

**Sociopolitical Aspects of Interpreting at the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946-1948)**

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References

Abstract

This study is based on the premise that interpreting is a social activity, which therefore needs to be described and analyzed with reference to the social, political and cultural context of the setting in which the interpreter operates. Sociopolitical aspects of interpreting at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) are studied by focusing on the three-tier structure of the linguists (language specialists) who were involved in the interpreting process. Based on the concepts of “trust, power and control”, the historical and political context of the IMTFE and the sociopolitical background of each linguist group are examined to explore why the tribunal devised the organization of interpreter, monitor and language arbiter. The concept of “negotiated norms” is applied to discuss the tribunal’s attitude toward the interpreting procedures and the interpreters’ performance. A pilot study is conducted to test the hypothesis that interpreters’ behavior is influenced by their position in the power constellation of the setting in which they operate. Findings in an examination of the nature of various interjections by the linguists and the interactions between the court and each linguist group during the testimony of Hideki Tojo indicate that the linguists’ behavior is linked to their relative positions in the hierarchy of the interpreting system.

Keywords

International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), interpreting, sociopolitical, power, control, negotiated norms, interpreters’ behavior, monitor, arbiter.

Definitions and notes on Japanese texts

Interpreting: In this study, interpreting or interpretation refers to oral renditions of spoken messages across different languages, and it does not encompass interpreting that involves signed languages.

Linguist: The term “linguists” is used in this study to refer to the interpreters, monitors and language arbiter as a whole, as personnel who engaged in language-related functions at the IMTFE were called “linguists” in relevant archival documents. Therefore, a “linguist” in this study refers to a person who speaks more than one language and engages in a language-related function, and not to a person who studies linguistics.

International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE): More commonly known as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal or the Tokyo Trial, the IMTFE was convened in Tokyo on May 3, 1946, and adjourned on November 12, 1948. Its objective was to try 28 “Class A” defendants, mostly military and political leaders of war-time Japan. This study will not discuss “Class B/C” trials, which took place from 1945 to 1951 in the places the pertinent war crimes were committed.

Nuremberg Trial: In this study, the Nuremberg Trial refers to the Trial of the Major War Criminals which was held in Nuremberg, Germany, from November 20, 1945 to October 1, 1946, and does not include the subsequent war crimes trials.

Nisei: Second-generation Japanese Americans

Kibei: Japanese Americans who received education in Japan and returned to the United States

When citations are derived from texts written in Japanese or interviews conducted in Japanese, English translations are provided by the author of this study unless otherwise indicated.

In the analysis of the interpreted testimony by Hideki Tojo, the utterances in Japanese are presented in romanized text and their English translations are provided by the author of this study.

A Japanese name consists of a surname, followed by the given name. This study adopts the Western order of given name before surname to present transliterated Japanese names for the sake of consistency with the order of Japanese Americans’ names.

Citations from *the Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East* are indicated by “TP”, followed by the page number(s).

1. Introduction

Over the past two decades, the scope and focus of Interpreting Studies has expanded to encompass more diverse interpreting settings and theoretical approaches. In earlier times, interpreting researchers mainly focused on conference interpreting, especially the cognitive processing aspect of interpreting, by drawing on such disciplines as psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology and neurolinguistics. With the increased visibility of court and community interpreting, however, research on dialogue interpreting has proliferated since the 1990s, focusing on interactional aspects of communicative activity and the functions of interpreters as communication mediators. Such studies are often influenced by sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and pragmatics. There is also an increasing awareness of interpreting as a social activity. Consideration is now given to the social, political, historical and cultural contexts in which interpreters operate. Cronin, for example, calls for a new “cultural turn” in Interpreting Studies to pay more attention to “questions of power and issues such as class, gender, race in interpreting situations” (2002: 46). Pöchhacker (2006) observes this overall evolution as Interpreting Studies “going social”, embracing diverse forms of interpreting and broader contextualization.

The present study will also explore interpreting as a social practice and describe and analyze it in sociocultural terms. The venue of interpreting activity to be examined is the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, 1946-1948). The most salient feature of interpreting at the IMTFE was the hierarchical structure of the three ethnically and socially different groups of linguists who performed three separate functions: interpreter, monitor and language arbiter. Notwithstanding this distinct feature of the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE, and the historical significance of the trial itself as the Japanese counterpart of the Nuremberg Trial, there has been very little research done on the interpreters who worked during the IMTFE.

The first aim of the present study, therefore, is to shed light on this forgotten chapter in the history of interpreting. An overview of the interpreter arrangements at the IMTFE will be provided, with special attention to its sociopolitical context. The second objective is to examine the hypothesis that interpreters’ behavior is influenced by their position in the power constellation of the setting in which they operate. This will be done in a pilot study on the interpreted testimony given by war-time Japanese Prime Minister and War Minister General Hideki Tojo, with special focus on interjections by the monitors and the interpreters.

In light of the first objective of the present study, literature covering interpreting in historical events will be reviewed in order to examine different approaches researchers apply to describe interpreting activities that took place in the past. There will also be a review of literature dealing with interpreters’ behavior in courtroom settings. Various focal areas and approaches observed in previous studies on courtroom interpreting are examined for their relevance to the theoretical framework employed in the present study.

Following the literature review, there will be a discussion on the application of a sociocultural approach to the overall theoretical framework of the present study. Two sets of key concepts will also be introduced to be used in explaining important features of interpreting at the IMTFE: “trust, power and control” in the discussion on the linguists’ hierarchy in the interpreting process; and “negotiated norms” in the discussion on the tribunal’s attitude toward the interpreting procedures and the interpreters’ performance.

As for the research methodology, the first part of the present study will be defined as historical and archival research, which draws on the examination of historical records and other archival information. Reference will be made to a wide variety of materials (and where they were obtained) and persons interviewed for this study. The second part of the present study will be presented as a case study. The qualitative nature of this pilot study will be discussed. In addition, the rationale for selecting Tojo’s testimony will be laid out.

The next chapter deals with the first aim of the present study - to provide an overview of interpreting at the IMTFE, emphasizing the three-tier structure of linguists who were involved in the interpreting process. There will be a discussion on the languages used, the recruitment of the interpreters, the equipment and the interpreters’ booth, the mode of interpreting, the interpreting process and the tribunal’s attitude toward the interpreting procedures and the interpreters’ performance. Reasons for which the tribunal devised the unusual interpreter organization will be explored based on an examination of US military trials in the Philippines and the sociopolitical background of each linguist group.

In addressing the second aim of the present study, the hypothesis will be tested in a pilot study analyzing the interpreting during Tojo’s testimony. First, the personal background of the interpreters and monitors who worked on Tojo’s testimony will be introduced. This will point to the historical, social, political and cultural dimensions of the circumstances under which those linguists became involved in the IMTFE. Their behavior will be examined by focusing on the nature of the interjections, and the interactions between the court, the interpreter, the monitor and the language arbiter.

An attempt will be made to determine if the findings from the pilot study support the hypothesis. Limitations of the pilot study, follow-up questions and how to address them will be discussed as well. Finally, the overall arguments and key findings of this study will be summarized and possible directions for future research will be presented.

2. Literature review

2.1. Interpreters in historical events

Interpreting has been used to facilitate communication across different cultures and languages throughout the history of humanity. Its inherent ephemerality, however, and the confidentiality and the invisibility generally self- or otherwise imposed on interpreters make it difficult to locate reliable records that can be used to describe interpreting activities through history. For the purposes of the first aim of this study, which is to present an overview of how the interpreters worked in the history-making IMTFE, some of the work done by researchers in the area of interpreting history will be reviewed.

2.1.1. Interpreters throughout history

There are not many English texts that are dedicated to the history of interpreters. Bowen *et al.* (1995) present a comprehensive overview of how interpreters worked in different times from Ancient Egypt to post-World War II international venues, mainly in the European context. Studies on interpreters in specific eras and geographies include: Hermann's work (1956/2002) on interpreters in Ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome; Kurz's discussion (1985) on the princes of Elephantine in Ancient Egypt as "overseers of dragomans"; pioneer professional Jean Herbert's account (1977) of the history of conference interpreting; Wilss' historical survey (1999) of translation and interpreting during the 20th century in the German context; and various articles in the special issue of *Interpreting* (4:1,1999) and *Triadic Exchanges* (Mason 2001), that cover topics such as the history of interpreters in Russia, the history of conference interpreter training and *Oranda Tsuji* (Dutch interpreters in 17th-19th century Japan).

More extensive work on the history of interpreting in particular settings is represented by Karttunen's examination (1994) of the lives of interpreter-guides who were involved in intercultural encounters in the Americas; Gaiba's thorough account (1998) of the interpreters and their work at the Nuremberg Trial; Roland's study (1999) on diplomatic history and interpreters; and Baigorri's work (2004) on the interpreters at the United Nations.

2.1.2. The Nuremberg Trial (Gaiba 1998)

Of the above-mentioned literature, the present study will most frequently refer to *The Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation: The Nuremberg Trial* by Gaiba (1998) in order to highlight the unusual features of the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE. Both trials were held for war crimes committed during World War II and took place around the same time (Nuremberg: November 1945 to August 1946; Tokyo: May 1946 to November 1948).

As Gaiba herself rightfully points out (*ibid.*: 20), the strength of this book lies in the amount of information on interpreting at this historical venue, which until then had not been discussed extensively. Based on an examination of a wide range of materials from the transcripts and microfilms to interviews with several

interpreters, Gaiba describes the preparation stage, the interpreting system, the impact of interpreting on the proceedings, the interpreters' lives outside the courtroom and the profiles of selected interpreters.

Gaiba's claim that "[t]he Nuremberg Trial was the first official international gathering in which simultaneous interpreting was used (ibid.: 19)" and her conclusion that the attempts at simultaneous interpreting prior to Nuremberg were actually "simultaneous successive interpretation" and "simultaneous reading of pretranslated texts" (ibid.: 31-32) may be a vexing point for researchers who discuss simultaneous interpreting at the 1928 International Labor Organization Conference and the 1928 Comintern. Simultaneous interpreting on those occasions has been studied, including corroborating sources (e.g. Baigorri 1999a, Shveitser 1999). Interpreting at the Nuremberg Trial should thus be considered "the coming of age" (Baigorri 1999a: 34) of simultaneous interpreting, or "the first time that simultaneous interpretation was used consistently and for extended periods of time" (Moser-Mercer 2005: 208).

Because of the general nature of this book, which comprehensively describes the "who, what, when, where, why and how" of interpreting at Nuremberg, it does not contain any in-depth, theory-based analysis of a particular aspect of interpreting. As Baigorri (1999b: 513-514) suggests, more narrowly-focused studies could follow up on such topics as the interpreter selection criteria and interpreting quality, and the background of the polyglot interpreters in the sociohistorical context of Nazi Germany.

2.1.3. The IMTFE and interpreters

Just as Gaiba (ibid.: 20) found very little literature on interpreting at the Nuremberg Trial, references to the interpreters and the interpreting system at the IMTFE are sporadic and add up to only a few lines in any given publication. Among English texts, some publications on the IMTFE and post-war Japan briefly refer to how the interpreters worked and what impact interpreting had on the proceedings. For example, Dower (1999: 458) discusses the differences between Nuremberg and the IMTFE in terms of the languages used, the mode of interpreting and the presence of monitors and language arbiters. He also comments on the impact of interpreting on the length of the proceedings, quality issues with translations and interpreting, and the scarcity of translators and interpreters (ibid.: 458, 467). These abbreviated remarks are echoed in other publications that refer to the interpreters at the IMTFE (e.g. Bix 2000, Brackman 1987, Harvey 2006).

In the field of Interpreting Studies as well, there are very few articles in English that discuss interpreting at the IMTFE. Shveitser's work (1999) may be the only publication that dedicates more than a few pages to this topic. In his article on the history of simultaneous interpreting in Russia, Shveitser shares his own experience as a Russian interpreter at the tribunal. He fails, however, to mention that the official languages at the IMTFE were English and Japanese, and that Russian interpreting was provided as a stand-alone operation for the Soviet judge who did not understand English. His description of interpreter "cabins"

separated into two (for Japanese-into-English and English-into-Japanese interpretation) (ibid.: 24) is incorrect, as the interpreters worked in both directions (Oka 2005). His claim that *Nisei* or “professional interpreters of Radio Tokyo” were used as interpreters (ibid.) is also false, since many of the interpreters came from the Japanese government. (See discussion on this topic below.) Thus, this article should not be considered a reliable source for studying interpreting at the IMTFE.

In Japan, because of the undying interest in the IMTFE, the output of publications on this historic event - written by actual participants and by Japanese journalists and experts in history, government, international law, etc. - amounts to more than one hundred, according to the Japanese National Diet Library (2005). Their references to the interpreters at the IMTFE, however, are as brief and sporadic as they are in the English texts. They generally draw attention to the disputes over translations and interpretations, the interpreting system, the attitude of some lawyers towards the interpreters, the dearth of translators and interpreters, and the unfeasibility of simultaneous interpreting. The only aspect found in the Japanese texts but absent in the English ones is the exploration of the personal background of the interpreters and monitors by some of the authors. The person most frequently mentioned is David Akira Itami, a *Nisei* monitor, who committed suicide after the trial. His life has been a subject of interest for academics as well as fiction and nonfiction writers (e.g. Kinashi 1985, Yamasaki 1983, special issue of *Daito Forum* 2000).

2.1.4. *Tokyo Saiban no Tsuyaku Kenkyu* (Watanabe 1998)

The only extensive research on interpreting at the IMTFE to date is *Tokyo Saiban no Tsuyaku Kenkyu* by Watanabe (1998). This MA thesis, written in Japanese, gives an overview of interpreting at the IMTFE, and an analysis of the interpretation during the testimony of former Prime Minister and War Minister General Hideki Tojo. Watanabe first describes the interpreting system, the roster of interpreters and monitors, and the establishment of the Language Arbitration Board. The workings of the interpreting process are illustrated by some examples from the transcripts of the proceedings.

Watanabe then analyzes the interpreting, using Tojo’s testimony as an example. She classifies the interjections by the monitors and the interpreters into three categories: error corrections; changes to an “easier-to-understand” version or additions of explanation; and clarifications, procedural explanations and instructions. Her analysis concludes that the main thrust of the interjections for interpretation from Japanese into English was a higher level of accuracy, and for interpretation from English into Japanese “user-friendliness”. She also argues that the interpreter and the monitor functioned as a team, and that this system as well as the monitor’s interjections helped elevate the level of fairness in the trial (ibid.: 53-57). Further, Watanabe examines the disputed translations and the language arbiter’s rulings on them during Tojo’s testimony, emphasizing the important role the monitors played in explaining the disputes to the court and the witness, as well as in directing the disputed matters to the arbiter (ibid.:79-80).

In conclusion, Watanabe asserts that the great latitude the monitors (and occasionally the interpreters) had contributed to “fair and conscientious” (ibid.: 83) interpreting during Tojo’s testimony. Referring to Shlesinger (1991) and Morris (1995), Watanabe presents interpreting at the IMTFE as a demonstrative case where the interpreter’s latitude was exercised to facilitate intercultural communication in a historical courtroom event.

Watanabe’s work is significant as the first academic inquiry into the interpreters at the IMTFE. Her roster of interpreters showing the number of interpreters for each language and the number of sessions each interpreter worked is apt to prove very useful for researchers who will study this subject. Watanabe’s characterization of the interpreter and monitor functioning as a team presents a valid reference to discussions on how to improve the quality of courtroom interpreting. Her argument that the interpreters’ latitude helped facilitate smooth communication at the IMTFE may also draw attention to those engaged in present-day debates on interpreter ethics. In addition, Watanabe’s assertion on the different motivations at play for interjections in interpretation from English into Japanese versus from Japanese into English contributes more evidence to support the findings of others that court interpreters use different strategies when interpreting in different directions (e.g. Berk-Seligson 1990, Hale 2004, Jansen 1995).

Watanabe presents another interesting finding. During Tojo’s testimony, the number of interjections in the interpretation from English into Japanese was significantly higher than that for the interpretation from Japanese into English: 172 versus 88 (ibid.: 53). She does not, however, attempt to explore possible explanations for this gap except the difficulty of interpreting English legal language into Japanese. She could have looked into factors such as the monitor’s competency, the institutional pressure or incomplete transcript recordings. In addition, the three categories Watanabe employs to describe the interjections could be examined more closely. For example, her second category “changes to an ‘easier to understand’ version” should include a distinction between mere explicitations and added explanations. Watanabe’s categorization of “interjections by the interpreter” is also problematic, as such interjections were most likely prompted by the monitor. (These whispered interjections by the monitor are audible in the motion pictures, but are not reflected in the transcripts.) Above all, the absence of an attempt to explain why the IMTFE established a system involving three tiers of linguists in the interpreting process needs to be rectified.

2.2. Interpreters’ behavior in the courtroom

With the increasing need for intra-societal communication due to demographic changes, and legislative developments such as the 1978 Court Interpreters Act in the United States, interpreting in the courtroom has become more visible and attracted researchers’ attention over the past few decades. Some early works may not have originated in the field of Interpreting Studies (e.g. Berk-Seligson 1990/2002), but studies by practitioner-researchers have proliferated, driven

mainly by their professional concerns. Research on court interpreting now has a strong presence within the reach of Interpreting Studies as observed throughout Pöchhacker's *Introducing Interpreting Studies* (2004). For the purposes of the pilot analysis in the present study, this section will review different approaches used to describe interpreters' behavior in the context of courtroom proceedings.

2.2.1. Micro-linguistic studies

Linguistic analysis of shifts in interpreting accounts for a good share of the research on court interpreting (e.g. Berk-Seligson 1990/2002, Hale 2004, Mason and Stewart 2001, Rigney 1999). The approach taken is often interdisciplinary, primarily drawing on pragmatics, sociolinguistics and discourse analysis. Some works, however, neglect certain factors that can, at least partially, explain why those shifts occur, such as the professional training of subject interpreters and the existence of normative behavior imposed on the interpreters by the institution.

For example, Berk-Seligson (1990/2002) analyzes the impact of interpreter alterations and intrusions on courtroom proceedings by drawing on a large number of recordings of Spanish and English proceedings and mock jurors. This in-depth ethnographical study, however, does not delve into why interpreters, consciously or subconsciously, alter their interpretations and interrupt the proceedings in the first place. It does allude to the linguistic characteristics of Spanish and English and psychological factors such as blame avoidance. It fails, however, to make a distinction between court-certified interpreters and non-certified interpreters, or between the three categories of interpreters it refers to - court-employed fulltime interpreters, court employees in other capacities and part-time freelance interpreters - in analyzing their behavior, for example. One exception to the lack of attention to the interpreter's background and institutional factors is the comment that the addition of politeness to interpretations into English can be explained by the fact that court interpreters are employed by the court and thus feel the need to speak politely to their employer (*ibid.*: 154).

On the other hand, Hale in *The Discourse of Court Interpreting* (2004) is keenly aware of various factors that can affect the interpreters' behavior, including their conscious or unconscious choices to alter the interpretation, and Hale's effort to explore such factors is evident. She correctly points out the importance of acknowledging the fact that most interpreters observed in past research are "completely untrained" (*ibid.*: 13). Throughout the book, Hale refers to the following factors as possible reasons for the different strategies interpreters take: the interpreters' own views of their role and their ethical concerns; the interpreters' competence in the languages and interpreting skills; the constraints of the language pair (lack of syntactic and semantic equivalence); and the constraints of the exercise (a complete disregard for the significance of discourse markers and other linguistic features). She also draws attention to the interpreter's working condition by referring to a comment of a survey respondent: "Time constraints and an impatient response by counsel and magistrates/judges should also be taken into consideration when analyzing interpreters' performance at court" (*ibid.* 233). Going beyond mere micro-

linguistic analysis, this type of holistic view is important to better understand how interpreters behave in courtroom proceedings.

2.2.2. Institutional constraints and interpreter latitude

Institutional constraints on interpreting in courtroom proceedings have been referred to as a major factor for shifts in interpretation. Morris (1989, 1990, 1995) discusses the highly complex interpreting arrangements at the Demjanjuk trial in Jerusalem (1987-1988), where different modes of interpreting (simultaneous, consecutive and whispering) were used for different language combinations (between Hebrew, English, Ukrainian, Yiddish, German and Russian). Morris analyzes the characteristics of each of these modes and the different types of impact they had on the court proceedings. She also observes shifts in interpretation, whether deliberate or inadvertent, and the interpreters' latitude in achieving dynamics of interaction and distancing themselves from the speaker. In addition to the institutional adoption of a monitoring system and recording of all the utterances in the courtroom to achieve a higher degree of accuracy, Morris (1995: 42) advocates that the legal practitioners and authorities drop their "unattainable insistence on verbatim translation in the courtroom" and allow the interpreters to "exercise the necessary latitude in dealing with the inherent difficulties of their profession".

Drawing on her observation of the interpreting at the same Demjanjuk trial, Shlesinger (1991) discusses the latitude the interpreters exert. This study presents three categories of such interpreter latitude by referring to examples in the court proceedings: 1. accommodating a direct addressee; 2. introducing stylistic shifts; and 3. asserting the interpreter's own independent persona. Shlesinger indicates that shifts in interpretation do occur in the courtroom despite the sworn requirement to "well and faithfully interpret". This study cites some reasons for such shifts, including facilitating understanding of the direct addressee, averting the risk of sounding unprofessional, feeling obliged not to waste the precious time of the court and dissociating from the speaker to be an active participant in the communication. In the summary of this article, Shlesinger calls for further discussion of the role definition of court interpreters and the extent of their latitude.

While the focus of micro-linguistic analyses of interpreter-mediated discourse in the courtroom is the text or the product, these studies by Morris and Shlesinger pay close attention to the interpreter or the producer. They discuss the various challenges the court interpreters face, including institutional constraints, the moral dilemmas they feel because of the participants' conflicting views of the interpreter's role, and the latitude they exert to facilitate the interpreter-mediated communication in the courtroom despite the principles of "accuracy" and "neutrality". This type of interpreter-centered approach with awareness of the institutional constraints on interpreter behavior is a key to studying why shifts in interpretation occur in courtroom proceedings.

2.2.3. *Norm-based approach*

In contrast to much of the research into court interpreting drawing on pragmatics, sociolinguistics and discourse analysis, there are not many studies that apply concepts and theories originating in Translation Studies to discuss shifts in courtroom interpreting. One exception is Jansen's case study (1995) of Spanish-Dutch court interpreting, in which he explores the nature of norms governing the court interpreter's strategies. Referring to the theories of Toury (1980) and the descriptive "Manipulation School", Jansen argues that the interpreter learns the norms during the socialization process and chooses the most appropriate translational solution in a specific situation. Accordingly, he advocates going beyond a mere linguistic comparison between the source text and the target text and examining the interpreter's performance in a sociocultural context.

The hypothesis of Jansen's study is that the situation in which court interpreters' work has a direct bearing on their interpreting strategies. He analyzes two interpreter-mediated court proceedings to see if the interpreter's choices are affected by how she perceives her own position in the situation, which "is based on an awareness of the power relations and ideological fundamentals of the institution" (ibid.: 15). He surveys various factors in courtroom settings, including the aims and organizations of the trial, the ideologies and roles of the various parties, and the inter-relationship between the interpreter's behavior and these elements. The study finds that the interpreter tends to simplify the institutional discourse when translating for the defendant and renders the defendant's remarks in a standardized (non-simplified) register. Jansen explains that these interpreting strategies were guided by the norms that reflected the complex dynamics of the situation. In the end, he argues that interpreters cannot be neutral, as interpreters' behavior reflects the position they are forced to take in the dynamics of institutional and power relations.

A few attempts have been made to apply a norm-based approach to interpreting research (e.g. Harris 1990, Schjoldager 1995/2002). Due to the complex nature of interpreting, however, as Shlesinger (1999) points out, it is difficult for researchers to determine whether a strategy used by interpreters is attributable to their cognitive constraints, or reflects norm-governed behavior. Since the courtroom has much greater institutional constraints than other settings, Jansen may have found the behavior of courtroom interpreters predominantly governed by norms. The fact that he observed an academically trained professional interpreter in this study may explain his seeming unawareness of the interpreter's cognitive constraints. He does, however, admit that one of the limitations of his study is that it is not representative, and is thus unable to reach a conclusion on general norms (ibid.: 28). As Shlesinger (1999: 65-66) alludes, with much larger corpora, an extensive discussion on norms in courtroom interpreting may appear later.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1. Sociocultural approach

The basic premise of the present study is a view of interpreting as a social practice. It focuses on the standing of interpreters in the pertinent social, political and cultural context in order to describe and explain their behavior in an interpreter-mediated event. The functionalist approach (e.g. Vermeer 1989/2000) is one of the key concepts in Translation Studies, and it can be referred to in the argument that interpreting does not occur in a vacuum; rather it serves a certain function in fulfilling the goal of a given setting. Therefore, in order to understand the factors that affect the interpreter's behavior, initial consideration should be directed to the overall institutional purpose of the setting and to how the interpreter is used to satisfy that purpose. The first part of the following study is dedicated to this aspect.

Since the hypothesis in this study links interpreters' behavior to their position in the power relationships within the setting in which they work, the social, political and cultural background of the interpreters and its relation to the hierarchical structure of the setting will be examined. This is in line with Pym's call (2006: 5-29) to focus on the translator/interpreter (mediator), instead of the texts or other microcosmic levels, to bring social and cultural considerations into the study of translation/interpreting. The approach taken in this study also embraces Pöchhacker's notion of "socio-cognitive perspective" (2005: 693) for a more holistic understanding of interpreting, which pays attention not only to mental operations but also to the macrotext which includes "institutional constraints and functional concerns" (ibid.: 690).

The challenge here is, as previously discussed, to pinpoint one predominant factor, whether it is cognitive limitations or institutional constraints, to explain the interpreter's behavior, choices or strategies. Shlesinger points to "the difficulty of teasing apart the deliberate/conscious/norm-driven features of performance from those which are constrained by the limits of cognition, of knowledge, of experience etc." (2001: 166), and emphasizes the importance of excluding or minimizing the possibility of commingling the two factors: cognitive limitations and norm-based strategies (1999:73-74).

In an effort to minimize this possibility, the pilot study in a subsequent chapter will focus on the proceedings of the testimony given by Hideki Tojo. Tojo was one of the last witnesses in the trial and his testimony took place in the twentieth month of the courtroom proceedings. Interpreters who had shown conspicuous cognitive limitations must have been dismissed by that time. In fact, of the 27 Japanese-English interpreters whose names appear in the transcripts, only three interpreted in more than 200 sessions (Watanabe 1998: 10-11). Also, in light of the fact that Tojo was considered the most influential figure in Japan's war-time actions and his testimony in court was attracting close attention from the world, the most competent, knowledgeable and experienced interpreters were probably assigned to Tojo's testimony. The pilot study focuses on those

interpreters with a hope to identify sociocultural elements, instead of cognitive limitations, as the predominant factor to account for their behavior.

In sum, the overall theoretical framework of the present study is to describe and explain an interpreter-mediated event in sociocultural terms. It means: 1. this study views interpreting as a social practice with a certain purpose to fulfill; 2. this study focuses on interpreters, namely their sociocultural background and hierarchical position in the setting in which they operate; and 3. this study examines whether interpreters' behavior is influenced by their awareness of the sociocultural context of the setting.

3.2. Trust, power and control

In a subsequent section, there will be a discussion on the most salient feature of the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE, namely, that three ethnically and socially different groups of linguists engaged in three different functions in the interpreting process. The following concepts will be drawn on to explain and analyze why the tribunal devised this organization of the linguists.

In an interpreter-mediated event, when different parties represent different interests, the party wielding the authority to select the interpreters will most likely avoid using interpreters who seem to have a conflict of interest, due to suspicions that they may act in "bad faith" to advance their own agenda. Such suspicions arise from the "power" that the interpreters are perceived to possess.

Anderson (1976: 218-221) argues that "the interpreter's position as the person in the middle has the advantage of power inherent in all positions that control scarce resources", and that the interpreter can monopolize the means of communication. Laster and Taylor (1994: 111) point to this "power" as the reason lawyers try to regulate and constrain the interpreter's role as "neutral machines or 'conduits'". The monolingual user's fear that interpreters may exercise such "power" to advance their own interests is not completely unwarranted. Examples of such interpreters include the one who deliberately misinterpreted for a Gaelic poet defendant in 18th century Ireland (Cronin 2002: 55), and the sign language interpreter in Ukraine who delivered her own political message on television while pretending to be interpreting the 2004 election results (Zarakhovich 2005).

The user's mistrust of the interpreter arising out of an absence of shared interest or affiliation has been discussed throughout the history of interpreting: William of Rubruck in the 13th century suspected that his Armenian interpreters distorted their interpretation (Bowen 1995: 254-255); European embassies complained about the incompetence and disloyalty of Levantine dragomans in the Ottoman era (Lewis 2004: 25-26); in the 1820 trial of Queen Caroline of England, the defense was concerned about the impartiality of the Italian interpreter provided by the prosecution (Morris 1999: 19); and, more recently, Sophia Coppola (2003), the director of the famed movie *Lost in Translation* (2003), voiced her skepticism over the lengthy renditions of the interpreter who worked for her in Tokyo.

In response to such concerns about trust, the party in power may establish a system to regulate and control the interpreter. Hermans (2000: 4-7) discusses several historical examples such as interpreters during the European discovery of America and *Oranda tsuji* (Dutch interpreters) in 17th-19th century Japan to point out the “tight controls on translators and interpreters to guarantee their trustworthiness, to ensure that they speak exclusively with their masters’ voice”. Referring to the overseers of the dragomans in Ancient Egypt, Pym (1998:186) also draws attention to the institutionalization of translation where “hierarchical control is established; boundaries are maintained”. Within this institution, according to Cronin (2002: 58), “[t]he role of interpreters throughout history has been crucially determined by the prevailing hierarchical constitution of power and their position in it.”

These sociopolitical aspects of interpreting are patent in the hierarchical structure of interpreting and the role of each linguist group during the IMTFE. A following chapter will explore the background of the interpreting arrangements and the linguists who were involved in the interpreting process at the IMTFE, focusing on issues of trust, power and control.

3.3. *Negotiated norms*

In a subsequent chapter, some institutional requirements of interpreting at the IMTFE will be discussed. One of the focus areas is how the norms of the interpreting procedure developed over the course of the trial. This process was greatly affected by the fact that none of the linguists were professional interpreters. Those bilinguals developed interpreting skills on the job during the course of the 2.5 years of courtroom proceedings at the IMTFE. In this regard, Toury’s discussion (1995: 241-258) on a natural/native translator may present some insight into the present study on the behavior of the linguists at the IMTFE.

In describing how a bilingual speaker grows into the role of a translator without formal training, Toury points to the internalization of the feedback from the environment the translator is in. Toury acknowledges the interactional aspect of communicative activity, which involves feedback from various players such as the receiver of the translated utterance, the originator of the utterance and the commissioner of the communicative event. According to Toury, such feedback embodies norms that determine the appropriateness or inappropriateness of various aspects of the translational activity. He argues that those who internalize the feedback and conform to the acquired norms will be recognized as translators.

What is missing here is the interpreter’s part in the very interactional aspect of communication to which Toury refers (*ibid.*: 248). As Wadensjö argues throughout her influential book *Interpreting as Interaction* (1998), the interpreter is an engaged participant in the interactional discourse. In addition, norms develop as part of rationalizing the cognitive limitations of the interpreter (Shlesinger 1999: 73). During the IMTFE, the court as the commissioner and user of the interpreters expected certain “norms” for the interpreting procedure at the beginning, but those norms were adjusted over time in response to the interpreters’ needs which were largely based on their cognitive limitations. The

tribunal had to come to terms with the unfamiliar constraints the interpreters presented. Thus, their “expectancy norms” (Chesterman 1993) had to be negotiated.

With this notion of “negotiated norms” as a backdrop, a subsequent section will examine some remarks made by the tribunal on the interpreting procedure and the interpreters’ performance over the first year of the court proceedings. There will be a discussion on how the tribunal’s perception on the workings of interpreting and the role of interpreters changed in response to the feedback from the linguists.

4. Research methodology

Williams and Chesterman (2002: 65-67) discuss case studies, corpus studies, survey studies and historical and archival studies as examples of empirical research in Translation Studies. The research methodology of the first part of the present study fits into the category of historical and archival research, which is based on the examination and analysis of historical records and other archival information. The present study draws on a wide variety of materials and applies the theoretical framework discussed in the previous chapter to describe and explain the findings from these materials.

The materials examined in this study include: the transcripts of the IMTFE court proceedings in both Japanese and English, relevant court and government documents, interviews with several people who were involved in the Japanese war crimes trials, some motion pictures recorded by the U.S. military during the IMTFE, a documentary film on the trial and literature on Japanese Americans and war-time and post-war Japan. Most of the materials were obtained from the U.S. National Archives, the Japanese National Diet Library, the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the National Archives of Japan, the Japanese American Veterans Association, the MacArthur Memorial Library and Archives, and the Archives at the University of Colorado, Boulder.

As for the interviews with people who actually were involved in the interpreting at the IMTFE, there will be references to interviews with Takashi Oka, who is the only known surviving interpreter; the transcript of an interview with Masakazu Shimada, another interpreter, conducted in 2000 by Kondo and Watanabe; and a 1980 taped interview of Lardner Moore, one of the language arbiters, conducted by his son George Moore. In addition, interviews were conducted with people who were involved in the U.S. Military Intelligence Service Language School, the Yamashita trial in Manila and other “Class B/C” war crimes trials. Since the interviewees’ memory of events that happened 60 years ago may not always be clear, any new information obtained in the interviews was corroborated by another source, such as government documents or an interview with another person.

The second part of the present study fits into the category of case studies. It is a case study on the interpreted testimony of Hideki Tojo. As discussed in the previous chapter, Tojo’s testimony was chosen for this pilot study in an attempt to minimize the influence of cognitive limitations on the interpreters’ behavior by focusing on the most competent and experienced interpreters. Notwithstanding whatever difficulties they may have had in coping with the cognitive demands of the task, as Shlesinger suggests (1999: 73-74), their output may have reflected norms that evolved as a rationalization of their own cognitive limitations. Measures to address such problems must have been established over the course of more than 19 months of courtroom procedures that had taken place by the time Tojo took the witness stand. The conspicuously reduced number of in-court discussions on interpreting in later stages of the trial is proof of that. Further, by

focusing on the same event, Watanabe's findings on the interpreting and interjections by the monitors during Tojo's testimony can be referred to as well.

Drawing on the transcripts in English and Japanese, the motion pictures filmed during the trial and the interviews, the behavior of the interpreters and the monitors during Tojo's testimony will be examined in order to test the hypothesis that links interpreters' behavior to their hierarchical positions. The focus is placed on the nature of their interjections and the interactions between the court, the interpreter, the monitor and the language arbiter, with special attention to the background of each linguist.

Although an attempt is made to seek patterns in the linguists' behavior, this will not be approached in a strictly quantitative way, as it is not feasible with the materials available to conduct a type of research which would involve measuring and counting to obtain statistics. The audio of the motion pictures recorded during the trial indicates that the transcripts are accurate but not complete, as they did not include interjections whispered to the interpreters by the monitors. Since an audio of the entire testimony of Tojo is not available (the total length of the available portions at the National Archives is approximately 280 minutes out of nine half-day sessions), it is not possible to get a complete tally of the total number of interjections that are missing in the transcripts, either.

Instead, this pilot study attempts to describe the quality of the linguists' behavior, drawing on their sociopolitical background and hierarchical positions. It is an interpretive examination of the materials by the author as a practicing interpreter and researcher. Therefore, this study does not attempt to reach a conclusion on the universality of interpreters' behavior in the courtroom setting. Rather, it intends to introduce one way of describing and analyzing interpreters' behavior and to seek any findings which may support its hypothesis.

5. Interpreting at the IMTFE

This chapter is devoted to the first aim of the present study: to provide an overview of the interpreter arrangements at the IMTFE with special focus on the three-tier structure of linguists who were involved in the interpreting process. There will be a discussion of the languages used, the recruitment of the interpreters and the interpreting system. A detailed analysis will be conducted of the hierarchical structure of the three ethnically and socially different groups of linguists who performed the three separate functions, and of the tribunal's reasons for devising this unusual interpreter organization. Lastly, the changes in the tribunal's attitude toward the interpreting procedures and the interpreters' performance over the first year of the court proceedings will be examined.


5.1. A brief overview of the IMTFE

The IMTFE was established by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (commonly known as the Tokyo Charter) under the direction of US Army General Douglas MacArthur on January 19, 1946. It was convened on May 3, 1946, and adjourned on November 12, 1948. This is significantly longer than the Nuremberg Trial which concluded in less than one year. According to Bradsher (n.d.: 180-181), the language difficulty is generally believed to have been the major cause of the excessive length of the tribunal, but there were other factors for the prolonged proceedings such as the complexity of the subject matter and the absence of relevant official records. A total of 419 witnesses appeared in 818 court sessions over 417 days, and 779 affidavits and depositions were presented. Exhibits admitted totaled around 30,000 pages, and the English transcript of the court proceedings, excluding exhibits and judgments, numbered 48,488 pages.

There were 28 "Class A" defendants. They were Japan's top military and political leaders who were accused of having planned and directed the war. A panel of 11 judges presided over the tribunal, one from each of the Allied Powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India and the Philippines. The president was the Australian judge Sir William Webb. Unlike at Nuremberg, there was only one prosecution team, consisting of representatives from the Allied Powers, and led by Chief Prosecutor Joseph Keenan of the United States.

The indictment accused the defendants of "crimes against peace", "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity". During the trial, two of the defendants died of natural causes, and one had a nervous breakdown and was found incompetent to stand trial. The remaining 25 were all found guilty. Seven, including Hideki Tojo, were sentenced to death by hanging, 16 to life imprisonment and two to lesser terms. The execution took place on December 23, 1948 (the birthday of Emperor Hirohito's son, the current Emperor Akihito).

Below is a diagram of the courtroom. The tribunal was held in the auditorium of the former Japanese Military Cadet School, which was requisitioned by the U.S. forces in August 1945. The booth for interpreters was set up on the upper platform; the lower platform was divided into two sections: one for the prosecution and the other for the defense. Between this area and the interpreters' booth were seats for high-ranking officials of the General Headquarters of U.S. occupation forces and their guests. The judges' bench was situated to the left of the platform, with the witness stand in front of it. To the right of the platform were the defendants' seats, facing the bench. Near the auditorium entrance were seats for journalists; seats on the bench side were for the international press and seats on the defendants' side for the Japanese press. Seats for the public gallery were placed on the overhung second floor opposite the platform, and family members of defendants sat there as well.



Source: *Zusetsu: Tokyo Saiban* (Hiratsuka 2002)

5.2. An overview of the interpreter arrangements at the IMTFE

5.2.1. Languages

The use of interpreters at the IMTFE was set forth in the tribunal charter. Under the title “Fair Trial for Accused”, Article 9 (b) states, “Language. The trial and related proceedings shall be conducted in English and in the language of the accused. Translations of documents and other papers shall be provided as needed and requested (Amended Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, April 26, 1946).” Accordingly, interpreting between English and Japanese was offered throughout the trial, but Russian simultaneous interpretation was also provided as a stand-alone arrangement for the Soviet judge who did not understand English. (One of the three channels of the interpreting equipment was offered to the Russian interpreting as a courtesy (Brackman 1987: 213-214).)

During the trial, the tribunal also used interpreters of Chinese, French, Dutch, German, Russian and Mongolian when witnesses and prosecutors spoke in those languages. The transcripts of the proceedings, however, indicate that the tribunal had not anticipated and prepared for issues involving the use of a language other than English and Japanese. At early stages of the trial, a significant amount of time was spent inside and outside the courtroom discussing whether the use of “non-official” languages should be permitted in court.

For example, when General Ching The-Chun of the Republic of China, the first Chinese-speaking witness, appeared on July 22, 1946, the initial arrangement was to provide relay interpreting with Japanese as the pivot language between Chinese and English because the Language Section, which managed all the linguists for the tribunal, could not find a Chinese-English interpreter. (There was also concern about the propriety of using a Chinese member of the prosecution as interpreter for a witness produced by the prosecution.) This “double translation” caused concerns on the defense side for “a very imperfect translation” (TP: 2,300-2301). The president of the tribunal, who had not been informed of this issue before, handed down a ruling on the spot to use a secretary of Judge Mei (the Republic of China), as suggested by the prosecution. Since then, English became the pivot language in relay interpreting between the three languages. The poor performance of this *ad hoc* interpreter drew questions from both the defense and the prosecution and disrupted the court proceedings. During the testimony of Henry Pu-Yi (former Emperor of Manchukuo), the president of the tribunal personally appealed to General MacArthur (Letter from W. F. Webb, President of IMTFE to General Douglas MacArthur, August 20, 1945) for Chinese-English interpreters. MacArthur responded by sending his own interpreter to the court on August 26 and trying to bring more interpreters in from Shanghai.

Having an *ad hoc* interpreter for the pivot language presented a challenge to the Japanese interpreters as well. According to Oka (2005), the most difficult task for him during the entire court proceedings was to sit next to the Chinese interpreter and relay his Chinese-to-English interpretation into Japanese. The problems with this arrangement seemed to prompt the IMTFE to ask the tribunal

in Nuremberg about its system of handling multiple languages at the same time. A telegram from the Secretariat of the IMTFE to its counterpart in Nuremberg, dated August 23, 1946, inquires about the following nine points:

1. How many languages are spoken in the court?
2. How many language translations are spoken simultaneously over the translator device?
3. What is the total number of interpreters and monitors used at any one time?
4. Are the interpreters in the open court or behind glass walls?
5. What is the distance between witness box and interpreters?
6. More than one court reporter for each language needed by the interpreter?
7. Where are official court reporters seated, near witness or near interpreters?
8. How much space is used by interpretation personnel involving interpreters, monitors and others?
9. How are counsel, witness and interpreters speech activities coordinated?

This belated inquiry illustrates the tribunal's unpreparedness for the use of a third language in court. The response from Nuremberg (dated August 27, 1946) gives a concise answer to each of the questions, but with the unavailability of simultaneous interpreting at the IMTFE as discussed below, the information from Nuremberg must have been not very helpful.

When the French prosecutor, Robert L. Oneto, opened his case in French on September 30, 1946, the defense raised an objection, citing the non-compliance to the charter, difficulty of monitoring the accuracy of interpretation and delay in the proceedings. It was overruled. When Oneto read documents, however, he read them in English because having everything translated into French would have been too taxing. Because of his accent, however, the interpreters and the court reporter could not understand him. A long discussion followed and the irritated President Webb made a ruling to use English only, suggesting an English-speaking member of the French prosecutor team take the lectern. The next day, after a long argument on the use of French, Oneto started speaking French again despite the court's ruling. Webb took it as "almost contempt" (TP: 6746) and adjourned the court. According to Brackman (*ibid.*: 215-216), who observed the trial as a journalist and witness, upon the French judge's threat to resign the following morning, Webb decided to allow the use of French, ending the debate that took up two days of court time. Oneto asked his American colleague to read documents for the sake of the interpreters and the court reporter, and took the lectern for other proceedings, speaking in French. There was no relay interpreting involved. English-French, French-Japanese and English-Japanese interpreters were available, and the speaker's language was interpreted into the other two languages concurrently.

The Soviet prosecution team also stirred up a dispute as it insisted upon the use of the Russian language. The defense raised an objection by complaining that the use of the French language had already disrupted, delayed and prolonged the court proceedings and that allowing the use of Russian would further hinder the fair and smooth operation of the court. They argued again that this was not compliant with the tribunal charter that stipulated English and the language of the

accused to be used to conduct the court proceedings. Further, the defense insinuated that political considerations were behind the court's decision to allow the Russian prosecutor to speak in Russian and that this had been arranged between the United States and the Soviet Union prior to the IMTFE. Webb called this line of argument offensive, claimed that the charter did not exclude a third language, and made a ruling that the tribunal would allow the language of any of the countries represented on the court (TP: 7087-7088). This debate over the use of the Russian language occupied the whole afternoon session on October 4, 1946. During the Soviet stage of the case for the prosecution, the speaker's language was interpreted into the other two languages concurrently and there was no relay interpreting involved.

5.2.2. *Recruitment of interpreters*

As previously discussed, the interpreting process at the IMTFE involved three different groups of linguists: the interpreters, the monitors and the language arbiter. The following presents how these linguists were recruited to work for the tribunal.

The organization of the IMTFE included the Tribunal Secretariat headed by a U.S. army colonel, whose functions included the supervision of the Language Section. The Language Section had a U.S. military officer as its chief and arranged interpreters and monitors to meet the language requirements of the tribunal. To recruit monitors (to monitor the interpreter's performance) and language arbiters (to make rulings on translation and interpreting disputes), the Language Section looked into those who had worked as interrogators and translators and had served other language-related functions during the war and were working in some functions of the occupational operations in Japan as military personnel or discharged civilians after the war. Four *Nisei*, David Akira Itami, Sho Onodera, Hidekazu Hayashi and Lanny Miyamoto, were selected as monitors. U.S. Army Major Lardner Moore and Captain Edward Kraft were appointed as language arbiter at different times.

The interpreters were recruited mainly from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the pool of translators who had already been working in various sections of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) such as the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), and the International Prosecution Section (IPS), established on December 8, 1945. According to Oka (2005) and Shimada (2000), who were among those translators, the recruitment and testing of interpreters took place in January and February 1946. The test was to have candidates interpret in a simulated trial. Some orientation on the court procedure was given to those who passed the test, but there was virtually no training for interpreting because no one was qualified to train interpreters (Shimada *ibid*: 18). The interpreters were then sent into the courtroom. According to Shimada (*ibid*.: 18-19), about 15 people were hired as interpreters at the beginning, but many of them left after a brief trial. The makeup of interpreters was very fluid for the first three months of the trial, but it subsequently settled down with about 10 interpreters.

The bilingual Japanese nationals who were hired as interpreters included Japanese government officials with overseas experience, people who were born and educated in the United States and those who grew up in bilingual households and were educated at international schools in Japan. The transcripts record a total of 27 Japanese-English interpreters, but only a handful of them worked regularly throughout the trial as previously mentioned. The interpreters who worked most frequently were: Toshiro Shimanouchi (419 sessions), Kazumasa Shimada (323 sessions), Takashi Oka (289 sessions), Tomio Mori (216 sessions), Masahito Iwamoto (170 sessions) and Makoto Taji (160 sessions) (Watanabe 1998: 10-11).

Documents issued by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (September- October 1946) indicate that the diplomats who were appointed by the ministry to work as court interpreters at the IMTFE (Mori, Tsuchiya, Shimanouchi and Yamanaka at the initial stage) received a monthly salary of 1,800 yen, plus 100 yen *per diem* from the tribunal. In light of the fact that the Japanese government established a price control regulation with the introduction of the new yen and set up “500 yen a month” as the standard living expense in 1946 (Gunji Joho *n.d.*), interpreting at the IMTFE was a well-paid job for Japanese at that time. The monitors and language arbiters were paid based on the U.S. military pay scale, but their designations in the scale and the amount of their pay are not known.

5.2.3. *Interpreting system*

For the first month of the trial, the interpreters and the monitors were situated at a table on the floor, next to those for the prosecution and the defense. During a one-week break in June 1946, an interpreters’ booth was set up above the floor behind the seats for the prosecution and defense teams. It was a space formerly designated for the imperial seat, used by Emperor Hirohito when he attended the cadet school’s ceremonial events. According to the Japanese Defense Agency (2006), until the end of the war, the stairs to the imperial seat were for the exclusive use of the Emperor, but now they were used by the people who worked in the interpreters’ booth and the judges who walked through the platform to reach the bench during the trial.

IBM equipment, identical to that used at Nuremberg, was also installed. When the tribunal resumed on June 14, 1946, the interpreters, the monitors, the court reporters, and the recording and equipment technicians worked from the booth (some photographs give the impression that it was divided into several booths, but it was actually not divided (Oka 2005)), and the people in the courtroom were able to listen to the interpretation through headsets.

However, unlike Nuremberg, consecutive was the predominant mode of interpreting at the IMTFE, simply because the tribunal came to the conclusion that simultaneous interpretation between English and Japanese was impossible. According to Oka (2005), Itami, who was considered the lead monitor, strongly insisted that simultaneous interpretation between English and Japanese was impossible. Simultaneous interpreting was used only when the speaker read a document and its translation was available to the interpreter. In effect, this was

nothing more than simultaneous reading of a prepared translation, and it was actually delivered by the monitor.

The use of consecutive mode of interpreting enabled interjections by the monitor who sat next to the interpreters in the booth. In a subsequent chapter, the types of interjections by the monitors and the interpreters are examined in detail. Lamps were installed in front of the president of the tribunal, at the lectern for the prosecutors and defense lawyers, and at the witness stand. A steady light indicated that interpretation was being delivered; and a blinking light indicated a request to the speaker to pause for interpreting.

Two to four interpreters were assigned to each morning or afternoon session, and they took turns every thirty minutes to interpret (Oka *ibid.*). Based on the audio of the moving pictures recorded during the trial and Shimada's interview (2000: 22-23), however, the turn-taking took place in a flexible fashion under the direction of the monitor, depending on the requirements of a particular procedure and the competency of the assigned interpreters. (Some interpreters interpreted in two directions and others only in one.) The interpreters worked for two days and had the third day off, making it a three-day-a-week job. The teams were assigned by the chief of the Language Section. The core members, however, were more or less fixed: Shimanouchi, Shimada, Oka, and later Taji, according to Shimada (*ibid.*: 24).

As for the monitor and the language arbiter, one monitor was usually assigned to each morning or afternoon session, and the language arbiter sat in the prosecution team's seat on the lower platform throughout the court proceedings. The arbiter engaged in action when a dispute over translation or interpretation arose or when he announced the language arbitration board's ruling on a disputed translation or interpretation.

5.3. *Three tiers of linguists*

As previously discussed, one of the highly unusual features of the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE was the presence of three tiers of linguists. The first tier consisted of the interpreters who interpreted the proceedings. They were all Japanese nationals. The second tier comprised the monitors. Four *Nisei* worked as monitors: David Akira Itami, Sho Onodera and Lanny Miyamoto worked throughout the trial, and Hidekazu Hayashi left halfway through the proceedings. They monitored the interpretation, and interjected to correct interpreting errors, coordinate the turns of speakers and add explanations to the interpretation for the benefit of the witnesses. They also simultaneously read the translations of the indictment, the opening statements, the judgment (verdict) and other prepared statements.

The last tier was the Language Arbitration Board, which consisted of one member appointed by the tribunal and one each by the defense and the prosecution. It ruled on any disputed translations and interpretations. The member appointed by the tribunal was designated language arbiter, and announced the rulings on the language disputes in court. Two Caucasian military officers played this role at different times over the course of the trial. One of

them, Major Lardner Moore was born and raised in Japan. He had been a missionary in Japan before joining the U.S. Army, and worked as an interrogator during the war. He was discharged in 1947 and went back to his missionary work. Much of the background of the other language arbiter, Captain Edward Kraft, is not known, but the records of the U.S. Military Intelligence Service Language School show that he studied Japanese for about a year there.

5.3.1. The tribunal's explanation of the Language Arbitration Board

Why did the IMTFE have this three-tier system of linguists to address its interpreting needs? There is an official explanation in the Judgment as to why the Language Arbitration Board was established: "Part a, Section I Establishment and Proceedings of the Tribunal" states,

[T]he need to have every word spoken in Court translated from English into Japanese, or vice versa, has at least doubled the length of the proceedings. Translations cannot be made from the one language into the other with the speed and certainty which can be attained in translating one Western speech into another. Literal translation from Japanese into English or the reverse is often impossible. To a large extent nothing but a paraphrase can be achieved, and experts in both languages will often differ as to the correct paraphrase. In the result the interpreters in Court often had difficulty as to the rendering they should announce, and the Tribunal was compelled to set up a Language Arbitration Board to settle matters of disputed interpretation (The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, November 1948).

This statement basically refers to the difficulty of interpretation between Japanese and English, and acknowledges that there can be more than one correct version in translations and interpretations. This official account of the Language Arbitration Board presents potential research topics for Interpreting Studies, such as different strategies used in simultaneous interpreting for different language pairs, and the definition of "accuracy" or "fidelity" of interpretation. It does not, however, explain why the monitor was appointed, and why three different socio-ethnic groups were engaged in three different functions. In pursuit of an answer, let us examine the background of the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE.

5.3.2. Military trials in Manila and Japanese interpreters at the IMTFE

Prior to the establishment of the IMTFE on January 19, 1946, there were U.S. military trials against two Japanese generals, Tomoyuki Yamashita and Masaharu Homma, in Manila, the Philippines. Correspondences by the U.S. military concerning the interpreting at the trials and a book written by one of Yamashita's attorneys indicate that serious problems with the military interpreters were uncovered during the proceedings.

For example, there is a military correspondence that discusses three officers who had been appointed court interpreters but refused to take the interpreter's oath, citing their own lack of qualification in spoken Japanese

(CINCAFPAC Manila 1945). In response to this incident, the Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific, asks in a message dated October 28, 1945 (one day before the Yamashita trial convened), "Why was competent interpreter personnel not selected in sufficient time to prevent this outrageous failure?"

Yamashita had a personal interpreter named Masakatsu Hamamoto. The Harvard-educated Hamamoto had been a civilian interpreter attached to the Japanese army during the war. He was indispensable to the communications that took place outside the courtroom such as for discussions between Yamashita and his counsel and for Yamashita's psychiatric evaluations. But Hamamoto was not permitted to act as an official court interpreter because he was also a prisoner of war.

According to A. Frank Reel (1971: 145-146), who was one of Yamashita's defense attorneys,

The official court interpreters were divided into two groups – American *Nisei* soldiers, whose Japanese was fairly good when restricted to elementary or "kindergarten" expressions but whose English left much to be desired, causing them frequently to take liberties in altering counsel's questions to fit their knowledge of the languages, and a number of American naval and marine officers, whose English was excellent but whose Japanese was spotty and required constant use of translation dictionaries.

This account is confirmed by Suelo Ito (2006) who was one of the interpreters at the Yamashita trial. Ito, a Hawaiian *Nisei*, states that he learned only military Japanese and never learned standard Japanese during his nine-month training at the Military Intelligence Service Language School. He admits the fact that he had difficulty interpreting legal language and "had to consult dictionaries all the time".

To address this problem, Hamamoto was permitted to sit beside Yamashita during the trial to do whisper-interpreting from English into Japanese. Reel writes (*ibid.*), "This was a *tour de force* of stupendous proportions that had the effect of shortening the proceedings by many weeks, for, without Hamamoto, the court interpreters would have had to translate the entire trial for the accused." Hamamoto, however, was not allowed to interpret Yamashita's testimony into English for the court. Concerned about the competency of the official court interpreter, Yamashita said to the interpreter before he took the witness stand: "Yamashita wants no mistakes. On long sentences I will repeat them twice. Listen carefully – with the brain as well as with the ear" (*ibid.*: 146).

The official interpreters' renditions were slow and required frequent pauses. Reel uses such adjectives as "painstaking", "bumbling" and "exasperating" in references to the official interpreters in his book (*ibid.*:14-15, 148). In addition, discussions over disputed translations took much of the time in court. There was even an incident in which newspaper reporters who had pointed out interpreting errors were called to testify in court and to elaborate on their opinions (*ibid.*: 45-49).

Yamashita was sentenced to death by hanging on December 7, 1945 (the fourth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack), and executed on February 23, 1946. Interviews with Takashi Oka (2005) and Masakazu Shimada (2000) confirm that the recruiting and testing of Japanese interpreters for the IMTFE took place in January and February 1946. Documents that explicitly link the interpreting problems in Manila to the tribunal's decision to open its interpreter search to Japanese nationals have not been located. A number of correspondences (in *the Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II* in the National Archives), however, clearly suggest that the Legal Section of the SCAP, which established the procedural guidelines of the IMTFE, was aware of the interpreting problems in Manila. The IMTFE could not afford to have the same problems, given the fact that it was an international forum and not a U.S. military trial, and that it had attracted close attention from all over the world. The tribunal must have recognized the need for competent interpreters, regardless of nationality or civilian status, who could facilitate smooth proceedings. This can explain the inclusion of Japanese nationals in the interpreting arrangements. This view is supported by Shimada's remarks (ibid.: 20-21), discussed below.

5.3.3. *Nisei* monitors

Many of the recruited interpreters were former or active diplomats with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shimada was a former soldier with the Japanese Imperial Army. Given the fact that three foreign ministers, two diplomats and 17 military leaders were included among the 28 defendants, these interpreters were, in effect, interpreting in a trial in which their former superiors' lives were at stake.

Just as it is hard to imagine former Nazi members interpreting at Nuremberg, it is conceivable that the tribunal was concerned about its interpreters' "impartiality" and was loath to appear dependent on citizens of the defeated nation; hence, the tribunal decided to establish a system to regulate and control the interpreters' work. Documents that explicitly describe such concerns on the part of the tribunal and the decision to monitor the interpreting have not been found, but interviews with Shimada (2000) and Oka (2005, 2006) generally support such a supposition. According to Shimada (ibid: 20-21), the tribunal's Language Section selected four *Nisei* to supervise the Japanese interpreters because the chief of the section did not understand the Japanese language.

The fact that all the prepared translations, such as the opening statements and the judgment, were rendered by the *Nisei* monitors indicates the tribunal's preference for using non-Japanese rather than Japanese citizens. Shimada says (ibid.: 34):

It was a given from the beginning, and it was expected. Whether it's the judgment or something else, it's the Americans who should be interpreting. Everything! But because they were not competent, Japanese were hired ... There were no such [capable American] people. Something formal, like the arraignment - things that were presented at the beginning and the end

of the trial - were prepared in writing beforehand. They were translated, Japanese lawyers checked them, and Americans read [the translations at the trial]. So, we never said anything like “Tojo, death by hanging!”

5.3.4. *Language arbiter*

As cited in the judgment, the Language Arbitration Board was established as a “referee” to settle disputes over translations and interpretations. When a translation or interpretation was challenged by the defense or the prosecution, the tribunal president referred the matter to the language arbiter. After deliberation among the board members outside the courtroom, the language arbiter announced the ruling in the following court session. Major Lardner Moore was the first language arbiter. According to Moore (1980), a naturalized Japanese-American lawyer represented the prosecution, and a Japanese citizen who had been the editor of an English magazine represented the defense. Moore says he let these two members of the board discuss and agree on the rulings and merely reported their decisions to the court.

After Moore was discharged, Captain Kraft assumed the arbiter position. The roster of the Military Intelligence Service Language School indicates that Kraft had studied Japanese in elementary level classes for only one year. According to Moore (*ibid.*), however, he was more involved in the board’s deliberations and he “had his own ideas about what’s to be done”.

The Language Arbitration Board probably served to minimize the time spent discussing interpreting and translation disputes in court. In addition, the language arbiter most likely kept an eye on the monitors as well. All the *Nisei* monitors except Miyamoto were *Kibei*, who suffered even greater prejudice than other Japanese Americans, as they were suspected of being “pro-Japanese” (Kono 2003). The *Kibei* monitors had all been sent to internment camps after the Pearl Harbor attack. Although they volunteered from the camps to go to the U.S. military’s Japanese language school to teach or train for military intelligence, they had to fight prejudice and suspicions of disloyalty within the U.S. army while they served in the Pacific (McNaughton 1994). (See the testimonial videos by Japanese American veterans in the Military Intelligence Service Resource Center website.) One of the interviewees, who worked as a translator at the IMTFE, mentioned the resentment he felt when he was sent to the Pacific from the language school with a dog tag that had the address of the internment camp where his parents were detained (Kawamoto 2005). The SCAP may have been concerned that these monitors were sympathetic to the Japanese defendants because of their background, and thus wanted to deter them from being too accommodating of the defendants’ needs. The language arbiter, a Caucasian military officer, may have functioned to address such concerns, and to give the appearance that the U.S. military was in charge of the procedure.

The absence of high-ranking Japanese Americans at the time could also explain why Caucasian military officers fulfilled the role as language arbiter. Organizational planning documents of the tribunal (in *the Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II* in the National Archives) called for an officer of a specific military rank to fill each of the high

positions in respective sections, including the Language Section. (This is another example of hierarchical positions dictating their own roles, regardless of their competence.) Designated as “enemy aliens”, Japanese Americans were never allowed in the Navy’s Japanese language schools (Slesnick 2006: 2-3). Even those who went to the Army’s language school were not commissioned until toward the end of the war. This war-time segregation may explain the absence of *Nisei* in higher positions in the Language Section as well.

5.3.5. *Summary*

Monitoring the work of interpreters out of concerns over their competence and/or “impartiality” has been part of the history of interpreting. The Nuremberg Trial also had an interpreter monitoring system. However, considering the fact that the interpreting errors were sometimes corrected by the interpreters themselves by checking the daily transcript against the verbatim recording (Gaiba 1998: 71, 97-98), it seems more reasonable to characterize this system as a means to ensure smooth operation of the interpreting arrangements in a formal international setting during the nascent stage of simultaneous interpreting, rather than as a means to police the interpreter’s behavior.

The interpreter monitoring system at the IMTFE was quite different. As previously discussed, in the socio-political context, when a party in power has to rely on interpreters who do not have shared interest or affiliation, the party may set up a system to regulate and control the interpreters out of concern over their trustworthiness. This scenario is evident in the case of the IMTFE: The tribunal wanted to use U.S. military personnel as interpreters, but it found them incompetent and had to resort to bilingual Japanese nationals. The tribunal did not trust the “impartiality” of those Japanese interpreters, and was loath to appear dependent on citizens of the defeated nation. So, it used four Japanese Americans to monitor the interpretation. The language arbiter (a Caucasian US army officer) may also have functioned to keep an eye on the Japanese American monitors, who may have been suspected of being sympathetic to the accused, and to maintain the appearance that the U.S. military was in charge. And all of these linguists were under the supervision of the chief of the Language Section, usually a navy officer who studied Japanese at the navy’s exclusive language school but did not have a good command of the language.

In sum, this hierarchical structure of linguists functioned as a display of authority and a check against any “bad faith” harbored by those who didn’t seem to share the same interests with the tribunal. The pilot study in the following chapter will examine whether the relative positions of the interpreters and the monitors in the hierarchy influenced their behavior during the interpreting process.

5.4. *“The making of an interpreter user”: the tribunal’s attitude toward interpreting*

Another important aspect of interpreting at the IMTFE is the fact that none of the linguists received professional interpreter training. While they were untrained “chance” or “natural” interpreters, the tribunal seemed equally inexperienced in using the service of interpreters. Some remarks made by the court during early stages of the trial indicate its lack of understanding in how interpreting works. However, through repeated appeal by the defense, especially by the head of the Japanese counsel, the chief of the Language Section and the language arbiter, the tribunal came to terms with the interpreters’ requirements and became an effective user of interpreters over time. The change in the court’s attitude toward interpreting can be observed over the first year of the trial when most of the discussions on the interpreting procedures took place.

On May 3, 1946 (the first day of the court session), the chief of the Language Section pleaded with the president of the tribunal, Australian judge Sir William Webb, informing him that the interpreter would not be able to interpret unless the speaker paused when directed. The court was not responsive. On May 6, Major Moore, language arbiter, delivered a formal request of the Language Section to the court that the speakers wait until the interpretation was completed as the interpreters were losing the opportunity to interpret and many of the remarks were not being interpreted. Webb responded by suggesting that a summary be sufficient for the proceedings for the sake of saving time. The chief of the Language Section reminded him of the charter article on language, but Webb still insisted upon a summarized interpretation. This discussion ended with the other counsel’s remarks that the planned installation of simultaneous interpreting equipment would solve the problem.

On May 14, the interpreter was struggling because the speaker was reading a prepared statement without pause and the Japanese translation was not available to the interpreter. In response to the interpreter’s request to the speaker to break down his remarks, Webb said, “Well, this interpreter has no difficulty in reading passage for passage. I do not see why he cannot string them all together (TP: 204).” He directed the speaker to complete the statement. The interpreter’s incomplete and inaccurate interpretation caused a disruption of the court proceeding. Moore attributed the difficulty of interpreting between English and Japanese to the differences in sentence structures. Webb still responded, “Well, I cannot understand yet why he can interpret paragraph for paragraph ... and yet not be able to string those paragraphs together” (ibid.: 216). Moore suggested providing the interpreter with the translation beforehand for prepared speeches. The chief of the Language Section conveyed a strong request from the defense team for “a complete and accurate translation verbatim”, not a summarization. Webb’s ruling was to continue summarization and provide a full translation to the defense later. Despite the Japanese lead counsel’s repeated objections, which included reminding the president of the charter article on language for fair trial, Webb insisted that the speaker read the whole text without “interruptions” by the interpreter with a promise of providing a full translation at a later time.

On May 15, in response to the defense’s persistent request to have the Japanese translation of prepared remarks furnished beforehand for the

interpreters and the defense, Webb finally granted permission for such a procedure and for sentence-by-sentence interpreting.

As of June 25, Webb's interpretation of the article on language in the tribunal charter was that it provided that "the proceedings shall be conducted in two languages (*ibid.* 1,301)". As discussed in a previous section, he would change his position on this matter three months later by accommodating the requests from the French and Russian prosecutors to speak their own languages.

On July 23, in response to the Japanese lead counsel's complaints about incomplete or skipped interpretations due to the complexity of relay interpreting involving the Chinese language, Webb argued that (*ibid.*: 2,405-2,406):

Well, as I explained before, all this interpretation of every word is not required in the interests of justice. It is required in the interests of propaganda. That is the whole point. This elaborate system of interpreting every word does not obtain in any national court. We try murderers there. We try men who cannot speak the English language, but we do not have all of this interpreting. I would like the Japanese to understand that. The Charter really is mostly concerned with the Japanese people understanding what is happening in this Court. It is not required in the interests of justice.

On July 25, Webb relayed to the court Moore's complaint whereby the unnecessary length of questions would make the interpreter's task the most difficult, and added that making the translations available to the interpreters could mitigate the difficulty of their task. Further, drawing on Moore's feedback, Webb referred to the difficulty of interpreting questions in negative form, and suggested using the affirmative form when possible. Then Webb told the counsel, "I again urge counsel to make their questions short and clear, and to give due notice of any passage from a report or other document which they desire to be read to the witness. (*ibid.*: 2,478)."

On August 19, when Chief Prosecutor Keenan pointed out an interpreting error, Webb asked the interpreter for clarification. Observing the interpreter being pressed, Moore said, "any question of the translation in open court simply puts an added burden on the translators and is irritating to them (*ibid.*: 3,981)", and offered his explanation on the error.

On October 11, based on a discussion he had with Moore the day before, Webb stressed to the court the following three points: "We should all speak into the microphone, speak slowly, and speak in short sentences if possible. (*ibid.*: 8,776)" Later, in response to a prosecutor's complaint at being stopped by the interpreter, Webb said, "... our very efficient translators are always doing their best ... They have a most difficult task and they are doing it admirably. That is the opinion of the Tribunal. (*ibid.*: 9,178)"

With these words - five months after the start of the trial - the court seems to have become more appreciative of how interpreting works and the difficulty of the task of interpreting, as the results of the persistent requests and patient explanations from the Language Section and the defense team. (A number of references to outside-courtroom discussions between Webb and Moore in the

transcripts indicate that Language Arbiter Moore was the main broker between the interpreters and the court.) The court had to listen to them and came to terms with their requirements in order to function and proceed under the circumstances.

Almost a year after the tribunal convened, Webb stopped showing any sign of his unfamiliarity with the working of interpreting and impatience with the interpreters as seen in his request that “all documents, including running commentaries of counsel, be presented to the Language Division forty-eight hours in advance in order to insure simultaneous interpretation, and that the Language Division be notified in advance of any deviations from the planned order of presentation” (ibid.: 21,281).

As observed above, norms the tribunal tried to establish at the beginning of the trial include: 1. the speaker can complete his remarks, however long they may be, before the interpreter starts his rendition; 2. a summarization in lieu of a full interpretation is sufficient; and 3. the speaker can read a prepared document and have it interpreted without submitting the translation beforehand. These expectancy norms (see p. 21 above) were challenged by the language arbiter and the Language Section Chief on behalf of the interpreters, and by the defense counsel. The interpreters’ cognitive limitations, i.e. that they could not interpret a long passage at a time or a speech that was read aloud from a document without access to the translation, were communicated to the tribunal mainly by Language Arbiter Moore. Complaints about not getting full and accurate interpreting, therefore not getting a fair trial, were raised by the defense counsel. To proceed with the trial, the tribunal’s expectancy norms were negotiated and changed to accommodate the feedback from various players in the court. The new norms that were developed over the first year of the trial include: 1. the speaker breaks down his remarks to short segments; 2. the interpreter delivers a full interpretation, not a summarization; and 3. the translation is provided to the interpreter beforehand when the speaker reads from a document.

6. A pilot study: Behavior of the linguists during the testimony of Hideki Tojo

In the previous chapter, the socio-political background of the interpreters and other linguists, and their hierarchical positions and roles in the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE were discussed. Whether these factors affected their behavior, choices and strategies during the interpreting process will now be examined by analyzing the interpreting during the testimony given by Hideki Tojo. As previously discussed, Tojo's testimony was chosen on the assumption that the most competent and experienced interpreters were assigned to it because Tojo was one of the last witnesses to testify, appeared toward the end of the court proceedings, and attracted close attention as the person who was considered most responsible for the war crimes of all of the accused.

6.1. Profiles of the Linguists

Hideki Tojo first took the witness stand on December 27, 1947. After the reading of his affidavit, the questioning started in the afternoon session of December 30, and ended in the morning session of January 7, 1948. The following are the interpreters and monitors who worked during those six days of testimony by Tojo. Captain Kraft (the second arbiter with one-year of Japanese language training) worked as language arbiter throughout these sessions .

Date	Monitor (<i>Nisei</i>)	Interpreters (Japanese nationals)
December 30, 1947 (PM)	Onodera	Masaki, Oka, Shimanouchi
December 31, 1947 (AM)	Onodera	Iwamoto, Taji, Shimanouchi
January 2, 1948 (AM)	Miyamoto	Shimanouchi, Oka, Taji, Yamanaka
January 2, 1948 (PM)	Itami	Shimanouchi, Shimada, Mori
January 5, 1948 (AM)	Itami	Shimanouchi, Oka, Taji, Mori
January 5, 1948 (PM)	Onodera	Shimanouchi, Oka, Mori
January 6, 1948 (AM)	Itami	Shimanouchi, Mori, Taji, Oka
January 6, 1948 (PM)	Onodera	Oka, Shimanouchi, Mori, Shimada
January 7, 1948 (AM)	Miyamoto	Shimanouchi, Iwamoto, Mori, Taji

(The interpreters' names are in the same order as they appear in the Japanese transcripts of the court proceedings. The transcripts do not show which interpreter interpreted a given portion of the proceedings. There is no reference to any names of the linguists in the English transcripts except to Captain Kraft as language arbiter.)

As monitor, Onodera worked in four sessions, Itami in three sessions and Miyamoto in two sessions. As for the interpreters, Shimanouchi worked in all nine sessions, Oka and Mori in six sessions, Taji in five sessions, Shimada and Iwamoto in two sessions and Masaki and Yamanaka in one session. Their personal profiles will be discussed, highlighting some elements that may explain certain behavior these linguists displayed during Tojo's testimony. The course of historical events that led them to become part of the IMTFE will also be reviewed in order to present a more comprehensive picture of the sociopolitical setting in which they operated.

6.1.1. Monitors

As previously mentioned, the most documented figure of all the linguists was David Akira Itami, who was considered the leader of the monitor team. According to Kinashi (1985), the special issue of *Daito Forum* (2000) and Otake (2005), Itami was born in California in 1911, moved to Japan at the age of three and was raised and educated there until 19. He once volunteered for the Japanese Imperial Army, but was rejected due to what was officially stated as inadequate health. According to Kinashi (ibid.), Itami speculated that it was due to his dual citizenship. At the time he left Japan in 1931, Itami had been studying Chinese classics and Indian philosophy at Daito Bunka Gakuin - currently Daito Bunka University - in Tokyo. Upon his return to California, Itami attended the University of California at Los Angeles before becoming a reporter for a newspaper for the Japanese American community in California. After the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, he was sent to an internment camp along with over 100,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans on the west coast of the United States. He volunteered teaching at the Military Intelligence Service Language School in Minnesota, and later worked in military intelligence during the war. He broke coded conversations (spoken in the dialect of the region where he grew up) between Japanese government officials and for this and many other intelligence activities he received the Legion of Merit, the highest medal for non-combatants. After the IMTFE, Itami stayed with the ATIS as a translator for the Korean War, but in 1950 at the age of 39 he shot himself. In Otake's article (ibid.), Itami's friend, Kinashi, and Itami's daughter discuss the prejudice Itami experienced for being an Asian in American society and being *Kibei* in the *Nisei* community. Further, they cite the emotional strains he suffered during the IMTFE as one of the reasons for his suicide.

According to Yukio Kawamoto (2005), his distant cousin, Sho Onodera was a Seattle-born *Kibei*. The length of his education in Japan is not known. Given that Onodera was one of Itami's students in the most advanced class at the military language school (*Album and Roster of the Military Intelligence Service Language School*), his Japanese must have been good, but probably not the native level in some aspect at that time. Onodera highly regarded Itami's knowledge of the Japanese language, especially his mastery of Chinese characters, and of the Japanese culture. After working at the IMTFE and other war crimes trials, Onodera returned to the United States to attend Oberlin College. He didn't complete his studies to obtain a degree, but was hired as a

correspondent for a Japanese newspaper and ran its New York office. He died before he reached 60.

Much of the background of Lanny Miyamoto is unknown. After returning to the United States from Japan, he ran a photo shop and taught Japanese martial art *judo* in the Baltimore area (Kawamoto 2005). According to Shimada (2000) and Oka (2005), Miyamoto was the youngest of all the monitors and his Japanese was rather weak to function as a monitor. Oka does not believe he was *kibei*. According to one of his *judo* students (Anderson 2005), Miyamoto died around 2001.

Whether or not they had some years of education in Japan, all of these monitors lived through the very difficult times that Japanese Americans experienced in the 1930s and 1940s. In those days, because of the prejudice and discrimination against them, the only jobs available to Japanese Americans were “houseboys, gardeners and fruit and vegetable salesmen” (Michi Itami quoted in Otake *ibid.*), and even after receiving higher education they worked within their own communities. After Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, nearly 120,000 Japanese Americans and Japanese on the west coast were forcibly relocated to internment camps as “enemy aliens”. The following testimony before a congressional committee by Army General DeWitt, the administrator of the internment program, epitomizes the fierce hatred against Japanese Americans in those days: “A Jap’s a Jap. ... I don’t want any of them here. They are a dangerous element. ... American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty. ... But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.”

At the same time, realizing the need for linguists in the war operations, the army started looking for qualified *Nisei* to train for military intelligence. It was a challenging task. Hosokawa (1969/2002: 397) writes:

The vast majority of *Nisei* were too thoroughly Americanized. Of the first 3,700 men interviewed, only 3 percent proved to speak Japanese fluently. The next 4 percent could be considered fairly proficient in the language. Another 3 percent knew just enough so that they could be thrown into intensive training; only one *Nisei* in ten understood a useful amount of his ancestral tongue. And even the best of them had to be taught military vocabulary and usage. Almost invariably the best qualified were *Kibei*, thanks to their education in Japan. Ironically, they as a group had been the first to be condemned as potentially the most likely to be disloyal.

More than 6,000 *Nisei* served in the war operations in the Pacific after training in the Military Intelligence Service Language School. Some of them were “loaned” to the navy as it did not accept *Nisei* enlistments. (The navy had its own Japanese language schools just for Caucasian officers, but they didn’t produce many competent linguists.) *Nisei* served extremely well and earned recognition for their valuable contribution. Colonel Mashibir, the ATIS commander, wrote in his autobiography (in Hosokawa *ibid.*: 399):

Had it not been for the loyalty, fidelity, patriotism, and ability of these American *Nisei*, that part of the war in the Pacific which was dependent upon intelligence gleaned from captured documents and prisoners of war would have been a far more hazardous, long-drawn-out affair. The United States of America owes a debt to these men and to their families which it can never fully repay.

Those *Nisei* linguists were indispensable during the U.S. occupation of Japan after the war as well. Itami, Onodera and Miyamoto came to Tokyo in that sociopolitical climate. It would be impossible to know what kind of emotional and psychological states these individuals were in during the IMTFE. A number of testimonials by *Nisei* linguists who worked in military intelligence during the war, however, discuss their emotional torment, humiliation, resentment and ambivalence about being sent to camps by the same government that later took advantage of them in the war against the country of their parents (e.g. essays by *Nisei* in the website of Discover Nikkei). McNaughton (1994) provides the following insight into how these American *Nisei* linguists may have viewed their opponents, the Japanese:

At a deeper level of analysis, for those who joined the Military Intelligence Service to become linguists the way they served was more specific to their heritage, and thus psychologically more complex. Whether translating captured diaries or radio messages, or interrogating prisoners of war, they had to confront issues of identity and heritage in ways that most other American soldiers could not even imagine. Although for most of them, learning the Japanese language was a major challenge involving six months of hard work, the knowledge and appreciation of Japanese culture and society they had absorbed from their parents and upbringing gave them a unique perspective on the enemy they faced. They had a capacity, all too rare at that time, for seeing their opponents as human beings, rather than animals.

With this historical, social, cultural and political context of the monitors' background in mind, their behavior during the interpreted testimony of Hideki Tojo will be examined.

6.1.2. Interpreters

The monitors weren't the only linguists who were born in the United States. According to the information contained in his sister's memoriam (ATPAM.com 2005), Toshiro (Henry) Shimanouchi, who interpreted in all the sessions during Tojo's testimony, was born in 1910 in California to immigrant parents. His father, until his death in an internment camp, was the publisher of a Japanese language newspaper. Upon graduating from Occidental College in 1931, Shimanouchi was unable to find work in California and returned to Japan to start working for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (He had dual citizenship.) He had a

distinguished career with the Ministry. His assignments included serving as Japanese Consul General in Los Angeles and Ambassador to Norway.

Takashi Oka, the only known surviving interpreter, was a student at Rikkyo (St. Paul) University in Tokyo at the time of the IMTFE. He was born in Tokyo in 1924. His mother was a diplomat's daughter who lived in the United States and Canada from age 12 to 20. His father worked for an American company. Oka grew up speaking English to his mother and Japanese to his father. He went to an American school in Tokyo from the first to fifth grades, and attended Japanese high schools. He had to give up on his hope of going to college in the United States due to the political climate of that time and entered Rikkyo instead in 1944. During the war he could not study much because students at that time had to serve the country by working in munitions factories and on farms. After the war, he was hired as a translator by the IPS which was preparing for the IMTFE. His work was mainly to check Japanese-into-English translations done by others. Oka took the test for court interpreters at the IMTFE in January or February 1946. Although he was the youngest interpreter at the trial, Oka interpreted most frequently after Shimanouchi and Shimada. After the last day of the summations by the prosecution and defense on April 16, 1948 (there was no court session until November 4 when the judgment stage started), he left Japan to study at a university in the United States. He obtained a BA from Principia University and an MA in international and regional studies from Harvard University. When he completed his doctoral course work at Harvard, he was recruited by the Christian Science Monitor. Thus his long, distinguished career as a journalist started. His assignments included Tokyo Bureau Chief for the Christian Science Monitor and the New York Times, and the Editor-in-Chief for Newsweek Japan. After serving as Senior Advisor for the Liberal Party of Japan, he retired in Washington, D.C. At the time of the interview (2005), Oka was working towards completing his doctoral dissertation in policy studies at Oxford University.

There is not much information available on Tomio Mori, who interpreted in six sessions during Tojo's testimony. According to documents issued by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, his title was "Embassy Third Secretary" at the time the Ministry appointed him as one of its three employees to become court interpreters at the initial stage of the IMTFE.

Makoto Taji became one of the core interpreters later during the trial, and he interpreted in five sessions of Tojo's testimony. According to Oka (2006), he was raised in a bilingual household with an English mother and his English was excellent.

Masakazu Shimada was born in 1912 to a Japanese mother and a German father who was a railway engineer hired by the Japanese government. He was educated at an international school in Yokohama. When the war ended, he was in the Pacific as a soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army. He almost died, but was saved by the Allied Powers. After recovery, he was sent to the ATIS to work as a translator, and later was recruited as a court interpreter for the IMTFE. He interpreted most frequently after Shimanouchi during the trial, and worked in two sessions of Tojo's testimony. Later on, he became a journalist. He had retired and

was living in Australia at the time of the interview by Kondo and Watanabe (2000).

Masahito Iwamoto was born in Tokyo in 1891. His parents were prominent figures in the Japanese literary world. His mother's translation of *Little Lord Fauntleroy* (Frances Hodgson Burnet) is considered one of the most successful literary works of that time. Iwamoto's daughter, Mari, was a renowned violinist. According to Oka (2005), Iwamoto was married to an American Quaker who was a university lecturer, and was working at the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo when the IMTFE was seeking interpreters. Oka says that Iwamoto was a traditional man and applied for a court interpreter position because he wanted to serve the Emperor as his final duty should the Emperor be called upon to testify at the IMTFE. He interpreted in two sessions during Tojo's testimony.

Hideki Masaki and Masao Yamakawa were sent by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to work as interpreters at the IMTFE. Masaki's father was a famous general in the Japanese Imperial Army, who was arrested after the war as a Class A war criminal but never indicted in the IMTFE. Masaki joined the Foreign Ministry in 1931. Starting in 1959, he served as interpreter to the Emperor for about 30 years. Masaki died in 2001 at the age of 93. Yamanaka's background is not known except that he was Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of his appointment as court interpreter at the IMTFE. Masaki and Yamanaka both interpreted in one session during Tojo's testimony.

There is no way to even speculate on the views that these interpreters had, collectively or individually, on the IMTFE. It is a fact, however, that they were hired by the former enemy of their country; and they were interpreting in a trial in which their former superiors and leaders were accused of committing war crimes and thus threatened with the death sentence. It should also be noted that the interpreters had relatively privileged backgrounds and were among the elite in Japanese society. This is in stark contrast to the backgrounds of the monitors who, as sons of immigrants, had to fight prejudice and discrimination in American society.

6.2. The monitors' behavior

According to Watanabe (1998: 19), during Tojo's testimony, the interpreters interpreted a total of 1,178 English utterances into Japanese and 845 Japanese utterances into English; and the number of the interjections by the monitors was 161 for interpretation from English into Japanese (18 per session on average), and 35 for interpretation from Japanese into English (4 per session on average). This means that the monitor interjected 13% of the times when the interpretation was from English into Japanese and 4% of the times when the interpretation was from Japanese into English. These statistics, however, merely cover the interjections recorded on the English and Japanese transcripts. As previously discussed, neither the transcripts nor the audio track of the motion pictures are complete; therefore, it is not feasible to count the exact numbers of the interjections. The following examination is based on the interpretive analysis by

the author of the interjections by the monitors to the extent that they are reflected on the transcripts and the audio of the films.

6.2.1. *Valid corrections and erroneous corrections*

Although there is no definition of the functions of the monitor in any official documents of the IMTFE, it is clear based on the transcripts and audio recording of the trial that one of the monitor's main functions was to correct errors in interpretation. During Tojo's testimony, the number of corrections made by the monitor for patent errors in the interpretation was two to three per session on average. (The interpreter interpreted a total of 225 utterances per session on average.) In addition to simple errors such as those involving numbers, there were some major meaning errors that were corrected. In the following example, President Webb's question during the proceedings on January 2 was interpreted to give the exact opposite meaning as the original. Monitor Miyamoto immediately corrected the error.

The President: He was not asked any question that bore on guilt or innocence. He was merely asked his opinion on the law. If I am asked whether I think aggressive war is a crime and I say that I think it is not a crime, am I guilty of anything?

Interpreter: *Shonin wa yuzai ka mujitsu ka to iu koto ni taishite nanra shitsumon o ukete orimasen. Shonin wa tanni horitsu no kaishaku ni tsuite shitsumon o uketani sugimasen. Moshi watashi ga shinryaku senso wa hanzai de aruka inaka to iu mondai ni tsuite kikareta baaini hanzai nari to kotaeta nara watashi wa sokode yuzai ni narimasuka?*

(The witness has not been asked any questions about being guilty or innocent. The witness was only asked a question about the interpretation of the law. If I am asked whether or not aggressive war is a crime and I answer it is a crime, will I be found guilty?)

Monitor: *Shinryaku senso wa hanza de nai to watashi wa kotaeta to sureba, watashi wa tsumi o okashia koto ni narimasuka?*

(If I answer that aggressive war is not a crime, will it mean that I committed a crime?)

This type of correction would help the court avoid possible confusion and disruption arising from inaccurate interpretation. In some cases, however, the monitor made erroneous corrections. Such errors by the monitor occurred at least once per session on average. In the example below, on December 31, Monitor Onodera makes the following erroneous correction of the examination by Chief Prosecutor Keenan.

Keenan: Do you claim as one justification for attacking the United States and the other Western Powers that they were interfering with your plans for Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity?

Interpreter: *Beikoku oyobi hoka no seio shokoku ni taishite kogeki o suru iiwake no hitotsu to shite korera no shokoku ga anata no daito kyoeiken ni kansuru keikaku o jamashite otta karada to shucho itashimasuka?*

(Do you claim as one of the excuses to attack the United States and other Western nations that these nations were interfering with your plans for Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity?)

Monitor: *Jamashite otta no ga seijoka suru hitotsu no riyu de atta to iimasuka?*

(Do you say that the interference was one of the reasons for normalization?)

This type of error committed by the monitors suggests that they were not always reliable checkers on the accuracy of the interpretation. What should be noted here is that the interpreters never objected to such errors made by the monitors, except on one occasion on January 2 when Miyamoto repeatedly made the same error and the interpreter had to correct it. Being fully aware of their relative position in the hierarchy of the interpreting structure, the interpreters seem to have had an understanding that they were not permitted to speak for themselves, and probably felt that they should not expose their supervisors' weaknesses.

6.2.2. Unnecessary corrections

On a number of occasions (about a dozen times per session on average), the monitor presented his version of a given interpretation by adding what the interpreter had omitted, or changing the wording or phrasing of the original interpretation. In many cases, the monitor's version was valid and provided completeness and clarity to the interpretation. In the following example from the afternoon session on January 5, the interpretation of a question posed by Keenan was not very articulate, and Monitor Onodera offered his version which gave more clarity.

Keenan: You have put in the weasel words, first, "fully," and secondly, "exactly." I am asking you if you can tell us what was meant at all by that, or if you have no idea what was meant by that phrase?

Interpreter: *Anata wa hakkiri de aru toka daitai de aru toka iu kotoba o chanpon ni tsukaimashite kekkyoku nani o itte orunoka wakaranai no de arimasu. Ittai douiu koto o anata wa iwanto shiteorunoka. Hakkiri kokode itte itadakitai.*

(You used words like "clearly" or "generally" all mixed together, and I do not understand what you are saying after all. What are you trying to say? I would like you to say it clearly here.)

Monitor: *Anata wa hakkiri to wa shiranai, kakujitsu ni wa shiranai. Ittai sorede wa sukoshiwa shitteoru to iu imidesuka? Sukoshimo shiranai to iu imi desuka? Shitte orunaraba kokode itte kudasai.*

(You don't know clearly. You don't know for certain. Does it mean that you know a little? Does it mean that you don't know at all? If you know, please say it now.)

There were some cases, however, in which the monitor's version was unnecessary or more confusing than the original interpretation. Monitor Miyamoto made such interjections significantly more often than the other two monitors (about 10 times per session). In this example, the interpretation of a question by Keenan on January 2 has no addition or omission and delivers the original meaning cohesively. Miyamoto, however, gives his rendition of the question anyway.

Keenan: And the next entry is "The Booty"; and it includes "Arms, 482,257." Wouldn't that indicate that that was attempting to get an exact figure?

Interpreter: *Sono tsugi no kisaijiko wa senrihin to natte orimasu. Soshite buki to iu kou ni 482,257 to kaite arimasu. Kore o mitemo hijoni seikakuna suji o arawaso to shiteiru funi natte orimasenka?*

(The next entry is "The Booty". And it states 482,257 under the item "Arms". Looking at this, doesn't it appear to be trying to present an exact number?)

Monitor: *Seikakuna suji o motomeyo to doryoku shiteiru to iukoto ga ukagawaremasenka, soreni yotte?*

(By that, can't you sense that it is making efforts to seek an exact number?)

In the same session, Miyamoto's interjection made the following interpretation of Keenan's question less articulate.

Keenan: Well, wouldn't you say the plain truth of the matter was that the YONAI Cabinet did not seize the opportunity of making the best of the situation for Japan in its plan for expansion and taking advantage of the turn of events in the European War? Isn't that a rather fair summation of the situation?

Interpreter: *Shikashi, jujitsu o sekirara ni ieba kekkyoku Yonai naikaku wa toji no jokyo o toraete soreno kikai o riyo shite toji no zenbu no josei o riyoshite Nihon no kakucho o hakarukoto, soshite Yoroppa no josei ni umaku binjosuru koto o shinakatta to iu noga genin de atta to iu no ga jijitsu dewa arimasenka?*

(However, if the bare truth is told, wouldn't it be true that it was because the Yonai cabinet did not seize the situation of that time to make use of the

opportunity and make use of the overall situation of that time to seek Japan's expansion, and did not take advantage of the situation in Europe?)

Monitor: *Chotto shusei itashimasu. Yonai naikaku wa tojino Oshu senso no tenkanki o riyoshi, Nihon no kakuchō kakudai o surutame ni sono jiki o riyoshi, kokeiki o riyoshinakatta to iu jotai o tadashiku itta koto ni narimasenka?*

(Let me modify it a little. Wouldn't it be correctly referring to a situation in which the Yonai cabinet made use of the turning point in the European War at that time and made use of that time for Japan's expansion and enlargement, and didn't make use of the good opportunity?)

These types of unnecessary interjections may simply be attributable to the monitors' insufficient capacity to quickly and accurately evaluate the interpreter's performance and provide his own version of interpretation on the fly. There were cases when the interpreter's errors were unchecked by the monitor as well. In the case of Miyamoto, however, his youth and weak Japanese (Shimada 2000, Oka 2005) may have led to his apparent eagerness to jump in and prove himself as a functioning monitor. He interrupted in the middle of a rendition by the interpreter more frequently than the other monitors.

6.2.3. Explaining the question, the procedure and beyond

During Tojo's testimony, the monitors sometimes offered the witness explanations on the questions he was asked and procedural matters that concerned him. For example, in the morning session on January 2, when Keenan quoted from an English translation of a Japanese document and used improperly translated words, the interpreter did not translate those words back to Japanese and used the corresponding word in the original Japanese document instead. Monitor Itami interrupted the interpretation and explained the situation to Tojo.

Keenan: Well, to simplify the matter, Mr. TOJO, and to come back to KIDO diary, I will quote his language. He said that the War Minister had just secretly recommended TOJO for War Minister, and I suggest to you that that was the language of Kido and not my own. Do you say KIDO was wrong about that?

Interpreter: *Soredewa mondai o kantan ni suru tame ni watashi wa futatabi Kido nikki ni modori sono naiyo kara inyo shimasu. Kare wa sono nakade rikusou yori konin ni Tojo o naiso...*

(Then, to simplify the matter, I am going back to Kido diary again and quoting from it. It says that the War Minister unofficially reported of Tojo as his successor to the emperor by *naiso*...)

Monitor: *Sorewa Nihon-bun no genbun niwa naiso to arimasuga, kensatsukan no yomareta eibun niwa himitsuri ni tenno ni suisenshita*

aruiwa sousenshita to iu kotoba ga arimasu.

(Here, the Japanese original text says “*naiso*”, but the English text the prosecutor read says “secretly recommended to the emperor” or “recommended to the throne”.)

“*Naiso*” means “an unofficial report from his subject to the throne”. Keenan used an improper translation for “*naiso*” – “secret recommendation”. If Monitor Itami had not intervened, Tojo might have continued answering the question without knowing this error. This addition, therefore, was valid. The added explanation in the following example, however, may have been unnecessary. The interpreter’s rendition already has some explicitation, but Itami further added more explicit information in his own version of interpretation of Keenan’s question in the morning session on January 6.

Keenan: Was this principle of making the population of China contribute to the preparation for war with Soviet Russia based on the experience derived by the Kwantung Army from using the population of Manchuria for the same purpose?

Interpreter: *Tadaima no shisakuyoryo no nakani kaite arimasu tokoro no genjumin o taisosen junbi no shiseshimeru to iu koto wa Kanto-gun ni oite genjumin o sono maeni taisosen junbi wa tsukatta keiken kara kite orunodesuka?*

(Did the idea of using local people for the preparation for war against the Soviets, which is written in the “General Outline of Administration”, come from the Kwantung Army’s prior experience of using local people for war against the Soviets?)

Monitor: *Imano tokoro o setsumei shimasu. Hokushi ni chuoseifu o kensetsu seshimete hokushi no genjumin o taisosen junbi ni shiseshimeru to iu koto wa Kanto-gun wa katte Manshu ni oite Manshu no genjumin wo soiu senso junbi ni shiseshimeta keiken ni motozuita tokoro kara detamono de arimasuka?*

(Let me explain about this. Did the idea of establishing a central government in Northern China and using local people of Northern China for the preparation for war against the Soviets come from the experience that the Kwantung Army once used local people in Manchuria for the preparation for such war?)

The line of questions by Keenan in this part of the session concerned a document called the General Outline of the Administration. The interpreter made the words “the principle” in Keenan’s question more explicit by specifying that it referred to this document. This would have been sufficient for Tojo to understand the question, but Itami further added information by explaining the contents of the document, which seems totally unnecessary.

The monitor’s interjection in the next example concerns a procedural

explanation. In the morning session on January 7, when the proceedings were resumed after a recess and the interpretation of the last question before the recess was going to be repeated, Monitor Miyamoto explained this procedure to Tojo.

Interpreter: If the Tribunal please, the question of defense counsel just before the recess has been retranslated by the Language Section and will now be given to the witness.

Monitor: *Shonin, sakihodo no shitsumon o mo-ichido iikae mashite yomiage masukara yukkuri kiite kudasai.*

(Mr. Witness, the previous question will be rephrased and read out, so please take time to listen to it.)

These types of interjections may have been helpful not only for Tojo but also for the court to avoid possible confusion in the court proceedings. Itami's following interjection on January 6, however, seems to go beyond that and sounds almost like advising Tojo who was pressed hard by Keenan with a rhetorical question.

Keenan: But you still insist that when the Foreign Minister of Japan at that critical moment was sending a message to his own ambassador that he was employing diplomatic language that had various meanings and not using a direct instruction?

Interpreter: *Sorede anata wa nao kono judai naru jiki ni oite Nihon no gaimu daijin ga sono taishi ni taishite tsushin o okuru toki ni, iroiro na imi ni torero tokoro no gaikouteki jirei o mochiite ori, soshite chokusainaru kunrei o hasshite oranakatta to iukoto o shuchou nasaru no desuka?*

(Then, do you still assert that at the critical time the foreign minister of Japan sent his ambassador a correspondence which used diplomatic language that could be interpreted in various ways and didn't convey a direct instruction?)

Monitor: *Chotto sono ten o setsumei shimasu. Shonin, gokai no nai yoni. Kono kunrei no nakani tsukatte aru kotoba wa gaikojo no kotoba de aruka doka, soretomo sonotori no koto o imishite orunoka to iu imi no shitumon de arimasu.*

(Let me explain a little on this point. Mr. Witness, please do not misunderstand. This question means to ask whether the language included in the instruction is diplomatic language or it means what it says.)

Itami appears to want to help Tojo. This is also evident when earlier in the same session he interrupts Keenan's speech to let the witness continue and complete his answer. Asked about Proposals A and B, Tojo starts responding.

After Tojo utters one sentence, Keenan responds. Sensing that Tojo wants to continue, Itami interrupts Keenan to let the witness complete his response.

Tojo: *Sore wa chotto hanashi ga chigai masu...*
(That's a little different...)

Interpreter: Well, matters have turned out a bit differently now.

Keenan: I thought so.

Monitor: Just a minute please.

The tribunal was probably unaware of the nature of Itami's interjections. A possible reason for the apparent latitude Itami and other monitors had is that neither the Language Section Chief nor the language arbiter had the ability to check on the monitors' interjections in Japanese. As previously mentioned, Kraft had only a year of Japanese language training. Don Jones, who was the acting chief of the Language Section during Tojo's testimony, admits he was a "phony" linguist (Slesnick 2006: 314-315). Without Itami's own words, it would be impossible to know whether he had sympathy for Tojo and whether that affected his behavior as monitor. Kinashi (1985:112), however, claims in his biography of Itami that Itami had a favorable impression on Tojo's sincere character as a military man and helped Tojo to the extent he could as monitor by elucidating the examiners' legalese and giving Tojo more time to think before he answered.

6.2.4. *Interactions with the witness*

The monitors interacted with Tojo by clarifying with him directly and responding to his question. There are two to three such instances in each session. For example, in an examination by defense counsel on December 30, Monitor Onodera clarified with the witness the portions explicated by the interpreter in order to see if the interpreter's choice was correct:

Tojo: *Watashi no seikaku to shite mata watashi no hoshin to shite juyonaru tokoro no gaiko ni tsukimashite wa kore wa tougai sekininsha, sunawachi gaimu daijun to sodan shimasu. Gunji ni kanshite wa kare niwa issai yokai sasemasen.*

(Both by nature and as my policy, on important foreign affairs I consult the person responsible, that is the Foreign Minister. As for military affairs, I do not allow him to interfere at all.)

Interpreter: Both by my nature and as a matter of policy, on all important matters concerning foreign affairs I consulted that Foreign Minister; and as for military affairs, I did not allow HOSHINO to interfere.

Monitor: *Kare niwa yokai sasemasen to iu nowa gaimu daijin no kotodesuka?*

(When you say “I do not allow him to interfere”, are you referring to the Foreign Minister?)

Tojo: *Hoshino no koto desu.*

(I’m referring to Hoshino.)

Occasionally, Tojo asked for clarification of the interpretation, and the monitor, on behalf of the interpreter, responded to him directly. For example, in response to a question by Keenan on December 31, Tojo asks for clarification and Monitor Onodera gives a direct response:

Keenan: By the year 1941, Mr. TOJO, can you give us a rough estimate of the number of Chinese troops—of Japanese troops that had been dispatched to China in the previous decade?

Interpreter: *1941-nen genzai de sono kako junenkan Shina ni haken sareta Nihongun no kazu o nobete kudasai. Daitai no kazu o... Heiryoku o.* (As of 1941, please tell me the number of Japanese troops that had been sent to China over the past ten years. A rough estimate... of the troops.)

Tojo: *Shina ni haken sareta Nihon no heiryoku su desuka?*

(The number of the Japanese troops that were dispatched to China?)

Monitor: *So desu.*

(That’s right.)

It has been documented that these types of interjections by the interpreter take place even in today’s courtroom. They arise out of comprehension issues. Despite the commonly prescribed guidance for court interpreters to refrain from engaging with the witness without the court’s permission, the interpreter may instinctively attempt to solve problems by clarifying with the witness or directly responding to the witness. In some cases, the court may condone the interpreter’s such behavior to save time. During Tojo’s testimony, the monitor asked Tojo for clarification for his own purpose of checking the interpreter’s performance and responded to Tojo’s question on behalf of the interpreter. As discussed below, the interpreter did respond directly to Tojo’s questions from time to time. According to Oka (2005) and Shimada (2000), however, the interpreters were not permitted to speak on their own in principle. That is why the monitor, as the interpreter’s supervisor, responded to Tojo’s questions. There is nothing in the transcripts to indicate that the court was concerned about such interactions.

6.2.5. *Communicating to the court*

In addition to interacting with the witness, the monitor communicated to the court on behalf of the interpreter to explain issues in interpretation. In the example below, when Tojo's answer included a quote from a document in the morning session on January 5, Monitor Itami interjected to explain issues with the English translation of the document.

Tojo (through interpreter): Very well, I have many more. Next, in paragraph "c" of what he calls "Point 3 of Article " he writes the following—he makes the following silly remark, however, right in this part as follows: "c. In regard to the concessions, together with planning the extermination of enemy sympathizers, and the withdrawal of troops of belligerent countries, we will induce China to gradually take these back."

Monitor: This again is a quotation from the IPS translation of the HARADA diary. In regard to the words "enemy sympathizers" we have some doubts, but we have just read it from the text.

Tojo (through interpreter): The next is item 3. HARADA states: "In view of their strategic importance to our national defense, we will, if at all possible, take measures to secure the return of the former German and French territorial islands in the South Pacific through diplomatic negotiations."

Monitor: It seems that there are some translation errors in this English passage, but we have to reserve our correction for later.

The monitor also requested, on behalf of the interpreter, the Japanese and/or English court reporters read out from their records when the interpreter had trouble remembering the speaker's remarks or when clarification was needed in order to redo the interpretation. In the example below, Monitor Itami asks both the Japanese court reporter and the English court reporter to read from their records in response to Tojo's question on the interpretation.

Tojo: *Imi ga wakarimasen. Ima nowa yakushikata ga warui no dewa naika?*

(I don't understand the meaning. Isn't that interpretation bad?)

Interpreter: Well, I cannot quite understand. Maybe the translation is wrong. May I have it again?

Monitor: English reporter first, will you please? We will translate it again.

[Whereupon, the question was read by the official court reporter as follows: And you will also agree, I take it, that in appointing the Prime Minister of Japan SAIONJI was exercising the most important governmental function

that there was, isn't that true?]

[Whereupon, the Japanese court reporter read.]

Monitor: No correction.

As seen in these examples, the monitors functioned as spokesmen for the interpreters who were not allowed to have their own voices in the courtroom. In this context, having a clear division of labor - the interpreter interprets the proceedings and the monitor coordinates the communication - probably helped the court minimize confusion arising from interpreting issues.

6.2.6. Whispered input and instructions

Watanabe's discussion (1998) of interjections by the interpreters assumes that they spontaneously made corrections of their own interpretations. As far as the available portions of Tojo's filmed testimony are concerned, however, all the "self-corrections" by the interpreters for Japanese-to-English interpretations were prompted by the monitor's whispered input. Such input was quickly interjected in Japanese when the interpreter misspoke or struggled to come up with the next words.

This may be due to the monitors' inability to quickly offer their own version of interpretation after the interpreter's rendition. Or it may be because the monitors were more disciplined when they offered their versions of Japanese-to-English interpretation as the tribunal probably did not have the patience to listen to the monitor's version after the interpreter's rendition in English unless it was patently different. The tribunal did not understand whether or not the monitors' interjections were warranted when they were made in Japanese, and this was probably one of the reasons why there were many more interjections for English-to-Japanese interpretation than for Japanese-to-English interpretation. The tribunal, however, could have recognized the difference between the original interpretation and the monitor's version when the renditions were in English. Thus, the monitors probably refrained from making excessive corrections and irritating the tribunal, which was concerned about the speed of the proceedings.

The monitors also whispered to Tojo to interrupt him and tell him to break down his answer for the interpreter. In the audio, Monitor Miyamoto's blunt interruption "*chotto matte* (Wait a second.*)" is heard frequently. As far as the transcripts and the available audio are concerned, there is nothing to indicate that the monitors whispered to the examining counsel to interrupt. A less intrusive way - a flashing red light - was used to remind them to break down their questions. It is not known whether Tojo did not pay attention to the light, so that the monitors had to whisper to him to interrupt his answers, or whether monitors felt less inhibited about interrupting Tojo than the examining counsel.

6.3. The interpreters' behavior

As previously mentioned, the interpreters were not to speak on their own in principle. Once in a while, however, they responded directly to questions by the witness and the court. Further, they spontaneously provided an explanation on procedural matters to the witness. Although the number of such interjections is very small (about a dozen over the nine sessions), their nature will be examined to ascertain what might have prompted the interpreters to break “the rule” and speak out.

6.3.1. Directly responding to the witness and the court

On several occasions, the interpreter provided a quick answer directly in response to Tojo’s request for clarification. The following is an example.

Keenan: We will pass to another subject for a moment. Did the United States have anything to do with Japan embarking upon its career in Manchuria in 1931?

Interpreter: *1931-nen Nihon ga Manshu ni okeru kodo o kaishisuru ni atatte Beikoku wa nanika soreni kankei arimashitaka?*
(Did the United States have anything to do with Japan embarking upon its activity in Manchuria in 1931?)

Tojo: *Eikoku desuka, Beikoku desuka?*
(The United Kingdom or the United States?)

Interpreter: Beikoku, Amerika.
(The United States, America.)

In the following example, Keenan asks if he missed the interpretation and the interpreter responds without interpreting Keenan’s remarks into Japanese.

Keenan: Was there something said by the witness that I didn’t get the translation of? Perhaps the Court did.

Interpreter: The witness asked if another question had been asked.

In these instances, the interpreters probably reacted instinctively or didn’t feel the need to defer to the monitor because they were dealing with simple questions. There is nothing in the transcripts that suggests the court or the monitors disapproved of such behavior by the interpreters.

6.3.2. Recovering interrupted interpretation and interrupting to let the witness speak

When the interpreter was interrupted and missed an opportunity to interpret Tojo’s answer in its entirety, the interpreter inserted the missed part in his next rendition. In the following example from January 2, Tojo has no problem with the interpretation and starts giving an answer. Monitor Miyamoto, however,

interrupts Tojo's answer and gives his version of the interpretation of the pending question. The interpreter misses the opportunity to interpret. Tojo continues his answer. When the interpreter has a chance to interpret, he inserts the missed interpretation at the beginning of his rendition.

Keenan: I am suggesting to you, Mr. TOJO, that it would be possible for things to be happening in Tokyo that you knew about and helped to plan without your being there. You will agree that was a possibility, will you not?

Interpreter: *Shikashi hitotsu no kanosei no mondai de arimasuga, anata ga Tokyo ni inakutemo Tokyo de okotte orukoto ni tsuite anata ga shitteta to iukoto wa oini ariurukoto da to iukoto o kiiteoru no de arimasuga, so dewa arimasenka?*

(But as a possible matter, isn't it true that it is quite possible that you knew what was happening in Tokyo even if you were not in Tokyo?)

Tojo: *Watashi niwa sozo dekimasen.*

(I can't imagine.)

Monitor: Anata ga shitte orukoto de ari, soshite anata ga ritsuan moshikuwa keikaku no sokushin o enjoshita to iu yona dekgigoto ni tsuite shitte orieta de aro to iu noga shitsumon de arimasu.

(The question concerns that you could know it and you could know the matters you planned or helped promoting the plan.)

Tojo: *Oriemasen. Oriemasen to iukoto wa ima watashi ga itta tori.*

(It's impossible. It's impossible as I have just said.)

Interpreter: Just prior to the Japanese rendition, the witness said, "I cannot imagine." His last reply was, "I could not have known."

The interpreters' desire to render everything the witness says is apparent in the following example when the interpreter advised Keenan that the witness had more to say in the morning session on January 2.

Tojo: *Sore wa sono tori. Tadashi...*

(That's right, but...)

Interpreter: Yes, as you say, but—

Keenan: You finally, in your affidavit, have referred to it as a war, have you not?

Interpreter: Before Mr. Prosecutor's question was put, the witness was just about to state his next answer.

Keenan: I question that, Language Section, or whoever is making that statement, but if the witness wishes to make some other statement I do not wish to cut him off. I am looking at him.

Since the interpreters were not supposed to speak on their own, the number of this type of interjections by the interpreters is very small. These interjections, however, do indicate the interpreters' eagerness to let Tojo complete his answers.

6.3.3. *Explaining to the witness*

On a couple of occasions, the interpreter offered the witness explanations on procedural matters. In the following example, Keenan refers to a document in his question during the morning session on January 2. The interpreter interjects to warn about a possible confusion in the translation.

Keenan: Now, I will ask you to refer to that document, exhibit 541—you have it there with you – “1. Basic Policy.” Will you look at that; and I want to call your particular attention to the second sentence. Have you read it?

Interpreter: *Dewa, anata no temoto ni aru sono shorui o mite kudasai. Sokoni 1. Konpon Hoshin to iu no ga arimasu. Soshite dai-2 banme no bunsho o tokuni chuishite mite kudasai. – Eigo no 2 banme no bunsho desukara atehamaranai kamo shiremasen. Yomimashitaka?*

(Now, please look at the document you have. There it contains “Basic Policy”. And please pay particular attention to the second passage. – It is the second passage in English, so it may not be relevant. - Did you read it?)

Tojo: *Yonde imasuyo.*
(I'm reading it.)

Interpreter: Yes, I am reading it. All right.

Keenan: Does it not say, as to basic policy, and I quote: “First of all, it is directed toward the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia built upon a firm solidarity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China with this Empire as the center.”

Interpreter: *Kou iu funi kaite arimasenka? “Mazu kokoku o kakushin to shi Nichi-Man-Shi no kyoko naru ketsugo o konpon to suru Daitoa no shin-chitsujo o kensetsusuru ni ari.”*

(Doesn't it say, “First of all, it is directed toward the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia built upon a firm solidarity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China with this Empire as the center”?)

Tojo: *Sore wa arimasu. Chotto matte kudasai. Sore wa tashikani arimashita.*

(It's here. Please wait a moment. It was certainly here.)

Interpreter: *Nihon-bun no 1-peji desu. 1. kihon-hoshin no naka desu.*
(It's the first page of the Japanese text. It's in "1. Basic Policy".)

Tojo: *Arimashita.*
(There it is.)

Interpreter: Yes—will you wait just a moment? Yes, I have found it.

This type of help was offered by Monitor Itami in other sessions. In this particular session, the interpreters may have felt the need to step in because they didn't expect Monitor Miyamoto, who was the youngest monitor with the weakest Japanese, to bring this issue to Tojo's attention.

6.4. Language arbiter

During Tojo's testimony, Captain Kraft, the language arbiter, spoke on five language issues. Only one of them was addressed at the time the issue arose, but the other four were addressed four to sixteen days later. At the beginning of the afternoon session on January 2, for example, Kraft makes a correction of the transcript as follows.

Language Arbiter: If the Tribunal please, the following language correction is submitted: Reference page 35,600, line 10, delete "I heard what the contents of the telegram were about" and substitute "I asked what that telegram was about, for which..."

The sentence he refers to was part of the testimony by Yasumasa Matsudaira, witness for the defense, on December 17, 1947. The monitor did not catch the error at that time. The defense may have found it in the transcripts and brought the issue to the Language Arbitration Board. The ruling was announced 16 days later.

In the following example, at the beginning of the afternoon session on January 5 Kraft made a correction on the translation error for the Japanese word "*joshu* (assistant)" that was brought up by defense counsel during his examination of Tojo on December 30.

Language Arbiter: If the Tribunal, please, the following language correction is submitted: Reference: Record page 36,314, lines 7-9 and exhibit No. 3655, page 14, Item 82, lines 7-8. Delete: "In the first place, the Secretary-General of the Cabinet was to be chosen as my right-hand man" and substitute: "But because I needed an assistant, it was necessary for me first to choose the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet."

The issue with the translation of "*naiso*" was brought up on January 2, but

the proceedings continued without a consensus on its correct translation. During another questioning on “*naiso*” in the following session on January 6, Kraft interjects as follows.

Language Arbiter: The word in question seems to be “*naiso*”, which, literally translated, means “informal recommendation.”

The Language Arbitration Board must have discussed this issue and decided on the correct translation during the recess. In the following example, in response to Tojo’s objection to the translation of “*taian*”, Kraft insists that the original translation was correct.

Language Arbiter: The word in question is “*hantai teian*.” It should be translated “counterproposal”.

Tojo pointed out the original Japanese word was “*taian*”. It was mistranslated as “counterproposal”, which was then back-translated to “*hantai teian*”. Kraft was not aware of this problem and believed that the original was “*hantai teian*”. He then offers another translation for “*hantai teian*”.

Language Arbiter: Correction: the former correction is “opposing proposal” instead of “counterproposal”. I am sorry; it was mistake.

This was not much different from the first translation, and did not convey the meaning of “*taian*” – which is actually “response”, based on Tojo’s explanation. Without a clear consensus, the court proceeded and Keenan moved on with a new question. In the following example, on January 6, Tojo is asked about Pu-Yi and answers, “*watashi-no fumei-de arimasho*” about trusting Pu-Yi and being betrayed by him. It was interpreted as “It must have been my lack of virtue.” Defense counsel Blewitt objected to it. The matter was referred to Kraft.

Blewitt: If the Tribunal please, may I have that answer which refers to lack of virtue referred to the Language Section? I am informed by my associate counsel that it is not perfectly clear.

Keenan: I am suggesting to the President that it is not worthwhile to take the time of this court, but I suppose we will have to follow the ordinary rule.

President: It is referred accordingly. Captain Kraft.

Language Arbiter: The word in question is “*fumei*”; translated, “lack of insight”.

There is nothing in the transcripts that indicates how Kraft came up with “lack of insight” on the spot. There must have been a quick discussion on this

issue within the Language Section personnel in the courtroom. It is not realistic to assume that Kraft, with one-year Japanese training, could by himself have come up with a translation of this classical Japanese word used by educated men.

6.5. Summary and discussion

Through examination of the interpreted testimony of Hideki Tojo at the IMTFE, some characteristics of the behavior by the linguists who were involved in the interpreting process have been identified. And the hypothesis that interpreters' behavior is influenced by their position in the power constellation in the setting is supported by some of the findings.

The interpreters kept the instances of speaking on their own to a minimum and did not object to the monitors' unnecessary or erroneous corrections. This behavior can be explained by the interpreters' position in the hierarchy of the linguists. They were not allowed to overstep the boundary to provide input other than the interpreting. The interpreters – being at the bottom of the hierarchy – were checked and controlled by their supervisors in the Language Section, including the monitors, and probably felt they were not in a position to protest against or complain about the monitors' undue interjections. Shimada (2000: 23, 25) compares the relation of the interpreter and the monitor to a race horse and a jockey, implying that the interpreter (the horse) couldn't stop the monitor (the jockey) to tell him that his direction was wrong. The interpreters, however, occasionally interjected mainly to ensure that the witness stayed informed of interpreting and procedural issues and could complete his remarks. Whatever views the individual interpreters may have had of Tojo, they seem to have made efforts to put him on an equal footing with the court participants who understood English.

Although the functions of the monitor are not clearly defined in the IMTFE official documents, the tribunal presumably expected the monitors to check the accuracy of the interpretation and correct any errors. A report (Hornady n.d.) that describes the issues the IPS faced during the trial refers to interpreting as “the biggest single problem for IPS & IMT.” It goes on to say, “Jap [*sic*] nationals unsatisfactory unless monitored (Handicap, lack of knowledge of English)” and “U.S. Niseis [*sic*] unsatisfactory. Handicap – lack of knowledge of Japanese.” This document suggests that the tribunal did not have confidence in the Japanese interpreters and expected the *Nisei* monitors to compensate for the interpreters' deficiencies.

As discussed previously, the monitors did check the interpretation and corrected whatever errors they spotted. Although, as Watanabe (1998: 46) points out, the monitors sometimes failed to catch omissions and improper expressions in the interpretation, in so much as they were able to, the monitors fulfilled the role that the tribunal – the party in power – had expected them to play, as checkers of the interpretation. The monitors also functioned as communication coordinators by dealing with the speakers' turns and explaining interpreting-related issues to the court. They were spokesmen for the interpreters who were not supposed to speak on their own; and they probably felt obliged to make such

interjections as the only people in supervisory positions who could understand the issues. No evidence is found in the transcripts or the available audio of Tojo's testimony that suggests the tribunal's problem with such behavior by the monitors.

The tribunal, however, was probably not aware of the nature of many interjections in Japanese provided by the monitors to explain questions asked of the witness or procedural matters that concerned the witness. Neither the language arbiter nor the chief of the Language Section at the time of Tojo's testimony had a good command of Japanese. No one in the Language Section seems to have closely checked the interjections in Japanese by the monitors during Tojo's testimony. This is probably one of the main reasons the monitors liberally interjected to help the witness by elaborating on the questions and cautioning about procedural issues. This could be viewed as an example of interpreters – the monitors in this case - exerting their power as the persons in the middle who monopolize the means of communication (Anderson 1976: 218-221).

The monitors also interrupted the court to let Tojo complete his answers. Overall, the monitors seem to have made efforts, as did the interpreters, to ensure that Tojo received fair treatment from the language perspective. Hints pointing to the possible reasons for such behavior by the monitors cannot be found in the transcripts or other materials. Their personal ethical views, sympathy toward the former leader of their parents' country, and respect for Tojo's honorable attitude in the court proceedings only fall in the realm of speculation. In addition, it cannot be known if Caucasian military officers would have behaved in the same way as the *Nisei* monitors, or how the court would have reacted had it known of the nature of such interjections by the monitors.

With a number of unnecessary or incorrect interjections by the monitors, one may wonder if the monitors were actually needed to achieve a sufficient level of interpreting quality for the functioning of the court. Watanabe (1998) argues that the interpreter and the monitor functioned as a team, which contributed to a higher level of accuracy in the interpretation. Shimada (*ibid.*: 23) refers to the aspect of team efforts by citing the fact that the monitors helped the interpreters by taking notes for numbers. He also claims, however, that the interpreters were much more competent than the monitors; that the monitors, excluding Itami, were not competent enough to correct interpreting errors or omissions; and that the monitors depended on the interpreters (*ibid.*: 21, 23). Further, Shimada points out that the tribunal was not aware of all these issues due to its lack of command of the Japanese language, and it believed that the monitors were effectively supervising the interpreters (*ibid.*: 21). Harnady's report (*ibid.*) could have been based on his perception of what may have been going on in the interpreters' booth. Asked if he believed the monitors were needed, Oka (2006) answered, "Whether or not the monitoring was needed has nothing to do with interpreting. It was a political matter. In a nutshell, [the tribunal] didn't fully trust the Japanese interpreters, and that's why the monitor and the language board were established."

In the context of this study's hypothesis, the monitors' unnecessary interjections can be explained partly by their eagerness to display their authority

as the interpreters' supervisors. To the interpreters, the monitors' frequent interjections would be a reminder of their power relations. To the tribunal, without understanding the content of such interjections, the appearance that the monitors were frequently correcting the interpreters' renditions would validate its assumption that the Japanese interpreters were not trustworthy and that their work had to be monitored by people from their own "camp".

Despite his top position in the hierarchy of the interpreting process as language arbiter, Captain Kraft did not seem to make a significant impact on the court proceedings. Due to his limited Japanese capability, he was probably not aware of the nature of the interjections in Japanese made by the monitors and the interpreters. He was "a figure head" (Kawamoto 2005) and was basically reporting the rulings of the Language Arbitration Board to the court. This is in contrast to Moore's active engagement with the court as discussed in a previous chapter. Based on the interviews and documents reviewed so far, it appears that the higher a person was in the interpreter hierarchy at the IMTFE, the less competent that person was in his second language. The tribunal, however, still kept turning to the language arbiter for disputed translations and interpretations during Tojo's testimony. As Lefevre (1992) suggests, "trust is invested in the producer of the translation, not necessarily in the product itself. Trust may be more important than quality."

Some evidence has been identified to support the hypothesis that links the interpreters' behavior to their relative position in the power constellation. The corpus in the pilot study, however, was limited to only 9 out of a total of 818 court sessions of the IMTFE proceedings. This opens up several follow-up questions: Did the linguists' behavior change over the course of the trial? Were there different patterns of behavior among different monitors? Did the interpreters and monitors behave differently when Moore (the first language arbiter with a relatively good command of Japanese), rather than Kraft, served as language arbiter? These questions could be explored by expanding the corpus to testimonies of other witnesses, and examining whether the court reacted to certain behavior by the linguists and whether that affected the linguists' subsequent behavior. By focusing on the different patterns of behavior by different monitors, it may be possible to ascertain whether or not the personal background of individual monitors was a contributing factor in their behavior. If it is found that the monitors interjected less frequently or differently under the supervision of Moore, it would lend further support to this study's hypothesis whereby interpreters' behavior was linked to their awareness of the extent of the power wielded by whoever was controlling them.

7. Conclusion

This study examined the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE and the behavior of the linguists during the interpreted testimony of Hideki Tojo. The basic premise of this study was that interpreting is a social activity, which therefore needs to be described and analyzed with reference to the social, political and cultural context of the setting in which the interpreter operates. In providing an overview of interpreting at the IMTFE, the focus was placed on the three-tier structure of the linguists who were involved in the interpreting process. The historical and political context of the IMTFE and the sociopolitical background of each linguist group were discussed. Against this backdrop, the concepts of “trust, power and control” were applied in order to explore why the tribunal devised this unusual interpreter organization. Also examined was how the tribunal’s attitude toward the interpreting procedures and the interpreters’ performance changed over time by drawing on the concept of “negotiated norms.”

The pilot study analyzed the linguists’ behavior during Tojo’s testimony; and some of the findings supported the hypothesis that interpreters’ behavior is influenced by their position in the power constellation of the setting in which they are placed. In the IMTFE proceedings, the interpreters, who were at the bottom of the hierarchy, kept their interjections to a minimum, and did not object to unnecessary or erroneous interjections by the monitors. Such interjections may be attributed to the monitors’ desire to display their authority to the interpreters and to prove to the tribunal that they were fulfilling their role diligently and effectively.

Overall, the monitors, as well as the interpreters, seem to have made efforts to put Tojo on an equal footing with the other court participants who understood English. They interjected to explain the questions and procedural matters to the witness. They also interrupted the court to let Tojo complete his answers. Whether or not such behavior was linked to their personal backgrounds is not known. Future research could be conducted to include interpreted testimonies of other witnesses at the IMTFE and to explore inquiries such as whether the linguists’ behavior changed over the course of the trial; whether there were different patterns of behavior among different monitors; and whether the interpreters and the monitors behaved differently when Moore served as language arbiter.

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