Captain Hendrick Aupaumut: The Dilemmas of an Intercultural Broker

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Abstract. The life of Captain Hendrick Aupaumut (1757–1830), a Stockbridge Mohican sachem, diplomat, and historian, illustrates the limited victories and painful dilemmas of a culture broker in the American Northeast. During the 1790s Aupaumut undertook four missions to the Ohio country to broker a peace between the United States and the native villages confederated in opposition to the Anglo-American advance. Ostensibly Aupaumut represented the United States, but he acted primarily to revitalize Mohican autonomy and influence as the "front door" between the Anglo-Americans and the Algonquian peoples to the west.

In April 1826 Col. Timothy Pickering had difficulty remembering a Mohican sachem named Capt. Hendrick Aupaumut. A Philadelphia antiquarian, Dr. Benjamin H. Coates, had recently acquired an unusual manuscript journal written by Aupaumut in 1792 during a journey commissioned by the colonel to open peace negotiations with the powerful Indian confederacy of the Ohio country. In 1792 Pickering had been an American Indian commissioner as well as the postmaster general of the United States. Because documents written by Indians were so rare, Coates was especially intrigued by his find. Seeking information on its provenance, he sent the journal to Pickering for comment. The aged colonel replied, "I suppose that I was directed (tho' I do not now recollect it and I wonder that I should have forgotten it) to engage Hendrick to visit the hostile tribes, with the hope that it might tend to produce a peace." Apparently, Pickering did not recall that his papers included numerous letters, journals, and speeches by Aupaumut, documenting their close collaboration during the early 1790s. Neither Coates nor Pickering thought to contact Aupaumut, perhaps be-

Ethnohistory 43:3 (summer 1996). CCC 0014-1801/96/$1.50.

cause they did not realize that he was still alive on the Mohican reservation in Wisconsin.[1]

Subsequent historians have had similar difficulties comprehending Aupaumut's role in the western diplomacy of President George Washington's administration. As a Mohican sachem from the East seeking peace on behalf of the United States, Aupaumut has seemed trebly out of place in a western war zone contested by militant Indians and the American government. Because he seems so anomalous, his appearances in historical narratives of the Ohio country are usually terse and misleading. Historians generally treat Aupaumut in passing either as an inconsequential oddity or as a thoroughly acculturated pawn of the United States (or as both). The historians follow the lead of American officials, who liked to believe in Mohican deference, and of Iroquoian leaders, who liked to belittle their Mohican rivals as American dupes.[2]

Worse still, one prominent ethnohistorian misidentifies Aupaumut as an "Oneida Captain" and one "of the most distinguished men among the Six Nations" who "became notorious drunkards." In fact, he belonged to an Algonquian-speaking people and, during most of his life, was renowned for his sobriety. They called themselves the Muhheakunnuk but appeared in British and American records as "Mohicans" or "the Stockbridge Indians" (after their former village in western Massachusetts). The Stockbridge Mohicans derived from three closely related seventeenth-century tribes—Mahicans, Wappingers, and Housatonics—that had dwelled between the Hudson and Connecticut valleys when first encountered by Dutch and English colonists. Although many ethnohistorians prefer to label Aupaumut's people "Mahican," this essay employs "Mohican," for two reasons. First, we know Aupaumut primarily through documents written by or to American officials and missionaries, who consistently used the labels "Mohican" and "Stockbridge," never "Mahican." Second, "Mohican" conveys that he belonged to a partially reinvented, culturally synthetic, and ethnically and geographically diverse people that was not identical with its Mahican predecessor. The eighteenth-century Mohicans should not be confused either with the seventeenth-century Mohegans of southern New England or with the nineteenth-century literary inventions of James Fenimore Cooper. During the 1790s most Mohicans lived within Oneida territory in central New York, but uneasily, and Aupaumut's diplomacy consistently sought greater autonomy from all Iroquoians as the traditional rivals and belated hosts of his people.[3]

Scholarly assessment of Aupaumut usually begins and ends with the narrative of his 1792 diplomatic journey west to the Ohio country, as published by Coates in 1827. In fact, Aupaumut undertook three other western

missions during the early 1790s, and those journeys are well documented in the unpublished papers of his principal American contact, Col. Timothy Pickering. With the possible exception of Joseph Brant, no other northeastern native of their generation produced a more extensive or more revealing set of surviving documents.[4]

By exploiting that wider array of evidence, this essay moves Aupaumut to the center of the narrative. Much more than an American pawn, Aupaumut expressed a sophisticated assessment of Mohican interests. By acting as an intercultural broker, he meant to use the federal government to weaken the Iroquois and the state of New York, the two most proximate and historically menacing threats to Mohican independence. Aupaumut acted more from informed suspicion of the Iroquois and New York than from naive love of the United States, and he evoked distrust from other natives and from American officials, both of whom misunderstood the nature and purpose of the Mohicans' selective appropriation of Anglo-American ways.[5]

Aupaumut employed a deep but consciously selective understanding of Mohican history. During the 1790s he pursued western peace primarily to revitalize a two-century-old tradition of Mahican and Mohican diplomats acting as a "front door" for more western Indians seeking to understand and cope with the Anglo-Americans. A historian as well as a diplomat and sachem, Aupaumut helped reinvent and magnify that tradition to maximize the autonomy and influence of his people, whose shrunken numbers and tenuous position among the Oneidas and New Yorkers precluded military resistance. True to the Mohican tradition of adaptability, he sought greater freedom of action and innovation by asserting continuities with a past that was, in fact and emphasis, a relatively new and ongoing construction.[6]

This essay benefits from the growing interest of ethnohistorians in individual lives and especially in the lives of those like Aupaumut who could maneuver and negotiate in multiple cultural settings. Passing nimbly between Anglo-America and native societies, these culture brokers demonstrated the porousness of the frontier and illuminated the possibilities for intercultural communication, exchange, synthesis, and even cooperation. In this new literature, the pursuit of peaceful accommodation becomes as sincere and as "patriotic" as the armed militancy pursued by more famous Indian leaders.[7]

The new biographers self-consciously react against older works that marginalized the culture brokers as tragic figures suspended between antithetical societies. James A. Clifton declares that "the older popular stereotype was that culturally marginal people became psychologically diminished, losing key elements of the ability to live effectively in the community

where they were originally socialized without gaining enough of another culture to become comfortably adjusted there." Clifton retorts that the masters "of both cultures" were "not diminished, but culturally enlarged, as Malcolm McFee points out with his apt phrase, 'The 150% Man.' " In this view, biculturalism was empowering.[8]

However, these biographies risk substituting a new stereotype that romanticizes the "bicultural man and woman" as ethnohistorical heroes, as the humanist scholar's idealized self projected onto past people. In the ethnohistorians' own hierarchy of values, nothing so ennobles and empowers as a talent to pass conceptually between very different cultures. However, those talents were usually mixed blessings for the intermediaries in the often deadly encounters and dangerous misunderstandings of the American Northeast during the late eighteenth century. The new academic celebration can be just as selectively distorting of history as any literary trope of tragic marginality. The following discussion tries to weave through the competing stereotypes of the culture broker by remaining equally attentive to the empowering and the tragic in Hendrick Aupaumut's attempts to broker a peace between the United States and the Indian confederacy.[9]

The Emissary

During the 1780s the various native villages located north and west of the Ohio River and south of the Great Lakes organized a confederacy dedicated to building pan-Indian resistance to American expansion. Determined to roll back the settlers who had crossed the Ohio River, Miami and Shawnee chieftains led the effort to unite all of the region's natives, including the Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Mingo, Potawatomi, Wyandot, Kickapoo, Wea, and Piankashaw. During the late 1780s and early 1790s the confederated Indians grew in confidence as they inflicted heavy losses on American armies and settlements. The Washington administration concluded that it could ill afford further losses of money and blood. Under the pressure of Indian victories, the federal government abandoned the confrontational premise that it had conquered the Indians and their lands during the recent American Revolutionary War. Adopting a more conciliatory tone, federal officials promised to restrain settler aggression; to compensate natives for their murdered relatives; to rectify the land frauds practiced on Indians by private speculators and by state governments; to regulate frontier trade, especially of alcohol; to allocate federal monies to build schools and mills and to provide domestic livestock and heavy farm tools; and to adopt the diplomatic protocol expected by the native peoples.[10]

The American government remained determined ultimately to transfer

the western lands from Indians to whites and to create a landscape dedicated to commercial agriculture. Indeed, federal officials believed that time was on their side, that the American population would continue to surge, and that the Indians would continue to dwindle and to recede westward. Consequently, the Washington administration concluded that short-term patience and restraint would dissolve the dangerous Indian confederacy and would eventually reward Americans with the continent at a minimal expenditure of blood and treasure. To draw the confederated Indians into negotiations, the federal officials promised to seek no additional land concessions and suggested their willingness to grant further compensation for tracts already taken from them by controversial treaty councils held during the 1780s.[11]

In 1791 the United States government desperately needed an emissary who could convey its new policy to the confederated Indians, win their trust, and persuade them to enter formal negotiations for peace. American officials astutely decided that the best possible emissary would be an eastern Indian who understood both the United States and its western opponents. In particular, the federal authorities wooed the leaders of the Iroquois nations resident in western New York and Upper Canada (Ontario). Ideally, the Americans wanted to recruit the celebrated Mohawk Joseph Brant or one of the two great Senecas, Red Jacket or Cornplanter. Like their British predecessors, American officials had an exaggerated notion of the power of the Iroquois to sway the western peoples.[12]

To cultivate the Iroquois as potential brokers, the United States Indian commissioner Timothy Pickering traveled to Newtown Point, in west-central New York, in June 1791 to hold a formal council. Wary of entanglement with the Americans, most of the leading Iroquois proved noncommittal. But to Pickering's pleasant surprise, he received an unsolicited offer of assistance from another people, the Mohicans at New Stockbridge, a small village in central New York. According to a Protestant missionary dwelling among them, the Mohicans had "been for some time preparing themselves to send Messengers on an embassy upon this important subject." In a formal speech to Pickering, their eloquent and dignified sachem, Capt. Hendrick Aupaumut, offered to effect a western reconciliation as both "a sincere friend to the United States" and "a true friend to the people of my own colour."[13]

Although he came from a relatively small and weak village, rather than from one of the coveted Iroquois nations, Aupaumut intrigued Pickering. Indeed, there were three reasons to conclude that the Mohican would make a better western emissary than any Iroquois. First, Aupaumut had perfected the repetitive eloquence and dignified bearing expected of a sachem.

In 1789 a missionary, Rev. Samuel Kirkland, carefully recorded one of Aupaumut's speeches "to shew the understanding and the ingenuity of some of the Indians; and how sensibly they can touch the feelings of humanity and move the tenderest springs of benevolence notwithstanding the savage character so universally given to them." (But on another occasion the impatient minister reported that, when asked a question, "with all the formality of an Indian, he must make a long speech of near an hour.") Second, unlike the Iroquois, the Mohicans spoke an Algonquian language, as did most of the natives in the Ohio country. Third, the Mohicans had a long tradition of friendly contact with the Miami, Shawnee, and Delaware, in contrast to the Iroquois, who had frequently fought against them. In 1791 Kirkland assured American officials that "Captain Hendrick is well acquainted with their customs & manners, & has since the warr received several invitations from those western tribes to make them a visit." [14]

Just as important, Aupaumut was well acquainted with the customs and manners of the Anglo-Americans. "He was intelligent and spoke the English language familiarly and with such a degree of correctness as to be easily & distinctly understood and he wrote a legible hand," Pickering recalled. Born in the Indian township at Stockbridge, Massachusetts, in May 1757, Aupaumut learned to speak, read, and write English at the school conducted there by a Protestant missionary. During the American Revolutionary War, Aupaumut fought in the Mohican company that served and suffered in the Continental Army under Washington. Aupaumut especially distinguished himself for bravery, endurance, dedication, and leadership, rising from private to captain and earning Washington's commendation. After the war Aupaumut became the Mohican sachem and led their exodus from western Massachusetts to New Stockbridge, in central New York, where he became conspicuous for his Christian piety, his sobriety, and his zeal for adopting the New England mode of agriculture. In 1796 two visiting Yankee clergymen reported, "The sachem Hendrick Aupaumut has a good field of wheat, Indian corn, potatoes, and grass, and we had the pleasure of meeting him in the road driving his ox team." [15]

Although not one of the sought-after Iroquois, Aupaumut nonetheless impressed Pickering as a promising emissary. On the one hand, he was adept at the language, protocol, and oratory of Algonquian peoples. On the other hand, because he was so well versed in Anglo-American culture, Aupaumut would be far easier than any other native for American officials to understand and work with. After all, aside from Kirkland, no prominent American official knew any Indian language. In return for Aupaumut's services, Pickering promised to pay for his time and expenses and to promote the Mohican claims on the patronage and justice of the

United States, vaguely adding, "Should your mediation prove successful, [President Washington] will generously reward you."[16]

The Front Door

Aupaumut's offer to assist the Americans derived from his sophisticated understanding of Mohican history and purpose. His people took special pride in their role as intercultural brokers, trusted both by fellow Algonquians and by the Anglo-Americans. In the early seventeenth century, the Hudson valley Mahicans had cast themselves as the "front door" by which hinterland natives should learn about and communicate with the colonists. At the same time, they explained the ways and expectations of western natives to the leading whites.[17]

In his speech to Pickering at Newtown Point, Aupaumut placed his offer in the Mohican tradition of mediating between East and West. On the one hand, the Mohicans had long befriended the Dutch and Anglo-Americans:

> Brother, Attend! I will remind you that I, my nation, have always been the true friends of the Americans, even from the first day they entered into the covenant of friendship. I, my nation, have never been unfaithful, nor broken any part of the chain of friendship. . . . I, my nation, am your true and nearest brother. This I have manifested in all your wars. My blood has been spilt with yours; and to this day my bones lie in the fields with yours, monuments of my strong friendship for the United States.

On the other hand, the Mohicans had an even longer tradition of influence among the western natives. Employing the kinship metaphors essential to Indian politics, Aupaumut noted, "For some time past I have felt a disposition to use my endeavours to effect an accommodation; seeing the Shawanees are my younger brothers—the Miamie my fathers—the Delawares my grandfathers—the Chippawas my grandchildren—and so on: They have always paid great respect to my advice." As an American emissary, Aupaumut detected a welcome opportunity to revive the Mohicans' role as intercultural brokers.[18]

As Aupaumut explained, his offer had deep roots in Mahican history. In the early seventeenth century the Mahicans had lived in several villages scattered along both banks of the upper Hudson, near its juncture with the Mohawk River. They periodically clashed with their Iroquoian neighbors to the west, the Mohawks, but the two peoples also exchanged goods, customs, and stories, generating a considerable convergence in folklore,

ceramics, clan systems, longhouse architecture, and palisaded villages. The Mahicans sustained more consistently amicable relations with their fellow Algonquian speakers to the north in the St. Lawrence valley, to the east in the Connecticut valley, and to the south in the Delaware and lower Hudson valleys. The Mahicans enjoyed especially close ties with their "grandfathers," the Munsee and Delaware peoples to the south. The Mahicans acted as middlemen in the north-south trade and diplomacy (the two were inextricably interwoven in native cultures of the Northeast) along the Hudson corridor, linking the Atlantic coast with the St. Lawrence valley. They brokered the northward flow of wampum made from seashells gathered along Long Island Sound and the southern flow of animal furs collected by northern hunters. Although small-scale and conducted as gift exchanges rather than as commerce, this trade was essential to peace and communication between Algonquian speakers from the Atlantic seaboard to the St. Lawrence valley.[19]

The Mahican position became more strategic and more dangerous with the arrival of Dutch fur traders, who in 1624 established a trading post called Fort Orange at the site of present-day Albany. At first the Mahicans thrived from their privileged access to the coveted European trade goods, especially tools and weapons made of iron or steel. Determined to usurp the Mahicans' trade and diplomatic position with the Dutch, the Mohawks waged wars that drove their rivals eastward. By 1628 the Mahicans had lost their lands west of the Hudson, and during the 1670s they had to accept diplomatic subordination to the Mohawks, who assumed dominance over the flow of furs from the north and west to Albany. By midcentury the Dutch, and after 1664 their English successors, treated the Mohawks as their principal allies, snubbing the defeated Mahicans.[20]

The Mahican position in the upper Hudson valley continued to deteriorate during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The growing settler population stripped the Mahicans of their best lands and decimated local game. New York's great landlords used fraudulent documents and creative surveys to seize legal control of the lands claimed by the Mahicans and their Wappinger kin and allies in that colony. Mahican and Wappinger leaders complained with increasing alarm and frequency that hunger and drunkenness plagued their peoples. Under the pressures of war, environmental change, outmigration, and especially epidemic disease, their numbers in the Hudson valley dwindled from about four thousand in 1610 to about five hundred in 1700.[21]

Growing numbers of Mahicans and Wappingers scattered from their homeland. Some headed north to settle among the Abenaki at Odanak, in the St. Lawrence valley. Others fled westward to dwell with Delaware-

Munsee refugees on the upper Susquehanna. Another band emigrated southwest to live around the Moravian mission at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Shortly before the American Revolution the Moravian Mahicans moved farther west to establish a new mission at Gnadenhutten, in the Ohio country. They followed late-seventeenth-century predecessors who had migrated westward to live among the diverse Algonquian peoples of the Great Lakes and the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. In the West they plied their special skills as traders and diplomats and often made themselves indispensable to their hosts.[22]

As the Mahicans became less numerous, powerful, and concentrated, they became more widespread and influential. They acquired an intercultural trust denied to more threatening peoples like the Mohawks. Indeed, they increasingly invested their identity in their expertise as mediators rather than as warriors. They developed especially close ties with the Miami, who from the 1670s periodically invited all of the Mahicans to emigrate westward and join their villages in what is now northern Indiana. The Mahicans also developed friendly relations with the Shawnee, helping them find refuge among the Delaware at a moment of threatened obliteration by their common rivals, the Iroquois. Periodically and ritually renewed, the Mahican covenants of friendship with the Miami, Shawnee, and Delaware would assume special significance during the 1790s, when the United States needed an emissary to open negotiations with them.[23]

Despite their widening diaspora, the Mahicans carefully preserved a cultural and political center in one corner of their traditional homeland. During the 1730s the largest single group of Mahicans had migrated eastward into the Housatonic valley, set amid the thinly settled Berkshire hills of western Massachusetts. Consolidating with their Housatonic and Wappinger kin, the Mahicans resettled around the Protestant mission at Stockbridge, a township reserved for them by the Massachusetts provincial government, which meant to strengthen its claim to that border region contested with the rival colony of New York. By subsidizing a missionary and his school, the expansionist government of Massachusetts also meant to train the Indians in Calvinist Protestantism and in New English notions of agriculture, property, and family. By 1774 about three hundred natives lived at Stockbridge, which served as the "fireplace of the nation," the home of their principal sachem and his council. Delegations came and went from Stockbridge to maintain ties with the dispersed Mahicans and to renew covenants of friendship with their western and northern hosts. An amalgam of Mahicans, Wappingers, and Housatonics, the Stockbridge Indians became "Mohicans." Because the Mahicans had been the most powerful and prestigious of the three related peoples, the Mohicans asserted their conti-

nuity with the Mahicans, masking the greater numbers of Wappinger and Housatonic descendants in Stockbridge. Throughout the late eighteenth century the Mohicans carefully crafted their historical memory to bolster their claims to prestige and influence beyond their diminished numbers and geographic dispersion.[24]

Despite their preference for peace, the Stockbridge Mohicans felt obliged to serve in war alongside their white neighbors in western Massachusetts. As a special company, they fought bravely and skillfully in the colonial armies, first against the French and Indians of Canada during the 1740s and 1750s and then against the British during the American Revolutionary War of 1775–1783. Despite their considerable sacrifices to the American cause, the Stockbridge Mohicans were increasingly outnumbered, surrounded, impinged on, unwanted, and cheated by their white neighbors. By 1775 a settler influx had rendered the Mohicans a small minority in their own township.[25]

To escape pauperization and cultural dissolution, they accepted an invitation from the Oneida in 1783 to move their village to a township on Oneida Creek, in central New York. At "New Stockbridge" about three hundred Mohicans settled around the new church and home of their white missionary, Rev. John Sergeant Jr., who migrated with them. Because most of the Oneida had supported the American Revolution (and many had embraced the Calvinist Protestantism taught by their missionary, Samuel Kirkland), the Mohicans were more readily reconciled to living among them, an Iroquoian people, for the time being. It also helped that the war had driven the loyalist Mohawks out of New York and into refuge in British Canada. For their part, by hosting dependent villages of newcomers, the Oneida meant to enhance their slipping prestige among their fellow Iroquoians and hoped to strengthen their hold on territory coveted by the aggressive state of New York.[26]

Under the pressure of settler expansion, the Mohicans shifted westward to regain a middle position between the expanding Americans and the resisting Indian villages farther west. Despite their grievances, the Mohicans proceeded only as far as central New York, rather than accept the Miami invitation to continue westward into the Ohio country. The Mohicans moved just far enough to escape settler domination but not so far as to lose contact with American officials and missionaries, and not so far as to become embroiled in the brutal western warfare of the 1780s. Their cherished role as a front door required a position between the Americans and the western nations, a position dominated by neither end.

The Mohicans' middle ground was cultural as well as geographic. Seeking new resources for coping with their drastically altered world,

the Stockbridge Mohicans had adopted many ways from their Anglo-American neighbors. The leading Mohicans concluded that they could survive only by grafting onto their own culture the spiritual and technical insights of their would-be conquerors. Most of the Stockbridge Mohicans were devoted to Calvinist Protestantism and to the methods practiced by white farmers: to private property in land, to residence in fixed farmhouses and nuclear families, to the possession of domesticated cattle, to English-language schooling, to female spinning and weaving of cloth, and to the use of sawmills, gristmills, and ox-drawn plows. Consequently, American missionaries and officials regarded the New Stockbridgers as model Indians. Sergeant extolled them as "the most happy, flourishing Tribe of Indians in America." The adaptations stabilized their population and helped them construct a common Christian-Mohican identity, binding together the various Algonquian refugees—some Mahican, others Wappinger and Housatonic—who had gathered first at Stockbridge and later at New Stockbridge.[27]

Despite their many cultural adaptations, the New Stockbridge Mohicans cherished their distinct identity as a native people. They adopted "white" techniques and beliefs that would help them persist as Mohicans in a changed world—not that they might pass as white men and women. They retained their Algonquian language (while adding English), matrilineal inheritance, clan system, and hereditary chieftainship and much of their folklore. In particular, they clung to traditional diplomatic rituals, considering their precise renewal the essence of a native identity. And they felt far greater kinship with the western natives, especially their old friends the Miamis, Delawares, and Shawnees, than with most white settlers.[28]

By elaborating a mythic history, Aupaumut maintained that the Mohicans' recent changes were not acculturation to white ways but a restoration of their ancient, lost world. He insisted that they had once been a numerous people dwelling in large towns far away to the northwest. They were "more civilized than what Indians are now in the wilderness." Driven by famine, the Mohicans had dispersed, losing their civilization during their eastward, transcontinental migration to a new homeland along the Hudson. This invented tradition permitted the Mohicans to claim that their cultural changes were not Indian apostasy but a repossession of their former ways.[29]

Proud of their own history and sympathetic to the cause of the western natives, the Mohicans refused to accept the Anglo-American notion of their racial inferiority. Aupaumut's writings convey his sense that Indians were naturally more moral and honorable than most Anglo-Americans. His capsule history of the Mohicans implies that they fell from their natural majesty and prosperity because of corruptions, especially alcoholism,

derived from the vulgar majority of settlers. It also suggests that their partial recovery came from a new association with a virtuous and benevolent minority among the Americans.[30]

The Mohicans' selective acculturation to Anglo-American ways was a careful strategy for resisting total absorption. In 1792 Kirkland was shocked belatedly to realize that the three most acculturated Indians in his experience—Samson Occom, Joseph Brant, and Hendrick Aupaumut—harbored and encouraged "inveterate prejudices against white people." It is significant that Aupaumut was a close friend of and collaborator with Reverend Occom, who promoted a religious syncretism designed to screen Indian Christians from Anglo-American designs to obliterate their native identities.[31]

Indeed, the New Stockbridge Mohicans were of two minds about their powerful American neighbors. Although they prided themselves as the best Indian friends of the Americans, they also nursed a powerful resentment against them, because they had been so frequently lied to and cheated, especially by New York's officials and landlords. Virtually unpaid for their wartime service, they felt slighted by American officials, who seemed to have forgotten the heavy sacrifices the Mohicans had made to defend the Revolution. "Since the British and Americans lay down their hatchets, then my nation was forgotten," Aupaumut complained. "But sometimes I feel sorrow, and shame, that some of my great brothers have forgotten me—that all my services & sufferings have been forgotten—and that I—my nation—remain neglected. . . . Perhaps I am too small to be regarded. My friendship however is strong; my friendship I do not forget." Believing that their acts of friendship imposed obligations on the Americans, the Mohicans felt aggrieved by their failure to reciprocate.[32]

Moreover, the Mohicans blamed the western war on provocations by the American settlers in the Ohio country. In offering his services to Pickering, Aupaumut denounced "the inhuman practices of your people on the frontiers, who ought to have set good examples; but . . . these cruel people have kindled the bad fire, and so raised the evil smoke." Aupaumut was willing to help the new federal government in the hope that it could restrain the violent "Big knifes" of its western frontier. Indeed, the Mohicans covertly nurtured, at least rhetorically, the option of turning against the Americans. In his 1791 speech to the Shawnee, Aupaumut bluntly concluded, "We now tell you [that] if these people with whom you are at war shall refuse to listen to a just and honourable peace, and remove all obstacles on their part, then we can join with you against them." Recorded privately by Sergeant, this speech apparently remained unknown to Pickering and other American officials.[33]

Consequently, Aupaumut became a western emissary out of neither dependence on, nor awe of, the Anglo-Americans. Instead, his motives were rooted in Mohican tradition and in service to the pressing needs of his people in 1791. First, the more conciliatory American position rescued the New Stockbridge Mohicans from the dilemma imposed by the harsher American policies of the 1780s: the tension between their sympathy for the western Indians and their reliance on the goodwill of their numerous and powerful American neighbors. Second, the Mohicans saw a special opportunity to become the favorite clients and proponents of the new United States government. They hoped thereby to become more independent from their sometimes overbearing Oneida hosts. Third, they also hoped to win federal assistance against their other powerful and arrogant neighbor, the state of New York. In particular, the Mohicans wanted the United States to pressure New York into providing compensation for the Hudson valley lands stolen from them at midcentury. Aupaumut's motives were more anti-Iroquois and anti–New York than pro-American. Fourth, the New Stockbridge Mohicans hoped to renew their claims on the United States government for their long-overdue wages as soldiers in the Continental Army. Fifth, Aupaumut meant for the United States to pay for the trip that he already intended to take west, as much to renew Mohican ties with the natives there as to broker a peace for the Americans.[34]

Finally, the New Stockbridge Mohicans regarded the new federal Indian policy as a ringing endorsement of the strategy that they had pursued for three generations. Troubled by the disease, dispossession, violence, alcoholism, and anomie afflicting many of his fellow Algonquian speakers, Aupaumut expected the United States to subsidize their instruction in the Christian gospel and New English material culture, the education that had halted the Mohicans' own catastrophic decline: "I trust that the United States does not respect any particular nations but they desire to raise our nations in general and Indians have rejoiced to hear this." Indeed, Aupaumut's greatest fear was that the United States would favor the more numerous and powerful Iroquois. He identified Mohican interests with the revival of all Indians (except, possibly, the Iroquois). Of course, he meant for the Mohicans to play the pivotal role in brokering that pan-Indian revival through selective acculturation.[35]

As Aupaumut saw it, he was not serving the United States; instead, the United States was belatedly recognizing its obligations to the Mohicans and adopting their program for the salvation of all native peoples (or at least all Algonquians). On behalf of the Americans, he offered to exercise his people's tradition of influence among the western Indians, especially the Miami and Shawnee, who led the hostile confederacy. In return, Au-

paumut meant to strengthen that tradition by acquiring, and sharing with his western contacts, information about and influence among the American national leaders. In sum, the New Stockbridge Mohicans seized on the new federal Indian policy as the vehicle by which to bolster their autonomy and to revive their influence, especially in the West. Aupaumut pointedly explained to Pickering, "We earnestly wish to see peace & friendship established between you and the Western Indians and we also wish that *we* may not be forgotten."[36]

Journeys

During the years 1791–93 Aupaumut took four trips westward on behalf of the American bid for peace negotiations. He proceeded via the British-held post at Niagara and the Mohawk-dominated settlement at Grand River (in Upper Canada, now Ontario), bound for the heart of the Indian confederacy: the multitribal villages along the Maumee River, southwest of Detroit. Stalled by suspicious British officers and jealous Iroquois sachems, he failed to get beyond Grand River during his first two journeys, in the summer and fall of 1791 and in February 1792. But he did parley with visiting representatives of the western villages. In 1792 and 1793 Aupaumut broke through to the Maumee and spent two summers consulting with the peoples of the Indian confederacy.[37]

In daily conversations and in many public councils Aupaumut promoted peace with the United States and vindicated the Mohican path of selective acculturation. He stressed a distinction between the United States government, as peace bearers, and the frontier "Big knifes," who had provoked the war: "If the great men of the United States have the like principal or disposition as the Big knifes had, My nation and other Indians in the East would [have] been along ago anihilated. But they are not so, Especially since [the Americans] have their Liberty—they begin with new things, and now they endeavour to lift us up the Indians from the ground, that we may stand up and walk ourselves."[38]

Iroquois sachems were understandably jealous of Aupaumut's bid for enhanced influence and prestige. They clearly saw that the Mohicans sought through him to secure greater independence from their Oneida hosts and thus an escape from subordination as "nephews" to their Iroquois "uncles." Determined themselves to mediate between the western Indians and the Americans and British, the Iroquois regarded with contempt the pretensions of the small and dispersed Mohican nation to that role. Moreover, the Iroquois preferred a more deliberate pace for the restoration of peace, for they benefited by prolonging their intermediate position

between the belligerents. American officials were solicitous of Iroquois grievances and interests only so long as the war in the West kept them fearful of Iroquois disaffection and in need of their influence. The Iroquois sachems wanted peace to return gradually and through their offices, not precipitously through an upstart nephew who seemed too quick and eager to please the Americans.[39]

The principal thorn in Aupaumut's side was the Mohawk Capt. Joseph Brant, who led the village at Grand River. Both men were accomplished soldiers, eloquent orators, and shrewd intercultural brokers. Both had been well educated at missionary schools in New England. But they had pursued divergent paths during the American Revolution. Brant had received a British officer's commission and had led the Mohawk loyalists, while Aupaumut had distinguished himself in the Revolutionary army. Thereafter, in the tangled frontier politics of the 1790s, the two had competed for the same role: to be the one man with the right connections to broker the peace. Working all sides, Brant flirted with American officials, who were desperately eager to win his goodwill and western influence. But he strung them along to serve the British and Mohawk policy of bolstering the autonomy of the Ohio country Indians. To that end he repeatedly undermined Aupaumut's missions by delaying his advance or by contradicting his speeches.[40]

In his reports to the Americans, Aupaumut exploited the Iroquois' obstructionism by contrasting their delays and duplicity with his own zeal and sincerity. He repeatedly reminded the Americans that the Mohicans had stood with them during the Revolution, when most of the Iroquois had aided the British. He even blamed the Iroquois for prolonging the war in the West by teaching the Indians there to believe "that all the people of the United States are as bad as those on the frontiers." Aupaumut did not conceal his disdain for the many American officials who considered their old enemy Brant more important to the peace process than their longtime friend: "This one thing every wise man well knew, that to employ an enemy or half friend, will never speak well." Noting that most of the western Indians were Algonquians with a long history of hostility toward the Iroquois, Aupaumut also insisted that the proper western emissary must "be an Indian to whom they look upon as a true friend, who has never deceived or injured them."[41]

Aupaumut worked among the western Indians to enhance Mohican prestige and influence at the Iroquois' expense. He often reminded the westerners that the Mohicans were their traditional allies and that Brant's Mohawks had been their common enemies: "The Shawannese, who we calld Weshauwonnoow, are our younger brothers according to ancient

covenant between our forefathers—for our ancestors, near 200 years ago rescued them from the mouth . . . of the Five Nations [i.e., the Iroquois] who were ready to swallow my younger brother Shawany, for which kind deliverance they ever have felt themselves under the greatest obligation to obey our voice." To refute Brant, who had insinuated that his mission was treacherous, Aupaumut assured his western hosts: "I say Let us look narrowly, to see whether you can find one bone of yours lay on the ground, by means of my deceitfulness, and I now declare that you cannot find such instance. . . . But you look back and see heaps of your bones, wherein the Mauquas [i.e., Mohawks] have deceived you repeat[ed]ly. I think I could have good reason to tell you not to believe the Message or words of the Mohawks, for they will deceive you greatly as Usual."[42]

On his western missions Aupaumut faced accusations that he was a pawn of the Americans and could not speak freely because his people were so dominated by their white neighbors. In 1792 a spokesman for the western confederacy insisted that the Mohicans "find themselves hampered among the white people and wanted to get into a place where they could be more at their liberty." Aupaumut noted: "They had for several years understood that my nation was collected in one place and that we were surrounded by the Yankees in arms, who would not suffer us to go abroad, but that we were shut up like so many hogs in a pen. This they had often heard. I told them such birds were liars, that we were an independent people, and could go where we pleased." The confederated Indians pressed Aupaumut to move west with all of his people to live free of American control and to join in the armed resistance to it. Buying time, Aupaumut blandly promised to convey their invitation to his people for their careful consideration and eventual reply.[43]

Iroquois and western natives often charged that the Mohicans had made so many accommodations to white ways that they were no longer Indians but had become "Yankees." Because Aupaumut had accepted the Anglo-American insistence that men must monopolize public authority, he traveled west without female companions. Consequently, he encountered critics in the more traditional Iroquois and western villages, where women exercised considerable influence and where their presence in a traveling party communicated peaceful intentions. In 1791 at Grand River, Aupaumut bristled when challenged by an outspoken Mohawk matron, Molly Brant: "The old Wm. Johnson's widow (Captn. Brant's sister) being present she spoke (I suppose she feel like Great Sachem) and said, here is another thing looks much strange. If these Indians were upon good business, they would certainly follow the customs of all nations. They would have some women with them, but now they have none." In a further attack on the Mo-

hican delegation, Molly's brother Joseph urged the western Indians "not to talk or walk with these Yankees." Native critics even charged that the Mohicans were spies come to assess western strength, lull western resistance, and subsequently guide American armies to their victims.[44]

In response, Aupaumut stressed the traditional essence of his mission: to renew long-standing ties between the Mohicans and their kin, the western Algonquians. "My business is with my own color—that we might brighten the Chain of friendship which has been subsisted between our forefathers." To assert that he remained an Indian, he stressed the most conservative aspect of Mohican culture: precise dedication to the venerable forms of northeastern diplomacy. Time and again his journals insist that his mission carefully followed "ancient custom." He also stressed his diplomatic cachet as a Mohican: "When [the Delaware and Chippewa] found to what nation I belonged, they were very glad to see me." Dwelling on continuities, he boasted, "We immediately began to speak together as our fathers & forefathers use to do." In his diplomatic role, Aupaumut posed as a trusted traditionalist rather than as the traitorous innovator depicted by his enemies.[45]

But Aupaumut went west with ears as well as with a tongue. He did not merely parrot the Americans but listened closely to the bitter complaints of his western hosts, so sorely beset by violent white neighbors and so egregiously cheated and arrogantly handled by American officials during the 1780s. Their grievances struck a chord, reminding Aupaumut that the Mohicans had been defrauded by the New Yorkers. In his 1792 report to Pickering, Aupaumut ruefully remarked:

> In all my arguments with these Indians, I have as it were [been] oblige[d] to say nothing with regard of the conduct of Yorkers, how they cheat[ed] my fathers, how they [have] taken our lands Unjustly, and how my fathers were groaning as it were to their graves, in loseing their lands for nothing, although they were faithful friends to the Whites; and how the white people artfully got their Deeds confirm[ed] in their Laws, &c. I say had I mention[ed] these things to the Indians, it would [have] ag[g]ravate[d] their prejudices against all white people, &c.

Aupaumut was especially affected on learning of the gruesome massacre at Gnadenhutten, in the Ohio country. There in 1782 frontier militiamen had slaughtered ninety-six unarmed natives who had embraced European-style agriculture and Christian pacifism. His journey west was more emotionally painful than he had anticipated.[46]

Aupaumut returned home profoundly troubled by the lamentations of

his western friends. Moreover, his prolonged absence from home, church, and minister and his obligations as an emissary to join in the heavy drinking of the western villages had shaken his commitment to Protestant discipline. In late 1792 his changed demeanor alarmed American officials in New York State. Kirkland warned Pickering:

> I fear you will be disappointed in your expectation of Capt. Hendrick. . . . I have been most intimately acquainted with him & an unreserved friendship has subsisted betwixt us for several years. . . . But since his tour to the westward last summer, he has greatly altered. He has become a lover of the intoxicating draught & duplicity begins to mark many steps of his conduct. He is not so friendly to the cause & character of the white people as formerly.

But Kirkland misunderstood. Aupaumut's trip westward had rendered him more transparent, rather than more duplicitous; it had weakened his ability to mask his profound ambivalence about the American advance.[47]

However, Aupaumut also recognized his investment in his American connection. In early 1793 he scrambled to repair his damaged reputation, writing to Pickering, "I hope that you will not entertain hard thoughts of me before you shall have the pleasure to hear my own Voice," and styling himself "Your true Friend." In February Aupaumut traveled to Philadelphia, then the nation's capital, for a thorough interrogation by the colonel. Aupaumut's prompt answers and detailed journals impressed Pickering, who concluded, "Upon the whole, I am induced to believe that he has acted usefully as well as *honestly*; and that in the negociations of the ensuing summer, it is important that Hendrick should be employed; and that by kind and grateful treatment his friendship & services should be secured."[48]

As a cultural broker Aupaumut could pass through two worlds, but he was never fully trusted in either. His American critics suggested that no Indian could be trusted, because none could permanently change his savage and deceitful nature. The Americans distrusted Aupaumut because they fundamentally constructed him racially as an Indian, while many western natives distrusted Aupaumut because they defined him culturally as having become a "Yankee." It was Aupaumut's dilemma that American officials ultimately doubted that any Indian could fundamentally change his racialized nature—while Indians were very quick to suspect that he had all too readily and completely shed his native identity.[49]

The distrust of Aupaumut on both sides reveals the asymmetry of the two cultural realms in the 1790s. Where the western natives regarded identity as cultural and contingent, subject to accommodation and even transformation, most Americans doubted that any Indian could ever be-

come fully "civilized." Although they officially promoted Indian conversion to Anglo-American ways, most American leaders suspected that it was a lost cause. In 1792 General Israel Chapin, the American agent to the Iroquois, confessed that, although he admired the program of acculturation in principle, "from my personal Experience & knowledge of the Indian Character I much despair of ever seeing it carried into Effect." Timothy Pickering designed the American program to "reeducate" natives, but he expected that within "half a century" all of the northeastern and midwestern natives would be "reduced to a handful, [or] may be become extinct, or be removed beyond the Mississippi."[50]

Endings

For two years, 1792–93, Aupaumut's influence and activity restrained offensive operations by federal troops and kept alive hopes for a peaceful reconciliation. In late 1792 Aupaumut returned from his third western trip convinced that the western natives would welcome an official delegation of American commissioners empowered to negotiate a peace treaty. Following up on his apparent success, the United States sent three commissioners—Benjamin Lincoln, Timothy Pickering, and Beverly Randolph—west to meet with the council of the confederated natives during the summer of 1793. To facilitate the commissioners' access, Aupaumut returned to the Maumee region. It was his fourth mission on behalf of peace. Pickering explained: "He formed such an acquaintance among the Western Indians last summer, his aid now I think material. He *expects* to be called for." Aupaumut preceded the commissioners to the Maumee villages, where he found that the war party had gained the upper hand. When the American commissioners reached Lake Erie in July, the council of the Indian confederacy refused to meet with them until they conceded that the United States would withdraw all of its settlers and forts from the Ohio country and restore the Ohio River as the boundary. Outraged, the commissioners broke off contact and hastened home in mid-August. Pickering sent word to Aupaumut: "When I first saw you, about two years ago, I remember you . . . mentioned as the motive of your attempt to promote peace 'That you were a friend to the United States—and *also a friend to the people of your own colour.*' You will therefore be very sorry as I am, that peace can not now be made."[51]

Thereafter the United States abandoned its bid for negotiations and instead renewed and escalated warfare with the western Indians. Aupaumut was pushed aside in the summer of 1794 as a formidable American army advanced on the Maumee valley, the heart of the Indian confederacy. No

longer an influential diplomat, Aupaumut went along as an interpreter and consultant. Under General Anthony Wayne, the American army defeated the confederated Indians on 20 August at Fallen Timbers, near the Maumee rapids. Wayne's troops systematically destroyed the thriving villages and fields along the Maumee and Au Glaize Rivers. The Indian confederacy collapsed, and the several Indian villages sued for peace. In the August 1795 Treaty of Greenville, the Indians surrendered the southern two-thirds of Ohio and agreed to allow the Americans to build forts throughout their remaining domain. In return, the United States paid twenty thousand dollars in goods and pledged annuities of ninety-five hundred dollars in goods, paid "every year, forever."[52]

Despite promising progress during 1791–92, Aupaumut's western missions ultimately failed to head off military conflict. Because the terms of peace were eventually dictated by the victorious General Wayne, rather than through Aupaumut's contacts, the Mohicans lost their diplomatic leverage. After 1794 the United States relied on its own agents to deal directly with Indian villages kept dependent on annuities. Able to manipulate or intimidate most western native leaders, the United States no longer needed or wanted Mohican diplomacy.[53]

That diplomacy had depended on a rough balance of power in the Ohio country. Although Aupaumut labored to dissolve western militancy, the confederacy's victories had been essential to the influence that he exercised with the American government. When the western confederacy had waxed powerful in 1791, the United States government became solicitous of Aupaumut's views and Mohican interests and willingly engaged his diplomatic services. But when the confederacy waned during 1794–95, the government lost interest in Aupaumut and the Mohicans. Without powerful and independent peoples to the west, the Mohicans could no longer serve as the front door to the Americans.

If the narration stops here, Aupaumut's story ends on a note of failure. His services, however, won three important, albeit limited, victories for the Mohicans. First, his missions produced immediate financial advantages for himself and for his people in New Stockbridge. After some delay, the federal government compensated Aupaumut for his travels and paid him twenty dollars a month for the periods of his missions. Although they never received anything from New York State for the lands taken from them during the colonial era, the New Stockbridge Mohicans did obtain five thousand dollars from the United States for their wartime services and losses. And they reaped a disproportionate share of the federal appropriations to encourage agricultural development by the various New York native peoples. The New Stockbridge Mohicans used their funds to

build a new school, a sawmill, and a gristmill and to buy additional oxen and plows. In 1815 Sergeant updated Pickering (who had last visited New Stockbridge in 1794): "The Stockbridge Indians have three saw mills and a grist mill since you was here and are in a tolorable flourishing state."[54]

Second, Aupaumut's missions renewed the Mohicans' amicable ties with the western peoples, especially the Miami. During his sojourns he carefully revived their long-standing invitation to the Mohicans to relocate among them. He wanted an alternative home for the Mohicans should the Americans or the Oneida frustrate their bid to remain an autonomous people in the East. If further removal west was inevitable, he meant to manage its pace, location, and circumstances in order to preserve the Mohican nation. For twenty years after the Treaty of Greenville was signed, he periodically returned to the West to renew the Mohican covenant with the Miami and to secure their title to a township on the White River in the Indiana territory. During 1817–18 Aupaumut led most of his people westward to their new village.[55]

Third, Aupaumut's credibility with American officials and Protestant missionaries permitted a redefinition of the Mohican role as the front door. As the native people most familiar with the ways and expectations of the Americans, the Mohicans were best positioned to introduce and teach the postwar program in Indian acculturation. Rev. Jedediah Morse explained, "They are more advanced in the knowledge of our language, and in civilization, than any Indians in our country; and many of them are capable of rendering essential service in accomplishing the plan of the government in respect to other tribes." In the early nineteenth century Aupaumut seized the opportunity to broker the financial assistance and cultural information that flowed from the Americans to the Ohio country Indians, especially the Delaware, Munsee, and Miami. In 1805 he explained to American missionaries, "We look on ourselves as the front door by and through which you can go through all the different tribes." Ever resilient, Aupaumut and the Mohicans had found a new means of revitalizing their tradition as the people of the front door.[56]

As in his diplomacy of the early 1790s, Aupaumut meant to modify and exploit the American program of acculturation to serve a pan-Indian agenda. He pitched an acculturation that was selective and cannily defensive rather than total and defeatist. Where the Americans meant to assimilate the Indians and peacefully transfer most of their remaining lands to white settlers, Aupaumut saw an opportunity to bolster Indian autonomy and to strengthen their land titles. In 1803 he assured the Delawares: "Among other things, our white brothers cannot so easily cheat us now with regard to our land affairs as they have done to our forefathers. . . . You

will be able to hold your lands to the latest generation." The Americans thought that they were using Aupaumut to dissolve Indian independence; he believed that he was using them to secure Indian persistence.[57]

If the story continues, there is a more tragic conclusion. In the end, the American officials were correct: they had used Aupaumut. Because the Americans enjoyed such disproportionate demographic and military power after 1794, they could impose their will with little regard for the interests and desires of the divided Indian peoples of the Ohio country. Never adequately funded, the American program in "civilization and education" did little for the western natives. Indeed, by provoking divisions between its opponents and proponents, the program hastened, rather than slowed, their dispossession and removal. In 1818 federal officials betrayed Aupaumut and the Mohicans by denying them their new tract on the White River, violating a written commitment made by President Thomas Jefferson in 1808. Deeming the lands already transferred to the United States by a treaty with the Miami, the federal government abruptly ordered the Mohicans to leave within three years. Aupaumut's 1807 boast to Joseph Brant became tragically ironic: "For my part, I will never live on a land which can be taken away from me without my consent." In 1821 most of the dispossessed Mohicans moved to a new tract in Wisconsin that they had bought from the obliging Menominee. In angry frustration, Aupaumut became an intemperate drinker before his death in 1830.[58]

In the complexity and contradictions of Aupaumut's life there are abundant materials either for an old-style tragic tale of marginality or for a new narrative of multicultural mastery. Similarly, Mohican history can be told with equal veracity either as a long, sad decline into exile, poverty, and insignificance or as a triumph through cultural adaptability and tribal endurance. Both stories are equally true and equally false, because they are equally selective. The fullest, truest story of Aupaumut and the Mohicans weaves together both the painful dilemmas and the limited victories of the culture broker.[59]

Notes

In October 1994 I presented an earlier version of this essay to the Western History Association conference in Albuquerque, New Mexico. I am grateful for the close reading and valuable suggestions offered by James Brooks, Susan Gray, Peter Mancall, Jean O'Brien, Daniel Richter, David Weber, and Peter Wood. I am indebted to the staff of the Massachusetts Historical Society, who helped me locate the research materials at the center of the essay.

1 Coates to Pickering, 10 April 1826, Timothy Pickering Papers (TPP hereafter), vol. 32, item 201, Massachusetts Historical Society (MHS hereafter); Pickering to Coates, 15 April 1826, TPP, vol. 16, item 116, MHS.

2 Aupaumut makes cameo appearances in Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815* (Baltimore, MD, 1992), 107–8; Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York, 1991), 455, 458–59; and Helen Hornbeck Tanner, "The Glaize in 1792: A Composite Indian Community," *Ethnohistory* 25 (1978): 31–32. White refers to the "sometimes shrewd, sometimes bewildered Aupaumut." A fuller account of Aupaumut appears in Jeanne Ronda and James P. Ronda, " 'As They Were Faithful': Chief Hendrick Aupaumut and the Struggle for Stockbridge Survival," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 3 (1979): 43–55.

3 For the misidentification of Aupaumut see Anthony F. C. Wallace, *The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca* (New York, 1970), 164, 199. On page 221 Wallace correctly identifies Aupaumut as a Stockbridge Mohican. In attempting to clarify my terminology, I have relied on Daniel Richter's helpful suggestions.

4 Hendrick Aupaumut, "A Narrative of an Embassy to the Western Indians," Historical Society of Pennsylvania *Memoirs* 2 (1827): 61–131. Aupaumut's narrative is the lone source for his mission in Dowd, *Spirited Resistance*, 231 n. 47; White, *Middle Ground*, 455 n. 76, 459 nn. 82–83; Tanner, "Glaize," 32; Wallace, *Death and Rebirth*, 349 n. 13, 350 n. 33. Ronda and Ronda, " 'As They Were Faithful,' " proceeds beyond that narrative but remains limited to published sources. A few of Aupaumut's unpublished documents are used in Isabel Thompson Kelsay, *Joseph Brant, 1743–1807: Man of Two Worlds* (Syracuse, NY, 1984), 449–50, 455.

5 Ronda and Ronda, " 'As They Were Faithful,' " and Tanner, "Glaize," 32, touch on this theme.

6 [Hendrick Aupaumut], "An Indian History," MHS *Collections* 9 (1804): 100.

7 For the theoretical importance of cultural biography see William S. Simmons, "Culture Theory in Contemporary Ethnohistory," *Ethnohistory* 35 (1988): 1–14. The biographical literature is becoming extensive; leading examples include R. David Edmunds, ed., *American Indian Leaders: Studies in Diversity* (Lincoln, NE, 1980); James A. Clifton, ed., *Being and Becoming Indian: Biographical Studies of North American Frontiers* (Chicago, 1989); Margaret Connell Szasz, ed., *Between Indian and White Worlds: The Cultural Broker* (Norman, OK, 1994); Nancy L. Hagedorn, " 'A Friend to Go between Them': The Interpreter as Cultural Broker during Anglo-Iroquois Councils, 1740–70," *Ethnohistory* 35 (1988): 60–80; and Daniel K. Richter, "Cultural Brokers and Intercultural Politics: New York-Iroquois Relations, 1664–1701," *Journal of American History* 75 (1988): 40–67. A classic set of vivid biographies stressing armed resistance is Alvin M. Josephy, *The Patriot Chiefs: A Chronicle of American Indian Leadership* (New York, 1961). Monographs that stress and celebrate native survival through cultural adaptability include White, *Middle Ground*; and James H. Merrell, *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1989).

8 Clifton, *Being and Becoming Indian*, 28–29; Szasz, *Between Indian and White Worlds*, 3–20; Malcolm McFee, "The 150% Man: A Product of Blackfoot Acculturation," *American Anthropologist* 70 (1968): 1096–1107.

9 For biographical essays that attend to the grave and even deadly difficulties of straddling the cultural divide see Nancy L. Hagedorn, " 'Faithful, Knowing, and Prudent': Andrew Montour as Interpreter and Cultural Broker, 1740–1772," in Szasz, *Between Indian and White Worlds*, 44–59; and James A. Clifton, "Personal and Ethnic Identity on the Great Lakes Frontier: The Case of Billy

Caldwell, Anglo-Canadian," *Ethnohistory* 25 (1978): 69–94, esp. 90, where Clifton characterizes Caldwell as "a man forced to adjust himself, in his sixty-one years, to the conflicting demands of too many conflict-ridden intercultural borderlands."

10 Washington to Indians of the Miami Towns, 11 March 1791, TPP, vol. 60, item 40, MHS; Pickering, Newtown Point Council Journal, 20 June 1791 and 4 July 1791, TPP, vol. 60, item 69, MHS; Octavius Pickering and Charles W. Upham, *The Life of Timothy Pickering*, 3 vols. (Salem, MA, 1829), 2:469–74; Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1780–1834* (Cambridge, MA, 1962); Bernard W. Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1973), 123–26; James H. Merrell, "Declarations of Independence: Indian-White Relations in the New Nation," in *The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits*, ed. Jack P. Greene (New York, 1987), 200. For the Indian confederacy see Dowd, *Spirited Resistance*, 93–99, 103–9; and White, *Middle Ground*, 413–68.

11 Knox to Washington, 15 June 1789 and 7 July 1789, in [U.S. Congress], *American State Papers: Class 2: Indian Affairs*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1831–44), 1:12–14; Pickering, "Remarks on the Proposed Instructions to the Commissioners, 1793," TPP, vol. 59, item 28, MHS; Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians* (Lincoln, NE, 1984), 60; Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction*, 120–21.

12 Pickering to Aupaumut, 27 June 1791, TPP, vol. 60, item 89, MHS; Katharine C. Turner, *Red Men Calling on the Great White Father* (Norman, OK, 1951), 3–5. For the exaggerated notions of Iroquois influence see Michael N. McConnell, "Peoples 'in Between': The Iroquois and the Ohio Indians, 1720–1768," in *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600–1800*, ed. Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell (Syracuse, NY, 1987), 93–112; and J. David Lehman, "The End of the Iroquois Mystique: The Oneida Land Cession Treaties of the 1780s," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 47 (1990): 523–25.

13 John Sergeant Jr., Journal, 9 June 1791, Society for Propagating the Gospel among the Indians and Others in North America, (SPGAI hereafter), Box 1, MHS; Aupaumut, Speech, 20 June 1791, in Pickering, Newtown Point Council Journal, TPP, vol. 60, item 70, MHS.

14 Walter Pilkington, ed., *The Journals of Samuel Kirkland: Eighteenth-Century Missionary to the Iroquois, Government Agent, Father of Hamilton College* (Clinton, NY, 1980), 160 (28 March 1789), 219 (5 February 1792); Kirkland to Knox, 22 April 1791, TPP, vol. 61, item 200, MHS.

15 Pickering to Coates, 15 April 1826, TPP, vol. 16, item 116, MHS; Electa F. Jones, *Stockbridge, Past and Present; or, Records of an Old Mission Station* (Springfield, MA, 1854), 119–21; Pickering to Knox, 10 August 1791, TPP, vol. 60, item 114, MHS; Jeremy Belknap and Jedediah Morse, eds., "Report on the Oneida, Stockbridge, and Brotherton Indians, 1976," *Indian Notes and Monographs* 54 (1955): 17.

16 Pickering to Knox, 1 July 1791 and 16 July 1791, TPP, vol. 60, items 76 and 112, MHS; Pickering to St. Clair, 8 July 1791, TPP, vol. 60, item 88, MHS; Pickering to Aupaumut, 11 July 1791, TPP, vol. 60, item 95, MHS.

17 Ronda and Ronda, " 'As They Were Faithful,' " 47; Ted J. Brasser, *Riding on the*

Frontier's Crest: Mahican Indian Culture and Culture Change (Ottawa, 1974), 23–27.

18 Aupaumut, Speech, 20 June 1791, in Pickering, Newtown Point Council Journal, TPP, vol. 60, item 70, MHS.

19 Brasser, *Riding on the Frontier's Crest*, 1–10; Bruce Trigger, "The Mohawk-Mahican War: The Establishment of a Pattern," *Canadian Historical Review* 52 (1971): 278.

20 Brasser, *Riding on the Frontier's Crest*, 11–24; Trigger, "Mohawk-Mahican War," 276–86.

21 Ted J. Brasser, "Mahican," in *Northeast*, ed. Bruce G. Trigger, vol. 15 of *Handbook of North American Indians* (Washington, DC, 1978), 198–206.

22 Brasser, "Mahican," 206; Brasser, *Riding on the Frontier's Crest*, 30.

23 Hendrick Aupaumut, "History Extract," in Jones, *Stockbridge*, 15–23.

24 Brasser, "Mahican," 206–8; Brasser, *Riding on the Frontier's Crest*, 30–38; Lion G. Miles, "The Red Man Dispossessed: The Williams Family and the Alienation of Indian Land in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, 1736–1818," *New England Quarterly* 67 (1994): 47–49; James Axtell, *The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America* (New York, 1985), 196–204.

25 Miles, "Red Man Dispossessed," 57–73; Brasser, "Mahican," 208–9; Patrick Frazier, *The Mohicans of Stockbridge* (Lincoln, NE, 1992), 194–231.

26 Brasser, "Mahican," 208–9; Frazier, *Mohicans of Stockbridge*, 194–231; Jones, *Stockbridge*, 84–87.

27 Belknap and Morse, "Report," 12–13, 21–22; Sergeant to Pickering, 15 January 1792, TPP, vol. 62, item 65, MHS.

28 Brasser, "Mahican," 206–8; Ronda and Ronda, "'As They Were Faithful,'" 44–46; Aupaumut, "Narrative," 61–131.

29 [Aupaumut], "Indian History," 100.

30 Aupaumut, "Narrative," 127; Ronda and Ronda, "'As They Were Faithful,'" 44–45; Hendrick Aupaumut, "History of the Muhheakunnuk Indians," in *Annual Report of the American Society for Promoting the Civilization and General Improvement of the Indian Tribes in the United States*, ed. Jedidiah Morse (New Haven, CT, 1824), 42–45.

31 Kirkland to Pickering, 31 May 1792, TPP, vol. 62, item 45, MHS; Margaret Connell Szasz, "Samson Occom: Mohegan as Spiritual Intermediary," in Connell Szasz, *Between Indian and White Worlds*, 76–77.

32 Franklin B. Hough, ed., *Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs Appointed by Law for the Extinguishment of Indian Titles in the State of New York*, 2 vols. (Albany, NY, 1861), 1:93, 99; Aupaumut, Speech, 20 June 1791, in Pickering, Newtown Point Council Journal, TPP, vol. 60, item 70, MHS.

33 Aupaumut, Speech, 20 June 1791; Aupaumut, "Narrative," 92; Aupaumut, Speech to the Shawnees, quoted in Sergeant, Journal, 9 June 1791, SPGAI, Box 1, MHS.

34 Aupaumut, Speech, 20 June 1791; in Pickering, Newtown Point Council Journal, TPP, vol. 60, item 70, MHS, Aupaumut, "Narrative," 92.

35 Aupaumut to Pickering, 24 February 1793, TPP, vol. 59, item 56, MHS; Ronda and Ronda, "'As They Were Faithful,'" 46.

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37 Pickering to Knox, 16 July 1791, TPP, vol. 60, item 112, MHS; Aupaumut, Report,

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38 Aupaumut, "Narrative," 127; Ronda and Ronda, "'As They Were Faithful,'" 44–45.

39 Aupaumut, "Narrative," 76; Chapin to Pickering, 17 July 1792, TPP, vol. 62, item 58, MHS; Kirkland to Pickering, 31 May 1792, TPP, vol. 62, item 65, MHS. For the Iroquois policy see Wallace, *Death and Rebirth*, 167–78.

40 Aupaumut, Report, July–October 1791; Aupaumut, "Narrative," 78, 112–13; White, *Middle Ground*, 459–60; Kelsay, *Joseph Brant*, 449–50, 455, 467, 469, 477–78. For American solicitude for Brant's goodwill see Chapin to Pickering, 2 June 1792, TPP, vol. 62, item 49, MHS.

41 Aupaumut, Speech, 20 June 1791; in Pickering, ed., Newtown Point Council Journal, TPP, vol. 60, item 70, MHS, Aupaumut, Report, July–October 1791; Aupaumut, Report, February 1792; TPP, vol. 59, item 18, MHS, Aupaumut to Pickering, 18 February 1792, TPP, vol. 62, item 4, MHS; Aupaumut to Pickering, 11 February 1793, TPP, vol. 59, item 49, MHS; Aupaumut, "Narrative," 131.

42 Aupaumut, "Narrative," 76–77, 129, 131.

43 Speech of "The Snake," 28 October 1792, in E. A. Cruikshank, ed., *The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe*, 5 vols. (Toronto, 1923–31), 2:242; Aupaumut, Report, July–October 1791; TPP, vol. 59, item 8, MHS; Aupaumut, Report, February 1792.

44 Aupaumut, Report, July–October 1791; TPP, vol. 59, item 8, MHS; Aupaumut, "Narrative," 112–13. For the active role of women in Iroquois politics see Pickering to Knox, 10 August 1791, TPP, vol. 60, item 114, MHS.

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46 John Heckewelder, *History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations Who Once Inhabited Pennsylvania and the Neighboring States*, ed. William C. Reichel (Philadelphia, 1876), 81; Aupaumut, "Narrative," 126–28; Thomas P. Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution* (New York, 1986), 75–78; Frazier, *Mohicans of Stockbridge*, 232–33.

47 Kirkland to Pickering, 31 May 1792, TPP, vol. 62, item 45, MHS; Chapin to Pickering, 2 June 1792, TPP, vol. 62, item 49, MHS.

48 Aupaumut to Pickering, 18 February 1793, TPP, vol. 62, item 4, MHS; Pickering to Knox, 13 February 1793, TPP, vol. 59, item 50, MHS. For American doubts about reforming Indians see Chapin to Pickering, 2 June 1792, TPP, vol. 62, item 49, MHS; and Pickering to Kirkland, 24 December 1793, TPP, vol. 62, item 71, MHS.

49 For the triumph of American notions of race over the more fluid and cultural notions of identity favored by the natives of the Old Northwest see White, *Middle Ground*, 518–23; and Clifton, *Being and Becoming Indian*, 11, 23, 26.

50 Chapin to Pickering, 2 June 1792, TPP, vol. 62, item 49, MHS; Pickering, "Remarks on the Proposed Instructions to the Commissioners, 1793," TPP, vol. 59,

item 28, MHS; White, *Middle Ground*, 469–70; Merrell, "Declarations of Independence," 208–10.

51 Pickering to Lincoln, 30 April 1793, TPP, vol. 59, item 133, MHS; Pickering to Aupaumut, 4 June 1793, TPP, vol. 60, item 145, MHS; Aupaumut to Pickering, 6 August 1793, TPP, vol. 59, item 201, MHS; Pickering to Aupaumut, 17 August 1793, TPP, vol. 59, item 209, MHS; Pickering and Upham, *Life of Timothy Pickering*, 3:49–52; Randolph C. Downes, *Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio Valley until 1795* (Pittsburgh, PA, 1940), 322–23; Bert Anson, *The Miami Indians* (Norman, OK, 1970), 122–25; "Address of the United States Indian Commissioners to the General Indian Council" (31 July 1793), "Address of the General Indian Council to the United States Commissioners" (13 August 1793), and "Address of the United States Commissioners to the General Indian Council" (16 August 1793), in [U.S. Congress], *American State Papers*, 1:352–57.

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56 Prucha, *Great Father*, 135–58; Jedediah Morse, *A Report to the Secretary of War of the United States on Indian Affairs, Comprising a Narrative of a Tour Performed in the Summer of 1820* (New Haven, CT, 1822), 86; Hendrick Aupaumut, Speech, 31 May 1805, quoted in John Sergeant, "Religious Intelligence," *Panoplist* 1 (1806): 465.

57 Hendrick Aupaumut, Speech, 15 April 1803, quoted in John Sergeant, "Religious Intelligence," *Panoplist* 1 (1805): 270.

58 Ronda and Ronda, "'As They Were Faithful,'" 49–51; Aupaumut to Brant, 5 September 1807, quoted in Kelsay, *Joseph Brant*, 651.

59 For historical storytelling see William Cronon, "A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative," *Journal of American History* 78 (1992): 1347–79.