascription is that it is clearly the same concepts that are ascribed in first- and third-person judgements, yet there is a strong and natural tendency to suppose that the content of mental concepts reflects their characteristic conditions of ascriptions."⁵⁴ However, the condition(s) that warrants the use of a word by oneself helps us to recognize the essential relation between the self-ascriptions and other-ascriptions of mental attributes.

When it is the matter of ascribing mental phenomenon to oneself, one seems to have a choice. I can know that I am in pain directly, or I can infer my pain from my

behavior. Normally one does not use the second alternative to ascribe oneself a pain state. However, one can imagine a situation where one might use the second alternative. For instance, I find myself an enigma, I do not know why I behave in a certain way in a certain type of contexts, following Freud, I might ascribe certain mental processes to myself following the outward criteria. When it is a matter of mental processes or states of others, we do not have this choice. All that we can do is to ascribe them to other minds on the basis of outward criteria. We have no direct knowledge of the mental process and states of others.

Notes

¹ In *Philosophical Investigations* (Part-I, Section 355), Wittgenstein discusses the language of sense-experience or sense impression. Analogically, we can use the language of mental phenomena through which we can express the various mental phenomena.

² Panda, M. M., Nath, R., "Experience and expression: The inner-outer conceptions of mental phenomena," *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, 36 (1-4), 2015, pp. 77-112.

³ Hicks, G. Dawes, Eddgell, Beatrice and Field, G. C. (reviewed works), *Immediate Experience*, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 9, 1929, p.175..

⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *The Big Typescript: Typescript 213*, C. G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue (eds. and trans.), Blackwell, Oxford, 2005, Section-94, p. 320e.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 320e.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Robinson, Howard, *Perception*, Routledge, London, 1994, p. 32.

⁸ Schroeder, Severin, *Wittgenstein: The Way Out of the Fly-Bottle*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 183.

⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *The Big Typescript: Typescript 213*, Section- 32, p. 96e.

¹⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958. Henceforth, we will write PI.

¹¹ <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/442540/paradox>, (accessed on 20/11/2012).

¹² Schroeder, Severin, *Wittgenstein: The Way Out of the Fly-Bottle*, p. 183.

¹³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Remarks*, Rush Rhees (ed.), R. Hargreaves and R. White (trans.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975. Henceforth, we will write PR.

¹⁴ Kiverstein, J., "Wittgenstein, Qualia and the Autonomy of Grammar," Zamuner, E. & Levy, D. (eds) *Wittgenstein's Enduring Arguments*. Routledge, USA and Canada, 2009, pp. 30-60.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁶ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *The Big Typescript: Typescript 213*, Section- 2, p. 6e.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, remark No. 154.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, remark No. 139.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, remark No. 122.

²⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *On Certainty*, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, (eds.), Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974. Henceforth, we will write OC.

²¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Grammar*, Rush Rhees (ed.), R. Hargreaves and R. White (trans.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969. Henceforth, we will write PG.

²² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *The Blue and Brown Books*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975. Henceforth, we will write BB.

²³ Hester, Marcus B., "Wittgenstein's Analysis of 'I Know I am in Pain,'" *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1966, p. 274.

²⁴ Kenny, Anthony, *Wittgenstein*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2006, p. 147.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

²⁶ Hacker, P.M.S., *Insight, and Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, pp. 256-264.

²⁷ Temkin, Jack, "Wittgenstein on Epistemic Privacy," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 123, Apr. 1981, p. 98.

²⁸ shawntoneil.com/data/texts/epistemology/dretske.pdf (Accessed on 25/08/2012), p.1.

²⁹ info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/Knowledge%20of%20Pain.pdf (Accessed on 03/11/2012), p. 4.

³⁰ Temkin, Jack, "Wittgenstein on Epistemic Privacy," p. 98.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

³² Kenny, Anthony, *Wittgenstein*, p. 147.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

³⁴ Sankowski, Edward, "Wittgenstein on Self-Knowledge," *Mind*, Vol. 87, No. 346, Apr. 1978, p. 257.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

³⁷ Overgaard, Soren, "The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgensteinian Phenomenological 37 Perspective," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, Vol. 5, 2006, p. 57.

³⁸ Hacker, P. M. S., *Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 310.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁴⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Wittgenstein's Lecture's on *Philosophical Psychology 1946-47*, P. T. Geach (ed.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989. Henceforth, we will write WLPP.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

⁴² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe, (eds.), G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978. Henceforth, we will write RFM.

⁴³ Backer, G. P., and Hacker, P. M. S., *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar, and Necessity: An Analytical Commentary on the "Philosophical Investigations"*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, p. 258.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

⁴⁷ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Zettel*, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds.), G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967. Henceforth, we will write Z.

⁴⁸ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. II, G. H. von Wright, and Heikki Nyman (eds.), C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (trans.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1992. Henceforth, we will write LWPP.

⁴⁹ Pradhan, R.C., *Language, Reality, and Transcendence: An Essay on the Main Strands of 50 Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy*, Overseas Press, New Delhi, 2009, p. 155.

⁵⁰ Nath, R., "Wittgenstein on the existence of the mind in the physical world," *Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society*, 39, 2016, pp. 181-182.

⁵¹ Pradhan, R. C., *Language, Reality, and Transcendence*, p. 157.

⁵² Panda, M. M., Nath, R., "Wittgenstein on Public Language About Personal Experiences," *Philosophia*, vol. 48 (5), 2020, pp. 1939-1960.

⁵³ Gillett, Grant, "Wittgenstein on the Mind," *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 37, n. 1, 1994, p.111.

⁵⁴ McGinn, Colin, *The Character of Mind*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982, p. 6.