Cultural Brokers and Intercultural Politics: New York–Iroquois Relations, 1664–1701

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American colonial history seems almost hopelessly fragmented. Competing analytical perspectives on diverse ethnic groups, regions, colonies, counties, and towns have produced shelves of imaginative studies, but a coherent whole remains elusive. Two of the most fruitful of the various interpretive strategies are the community study, which stresses the minutiae of everyday social interaction, and the "North American perspective," which sees the continent as a grand stage for the interaction of Indian, European, and African cultures. For all their apparent differences, the community study approach and the North American perspective are intrinsically complementary. The strengths and weaknesses of each—rich detail and narrow vision in the first approach, broad canvas and sweeping generalization in the second—balance those of the other. The operational problem is how to achieve a synthesis, how exactly to connect the local community to wider developments.[1]

Anthropological theorists have been struggling with much the same dilemma in their efforts to integrate traditional ethnological analysis of small communities with a "world-systems" approach. One promising avenue of inquiry examines links between local political structures and regional and international sources of power, for in local hands frequently lay the fate of both the imperial powers of the modern

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[1] Bernard Bailyn, "The Challenge of Modern Historiography," *American Historical Review*, 87 (Feb. 1982), 1–24; Michael Zuckerman, "Myth and Method: The Current Crises in American Historical Writing," *History Teacher*, 17 (Feb. 1984), 219–45; Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole, "Reconstructing British-American Colonial History: An Introduction," in *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era*, ed. Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole (Baltimore, 1984), 1–17; Thomas Bender, "Wholes and Parts: The Need for Synthesis in American History," *Journal of American History*, 73 (June 1986), 120–36. On the community studies approach, see Darrett B. Rutman, "The Social Web: A Prospectus for the Study of the Early American Community," in *Insights and Parallels: Problems and Issues of American Social History*, ed. William L. O'Neill (Minneapolis, 1973), 57–89; and Richard Beeman, "The New Social History and the Search for 'Community' in Colonial America," *American Quarterly*, 29 (Fall 1977), 422–43. On the North American (or "cultural" or "ethnohistorical") perspective, see Gary B. Nash, *Red, White, and Black: The Peoples of Early America* (Englewood Cliffs, 1974); James Axtell, "A North American Perspective for Colonial History," *History Teacher*, 12 (Aug. 1979), 549–62; and T. H. Breen, "Creative Adaptations: Peoples and Cultures," in *Colonial British America*, ed. Greene and Pole, 195–232.

world-system and the native peoples that system sought to absorb.[2] The connections were frequently highly personal, centered on individuals called, in the language of social network theory, "brokers" or "mediators." As simultaneous members of two or more interacting networks (kin groups, political factions, communities, or other formal or informal coalitions), brokers provide nodes of communication; with respect to a community's relations with the outside world, they "stand guard over the crucial junctures or synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole." Their intermediate position, one step removed from final responsibility in decision making, occasionally allows brokers to promise more than they can deliver. The resulting maneuvering room allows skillful mediators to promote the aims of one group while protecting the interests of another—and thus to become nearly indispensable to all sides.[3]

As European powers dealt with native polities in colonial North America, adept brokers well connected to networks of political influence in local communities on both sides of the cultural divide played essential roles in trading partnerships and military alliances. Without brokers' communication skills and abilities to please diverse interest groups, peoples with vastly differing political structures, economic systems, and cultural beliefs could hardly talk to each other, much less work together. The point is nowhere better illustrated than in relations between the English of New York and the Five Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, two of the key players in late seventeenth-century North American diplomacy and warfare.

With the aid of influential Euro-American and native American brokers, in the late 1670s and early 1680s, New York and the Five Nations forged an alliance that was the centerpiece of a broader set of diplomatic ties among English colonies and Indian peoples known in the language of native diplomacy as the "Covenant Chain." Relying on those connections, the Iroquois and the English fought, independently but in concert, against New France and its Indian allies in the conflict colonials called King William's War. The experience was an almost unmitigated disaster for the Five Nations, whose English friends provided little assistance. The fighting stopped only after confederacy leaders agreed to French demands that they remain neutral in future conflicts between European empires.[4]

[2] Anthony Leeds, "Locality Power in Relation to Supralocal Power Institutions," in *Urban Anthropology: Cross-Cultural Studies of Urbanization*, ed. Aidan Southall (New York, 1973), 15–41; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1974); Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, 1982); Bruce G. Trigger, *Natives and Newcomers: Canada's "Heroic Age" Reconsidered* (Kingston, Ont., 1985), 169–71; Billie R. DeWalt and Pertti J. Pelto, eds., *Micro and Macro Levels of Analysis in Anthropology: Issues in Theory and Research* (Boulder, 1985); Michael D. Olien, "Micro/Macro-Level Linkages: Regional Political Structures on the Mosquito Coast, 1845–1864," *Ethnohistory*, 34 (Summer 1987), 256–87.

[3] Eric R. Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico," *American Anthropologist*, 58 (Dec. 1956), 1065–78, esp. 1075; Adrian C. Mayer, "The Significance of Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies," in *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*, ed. Michael Banton (New York, 1966), 113–15; Jeremy Boissevain, *Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions* (Oxford, 1974).

[4] Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Origins of Iroquois Neutrality: The Grand Settlement of 1701," *Pennsylvania History*, 24 (July 1957), 223–35; Richard Aquila, *The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial Frontier, 1701–1754* (Detroit, 1983), 29–128; Daniel K. Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 40 (Oct. 1983), 528–59; Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain*

From a North American perspective, the story seems a simple tale of alliance and defeat, spiced with a touch of English betrayal. But when the viewpoint shifts to the community level of Albany and the Iroquois villages, the neat picture breaks down into a kaleidoscope of local and supralocal leaders working at cross-purposes, struggles and alliances among competing interest groups, and tangled family quarrels—the stuff of small town life familiar to any reader of community studies. The local context suggests that large-scale diplomatic interactions between New York and the Iroquois rested on the internal politics of Euro-American and native American communities and that individual cultural brokers are a key to understanding the rise and fall of the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain alliance and the nature of intercultural power relationships in colonial North America.

Historians frequently treat the province of New York and the Five Nations of the Iroquois confederacy as monoliths. In fact, however, each was a bundle of localized communities held together by intricate networks of personal and familial political connections. New York, called New Netherland until conquered by the English in 1664, was less a single colony than three—one centered on the cosmopolitan but Dutch-dominated town on Manhattan Island, another on the almost exclusively Dutch fur trading outpost at Albany, and a third on the Long Island villages settled by immigrants from New England. A fourth element in the unstable colonial mixture was provided by a succession of English governors who, in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, attempted to make the fractious province a cornerstone of imperial power in North America.[5]

Like New York, the Iroquois Great League of Peace—composed of the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas—was a far from unified entity. Instead it encompassed a cluster of autonomous villages, in which politics rested on ties of economic reciprocity among kin groups; clan headmen retained their status largely through ritualized generosity toward their kin and fellow villagers. Within and among communities, ceremonial exchanges of wampum and other symbolic or economically valuable items ratified brokerlike relationships among headmen with hereditary sachem titles. Less highly structured personal alliances among charismatic local leaders created political networks that cut across the lines of kinship and nation. The significance of personal brokerage in Iroquois political life is suggested by the formal language used in internal political councils and in treaty conferences with outsiders: almost invariably Iroquois spokesmen addressed a village or nation by a ceremonial council title that was the hereditary name of a historically significant headman.[6]

Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (New York, 1984), 113–219.

[5] Patricia U. Bonomi, *A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York* (New York, 1971), 17–55; Michael Kammen, *Colonial New York: A History* (New York, 1975), 1–160; Stephen Saunders Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (New York, 1984), 251–404.

[6] William N. Fenton, "Locality as a Basic Factor in the Development of Iroquois Social Structure," in *Symposium on Local Diversity in Iroquois Culture*, ed. William N. Fenton (Washington, 1951), 35–54. Elisabeth Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois: Its History, Politics, and Ritual," in *Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. XV: *North-*



Settlement patterns in seventeenth-century New York.
Reproduced, with the author's permission, from Patricia U. Bonomi,
A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York (New York, 1971), 21.

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east, ed. Bruce G. Trigger (Washington, 1978), 418–41; Jack Campisi, "The Iroquois and the Euro-American Concept of Tribe," *New York History*, 63 (April 1982), 165–82; Daniel K. Richter, "Ordeals of the Longhouse: The Five Nations in Early American History," in *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600–1800*, ed. Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell (Syracuse, 1987), 11–27.



Iroquois villages relocated roughly every twenty years, frequently with a change of name. This map, based on recent archaeological research, contains the approximate locations of major villages in the 1670s. Map based on *Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. XV: *Northeast*, ed. Bruce G. Trigger (Washington, 1978), 419, 466–67, 481, 500, 505–6; Mary Ann Palmer Niemczycki, *The Origin and Development of the Seneca and Cayuga Tribes of New York State* (Rochester, 1984), 22–23, 95; and James W. Bradley, *Evolution of the Onondaga Iroquois: Accommodating Change, 1500–1655* (Syracuse, 1987), 115–17, 205–27.



Map based upon Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell, eds., *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600–1800* (Syracuse, 1987), 2.

For both New York and the Five Nations, then, personal connections among brokers for kin groups, political factions, and local communities were crucial for internal unity. Not surprisingly, similar mechanisms characterized their interactions with each other. Basic patterns were set long before the English conquered New Netherland. Since the 1620s the Iroquois and the Dutch of what later would be called the Albany area—Fort Orange, Beverwyck, and Rensselaerswyck—had been each other's principal trading partners. To the colonists, the partnership yielded a lucrative harvest of beaver and other pelts for sale in European markets. To the Iroquois it brought vital European manufactured textiles and tools and the firearms

with which, in the Beaver Wars of the 1640s and 1650s, their warriors overran one native foe after another. The key broker in the mid-seventeenth-century Dutch-Iroquois relationship was the fur trader and agent of the van Rensselaer family Arent van Curler (his Iroquois council title was based on the alternate spelling "Corlaer"), who on countless occasions beginning in the 1630s mediated disputes between Mohawks and colonists. He earned great influence with the Mohawk and Mahican neighbors of Rensselaerswyck through extensive sojourns in Indian villages, mastery of native diplomatic protocol and gift giving, and—apparently—a clandestine traffic in liquor and guns.[7]

Van Curler drowned in 1667; by then the intercultural relationships he personified had perished as well. The problems that resulted for the Five Nations explain the shape of new brokerage connections that emerged during the last quarter of the century. Since the late 1650s New Netherland's economy had been in trouble, plagued by underpopulation, severe inflation, excessive profit taking by Old World merchants, shortages of staple Indian trade items, competition from the New England colonies, and wars with Indians of Long Island and the lower Hudson Valley. In the marketplace of Fort Orange, the mood turned nasty as hard-pressed traders regularly cheated their native customers and employed strong-armed agents to steal furs outright from Indians with the temerity to shop around for a better price. With all the Dutch colony's woes, it is little wonder that in 1664 it fell without a shot to the English forces of James, duke of York (the future King James II). In the initial years of the duke's regime, Anglo-Dutch warfare and the gradual reorientation of transatlantic commercial patterns from the Netherlands to the British Isles continued to produce occasional shortages of trade goods. The situation remained in flux through a brief Dutch reconquest of the colony in 1673, until the Treaty of Westminster confirmed English rule in 1674.[8]

The disruption of the Five Nations' vital economic ties with New York occurred just as they most desperately required a secure source of firearms and other European manufactures, for their formerly dominant military position was deteriorating rapidly in conflicts with native enemies on multiple fronts. In the 1640s, when the Beaver Wars began, the French allies and trading partners of many foes of the Iro-

[7] A. J. F. van Laer, trans. and ed., *Van Rensselaer Bovier Manuscripts: Being the Letters of Kiliaen van Rensselaer, 1630–1643, and Other Documents Relating to the Colony of Rensselaerswyck* (Albany, 1908), 390–690; A. J. F. van Laer, "Arent van Curler and His Historic Letter to the Patroon," *Dutch Settlers Society of Albany Yearbook*, 3 (1927–1928), 11–29; Daniel Karl Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change and Persistence on the Iroquois Frontier, 1609–1720" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1984), 59–66; Oliver A. Rink, *Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York* (Ithaca, 1986).

[8] E. B. O'Callaghan and B. Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (15 vols., Albany, 1856–1887), XIV, 444, 450–51; A. J. F. van Laer, ed. and trans., *Minutes of the Court of Fort Orange and Beverwyck, 1652–1656* (2 vols., Albany, 1920–1923), II, 222–23, 255–98; A. J. F. van Laer, ed. and trans., *Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 1651–1674* (Albany, 1932), 325–32, 345–46, 358–71, 412–13, 440–49; Allen W. Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century* (Ithaca, 1960), 112–74; Lynn Ceci, "The First Fiscal Crisis in New York," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 28 (July 1980), 839–47; Thomas E. Burke, "The New Netherland Fur Trade, 1657–1661: Response to Crisis," *de Halve Maen*, 59 (March 1986), 1–4, 21. For an argument that the Anglo-Dutch wars had little impact on trade at Albany, see Jan Kupp, "Aspects of New York-Dutch Trade under the English, 1670–1674," *New-York Historical Society Quarterly*, 58 (April 1974), 139–47.

quois had offered only sporadic, largely ineffectual, resistance to raiders from the Five Nations. In 1663, however, the Crown assumed the powers previously exercised by the Company of New France and transformed the French colony on the St. Lawrence River into a significant military threat. In late 1665 the altered balance of power led Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Oneida leaders to sue for peace with the French and several of their Indian allies.[9]

Although many Mohawks saw the wisdom of the settlement that leaders of the other four Iroquois nations had made, a majority fought on. They soon learned how fragmented the politics of the Hudson River colony had become. Two French-led armies that invaded the Mohawk country in 1666 received a hearty welcome from Dutch residents of Schenectady and Albany, who nursed the Frenchmen's wounds and replenished their supplies. No one entertained the attackers more lavishly than van Curler, the erstwhile principal broker between the Iroquois and the colony. After the second invasion, which destroyed several hastily abandoned Mohawk villages, van Curler and other Albany Dutch were "very forward towards . . . [the Mohawks'] makeinge of peace." The town's English commander suspected they wanted to remove obstacles so French forces would be able to "Martch Which way they please Thurrow" Iroquoia and remove the English duke's men from the Hudson. Bereft of support from Albany, in June 1667 Mohawk headmen traveled across Lakes George and Champlain to surrender at Quebec.[10]

Peace with New France and its native allies provided a partial respite from conflict but hardly a solution to the economic and military problems of the Five Nations. Abroad, while brokerage relationships to Albany lay in a shambles, debilitating wars with Mahicans, New England Algonquians, and Susquehannocks continued. At home conflict of another sort brewed. Under the terms of the 1665–1667 treaties, French Jesuit missionaries settled in most of the major villages of the Five Nations. Building on connections already formed with Iroquois leaders who had long been trying to mediate trade and diplomatic relationships between their people and the French, the missionaries soon created sizable followings for whom conversion to

[9] Van Laer, ed. and trans., *Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer*, 325–26; O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, III, 121–27; Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610–1791* (73 vols., Cleveland, 1896–1901), L, 127–47; George T. Hunt, *The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Trade Relations* (Madison, 1940), 66–144; W. J. Eccles, *Canada under Louis XIV* (Toronto, 1964), 1–58; Francis Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration: The Susquehannock Indians in the Seventeenth Century," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 112 (Feb. 1968), 15–53; Neal Salisbury, "Toward the Covenant Chain: Iroquois and Southern New England Algonquians, 1637–1684," in *Beyond the Covenant Chain*, ed. Richter and Merrell, 61–73.

[10] John Baker to John Winthrop, Jr., Aug. 9, 1666, in Francis Jennings, William N. Fenton, and Mary A. Druke, eds., *Iroquois Indians: A Documentary History of the Diplomacy of the Six Nations and Their League* (Woodbridge, Conn., 1985, microfilm), reel 2; Lawrence H. Leder, ed., *The Livingston Indian Records, 1666–1723* (Gettysburg, 1956), 29–33; O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, III, 118–19, 127–35; 146–54; [Cadwallader Colden], *The History of the Five Indian Nations Depending on the Province of New-York in America* (New York, 1727), 22–24; Nicholas Perrot, "Memoir on the Manners, Customs, and Religion of the Savages of North America," in *The Indian Tribes of the Mississippi Valley and Region of the Great Lakes*. . . . , trans. and ed. Emma Helen Blair (2 vols., Cleveland, 1911), I, 199–203. In all quotations from seventeenth-century sources the original spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are preserved, abbreviations are expanded, and orthography is modernized.

Christianity and close political ties to the French were virtually inseparable. The francophile Christians were reviled by other Iroquois who saw their policies and religion as abject capitulations to the enemy, but with connections to the Hudson in disarray, there was no viable alternative.[11]

That changed after the final English take-over of New York in 1674. By the early 1680s a triangular brokerage system emerged to link the English government based in Manhattan, the Dutch trading community at Albany, and the Iroquois villages of the Five Nations. Individual mediators rose to prominence in both Albany and Iroquoia through their membership in political networks and their ability to deal with forces in other corners of the triangle.[12]

A central personality in the new brokerage arrangements was the duke's governor from 1674 to 1681, Edmund Andros. A loyal servant of the Stuart family and a paradigm of the vigorous imperial style known as "garrison government," Andros was instructed to pacify the turbulent frontiers of the English colonies; his improvised efforts created the Covenant Chain system of diplomacy. That system, whether Andros knew it or not, provided a focus around which demoralized anti-French Iroquois factions could regroup. Early in his tenure, the governor struck a military partnership with the Mohawks and encouraged them to intervene against New England Algonquians in King Philip's War. Simultaneously he and his agents at Albany worked to end Iroquois conflicts with Susquehannocks and Mahicans. By 1677 those wars to the south and east of Iroquoia were over on terms favorable to the Five Nations, many Susquehannocks and New England Indians had relocated under the protection of New York and the Iroquois, the Mohawks had emerged as the principal Indian power in the Albany area, and the confederacy had assumed new prominence in the diplomacy of the colonial Northeast. Anti-French Iroquois could now dream of security on their eastern and southern borders and of thousands of prospective allies among Englishmen, Mahicans, and Indian refugees united in the chain of English-Indian and Indian-Indian alliances that Andros had helped construct.[13]

[11] Daniel K. Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois: Jesuit Missions and Christianity in Village Politics, 1642–1686," *Ethnohistory*, 32 (Jan. 1985), 1–16.

[12] These intercultural personal relationships greatly shaped New York–Iroquois relations in the period of King William's War, yet historical reconstruction of them is not easy. Documentation on political factions in Albany and Iroquoia is scant; the usual inadequacies of seventeenth-century sources are compounded by a complete lack of first-hand Iroquois accounts and by the fact that in both communities the brokers themselves—as officeholders and official spokesmen—usually created the version of events that appears in the records; they tended, of course, to downplay divisive quarrels in the interest of smooth relations among interacting networks. Further adding to the frustration of historians is the value that both Iroquois and Dutch-American political cultures placed upon the appearance of internal consensus. In short, one is frequently unsure who belonged to what network or for whom a given mediator spoke. The alignments were seldom clear-cut and never static. Leder, ed., *Livingston Indian Records*, 5–14; Adrian Howe, "Retreat and Accommodation: Politics in Anglo-Dutch New York City, 1700–1760" (Ph.D. diss., University of Melbourne, 1982); Mary A. Druke, "Linking Arms: The Structure of Iroquois Intertribal Diplomacy," in *Beyond the Covenant Chain*, ed. Richter and Merrell, 29–39.

[13] O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, III, 254–57; Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, LX, 133–35; Treaty minutes, Nov. 9–10, 1680, folio 254–54a, vol. 30, Massachusetts Archives (Massachusetts State House, Boston); Francis Jennings, "The Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 115 (April 1971),

Iroquois enemies of the French could also rest assured of a secure market at Albany, where the confirmation of ducal rule and the conclusion of the Anglo-Dutch wars had ended shortages and provided an attractive option to commerce with New France. Meantime, the regional peace Andros's government had sponsored freed the Five Nations' hunters to seek new sources of furs in the West and allowed their traders unmolested access to the Albany marketplace, itself physically safer than it had been in over a decade. Under the government of Andros, the worst abuses of the mid-seventeenth century abated dramatically as strictly enforced new ordinances confined legal trading to residents of Albany and to public areas inside the town palisade. It is hard to imagine that unscrupulous practices disappeared or that Indians received very attractive prices in an environment tightly controlled by local magistrates who were fur traders. But the improvement over the beatings and thefts of earlier years was plain. Native traders could now expect to get something in exchange for their pelts and to return home in one piece.[14]

The changes at Albany included the rise of a coterie of local brokers who believed that their best interests lay in cooperation with Andros. Just as in Iroquoia anti-French political factions profited from connections to the English government, so in the Dutch community a particular group advanced under the new regime. In the late 1670s, Peter Schuyler, Dirck Wesselse Ten Broeck, Evert Bancker, and other young fur traders cultivated ties to Sylvester Salisbury (commander of the Albany garrison and the town's chief magistrate under Andros) and to such other newcomers as Robert Livingston, a Scot reared in the Netherlands. The turning point for such men, most of whom were in their twenties, seems to have been the restoration of English control after the Dutch reconquest of 1673. The rescue by the fatherland on which New Netherlanders had pinned their hopes for a decade would never come, they now realized; Albany had best make its peace with the English regime. Compromises with the conquerors allowed members of this rising "anglicizer" elite to gain offices and preferment at the expense of such dominant figures of the old regime as trader and Mohawk language interpreter Arnout Cornelisz Vielé and merchants Johannes Cuyler and Johannes Wendell.[15]

The anglicizer group first emerged in 1675, when a clergyman named Nicholas van Rensselaer came to America to assume his family's patroonship on the upper Hudson and—armed with a recommendation from the duke of York—to find a

88–96; Stephen Saunders Webb, *The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569–1681* (Chapel Hill, 1979), 39–49, 498.

[14] Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, LVII, 81; A. J. F. van Laer, trans. and ed., *Minutes of the Court of Albany, Rensselaerswyck, and Schenectady, 1668–1673* (3 vols., Albany, 1926–1932), II, 91, 105–8, 137–41, 159, 173, 187, 193, 241–78, 336–54; Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York*, 204–27; Thomas Elliot Norton, *The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686–1776* (Madison, 1974), 43–50; Donna Merwick, "Becoming English: Anglo-Dutch Conflict in the 1670s in Albany, New York," *New York History*, 62 (Oct. 1981), 411–13.

[15] Alice P. Kenney, "Dutch Patricians in Colonial Albany," *New York History*, 49 (July 1968), 249–83; Donna Merwick, "Dutch Townsmen and Land Use: A Spatial Perspective on Seventeenth-Century Albany, New York," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 37 (Jan. 1980), 53–78; Merwick, "Becoming English," 389–414. The term *anglicizer* is borrowed from John M. Murrin, "English Rights as Ethnic Aggression: The English Conquest, the Charter of Liberties of 1683 and Leisler's Rebellion in New York," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, San Francisco, Dec. 1973 (in Daniel K. Richter's possession).

Peter Schuyler (1657–1724), by Nehemiah Partridge.
Courtesy Collection of the Albany Institute of History and Art.

pulpit. Andros obligingly appointed him to assist the minister at Albany. When his English connections and questionable Dutch Reformed credentials precipitated dispute, the clergyman's chief supporters included Schuyler (whose maternal grandfather had been resident director of Rensselaerswyck) and Livingston (who was the patroon's secretary and would soon marry a van Rensselaer). Opposing them, speaking in behalf of orthodox Calvinism and the independence of the Dutch church from English government interference, were members of the older merchant community and two Manhattan interlopers, Jacob Leisler and his son-in-law Jacob Milborne. The uproar subsided with van Rensselaer's death in 1678, and an outward appearance of consensus returned. But the anglicizers and the guardians of Dutch tradition had drawn enduring battle lines.[16]

Despite the real divisions between them, the anglicizers and the traditionalists—interlinked by ties of kinship, debt, and trade—melted together in what outsiders (and most historians) took to be an undifferentiated and unassimilated Dutch subculture in the English colony. The surface calm stemmed partly from the anglicizers' success as cultural brokers between their community and the English regime at Manhattan, from which they garnered an enhanced position for the town and its fur trade economy as well as for themselves. In 1686 the leaders secured from Andros's successor, Thomas Dongan, a city charter that confirmed Albany's traditional monopoly of the province's northern and western Indian trade and installed Schuyler as mayor, Livingston as town clerk, and other prominent anglicizers as aldermen. Although all of the town's merchants benefited from the new charter, the anglicizers, who already were among the community's most prosperous traders, profited most. Not coincidentally, for example, confirmation of the Albany trading monopoly brought to naught the schemes of several traditionalist traders who had been investing in lands at Schenectady, where, sixteen miles closer than Albany to the Mohawk villages, they hoped to forestall business that might otherwise go to members of the Schuyler faction.[17]

At the same time that members of the anglicizer elite consolidated their economic and political dominance at Albany and their positions as brokers between the Dutch community and the English government, they also emerged as brokers between the Five Nations and the duke's government at Manhattan. They could assume that role because they controlled key local offices, they dominated the town's Indian trade, they enjoyed good connections with anti-French Iroquois, and they were on the scene—of necessity Andros and Dongan left day-to-day Indian affairs in the hands of local authorities. Schuyler, as mayor and chief spokesman for the

[16] [Edward T. Corwin, ed.], *Ecclesiastical Records of the State of New York* (7 vols., Albany, 1901–1916), I, 678–91; Lawrence H. Leder, "The Unorthodox Dominie: Nicholas Van Rensselaer," *New York History*, 35 (April 1954), 166–76; Randall H. Balmer, "The Social Roots of Dutch Pietism in the Middle Colonies," *Church History*, 53 (June 1984), 187–99.

[17] Joel Munsell, comp., *The Annals of Albany* (10 vols., Albany, 1850–1853), II, 61–87; Arthur H. Buffinton, "The Policy of Albany and English Westward Expansion," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 8 (March 1922), 327–35; Lawrence H. Leder, *Robert Livingston, 1654–1728, and the Politics of Colonial New York* (Chapel Hill, 1961), 36–53; Kammen, *Colonial New York*, 100–111.

town, and Livingston, as town clerk and by extension Indian affairs secretary, played particularly important roles. In recognition of the intermediary functions the Albany elite had assumed, in the mid-1680s Iroquois spokesmen modified the ceremonial language of diplomacy to distinguish between propositions to be relayed to their "brother" the governor at Manhattan and those intended primarily for their "brethren" of Albany and "Quider," a Mohawk pronunciation of Peter Schuyler's first name.[18]

The intercultural influence of Quider and the other Albany anglicizers increased after 1683, when Dominie Godfridius Dellius arrived from the Netherlands to take a pulpit at Albany. Like his predecessor van Rensselaer, the clergyman allied himself with the English government and the Schuyler faction and thus earned the hearty distrust of the orthodox Calvinist burghers who were the anglicizers' chief opponents. Among anti-French Iroquois attracted to Christian beliefs, however, he was a great success as an alternative to the political power that French missionaries and their followers exercised in many villages of the Five Nations. "Wee cannot forbear to acquaint you how greatt Pains the Jesuit Takes and what Diligence he uses to draw away and Entice our Indians to Canada upon Pretence to Convert them to his Religion, [and we] Desyre that itt may be hindred," the Mohawk headman Tahiadoris pleaded at Albany in 1687.[19] In the late 1680s, Dellius answered the prayer of Tahiadoris by systematically cultivating Iroquois religious converts and political allies. For Dellius, as for Tahiadoris, politics and conversion went hand in hand to strengthen personal ties between Indians and members of the Albany elite; the latter often served as sponsors at converts' baptisms. From such connections emerged a coterie of Mohawks, notably three young men with the Christian names of Joseph, Jurian, and Lawrence, who in coming years would mediate with varying degrees of success between their communities and Albany.[20]

Because Dellius never mastered an Iroquoian dialect, he could not have succeeded without the assistance of another newcomer to Albany, a Mohawk language interpreter named Hilletie. In the native village where she was reared—her mother was Mohawk and her father Dutch—she had been impressed by the teachings of French priests. Ridiculed for her beliefs, she moved to Schenectady, and sometime before 1673 she became one of a handful of Indians who received baptism at Albany before the arrival of Dellius. By 1680 her bicultural background and linguistic tal-

[18] Leder, ed., *Livingston Indian Records*, 75–81; Francis Jennings et al., eds., *The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and Their League* (Syracuse, 1985), 250.

[19] Treaty minutes, April 5, 1687, Jennings, Fenton, and Druke, eds., *Iroquois Indians*, reel 3; A. J. F. van Laer, trans. and ed., *Correspondence of Maria von Rensselaer, 1669–1689* (Albany, 1935), 69–82, 151–52; Balmer, "Social Roots of Dutch Pietism," 187–99.

[20] O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, III, 799, IV, 77–78, 125; [Corwin, ed.], *Ecclesiastical Records of the State of New York*, II, 885, 1002–4; Munsell, comp., *Annals of Albany*, II, 163–65; Treaty minutes, Jan. 4, 1690, notebook, Indians of North America, Miscellaneous Papers, 1620–1895 (American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass.); Charles E. Corwin, "Efforts of the Dutch-American Colonial Pastors for the Conversion of the Indians," *Journal of the Presbyterian Historical Society*, 12 (Oct. 1925), 238–41; Lois M. Feister, "Indian-Dutch Relations in the Upper Hudson Valley: A Study of Baptism Records in the Dutch Reformed Church, Albany, New York," *Man in the Northeast* (Fall 1982), 89–113.

ents had come to the attention of the Albany anglicizers, who could always use someone fluent in both Dutch and Mohawk. Although her twin handicaps as a woman and a *métis* prevented her from ever becoming an equal to Schuyler, Livingston, and Dellius, Hilletie possessed ideal credentials to mediate between Dutch anglicizers and Iroquois anglophiles, and by the early 1690s the province was regularly paying her a salary for her services. As the anglicizers' alternative to Vielé, she shared with her rival interpreter official translating duties at Albany treaty sessions with the Iroquois.[21]

The rise of the Albany anglicizers, their emergence as cultural brokers, and their implementation of Andros' economic and diplomatic policies occurred just as Iroquois concern about French expansionism was reaching a peak. New York authorities delivered precisely the message that anti-French Iroquois hoped to hear. "Let the *Maques* [Mohawk] Indyans know . . . ," Andros instructed Albany officials in early 1675, "that if they bee not wanting themselves, I shall not [be wanting] on my part, in continuance of the Friendship . . . and also [in] interposing with the *French*, or any other Neighbour, in any just matter." Such pledges of aid, which various Albany anglicizers—and, on at least one occasion, Andros himself—delivered in person in Iroquois villages, won wide support. "Wheras wee have alwyes had ane firm Covenant with this Goverment which haith bein fayt[h]fuly Keeped by this Governor Generall . . . ," The Seneca leader Adondarechaa proclaimed in 1677, "wee doe give him harty thankes, whom wee have taken to be our greatest Lord."[22]

The word *Lord* is European, not Iroquoian, although it has frequently been used to translate Iroquois terms for civil chiefs. Yet, whatever Seneca phrase Adondarechaa actually employed, the interpreter's translation suggests a final key to Iroquois support for Andros and his intermediaries at Albany. Around the formal diplomacy and day-to-day dealings of Iroquois and Euro-Americans at Albany developed a rich body of intercultural rituals that, like *Lord*, had different meanings for Indians and colonists. The key rituals were modeled on the rites of the Iroquois Great League of Peace and, for natives, helped make the relationship with Albany a partnership much like that among the Five Nations. When Andros visited the Mohawk country in 1675, headmen bestowed on him the council title "Corlaer," thus installing him in the position formerly held by van Curler. The name was inherited by successive New York governors in the same way that Iroquois sachems passed their traditional names from one generation to the next. Regular Albany councils that

[21] Jasper Dankers [Danckaerts] and Peter Sluyter, *Journal of a Voyage to New York and a Tour in Several of the American Colonies in 1679–80*, trans. and ed. Henry C. Murphy, *Memoirs of the Long Island Historical Society* (Brooklyn, 1867), I, 301–14; Jonathan Pearson, *Contributions for the Genealogies of the Descendants of the First Settlers of the Patent and City of Schenectady, from 1622 to 1800* (Albany, 1873), 239; Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York*, 212. On the significance of interpreters as cultural brokers, see Nancy L. Hagedorn, "'A Friend to Go between Them': The Interpreter as Cultural Broker during Anglo-Iroquois Councils, 1740–70," *Ethnohistory*, 35 (Winter 1988), 60–80.

[22] O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, III, 250–57, XIII, 483; van Laer, ed., *Minutes of the Court of Albany, Rensselaerswyck, and Schenectady*, II, 211–12; W. Noel Sainsbury et al., eds., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies* (44 vols., London, 1860–1969), *1681–1685*, 364–66; Leder, ed., *Livingston Indian Records*, 47; Treaty minutes, Aug. 22, 1677, Jennings, Fenton, and Druke, eds., *Iroquois Indians*, reel 2.

Andros initiated with headmen of the Five Nations evolved into periodic ceremonies at which the Covenant Chain was "brightened" in accordance with native tradition. In the ceremonies, Iroquois spokesmen metaphorically removed the rust that had tarnished the alliance, just as in native councils they began with rituals designed to calm the minds and hearts of participants. They intoned an oral history of the Iroquois relationship with New Netherland and New York, just as in league rituals an orator recited the traditional epic of the confederacy's founding. They insisted that Albany was the only legitimate place for treaties with members of the Covenant Chain, just as the main Onondaga village was the seat of the league. And they exchanged with their allies ceremonial gifts of wampum, just as in native diplomacy reciprocal exchange cemented brokerage relationships. Once the Albany anglicizers learned to perform them, such practices infused the utilitarian benefits of the Covenant Chain with a cultural meaning that ordinary Iroquois could understand and embrace.[23]

For many, the combination was irresistable; by the early 1680s in most Iroquois villages cohesive anglophile factions mobilized previously diffuse and demoralized anti-French sentiment. Of the precise dynamics of these developments, we know little. Anglophile headmen like Tahiadoris and Adondarechaa appear in English records to give a few eloquent speeches in behalf of the Covenant Chain and in opposition to the French and then return to the largely unrecorded political battles of their native villages or—like so many of their people in an era plagued by devastating European diseases—disappear from the scene entirely. We may safely assume, however, that the new anglophile factions mirrored the francophile groups that had already reshaped village politics: headmen without close ties to French missionaries, traders, and officials emerged as anglophile leaders; fervent opponents of Catholicism provided a core of support; kinship ties and traditional forms of reciprocal obligation contributed additional followers. The anglicizers and their policies provided a focal point for those who hoped that, by working closely with the English, they could best secure Iroquois independence from French domination. Like the Albany anglicizers, then, the Iroquois anglophiles cooperated with the English government to further their own anti-French agenda; they were *friends*, not lackeys, of New York. On all sides the survival of relationships depended on the continued ability of brokers to convince each community that its interests were being served.[24]

As Iroquois enthusiasm for the English regime and the Albany leadership waxed, tolerance for the French and their religion waned. One crucial factor in the mid-1670s was the departure of hundreds of francophiles for mission villages in Canada.

[23] O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, III, 559; Daniel K. Richter, "Rediscovered Links in the Covenant Chain: Previously Unpublished Transcripts of New York Indian Treaty Minutes, 1677–1691," *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, 92 (April 1982), 48–49; William N. Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," in *History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy*, ed. Jennings et al., 3–36; Mary A. Druke, "Iroquois Treaties: Common Forms, Varying Interpretations," *ibid.*, 85–98.

[24] On the rise and fall of francophile factions and the impact of Euro-American connections on village politics, see Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois," 1–16.

The exodus by no means included all Iroquois Catholics, but it did remove many of the most dedicated, while the depopulation further angered their foes who remained behind. At the same time franchophile ranks were further weakened by the deaths of several prominent leaders. As francophile support evaporated, the days of the French Jesuits were numbered. By early 1684 missionaries' lives were in danger throughout the Five Nations, and a mere handful of Iroquois still openly practiced Roman Catholicism. That summer, with the anglophiles apparently in complete control, most of the priests serving Iroquoia abandoned their posts. As they left, the new governor of New France, Joseph-Antoine Le Febvre de La Barre, prepared to invade the Seneca country in retaliation for challenges to French interests in the west. During the weeks and months preceding his expedition, anglophile Iroquois, in collaboration with Governor Dongan and the Albany elite, had greatly strengthened the Covenant Chain alliance, "You will Protect us from the French," an Iroquois spokesman demanded of the governor at Albany. "We have Put all our Land and our Selves under the Protection of the great Duke of York the brother of your great Sachim."[25]

Most Iroquois probably welcomed that protection, but many believed the anglophiles were paying too high a price in acknowledging English claims to their lands. In the crisis engendered by the French invasion attempt of 1684, therefore, a third identifiable faction emerged to join the anglophiles and the francophiles in the tangle of Iroquois politics: neutralists who sought an independent course that might avoid excessive reliance on either Euro-American power. Despite Dongan's pledges of protection and his demands that the Iroquois refuse to negotiate with La Barre (indeed, partly because of them), the Onondaga neutralist Otreouti ("Big Mouth") led a delegation of Onondagas, Cayugas, and Oneidas to the invading French army's camp at La Famine on Lake Ontario. After a humiliating lecture from Otreouti, La Barre, whose army was too short of supplies and too weakened by disease to proceed, came to terms and abandoned his expedition. Subsequently, Iroquois raiders and traders, encouraged by both anglophiles and neutralists and openly supported by Dongan and the Albany leadership, redoubled their western offensives. By 1687 their initiatives provoked another—and this time successful—French invasion of the Seneca country and the outbreak of general conflict in King William's War two years later.[26]

The English colonists joined the Iroquois-French war as a result of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which brougnt William of Orange to the throne to rule jointly with James II's daughter Mary. When Albany officials informed their Indian allies

[25] Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, LX, 177–79, LXI, 19–33; Treaty minutes, July 31–Aug. 6, 1684, esp. Aug. 2, 1684, item 2A, folder 4, Colonial Papers (Virginia State Library, Richmond); O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, IX, 228–36, XIV, 771–74.

[26] Leder, ed., *Livingston Indian Records*, 99–147; O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, IX, 236–48, 324–69, 681–85; Sainsbury et al., eds., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1685–1688*, 641–47; [Louis-Armand], Baron [de] Lahontan, *New Voyages to North-America* (2 vols., London, 1703), I, 34–43; Helen Broshar, "The First Push Westward of the Albany Traders," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 7 (Dec. 1920),,228–41; W. J. Eccles, *Frontenac: The Courtier Governor* (Toronto, 1959), 173–97.

[27] Leder, ed., *Livingston Indian Records*, 154–58.

that William would soon bring his new domains into his ongoing conflict against the French, anglophile Iroquois had great hopes for the future of the Covenant Chain, in which, proclaimed the Mohawk Tahiadoris, "are Included all there Majesties Subjects from the Sinnekes Countrey quite to the Eastward as farr as any Christian Subjects of our great king lives and from thence Southward all along New England quite to Virginia." For anglophiles, whatever they understood the term "Subjects" to mean, the covenant of friendship now became a reciprocal military alliance, binding on both English and Indian partners: "Wee Esteem your Enemies ours," Tahiadoris, Adondarechaa, and several other leaders declared at Albany in September 1689. Yet Iroquois opinion was hardly unanimous. In all five nations, though "there Majesties Subjects" were apparently in control, many people remained skeptical of English promises. Tahiadoris and Adondarechaa made their declaration in a secret session with a few magistrates, for fear, they said, "by Some falsehearted Persones our DeSigne should be carried to our Enemies."[27]

The anglophiles' need for secrecy indicates the degree to which relationships between New York and the Five Nations depended on the outcome of the internal political struggles that had brought the Indian and Euro-American mediators to power. Occasionally, glimpses of those struggles appear in formal records of intercultural diplomacy despite the brokers' best efforts to preserve an appearance of harmony. At a council with Albany magistrates in 1671, when a Mohawk named Canadasse made an early effort to strengthen ties with New York, a native opponent publicly demanded that the officials "give no further credence to Canadasse, saying that he is a great liar and that he makes the drunken savages say what he pleases and, furthermore, he is not a sachem." A few years later, while Andros and his Albany friends were enlisting Mohawks to fight in King Philip's War, rumors persisted that Dutchmen were selling arms to New England Algonquians and urging Iroquois not to enter the conflict. Significantly, Vielé, traditionalist foe of the anglicizer faction, was mentioned in both connections. The interpreter also figured prominently in attempts to thwart a key part of Dongan's plans for the Five Nations during 1683 and 1684: William Penn's agents relied on him to bargain with Iroquois for the purchase of lands along the Susquehanna River. Schuyler, Wesselse, and the Cayuga leader Ourehouare (Taweeraet) quickly intervened to secure the territory for the duke's governor instead of Pennsylvania, thus turning the episode to the advantage of Dongan and the Iroquois anglophiles. The partnerships struck between brokers on such occasions were crucial to the Anglo-Iroquois alliance—a French missionary complained that, after the Susquehanna deal, Ourehouare came home to make his Albany friends "the never-ending subject of his praise."[28]

[28] Van Laer, ed., *Minutes of the Court of Albany, Rensselaerswyck, and Schenectady*, I, 255–57; Sentence of William Loveridge, Oct. 7, 1676, folio 184, vol. 25, New York Colonial Manuscripts (New York State Archives, Albany); Increase Mather, *A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New-England. . . .* (Boston, 1696), 38–42; Mary Maples Dunn and Richard S. Dunn, eds., *The Papers of William Penn* (5 vols., Philadelphia, 1981–1987), II, 423, 469–71, 479–82, 487–89; E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., *The Documentary History of the State of New-York*, small paper ed. (4 vols., Albany, 1842–1851), I, 393–97; O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, IX, 226–28.

Throughout King William's War, the fates of anglophiles and anglicizers remained linked. The intricacies became vitally apparent in early 1689, when the Glorious Revolution and the presence of a Dutch king on the English throne inspired disgruntled Dutch New Yorkers to take action against local forces they identified with Stuart tyranny. By June, Jacob Leisler, since the Nicholas van Rensselaer affair a persistent champion of Calvinist orthodoxy and opponent of the province's anglicizers, had emerged as leader of a revolt that seized control of Manhattan and ousted the Stuarts' government. In November Leisler sent Milborne upriver to take over Albany, which was governed by a provisional "convention" dominated by Schuyler and Livingston. Traditionalist leaders, supported by much of the populace, gave Milborne a warm reception. The day was saved for the anglicizers by a group of anglophile Mohawks "who were come . . . for the assistance of there Majesties Subjects Standing upon the hill neer the fort and being Spectators to all these tumolts." When Milborne and his troops attempted to seize the town garrison, the Indians sent word to the beleaguered members of the convention "that Since they were in a firm Covenant chain . . . , and Seeing that the People of New Yorke [City] came in a hostile manner to Disturbe their Brethren . . . if any of those men came without the gates to approach the fort they would fyre upon them." Milborne withdrew, and Albany remained under the control of anti-Leislerian forces for two more months.[29]

The dramatic rescue of the anglicizer leaders by their Indian friends not only revealed how intertwined and interdependent factions in Iroquoia and Albany had become, but it also marked the beginning of the collapse of their system of intercultural brokerage relationships. At the end of 1689, native messengers approached the confederacy's seat at Onondaga to present a peace offer from the French. En route, they stopped at the Oneida village to deliver letters to the resident French Jesuit priest, Pierre Millet, and were met by some of Dellius' Mohawk protégés—"to wit, those of the Dominie's side"—who argued that the priest's papers should be seized and burned. "The more cunning sachems," including a recently released prisoner of the French, proposed instead to read the letters at the Onondaga council, where the French treacheries they presumably contained could be revealed. The latter plan prevailed, and headmen invited Schuyler and other Albany leaders to attend the meeting at Onondaga and press the English cause.[30]

The political situation at Albany ensured that things would not work out as the anglicizers and anglophiles "of the Dominie's side" had hoped. Milborne's recent visit had imperiled the Albany anglicizers; Schuyler and his friends dared not leave their besieged posts. Moreover, to go to Onondaga and perhaps watch the Iroquois make peace with New France could be politically fatal, for that would seem to substantiate Leislerian charges that anglicizers were—as their supposed Stuart mentors were alleged to be—secret papists plotting to deliver the province into French

[29] O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of the State of New-York*, II, 112–32; Robert C. Ritchie, *The Duke's Province: A Study of New York Politics and Society, 1664–1691* (Chapel Hill, 1977), 198–211.

[30] O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of the State of New-York*, II, 137–39; Treaty minutes, Dec. 27, 1689, Jan. 4, 1690, notebook, Indians of North America, Miscellaneous Papers.

hands. No one felt the pressure more than Dellius, who was religiously and politically anathema to Leislerians. Within a few weeks he fled to Boston when Albany leaders, panicked by a French raid on nearby Schenectady, nominally submitted to Leisler. Ironically, in light of the scene at the Oneida village, the dominie's foes charged that he had conspired with Father Millet.[31]

Because of the crisis at Albany, the only men the anglophile Iroquois could pry loose to attend the council at Onondaga were the traditionalist faction interpreter Vielé and Robert Sanders, a major fur trader whose long-standing ties to Mohawks had developed independently of the anglicizer elite and who was apparently sympathetic to Leisler. Vielé and Sanders convinced a traveling companion, Dellius's Mohawk convert Jurian, to peddle trade goods at the sacred council fire. That scandalous breech of Iroquois political and diplomatic etiquette undermined the credibility of all involved and thus botched a prime opportunity to forge an anglophile consensus among the Five Nations. To compound the problems of anglophile forces, a public reading of Millet's letters revealed nothing incriminating. In the end, although confederacy leaders stridently rejected the French proposal, they ignored English demands that they refuse to answer it at all.[32]

The episode, embarrassing for Iroquois anglophiles and members of both Albany factions, was a harbinger of worse things to come. In April 1691 Leisler and Milborne were hanged by King William's new royal governor, Henry Sloughter. In consolidating his power, Sloughter understandably allied himself with groups that had opposed Leisler, and thus he restored the anglicizers to authority in Albany. With them he made hasty plans to inspire New York's wavering Iroquois allies by a dramatic assault on Canada. The 1691 campaign, like a more elaborate invasion Leisler's government had attempted the previous year, was a fiasco that hardly encouraged the Five Nations. Nor did either effort foster English confidence in the Iroquois: in 1690 the anglophiles could convince few Iroquois to enlist, and in 1691 the death of Tahiadoris prevented the participation of mourning warriors from his village. His awkwardly timed demise led a disgruntled Wesselse to call the Mohawk anglophile "a Sachim who never did good in his Lifetime and his death it self was prejudiciall to a good Design."[33]

Whatever else the 1691 "Design" did, it intensified the Five Nations' involvement in the continental war. Schuyler had led a raid into Canada, during which a few confederacy Mohawk scouts exchanged fatal shots with Mohawks from the Catholic mission village of Caughnawaga. Soon mission Iroquois and confederacy Iroquois

[31] O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of the State of New-York*, II, 141–42, 246, 268; [Corwin, ed.], *Ecclesiastical Records of the State of New-York*, II, 1132, 1412–15.

[32] O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of the State of New-York*, II, 137–44; Treaty minutes, Jan. 4, 6, 18, Feb. 3, 1690, notebook, Indians of North America, Miscellaneous Papers; David Arthur Armour, "The Merchants of Albany, New York: 1686–1760" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1965), 45–46. On Sanders, see O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, III, 469; and Charles T. Gehring and Robert S. Grumet, "Observations of the Indians from Jasper Danckaerts' Journal, 1679–1680," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 44 (Jan. 1987), 105–6, 108n11.

[33] Dirck Wesselse to Henry Sloughter, July 2, 1691, folio 176, vol. 27, New York Colonial Manuscripts; O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of the State of New-York*, II, 171–290; O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, III, 751–54, 771–91, 800–809, IV, 193–96, IX, 513–15.

of all five nations were attacking each other mercilessly, widening and deepening the conflict in which most French- and English-allied natives were already engaged. By the end of the century, two French invasions of Iroquoia, relentless attacks by western and northern Indians, and parsimonious English aid had left the Iroquois vulnerable to foes too numerous and well armed to handle. "We are dayly in great Terrour, and very uneasie, . . . our Wives and Children being daily Exposed to fresh assaults," the exasperated Onondaga anglophile Sadekanaktie (Aquendero) informed his New York friends.[34]

That any Iroquois at all remained in the English interest was due largely to the efforts of the anglicizer brokers at Albany. Amid warfare and political rebellion, Quider and his fellow magistrates retained steady control of New York–Indian relations and proved loyal allies. In 1690, as the first joint Anglo-Indian invasion of New France crumbled, Schuyler's brother Johannes led a band of Mohawks in a successful attack on the French settlement at La Prairie. The next summer Quider slogged to Canada and fought his way home at the side of his Iroquois friends. Two years later, after a French and allied Indian invasion of the Mohawk country, he defied orders and organized a rescue of prisoners from the retreating attackers. The same year, Wesselse and Johannes Schuyler secured the release of two Mohawks falsely accused of murdering several residents of Deerfield, Massachusetts.[35]

Other actions further endeared the Albany mediators to their Iroquois friends. On crucial occasions, anglicizer magistrates traveled to Onondaga to make their case in person and to support their Iroquois allies in confederacy councils. There and at home, Schuyler's, Livingston's, and Wesselse's positions in local and provincial government enabled them to support and reward Iroquois clients. Like country squires dispensing food, drink, and cheer on election day in eighteenth-century Virginia, they knew well the value of "treating" the common folk whom they wanted to keep in their interest. Major English-Indian conferences at Albany, which lasted several days, included almost nightly feasts for the dozens of men, women, and children who accompanied Iroquois headmen. Favored Iroquois leaders dined with Albany officials and, if he was present, the governor. Conferences ended with massive gifts of clothing, tools, food, rum, weapons, and ammunition for all the Indians present; these, along with the ritual gifts of wampum that accompanied official treaty proposals, the headmen would distribute to followers once they returned home. In addition, loyal anglophile leaders received personal gifts of fine coats, hats, shirts, and guns. On a smaller scale, such rewards awaited the Albany anglicizers'

[34] Examination of two Frenchmen, Aug. 1, 1692, folio 158, vol. 38, New York Colonial Manuscripts; *Propositions made by the Five Nations of Indians . . . to his Excellency Richard Earl of Bellomont . . . the 20th of July, Anno Dom. 1698* (New York, 1698), 4; O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, III, 814–18, 840–44, IX, 520–27, 539–43; Leder, ed., *Livingston Indian Records*, 162–68; Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, LXIV, 109–13.

[35] O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, IV, 14–24; Deposition of John Baptist van Eps, July 1, 1693, folio 73, vol. 39, New York Colonial Manuscripts; John Pynchon to Benjamin Fletcher, July 4, 13, 20, 1693, folios 330a, 331–32, 335a, vol. 30, Massachusetts Archives; *Propositions made by the Five Nations*, 11; Richard Irwin Melvoin, "New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Frontier Deerfield, Massachusetts" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1983), 396–405. The Mohawks escaped from jail before orders for their release reached Deerfield.

The dress and equipment of this Iroquois warrior blend native and European material cultures. He wears native snowshoes, leggings, traditional facial tatoos, and a scalplock. He holds wampum and a ball-headed war club. He wears a trade cloth breechclout and carries a trade hatchet and a musket, from which a scalp dangles. Etching by J. Grasset St. Sauveur.
C-3165 Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.

Iroquois friends whenever they visited. The hospitality and the material rewards coincided with Iroquois expectations about generous headmen and the ratification of political ties through ritual exchanges of gifts. As providers and patrons, the Albany leaders acted in ways that Indians understood and respected.[36]

Dellius too earned Iroquois respect. Governor Sloughter had concluded that the clergyman's work was essential and had lured him home with the promise of stipends from the province and from the New England Company for the Propagation of the Gospel. The dominie plunged deeply into intercultural diplomacy, and in late 1696 and early 1697, while Livingston attended to personal affairs in England, he emerged as chief recorder and manipulator of treaty sessions with Iroquois ambassadors. Meanwhile, with Hilletie's aid, he translated a number of religious texts into Mohawk, and by the end of the century he had baptized at least 131 Indians, most of them residents of Tiononderoge, the major Mohawk village nearest Albany. The religious sincerity of the conversions is open to question, but their political import is not. Anglophile groups existed in each of the Five Nations, but the English had no more staunch friends than the Protestant Mohawks. Through most of the 1690s, they worked closely with the anglicizers to thwart increasingly popular Iroquois movements for peace.[37]

Nonetheless, the movements gained strength, and the influence of the Albany anglicizers and their anglophile Iroquois friends declined precipitately. In the Treaty of Ryswick of 1697, the English and French signed a truce, but for the Iroquois the war dragged on. Because both New France and New York claimed the Five Nations as subjects, both alternately insisted that the Indians could neither be subsumed by the European pact nor negotiate as independent agents. Caught between the two imperial powers and weakened by nearly two decades of uninterrupted warfare, the Iroquois were politically deadlocked by the conflicting agendas of demoralized anglophiles who found their English ties more a hindrance than an aid, resurgent francophiles who sought peace at almost any price, and desperate neutralists who could propose no real alternative. The Five Nations were fair game for the Indian foes who pounded them relentlessly at the end of the century.[38]

In those bleak times, Iroquois anglophiles found their Albany friends ever less able and willing to offer support. If many Iroquois rightly believed the English

[36] O'Callaghan, ed., *Documentary History of the State of New-York*, II, 246–69; O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, IV, 23–44, 59–63, 369–74, 716; Schuyler, Account of expenses, [c. 1688], Jennings, Fenton, and Druke, eds., *Iroquois Indians*, reel 3; Examination of Jurian, July 25, 1693, folio 82, vol. 39, New York Colonial Manuscripts. On "treating" see Rhys Isaac, *The Transformation of Virginia, 1740–1790* (Chapel Hill, 1982), 104–14.

[37] Henry Sloughter to William Stoughton, n.d., folio 160a, vol. 37, New York Colonial Manuscripts; Relation concerning Canada, April 28, 1691, folio 56, *ibid.*; Examination of Jurian, July 25, 1693, folio 82, vol. 39, *ibid.*; Treaty minutes, Nov. 25, Dec. 22, 1696, March 9–12, 1697, folios 16, 38, vol. 41, *ibid.*; Godfridius Dellius to Benjamin Fletcher, May 6, 17, June 2, 1697, folios 417–18, 423–24, 427–28, vol. 30, Massachusetts Archives; O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, III, 771–72, IV, 92–97; Leder, ed., *Livingston Indian Records*, 179–80; Feister, "Indian-Dutch Relations in the Upper Hudson Valley," 96.

[38] Leroy V. Eid, "The Ojibwa-Iroquois War: The War the Five Nations Did Not Win," *Ethnohistory*, 26 (Fall 1979), 297–324; Aquila, *Iroquois Restoration*, 43–69.



French reproductions of Iroquois pictographs illustrate native conceptions of political brokerage. Here the Bear Clan speaks across a council fire to the Turtle Clan. Reproduced from E. B. O'Callaghan and B. Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (15 vols., Albany, 1856–1887), IX, following 48.

government had betrayed them during King William's War, so too did many Albany residents, who had seen French and Canadian Indian raiders harass their countryside while their fur trade dried up and many of their neighbors fled to safer locales. In the late 1690s, therefore, many burghers—traditionalist Leislerians and anti-Leislerian anglicizers alike—began to repudiate the diplomatic and economic policies on which the friends of the Iroquois had risen to power and to question the economic and military alliance the anglicizers had brokered between the English government and the Five Nations. The wartime experience taught many of the town's leading merchants "that success against the French depended upon concerted action by all the colonies backed by English assistance," one historian observes. "Failing that, . . . [they] preferred to maintain a neutrality which enabled them to continue their trade and spared them both loss of life and the cost of defensive measures."[39]

The new reasoning led merchants of both political persuasions to seek trading partners other than the war-ravaged Five Nations, who were in no position to supply pelts for the starving Albany market. In 1692, Vielé, whom Governor Sloughter had recently removed from his interpreter's post, headed west in search of new customers; two years later he returned triumphantly at the head of a virtual army of Shawnees eager to bypass Iroquois middlemen. After the Peace of Ryswick, the anglicizers themselves diminished the economic importance of their ties to Iroquois anglophiles. On an official diplomatic visit to Montreal in 1698, Schuyler and Dellius invited Iroquois from the Catholic mission villages on the St. Lawrence to trade directly at Albany. In subsequent years, Albany leaders of both political persuasions repeatedly renewed the invitation, and countless French-allied Indians accepted, firmly establishing an illegal trade between Albany and Montreal that would thrive for much of the next century.[40]

As the Iroquois, their wars, and their beaver pelts became less vital to Albany than they had been in the early 1680s, personal links between Yorkers and Iroquois withered. A turning point in intercultural politics came in 1698, with the exposure of one of many questionable land grants made by Governor Sloughter's successor, Benjamin Fletcher. The previous year, Fletcher had granted Dellius, Schuyler, Wesselse, Bancker, and New York merchant William Pinhorne title to most of the Mohawk Valley and to an enormous tract surrounding Schaghticoke on the upper Hudson. With help from Hilletie, Dellius had somehow convinced eight Mohawks—all apparently lived in Tiononderoge—to sign a confirmatory deed to the acreage, which included much of the Mohawk homeland but not the immediate environs of the convert-dominated village. Leislerian Albany merchants, who feared competition from Euro-American traders who might settle on the tract and were eager to undermine the anglicizers' power, gained the support of Fletcher's successor,

[39] Buffinton, "Policy of Albany and English Westward Expansion," 348–49.

[40] Broshar, "First Push Westward of the Albany Traders," 238–41; Norton, *Fur Trade in Colonial New York*, 121–23; Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade out of New France, 1713–60," Canadian Historical Association, *Report* (1939), 61–76.

Richard Coote, earl of Bellomont, for their efforts to void the deal. When Schuyler, Wesselse, and Bancker sensed the direction of the political winds, they resigned their shares, laying the blame for any deception on Dellius. Finally, in the spring of 1699, Bellomont pushed through the New York assembly a bill that invalidated the Mohawk Valley grant and several others. At the legislators' insistence, the same bill removed Dellius from his pulpit.[41]

The already tottering brokerage structure on which New York-Iroquois relations were built collapsed almost completely under the weight of the scandal. Not only did Dellius's influence vanish from Iroquois councils, but Hilletie too lost her position. Bellomont, convinced that she was a principal reason Indian diplomacy was conducted "with extraordinary division and jealousy," dismissed her from provincial service and tried to banish her from Albany. In her place he reinstated that "good and faithful interpreter, name[d] Arnout Cornelissen Vilé." Most other anglicizers also left or were forced from political office; only Schuyler and Livingston, whose expertise in Indian affairs made them irreplaceable, remained in positions to mediate effectively between the provincial government and the Iroquois. Yet, as Vielé's return shows, both now had to share power in local politics and intercultural diplomacy with Albany Leislerians, many of them members of the Dutch merchant families that had presided over the collapse of New Netherland-Iroquois relations in the 1660s.[42]

As the influence of the anglicizers who had mediated between Albany and Iroquoia declined, English political leverage in the Five Nations reached a nadir. During the war, New York's failure to provide the military protection that Dongan had promised undermined the credibility of anglophile brokers. And after the European peace, the role Dellius's Mohawk converts played in the land deal must have further cost them the trust of their confederates. The weakness of anglophile factions was demonstrated when Schuyler, Livingston, and Albany Leislerian Hendrick Hansen visited Iroquoia on Bellomont's instructions in the spring of 1700. In the Onondaga country, the travelers found many of the nation's men dispersed to fishing camps, as was usual at that time of year. Also fishing were many of the headmen, including the anglophile Sadekanaktie and the influential Onondaga neutralist Teganissorens. The leaders' absence apparently had as much to do with politics as with subsistence: when the New Yorkers tracked down Sadekanaktie, he told a rambling tale of factional intrigue implying that anglophiles were no longer welcome in his village. At Onondaga, the New Yorkers found neutralists and an-

[41] O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, IV, 362–67; Treaty minutes, July 25, 1698, Jennings, Fenton, and Druke, eds., *Iroquois Indians*, reel 6; Bellomont, Reports on Dellius case, July 9, Aug. 2, 1698, *ibid.*; [Corwin, ed.], *Ecclesiastical Records of the State of New York*, II, 1313–20, 1394–1436; John D. Runcie, "The Problem of Anglo-American Politics in Bellomont's New York," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 26 (April 1969), 191–217.

[42] O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, IV, 329–30; Instructions to Reyer Schermerhoorn and Hendrick Hansen, Jennings, Fenton, and Druke, eds., *Iroquois Indians*, reel 6; *Propositions made by the Five Nations*, 18–19; Stephen van Cortlandt to William Blathwayt, July 18, 1698, folder 4, box 9, Blathwayt Papers (Research Library, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, Williamsburg, Va.); Nicholas Bayard to John Povey, folder 1, box 7, *ibid.*

glophiles in reteat and francophiles firmly in charge. Within a few months, Sadekanaktie and some twenty-five supporters had to flee their country entirely and take up residence on Schuyler's land near Albany.[43]

The eclipse of the anglophile factions paved the way for peace negotiations with western Indians and the French in 1700 and 1701, negotiations from which the remaining anglophiles were often pointedly excluded. During Sadekanaktie's exile from Onondaga, a council of leaders of the Five Nations surrendered to a delegation of Ojibwas. A few weeks later, over the objections of Teganissorens and his neutralist followers, francophile Iroquois dispatched an embassy that capitulated at Montreal to New France and its Indian allies on behalf of the Senecas, Cayugas, Onondagas, and Oneidas. The dual surrenders of 1700 were not the last act in the drama. Later that year both Sadekanaktie and Teganissorens regained influence and worked collectively with francophiles to reunite the factionally divided confederacy, to bring the Mohawks into the peace, and to salvage some shreds of Iroquois independence. The next summer, their efforts culminated in the simultaneous treaties at Montreal and Albany that one historian has called "the Grand Settlement of 1701." In exchange for peace, the Iroquois conceded to French demands that they remain neutral in future imperial wars.[44]

The anglophiles agreed to the new policy of Iroquois neutrality. At the 1701 Albany council, Onnucheranorum, a long-time Mohawk friend of the English speaking for all Five Nations, substantially redefined his people's relationship with New York. "Wee doe assure you of our reall intentions to cleave close to you and never to separate our interest nor affections from you," he told Bellomont's successor, Lt. Gov. John Nanfan. "If a warr should break out between us and the French, wee desire you . . . to assist and defend us." But the spokesman said nothing about Iroquois assistance and defense of the English. The bond of friendship between the colony and the confederacy remained, but it was no longer the reciprocal military alliance Iroquois anglophiles and Albany anglicizers once believed it to be. Nonetheless, Nanfan was convinced that the 1701 conference had "intirely . . . fix'd our Indians in their obedience to his Majesty." His misreading of Iroquois sentiments, like his virtual ignorance of the concurrent negotiations between the Five Nations and New France and its Indian allies, epitomized the breakdown in communications that political upheavals in Albany and Iroquoia had produced.[45]

In the first decade of the eighteenth century, the brokerage system further decayed. Schuyler increasingly devoted his attention to provincial, rather than local, politics, and Livingston was in England from 1703 to 1706. In their absence, their political foes at Albany repeatedly—and one may therefore presume ineffectively—

[43] O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, IV, 647–61, 689, 716, 694.

[44] Leder, ed., *Livingston Indian Records*, 176–80; O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, IV, 690–96; [Claude-Charles Le Roy de] Bacqueville de La Potherie, *Histoire de l'Amérique Septentrionale* (4 vols., Paris, 1722), IV, 135–48, 193–266; Wallace, "Origins of Iroquois Neutrality," 223–35; Richter, "Ordeal of the Longhouse," 381–437.

[45] O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, IV, 888–911, esp. 888, 904–5.

promulgated ordinances against the abuse of Indian fur traders; the Hudson River marketplace was returning to the chaos of the mid-seventeenth century. Meanwhile, a new royal governor repeatedly ignored and insulted Iroquois diplomats. He alternately missed appointments and called snap treaty sessions, he failed to distribute customary diplomatic presents, and he only once formally "brightened" the Covenant Chain during his seven-year tenure.[46]

The close partnership between Albany anglicizers and Iroquois anglophiles had collapsed, and with it the triangular system of political brokerage and the reciprocal alliance created in the administrations of Andros and Dongan. There would be no more scenes like the Mohawk rescue of embattled anglicizer leaders in 1689. A "fire of prudence and friendship" had been kindled "at the habitation of Quider," a Mohawk leader informed latter-day cultural broker William Johnson in 1755. "This fire never burnt clear and was almost extinguished." For more than a generation, until Johnson was able to fan the flames and reenlist Mohawk warriors in Great Britain's imperial struggles with the French, the English-Iroquois alliance blazed brightly only in the fertile minds of such imperialist politicians as Cadwallader Colden, who spun the elaborate fiction that the Covenant Chain was an Iroquois "empire" of native peoples and their lands all "dependent on the Province of New-York" and thus all subject to British, rather than French, suzerainty. The Five Nations—struggling to preserve their independence and political unity as their various headmen wove and rewove a tangled and often contradictory web of economic, military, and diplomatic relationships with New York, Pennsylvania, New France, and a host of native friends and foes—knew better.[47]

The rise and the fall of the late seventeenth-century Anglo-Iroquois alliance and of the political factions and mediators who helped create it illustrate the complexities of interactions among the peoples and polities of colonial North America. Neither a focus on monolithic European empires and Indian tribes nor on isolated localities can fully convey the texture of colonial history, nor can the empires and the localities be understood apart from one another. All colonial Americans—Indian, European, and African—lived in "little communities." Yet, as historian Darrett Rutman observes, "small and face to face as they were, none of these localities was a complete isolate; each was, to some extent, a part of a larger whole, which in turn was part of a still larger whole."[48]

A faithful reconstruction of the larger whole that the native and European

[46] Munsell, comp., *Annals of Albany*, V, 116–20, 135–38, 154–58, 162–64, 186, 194; O'Callaghan and Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, IV, 972–78, V, 64–65; Leder, *Robert Livingston, 1654–1728, and the Politics of Colonial New York*, 129–99; Norton, *Fur Trade in Colonial New York*, 60–82.

[47] James Sullivan et al., eds., *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* (14 vols., Albany, 1921–1965), IX, 177; Francis Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances in American History," in *History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy*, ed. Jennings et al., 37–65; Cadwallader Colden, *The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada, Which are dependent On the Province of New-York in America, and Are the Barrier between the English and French in that Part of the World* (London, 1747); Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 10–24; Richard L. Haan, "Covenant and Consensus: Iroquois and English, 1676–1760," in *Beyond the Covenant Chain*, ed. Richter and Merrell, 41–57.

peoples of early America shared, therefore, requires simultaneous attention to the broad North American context, to the internal dynamics of local communities, and to links between the two levels of experience. The Albany anglicizers and the Iroquois anglophiles exemplify those links. As members of local political networks and as brokers between their communities and the outside world, they struggled and allied with imperial officials and with similar individuals elsewhere to serve the interests of their compatriots, their particular political factions, and themselves. Their behavior in the small-scale politics of their little communities shaped the global imperial struggle during the late seventeenth century. Their story suggests that until events such as King William's War and phenomena such as the Covenant Chain are analyzed in local, as well as continental, contexts, the grand synthesis of colonial history that scholars seek will remain elusive.

[48] Darrett B. Rutman, "Assessing the Little Communities of Early America," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 43 (April 1986), 163–78, esp. 175.